Chattisgarh High Court
Kishore Singh Sidar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 20 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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CGHC010316962024 2026:CGHC:30587-DB
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
SAGRIKA AGRAWAL
NAFR
AGRAWAL Date:
2026.07.27
12:05:14
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2580 of 2024
Kishore Singh Sidar S/o Mr. Samundram Sidar Aged About 33 Years R/o
Village Baroda, P.S. Sakti, District Sakti, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Ministry Of Home,
Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur
2 - The Station House Officer Police Station Mangchuwa, District Balod,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - Xxxxx (Prosecutrix) Nil
... Respondent(s)
(cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Raza Ali, Advocate
For State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate
For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Vivek Mishra, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
20.07.2026
1. Heard Mr. Raza Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr.
S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State and Mr. Vivek
Mishra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3.
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2. This petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (in short B.N.S.S.) has been preferred by the petitioner with the
following prayer:-
“It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be
pleased to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section
528 of BNSS and in exercise thereof admit the petition, call
for the records and after hearing the parties in the matter,
quashing entire charge sheet including the FIR No.15/2024
filed before the JMFC, Dondilohara Dist. Balod, under
Section 366, 376, 506 & 376(2) (n) of IPC and in
consequences quash the order of taking cognizance and
entire criminal case (i.e. Criminal case no. 1058/2024
between State Vs. Kishore Singh Sidar) being abuse of
process of court and abuse of process of law and also in
violation of petitioner’s fundamental rights and in peculiar
factual matrix of case and in interest of justice.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner
seeks quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential criminal
proceedings arising out of Crime No. 15/2024 registered for the offence
under Section 376 IPC, contending that the relationship between the
petitioner and the prosecutrix was consensual and developed during their
training as Revenue Inspectors in 2019-2020, culminating in an engagement
on 23.04.2023 with the consent of both families. It is submitted that the
marriage was fixed for 19.05.2024 and the petitioner, along with his family
and wedding procession, reached the venue with the intention of solemnizing
the marriage. However, due to a dispute regarding the playing of traditional
tribal musical instruments during the marriage ceremony and the refusal of
the priest (Purohit) to proceed, the marriage could not be performed. The
petitioner contends that there was never any false promise of marriage, as
evident from the engagement, wedding preparations, invitation cards,
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exchange of ornaments, and his presence at the marriage venue, and that
the subsequent complaint lodged by the prosecutrix nearly one month later
has been falsely given with mala fide intention. It is therefore argued that,
even if the allegations are accepted in their entirety, no offence of rape on the
false promise of marriage is made out.
4. He further submits that the FIR, charge-sheet and the consequential
criminal proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law, as even
if the entire prosecution case is accepted at its face value, no offence under
Section 376 IPC is made out. It is contended that the prosecutrix was a
major, the relationship between the parties was consensual, and the promise
of marriage was genuine, as evidenced by the engagement ceremony,
fixation of the marriage date, exchange of gifts and ornaments, and the
petitioner’s arrival at the marriage venue with the wedding procession. The
marriage could not be solemnized solely due to unforeseen circumstances
arising during the ceremony and not because of any dishonest intention on
the part of the petitioner. It is further submitted that there was an unexplained
delay in lodging the FIR, the allegations are actuated by mala fide intention,
and the investigating agency failed to follow the settled legal principles
governing such cases and therefore, the present CrMP may be allowed.
5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submits that the
prosecutrix has voluntarily filed her reply before this Court stating that she
does not wish to prosecute the criminal case any further and has no
objection if the present petition is allowed and the FIR, charge-sheet and all
consequential criminal proceedings arising out of Crime No. 15/2024 are
quashed.
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6. Learned counsel for the State, in turn, submits that the State has no
objection in case if the matter is disposed of by quashing further criminal
proceeding pending before the learned trial Court as prosecutrix has no
objection and she does not wish to prosecute the criminal case further.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material annexed with the petition.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the
material available on record, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that the
petitioner and respondent No. 3 were major, were known to each other since
their training as Revenue Inspectors during the year 2019-2020, and were in
a consensual relationship. It is also borne out from the record that their
engagement was solemnized on 23.04.2023 with the consent of both
families, the marriage was fixed for 19.05.2024, and the petitioner, along with
his family members and marriage procession, had reached the venue for
solemnization of the marriage. The marriage, however, could not be
performed owing to a dispute which arose during the marriage ceremony.
Prima facie, these facts indicate that the promise to marry was not false from
its inception and that the relationship between the parties was consensual.
Moreover, respondent No. 3 has filed her reply before this Court categorically
stating that she does not wish to prosecute the criminal case any further and
has no objection if the FIR and the consequential criminal proceedings are
quashed, and that such decision has been taken voluntarily without any
pressure or coercion.
9. In the case of Prithivirajan v. State (represented by the Inspector of
Police and another), reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 696, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has considered that :-
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“7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between
the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear
from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made
by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself
suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled
by the appellant due to intervening circumstances.
Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the
present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances,
letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse
of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted.”
10. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra
& Another, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
considered that :-
14.In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the
complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically
in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise given on the
understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach
of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. In *Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh^7, this Court
held: (SCC para 12)“12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions
would be that if it is established and proved that from the
inception the accused who gave the promise to the
prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry
and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual
intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that
he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a
consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per
Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such a consent
would not excuse the offender and such an offender can
be said to have committed the rape as defined under
Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence
under Section 376 IPC.”
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Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v.
State of Haryana (Deepak Gulati): (SCC p. 682, para 21)
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;”
15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P.^9 the accused
forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When
she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised
to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had
sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant
became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the
matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to
having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but
subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the
Court observed: (SCC pp. 620-21, para 10)“10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per
the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not
honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her,
till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained
by the accused cannot be said to be any consent
because she was under a misconception of fact that the
accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had
submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is
also admitted by the accused that he had committed
sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony
of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of
the village. It is more than clear that the accused made
a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the
intention of the accused right from the beginning was
not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of
the accused, completely being misled by the accused
who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of
consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to
7fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that
he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for
the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot
be treated to be a consent.”
16.* Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide
by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates
the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a
false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no
intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
“consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the
ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception
was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In
Deepak Gulati1 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21
& 24)
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her
love and passion for the accused, and not solely on
account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her,
despite having every intention to do so. Such cases
must be treated differently.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
1 Deepak Gulati V. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675
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initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
“failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact
must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon
the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on
the other, *unless the court is assured of the fact that
from the very beginning, the accused had never really
intended to marry her*.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.In Uday v. State of Karnataka2 the complainant was a college-
going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the
complainant’s statement, she admitted that she was aware that
there would be significant opposition from both the complainant’s
and accused’s families to the proposed marriage. She engaged
in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the
relationship secret from her family. The Court observed that in
these circumstances the accused’s promise to marry the
complainant was not of immediate relevance to the
complainant’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the
accused, which was motivated by other factors: (SCC p. 58, para
25)
“25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the
prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section
90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was
given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must
2 (2003) 4 SCC 46
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be proved that the person who obtained the consent
knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was
given in consequence of such misconception. We have
serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the
prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with
the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier,
that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on
account of caste considerations. The proposal was
bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of
both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility,
of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage
may not take place at all despite the promise of the
appellant. The question still remains whether even if it
were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe,
that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual
intercourse with him only as a consequence of her
belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in
due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this
fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case
tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had
reason to believe that the consent given by the
prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each
other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love.
They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix
permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only
to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not
without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went
out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o’clock in
the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they promise to
each other several times that come what may, they will
get married.”
(emphasis supplied)
18.* To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section
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375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards
the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated
by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry,
two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage
must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false
promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”
11. In the case of Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013)
7 SCC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :-
“21.Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the
court must very carefully examine whether the accused had
actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as
the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a
distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by
the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to
have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for
the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were
beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and
that he had clandestine motives.
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22. In Deelip Singh it has been observed as under: (SCC p. 99,
para 19)
“19. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are
from the point of view of the victim. The second part of
Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the
point of view of the accused. It envisages that the
accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe
that the consent was given by the victim in consequence
of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the
second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or
reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted
consent. The requirements of both the parts should be
cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the court has to
see whether the person giving the consent had given it
under fear of injury or misconception of fact and the
court should also be satisfied that the person doing the
act i.e. the alleged offender, is conscious of the fact or
should have reason to think that but for the fear or
misconception, the consent would not have been given.
This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in
negative terminology.”
23. This Court, while deciding Pradeep Kumar, placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in N. Jaladu, In re^6,
wherein it has been observed: (Pradeep Kumar case, SCC pp.
418-19, para 11)
“11. ’26. … “… We are of opinion that the expression
‘under a misconception of fact’ is broad enough to
include all cases where the consent is obtained by
misrepresentation; the misrepresentation should be
regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with
reference to which the consent is given. In Section 3 of
the Evidence Act Illustration (d) [states] that a person
has a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the
fact about which the second and third prosecution
witnesses were made to entertain a misconception was
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the fact that the second accused intended to get the girl
married. … ‘thus … if the consent of the person from
whose possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud,
the taking is deemed to be against the will of such a
person’. … Although in cases of contracts a consent
obtained by coercion or fraud is only voidable by the
party affected by it, the effect of Section 90 IPC is that
such consent cannot, under the criminal law, be availed
of to justify what would otherwise be an offence.” (N.
Jaladu, In re case, ILR pp. 456-57)’ (Deelip Singh case,
SCC pp. 101-02, para 26)”
24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a
person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim
owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep
a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does
not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact
must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in
entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court
is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused
had never really intended to marry her.”
12. From perusal of the FIR lodged by the victim annexed at Page No. 26
of the petition and her written complaint at Page No. 31, it is the case of the
victim herself that at the time of marriage ceremony, some dispute arose
between the parties with respect to playing band. It is necessary here to take
notice of the relevant part of the report made by the victim which reads as
under :-
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“bl izdkj nksuksa ifjokj ds }kjk esjs vkSj xxxx dk fookg frfFk 17-05-24 ls 19-05-24 rd r; fd;k
x;k FkkA fnukad 19-05-2024 dks xxxx dh ckjkr yxHkx 100 yksx djhcu 6&7 cts xzke igqpkA jkf=
esa vk’khokZn Hkkst Vhdkou dk dk;Zdze py jgk FkkA jkf= djhcu 1&2 cts ds e/; yxu Hkkaoj jLe dk
dk;Zdze eaMi ds ckgj gksuk Fkk ogh Ckktk ctkus ds laca/k esa nksuks i{k esa okn&fookn gksus ls xxxx }kjk
fookg dk;Zdze iw.kZ gksus ds igys gh vius ifjokj ,oa ckjkfr;ks ds lkFk eaMi NksMdj pys x;sA mDr
d`R; ls eSa dkQh fopfyr rFkk ijs’kku gks xbZ FkhA fQj eSa fnukad 21-05-2024 dks xxxx ls eqykdkr ,oa
ckrphr djus mlds fuokl LFkku xzke cksjnk lDrh xbZ FkhA ckrphr djus dh iz;kl dh ij ckrphr
ugh gks ik;kA”
13. Similarly is the statement of the victim under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
and it is also the statement of her mother, brother, sister in law and other
persons who were present in marriage ceremony of the victim as well as the
petitioner. The settlement of marriage between the parties, the marriage
procession and the marriage functions are not disputed by the victim and it is
her case also that some dispute arose at the time of marriage ceremony
regarding playing band and then the quarrel took place between the parties.
It is not a case where the marriage with the victim but he proceeded up to
marriage functions with the victim. In the present petition, a marriage card
was also annexed by the petitioner which is at Page No. 66 and the
photographs of the marriage functions have also been annexed at Annexure-
P/3 annexed at Page No. 160 on words including the marriage cards. When
the notices were issued to the Respondent No. 2/ victim, she filed her
affidavit that she does not want to pursue her complaint further and due to
dispute arose between the parties, she felt deeply insulted and embarrassed
and therefore, she lodged the FIR against the petitioner.
14. From the peculiar facts of the present case as well as the low laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, it is not a case
where the petitioner was not intended to marry with the victim or have not
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fulfilled his promise even if it is accepted that he made physical relation with
the victim on the pretext of marriage, however, the fact clearly demonstrates
that the petitioner proceeded for marriage and it is only when some dispute
arose at the time of marriage ceremony with respect to playing band, the
marriage ceremony could not be completed.
15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the admitted factual position
emerging from the record, the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 expressing
her unwillingness to pursue the matter further, and the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the
considered opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly,
this Court deems it a fit case for exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
16. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The charge-sheet including the
FIR No. 15/2024 filed before the JMFC, Dondilohara, Dist- Balod, under
Section 366, 376, 506 and 376 (2)(n) of IPC and the entire Criminal Case
(i.e. Criminal Case No. 1058/2024) and all further proceedings arising
therefrom, are hereby quashed.
17. The petition stands allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Sagrika
