Uttarakhand High Court
Kishan Udaylal Jain vs State Of Uttarakhand And Another on 22 July, 2026
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Habeas Corpus No. 23 of 2026
Kishan Udaylal Jain ...... Petitioner
Vs.
State of Uttarakhand and another ......Respondent
Presence:
Mr. Aryan Kotwal, learned counsel (through V.C), Shrey Slodha and
Mr. Yuvraj Singh, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Rohit Arora,
learned counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the CBI.
Mr. V.S. Rawat, learned AGA for the State.
Coram: Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J.
Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
The petitioner is in judicial custody in CBI Case No.
RC0072025E0007 dated 26.11.2025 under Sections 420, 406, 506
& 120-B of the IPC; Sections 61(2), 111, 316, 318(4), 336, 338,
340(2), 351(3), and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;
Section 3 of the Uttarakhand Protection of Interests of Depositors (in
Financial Establishments) Act, 2005; and Sections 3, 4, 21, and 22
of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019 (“the
case”).
2. The petitioner has filed the instant Habeas Corpus
petition, declaring that his arrest in the case is illegal and seeking
his release forthwith. The petitioner has also challenged the order
dated 02.06.2026 passed by the Court of the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, by which
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transit remand was granted, as well as the police custody remand
dated 03.06.2026 passed by the Court of the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, 1st Special Judge, BUDS Act, Dehradun.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
4. There were allegations against M/s Loni Urban Multi-State
Credit and Thrift Co-operative Society that it had been illegally
operating and carrying out malpractices by misusing/squandering
public money. There were multiple FIRs filed in this regard in the
State of Uttarakhand. On 17th September, 2025, this Court, in
WPPIL No. 46 of 2025, Ashutosh vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others,
directed the CBI to take up the investigation of all criminal cases
related to M/s Loni Urban Multi-State Credit and Thrift Co-operative
Society in Uttarakhand. Thereafter, the CBI took up the
investigation.
5. FIR No. 142 of 2024 dated 1st June, 2024 of Police Station
Kotwali Kotdwar, District Pauri Garhwal being the first information
report originally registered in the instant case was treated as the
original FIR in the case.
6. In the investigation of the instant case, according to the
CBI, the petitioner was arrested on 1st June, 2026, at Mumbai. He
was produced before the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, 3rd Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, and the Court passed a
transit remand order. It may be noted that the transit remand was
opposed by the petitioner. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated
3rd June, 2026, the petitioner was remanded to police custody from
11:00 AM on 4th June, 2026, till 5:30 PM on 5th June, 2026. Both
the transit remand order and the police custody remand order have
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been challenged, and a declaration is also sought that the arrest is
illegal.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 4th
May, 2026, the petitioner was issued a notice under Section 179 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“the BNSS”),
requiring his appearance, with which the petitioner complied. On
13th June, 2025, a co-accused was arrested, who implicated the
petitioner. On 28th May, 2026, another notice under Section 179 of
the BNSS was issued to the petitioner. In compliance therewith, the
petitioner appeared before the CBI on 30th May, 2026. He was
questioned by the CBI and allowed to leave, but was directed to
appear again before the CBI on 1st June, 2026. The petitioner
accordingly appeared before the CBI on 1st June, 2026, at 12:00
noon. He was not allowed to leave and was shown to have been
arrested at 6:00 PM. In these factual circumstances, learned counsel
for the petitioner raised the following points:-
(i) According to the prosecution, on 13th May, 2026, the
co-accused had implicated the applicant, but the
applicant was not arrested then. After the
interrogation of the co-accused on 13th May, 2026,
the CBI did not have any new material so as to make
it necessary to arrest the applicant.
(ii) The appellant was not produced before the
Magistrate within 24 hours, which violates the
constitutional rights of the petitioner, and on this
ground alone, the entire remand and arrest are liable
to be declared illegal. On this aspect, learned counsel
submits that, under the oral directions of the CBI on
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30th May, 2026, the petitioner appeared before theCBI on 1st June, 2026, at 12:00 noon. As soon as he
appeared, he was not allowed to go anywhere; his
movements were restricted. He was formally shown
to have been arrested at 6:00 PM, whereas, in fact, in
the eye of law, his arrest is to be considered as
having taken place at 12:00 noon on 1st June, 2026.
However, he was produced before the remand
Magistrate in Mumbai at 1:30 PM; therefore, it was
beyond 24 hours and is illegal.
In support of his contention, learned counsel
for the petitioner relies upon the principle of law laid
down in the cases of Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar
vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom
2508 and T. Ramadevi vs. The State of Telangana,
2024 SCC OnLine TS 4288.
In the case of Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar
(supra), in paragraph 12, the Hon’ble Bombay High
Court framed the questions involved in that petition
and answered them in paragraph 31. It may be noted
that, according to the prosecution case in the case of
Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar (supra), the petitioner
in that case was taken into custody from a metro
station on 26th October, 2024, at 9:00 PM, and that
time was considered as the time of arrest.
Paragraphs 12 and 31 of the judgment are as below:-
“12. The short issue which arises for our
consideration is whether the period from 25
October 2024 1:00 p.m. to 26 October 2024 9:00
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p.m. when the Petitioner was taken into custody
from Shivajinagar Metro Station, Pune and
produced in custody at Baramati Police Station and
thereafter at Baramati where he was taken for pre-
arrest medical examination can be considered as
the period when the Petitioner can be said to have
been arrested.
31. In our view, there can be no doubt that the
Petitioner’s free movement and liberty were
restrained on 25 October 2024 at 1:00 p.m. when
he was taken into custody at Shivajinagar Metro
Station, Pune and produced before the Shivajinagar
Police Station. Even otherwise, the police
authorities took the Petitioner from Pune to
Baramati and reached Baramati on 25 October
2024 at 5:07 p.m. At least from 5:07 p.m. on 25
October 2024, the Petitioner can be said to have
been arrested.”
In the case of T. Ramadevi (supra), the
petitioner in that case was apprehended on 31st
July, 2024, at 10:00 AM. In those circumstances, in
paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Telangana
High Court observed as follows:
“11. In the aforesaid backdrop, when we look into
the provisions of Section 57of Cr.P.C, the very first
line of the said provision refers to the term
detention. It does not use the term ”from the time
of arrest”, which further strengthens the case of the
petitioner when they say that period of detention
starts the moment they stand apprehended by the
police, as from that moment itself there is a
restraint so far as personal liberty of the concerned
person and there is also an arrest of his movement,
as he remains under confines of police personnel.
Thus, it would amount to a detention of a person
right from the time he is apprehended by the police
personnel. Thus, in terms of the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Ashak Hussain
(supra), the arrest of a person commences from the
time restraint is placed on his liberty and not from
the time of the arrest officially recorded by the
arresting officers.”
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(iii) The police custody remand of the petitioner dated
3rd June, 2026, is bad in the eyes of law because it
is mechanical.
(iv) The grounds of arrest had not been meaningfully
supplied to the petitioner because they were in
English, whereas the petitioner is a matriculate who
knows only Hindi. Therefore, on this ground also,
the arrest is illegal.
8. Replying to the submissions made by learned counsel for
the petitioner, learned counsel for the CBI submits that the grounds
of arrest were meaningfully communicated to the petitioner in
writing. He submits that the notice under Section 179 of the BNSS
was given to the petitioner in English, in response to which he
appeared. The grounds of arrest are also in English. Therefore, he
argues that merely because the grounds of arrest are in English, it
cannot be said that they were not meaningfully communicated.
9. Learned counsel for the CBI submits that on 1st June,
2026, when the petitioner appeared before the CBI at 12:00 noon, he
was not under arrest from that time, and his movements were not
restricted. Mere presence does not amount to a restriction on
movement. He submits that an Investigating Officer may call any
person who may be helpful in the investigation, including the
accused, and examine him, and subsequently effect an arrest. In
such a situation, “arrest” means the moment when such person was
arrested, and not any time prior to that moment. In support of his
contention, learned counsel for the CBI has referred to the cases of
Directorate of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan & Anr., reported in
(1994) 3 SCC 440; Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra &
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Anr., reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500; Gharban Ali Pour Azadi vs.
Intelligence Officer Air Intelligence Unit, Bombay and others,
reported in 1996 SCC OnLine Bom 59; and Rameswar Talukdar vs.
State of Assam, 2019 SCC OnLine Gau 5938.
10. In the case of Directorate of Enforcement vs. Deepak
Mahajan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the concept
of arrest and observed as follows:-
“48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police
officer and a Magistrate but also under certain circumstances or
given situations to private persons. Further, when an accused
person appears before a Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily,
the Magistrate is empowered to take that accused person into
custody and deal with him according to law. Needless to
emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition precedent
for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it differently,
the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the
arrest of the person concerned by the Magistrate on appearance
or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in
every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa and that both
the words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not synonymous terms.
Though ‘custody’ may amount to an arrest in certain
circumstances but not under all circumstances. If these two
terms are interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra
legalist interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted
and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting in
serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi 1984 Cri LJ 134.”
11. In the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court considered a situation where, after interrogating an
accused, an arrest was made. In paragraph 61 of the judgment, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“61. Supplanting the above situation, there may be a case
wherein the investigating officer has sent a notice for appearance
of the accused to join the investigation under Section 41-ACrPC
[now Section 35(3) to Section 35(6) of BNSS 2023] pursuant to
which the accused has joined the investigation. The investigating
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officer, after perusal of material available before him and/or on
interrogating the accused, makes up his mind that the arrest of
the accused person is required for further investigation or has
other reason(s) for arrest, in such cases, since the accused is
under the supervision of the investigating agency and there
exists no apprehension of him absconding, it becomes
incumbent upon the police officer to supply the grounds of
arrest in writing on arresting the accused person. This can also
be followed, for instance, in cases involving offences which are
primarily based on documentary evidence/records, economic
offences such as under PMLA where the grounds of arrest in
writing be furnished to the arrested person on arrest
simultaneously.”
12. In the case of Gharban Ali Pour Azadi (supra), it was, inter
alia, held that “the trial Court has referred to a later decision of
the learned Single Judge of this Court in Munsamy Shanmugam
v. Collector of Customs, reported in 1995 Cri. L.J. 1740 which
was decided on 25th October, 1994, wherein it has been clearly
held that mere taking a person to custody for the purpose of
enquiry does not amount to arrest and we have to calculate the
time of 24 hours from the time of formal arrest.” The Court
observed that it was in respectful agreement with the said later
decision of this Court.
13. In the case of Rameswar Talukdar (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of arrest, detention, etc. In
paragraphs 20 and 21, it observed as follows:-
“20. It needs to be mentioned that the word ‘arrest’ implies
apprehension or restraint on, or the deprivation of one’s
personal liberty by adopting the procedure laid in section 46 of
the Cr.PC, which are (a) submission to custody, (b) trouncing the
body physically, or (C) confining the body. Therefore, detention
of a person to amount to arrest, it must be shown that he is put
under restraint which prevents him from going wherever he
likes, to which sections 56 and 57 of the Cr.PC are applicable.
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21. In other words, in case of detention, the person so detained
is not formally accused of committing any offence. In such a
situation, the person is only questioned or investigated by the
detaining authority. In case of arrest, however, the person is
reasonably charged of commission of a crime and has to be
produced before a Magistrate within the next 24 hours. In
certain other situations, of course, initial detention may lead to
arrest of the person, subject to the safeguards for arrest and
detention under the provisions of article 22 of the Constitution
and other mandatory provisions of sections 50 and 50A of the
Cr.PC.”
14. On the question of new material being available before the
Investigating Officer so as to effect the arrest of the petitioner on
01.06.2026, it is argued that the co-accused had earlier been
examined by the Investigating Officer, the petitioner had also been
examined on multiple occasions, and on 01.06.2026, the
Investigating Officer formed an opinion based on the material
available with him and the examination of the petitioner, and
arrested him. It is argued that this constituted additional material
which empowered the Investigating Officer to arrest the petitioner.
15. It is also argued that the police custody remand order
dated 03.06.2026 has been challenged by the petitioner, but the
challenge has now been rendered infructuous because the period of
police custody remand has already expired. It is further argued that
the petitioner has not challenged the judicial custody remand. Even
otherwise, it is argued that the police custody remand is based on
material that was extensively examined by the Court before forming
its opinion and granting the police custody remand. It is submitted
that, at this stage, such findings are not required to be recorded, as
they are ultimately required to be recorded at the stage of delivering
the judgment.
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16. Learned counsel for the CBI submitted that the Habeas
Corpus petition is not maintainable as it challenges the remand
orders. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs.
Rahul Modi and Another, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 266.
17. In the case of Rahul Modi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, inter alia, held that the legality or otherwise of the detention is
to be decided at the time of the return filed in the Habeas Corpus
petition, and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings.
In paragraphs 19, 20.3, and 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:-
“19. The law is thus clear that “in habeas corpus proceedings a
court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the
detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the
institution of the proceedings”.
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………..
20.3. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee [State of
Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, (2018) 9 SCC 745 :
(2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 386] concluded as under: (SCC pp. 751-52,
paras 10-12)“10. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus could be
maintained in respect of a person who is in police custody
pursuant to a remand order passed by the jurisdictional
Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation,
this issue has been considered in Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor,
Koneila Jail [Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor, Koneila Jail, (2014) 13
SCC 436 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 702] and Manubhai Ratilal
Patel v. State of Gujarat [Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of
Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 314 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 475] . It is no
more res integra. In the present case, admittedly, when the writ
petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed by the
respondent on 18-3-2018/19-3-2018 and decided by the High
Court on 21-3-2018 [Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee v. State of
Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2712] her husband Rizwan
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Alam Siddiquee was in police custody pursuant to an order
passed by the Magistrate granting his police custody in
connection with FIR No. I-31 vide order dated 17-3-2018 and
which police remand was to enure till 23-3-2018. Further,
without challenging the stated order of the Magistrate, a writ
petition was filed limited to the relief of habeas corpus. In that
view of the matter, it was not a case of continued illegal detention
but the incumbent was in judicial custody by virtue of an order
passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate, which was in force,
granting police remand during investigation of a criminal case.
Resultantly, no writ of habeas corpus could be issued.
……………………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………….
12. Suffice it to observe that since no writ of habeas corpus could
be issued in the fact situation of the present case, the High Court
should have been loath to enter upon the merits of the arrest in
the absence of any challenge to the judicial order passed by the
Magistrate granting police custody till 23-3-2018 and more
particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the
Magistrate. In a somewhat similar situation, this Court
in State v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate [State v. N.M.T. Joy
Immaculate, (2004) 5 SCC 729 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1722] deprecated
passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court
[N.M.T. Joy Immaculate v. State, 2002 SCC OnLine Mad 265 :
(2002) 1 MWN (Cri) 237] against the investigating officer and
about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no
hesitation in expunging the observations made in paras 4 to 6 of
the impugned judgment [Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee v. State of
Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2712] against the police
officials concerned in the facts of the present case.”
21. The act of directing remand of an accused is thus held to be a
judicial function and the challenge to the order of remand is not to be
entertained in a habeas corpus petition.
……………………………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………….”
18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner further
submits that, in fact, the notice of appearance issued to the
petitioner does not conform to the Standing Orders required to be
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followed pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and
Another, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 162. It is argued that,
since the notice was not in the prescribed format, the petitioner’s
rights have been prejudiced because, had he known that he was
being called as an accused, he would have chosen to avail himself of
the remedy of anticipatory bail. It is also argued that, in fact, the
Habeas Corpus petition is very much maintainable in view of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha vs.
National Investigation Agency, reported in (2022) 13 SCC 542. In
paragraph 80 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
as follows:-
“80. Thus, we would hold as follows : If the remand is absolutely
illegal or the remand is afflicted with the vice of lack of
jurisdiction, a habeas corpus petition would indeed lie. Equally,
if an order of remand is passed in an absolutely mechanical
manner, the person affected can seek the remedy of habeas
corpus. Barring such situations, a habeas corpus petition will
not lie.”
19. It is argued that the case of the petitioner is squarely
covered by the said judgment. In reply, learned counsel for the CBI
argued that, in fact, in the case of Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani &
Anr., reported in (1978) 2 SCC 424, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that a notice under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 could also be issued to an accused. He referred to paragraph
10(7) as well as paragraph 35, which read as follows:-
“10. The points in controversy may flexibly be formulated thus:
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………(7) Does “any person” in Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure
Code include an accused person or only a witness?
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35. We will now answer the questions suggested at the
beginning and advert to the decisions of our Court which set the
tone and temper of the “silence” clause and bind us willy-nilly.
We have earlier explained why we regard Section 161(2) as a sort
of parliamentary commentary on Article 20(3). So, the first point
to decide is whether the police have power under Sections 160
and 161 of the CrPC to question a person who, then was or, in
the future may incarnate as, an accused person. The Privy
Council and this Court have held that the scope of Section 161
does include actual accused and suspects and we deferentially
agree without repeating the detailed reasons urged before us by
counsel.”
20. This petition has been heard finally at the stage of
admission itself. The legality of the remand, arrest, and custody has
been challenged on multiple grounds, as stated in the petition. In the
case of Gautam Navlakha (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
fact, held that a Habeas Corpus petition would be maintainable
where a remand is absolutely illegal or is affected by a lack of
jurisdiction. In addition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that if
an order of remand has been passed in an absolutely mechanical
manner, a Habeas Corpus petition may lie. Is this such a case?
21. It is true that in every cognizable offence, it is not
mandatory for an Investigating Officer to effect an arrest. The power
to arrest and the necessity of arrest are two different concepts. They
need no further elaboration. The factual narration is not disputed,
namely, that the petitioner was issued a notice under Section 179 of
the BNSS to appear before the Investigating Officer. He appeared on
multiple occasions. He appeared on 30th May, 2026, when he was
questioned and allowed to go back with directions to appear again on
1st June, 2026. On 1st June, 2026, the petitioner appeared and was
arrested on that day. The arrest memo is on record. It is quite
detailed. It records whether the grounds of arrest had been
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explained, the reasons for arrest, etc. The arrest is also based on the
examination of the petitioner. The Investigating Officer took a
conscious decision to arrest the petitioner based on the material
available before him. It cannot be said that the arrest was
mechanical.
22. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the
statement of an accused may not be a ground for arrest.
23. A confession made by an accused before a police officer is
definitely not admissible, but what was revealed by the petitioner to
the Investigating Officer on 1st June, 2026, or on the days preceding
it, which, according to the Investigating Officer, necessitated the
arrest of the petitioner, cannot be examined at this stage. This Court
is not required to undertake a deeper scrutiny of the same. Suffice it
to say that the Investigating Officer took a conscious decision on 1st
June, 2026, to arrest the petitioner based on the investigation
carried out by him and upon the examination of the petitioner.
Therefore, it cannot be said that, on 1st June, 2026, there was no
necessity to arrest the petitioner.
24. It is argued that the petitioner was produced before the
Magistrate beyond 24 hours of his arrest. The contention is that the
petitioner appeared before the CBI on 1st June, 2026, at 12:00 noon,
and his movements were restricted from that time onwards.
Therefore, it is argued that the arrest is to be considered as having
taken place at 12:00 noon on 1st June, 2026, when the petitioner
appeared before the CBI and his movements were allegedly
restricted. This has been countered by learned counsel for the CBI,
who argues that mere presence does not amount to custody,
apprehension, or detention.
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25. Undoubtedly, an accused may also be required by the
Investigating Officer to appear before him for the purpose of
investigation. The examination of an accused during investigation by
an Investigating Officer is not barred; in fact, it is permissible. In the
case of Nandini Satpathy (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
laid down the law on that aspect, which has already been quoted
hereinabove.
26. The judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner, namely,
Hanumant Jagganath Nazirkar (supra) and T. Ramadevi (supra), are
distinguishable. In both those cases, the petitioners did not merely
appear before the investigating agency; rather, they were either
taken into custody or apprehended, which is not the situation in the
instant case.
27. Moreover, the Court enquired from learned counsel for the
petitioner as to whether this plea had been taken before the Remand
Magistrate at Mumbai. The answer is in the negative. But, learned
counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is a constitutional right of
the petitioner, which can be asserted at any time. Undoubtedly, a
constitutional right cannot be waived, and the petitioner is free to
take such a plea. However, mere presence before the CBI cannot be
termed as detention, custody, or apprehension. If, in fact, the
movement of the petitioner had been restricted the moment he
appeared before the CBI on 1st June, 2026, at 12:00 noon, he would
have raised this issue before the Remand Magistrate, which he did
not. For the first time, it is being agitated before this Court.
Therefore, it cannot be said in the instant case that the petitioner
was arrested at 12:00 noon on 1st June, 2026. He was arrested at
6:00 PM and was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours.
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28. The challenge has also been made to the police custody
remand order dated 03.06.2026 passed by the Court of the 1st
Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, BUDS Act, Uttarakhand.
This order is quite extensive. The remand order records the case of
the prosecution, the submissions advanced, and what the witnesses
have stated. The Court considered all the aspects of the matter and
opined that it was necessary to grant police custody remand. The
reasons, though brief, have been stated therein. It is not a
mechanical order. It contains reasons. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the police custody remand order dated 03.06.2026 in respect of
the petitioner is illegal.
29. One of the grounds taken to challenge the detention relates
to the grounds of arrest. It is argued that they were communicated in
English, a language with which the petitioner is not conversant.
Admittedly, the petitioner was issued notices under Section 179 of
the BNSS in English, and pursuant thereto, he appeared. When the
petitioner was produced before the Remand Magistrate at Mumbai,
he filed objections, and the objections filed by him at the time of the
transit remand form part of this petition. In paragraph 3 thereof, the
petitioner stated that the grounds of arrest were ex facie vague,
omnibus, mechanical, and legally insufficient, and failed to satisfy
the constitutional and statutory requirements governing arrest. The
petitioner did not raise the ground that he did not understand
English or he was not conversant with the language, or was unable
to understand the communication of the grounds of arrest in a
meaningful manner. In its remand order dated 02.06.2026, the
Remand Magistrate at Mumbai considered the objections regarding
the grounds of arrest raised by the petitioner in paragraph 4 thereof
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and recorded a finding that the Investigating Officer had fully
complied with the mandatory provisions of the BNSS while effecting
the arrest and producing the accused before the Remand Magistrate.
Therefore, on this ground also, the custody cannot be termed illegal.
30. Having considered the entirety of the facts, this Court is of
the view that there is no reason to make any interference. Therefore,
the instant petition deserves to be dismissed at the stage of
admission itself.
31. The petition is dismissed in limine.
(Siddhartha Sah, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.)
22.07.2026 22.07.2026
BS
BALWANT Digitally signed by BALWANT SINGH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT
OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=fbbd191c8bdb8b16e8ca7937deaf72a17c02fe2eacbf28
SINGH
cdf4ba7ce8640c5820, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=04E141DF4614F9A4D5F48346EB553DE5185F418
755DC00A7A13C14A680C3FA90, cn=BALWANT SINGH
Date: 2026.07.29 16:35:46 +05’30’
