Delhi High Court
Kishan Sharma & Ors vs Mangt. Of M.C.D on 1 April, 2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 12.02.2026
Date of decision: 01.04.2026
Uploaded on: 01.04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 1162/2008
KISHAN SHARMA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. R.K. Ojha, Adv.
versus
MANGT. OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, SC with Ms.
Shweta Singh, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1. The present Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, inter alia, challenging the Award dated 25th October,
2007 (impugned Award), passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the
Labour Court No. X, Delhi, in Industrial Dispute (I.D.) No. 2016/1994. By
the said Award, the learned Labour Court declined the relief of
reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages sought by the
Petitioners, holding that the Petitioners/Workmen were not entitled to any
relief since the employer-employee relationship could not be established by
the Petitioner/Workman.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 1 of 28
2. At the outset, it may be noted that the present Petition pertains to the
alleged termination of three workmen, namely, Mr Kishan Sharma, Mr
Sunder Lal and Mr Vinod Kumar. The facts giving rise to the present
Petition are common to all the aforesaid Petitioners/Workmen.
3. The Petitioners state that they were engaged with the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi in its Horticulture Department on the post of
Mali/Beldar on a casual, daily-rated/muster-roll basis and had worked for
several years prior to the termination of their services. Aggrieved thereby,
the Petitioners raised an industrial dispute which resulted in the passing of
the impugned Award dated 25th October, 2007, passed by the learned
Labour Court. The said Award is under challenge in the present Petition.
The Petitioners seek the setting aside of the impugned Award and pray for
reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
4. The brief factual background leading to the filing of the present
Petition is set out hereunder.
A. The Petitioners/Workmen state that they were engaged with the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi in its Horticulture Department
at Roshanara Garden, New Delhi, in the post of Mali/Beldar.
The Petitioners were employed as casual, daily rated/muster
roll workers and were paid wages as revised from time to time.
It is their case that other similarly placed employees performing
identical work were regular employees of the Respondent and
were receiving salaries in the prescribed pay scale along with
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 2 of 28
allowances and other service benefits, including earned leave
and casual leave, in accordance with the applicable rules.
According to the Petitioners, such benefits were not extended to
them despite the nature of the duties performed by them being
similar.
B. It is further stated in the Petition that appointment letters were
not issued to the Petitioners at the time of their engagement.
The Petitioners contend that although the work performed by
them was of a regular and perennial nature, they continued to
be treated as casual, daily rated/muster roll workers for an
extended period, without being issued any formal proof of
employment.
C. The Petitioners further state that on 26th September, 1990, after
having worked for more than four years, their services were
terminated by the Respondent without assigning any reason.
D. Subsequently, in September 1993, the Petitioners raised an
industrial dispute by filing a demand notice before the Labour-
cum-Conciliation Officer, alleging that their termination was
illegal and unjustified. It is stated that the notice of the demand
was served upon the Respondent; however, the Respondent did
not participate in the conciliation proceedings despite
acknowledging it. Consequently, the appropriate Government
referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court No.
IX, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, vide Notification No.
F.24(3073)/94-Lab./51233-38 dated 27th October, 1994.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 3 of 28
The terms of reference were as follows:
“Whether the services of S/Shri Kishan Sharma, Sunder Lal and
Vinod Kumar have been terminated illegally and/or
unjustifiably by the management and, if so, to what relief are
they entitled and what directions are necessary in this
respect?”
The said reference was adjudicated by the Labour Court as I.D.
No. 2016/1994.
E. During the course of the proceedings of the aforesaid dispute,
the following issues were framed:
“i. Whether there existed an employer-employee relationship
between the parties?
ii. Whether the termination of the Petitioners/Workmen was
illegal and unjustified?
iii. Relief.”
F. The learned Labour Court treated Issue No. 1 as the primary
issue and proceeded to decide the same first. Upon
consideration of the material on record, the Labour Court held
that the Petitioners/Workmen had failed to establish the
existence of an employer-employee relationship with the
Respondent/ Management. In view of the finding returned on
Issue No. 1, the remaining issues, being consequential in
nature, were also decided against the Petitioners/Workmen.
G. Accordingly, the learned Labour Court passed the impugned
Award dated 25th October, 2007, whereby the claim of the
Petitioners/Workmen came to be rejected, and no relief was
granted to them.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 4 of 28
H. Aggrieved by the said Award, the Petitioners have filed the
present writ petition before this Court challenging the legality
and correctness of the impugned Award and seeking the
following reliefs.
a. Pass an appropriate writ/ orders/directions in the nature
of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
in the nature thereof quashing the award dated 25.10.2007
passed by the Learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.
X, Delhi, with respect to I.D. No. 2016/1994;
b. Award the cost of the petition; and
c. Pass such other and further order or orders as this
Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
5. In addition to the aforesaid, the grounds set out hereunder have been
relied upon by the Petitioners in respect to the reliefs claimed by them.
A. Employment records of such nature are ordinarily maintained
by the employer. The non-production of the muster roll
records by the Respondent, despite their relevance to the
dispute, was also a factor requiring consideration, particularly
in the context of whether any adverse inference ought to have
been drawn.
B. In addition, the Respondent took the stand that the muster roll
records had been destroyed on the ground that records older
than fifteen years are routinely destroyed; however, no rule or
policy governing such destruction was produced before the
Labour Court. The services of the Petitioners had been
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 5 of 28
terminated on 26th September, 1990, and the industrial dispute
was raised in 1993. In these circumstances, the plea regarding
the destruction of the muster roll records, which were material
to the adjudication of the dispute, required closer scrutiny.
C. It was also indicated during the proceedings on behalf of the
Respondent/Management that the muster roll records of the
concerned workmen for the period from 26th June, 1986, to
26th September, 1990, had been seen. The said statement
suggests the existence of muster roll records for the relevant
period.
6. It may also be noted that, both before this Court as well as the learned
Labour Court, the consistent stand of the Respondent has been that the
Petitioners were never in its employment and that material facts have been
suppressed. The Respondent has denied the existence of any employer-
employee relationship and has further submitted that the conciliation
proceedings failed on account of non-cooperation on the part of the
Petitioners. It has also been contended that the industrial dispute raised by
the Petitioners was barred by limitation.
ISSUES INVOLVED
7. In light of the facts and grounds noted hereinabove, the questions that
arise for consideration before this Court are set out hereunder.
I. Whether the impugned Award dated 25th October, 2007,
passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. X,
Delhi in I.D. No. 2016/1994 suffers from any illegality,
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 6 of 28
perversity or material irregularity warranting interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
II. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to any relief in respect of
their termination dated 26th September, 1990, and if so, to what
extent.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
8. As regards the submissions of the parties, the following contentions
were urged on behalf of the Petitioners.
a. The learned Counsel submitted that the Petitioners were
engaged with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in its
Horticulture Department at Roshanara Garden, New Delhi, in
the post of Mali/Beldar on a casual daily rated/muster roll basis
and had rendered services for several years prior to the
termination of their services on 26th September, 1990.
b. It was further contended that the Petitioners were discharging
duties of a regular and perennial nature similar to those
performed by regular employees of the Respondent. During the
period of their engagement, their service record remained
unblemished, and no allegations of misconduct were ever raised
against them.
c. It was further submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that the
termination of their services was illegal and unjustified as it
was effected without following the procedure prescribed under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice of termination was
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 7 of 28
issued to the Petitioners, nor were they paid wages in lieu of
notice prior to the termination of their services.
d. It was further submitted that the termination was arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
e. It was mainly contended by the learned Counsel for the
Petitioners that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate
that the Petitioners were engaged on a regular basis and were
discharging duties of a regular and perennial nature similar to
those performed by regular employees; hence, their services
could not have been terminated without following the
procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
f. Lastly, the learned Counsel stated that, considering the
Petitioners were appointed on a regular basis, their termination
violated Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
the mandatory requirements relating to notice and payment of
retrenchment compensation were not complied with by the
Respondent, and that the learned Labour Court failed to
consider the same while deciding in favour of the Respondent
Management and against the Petitioners-Workmen.
9. In contradistinction, the following Submissions were advanced on
behalf of the Respondent/Management.
a. The Respondent/Management, at the outset, denied the
existence of any employer-employee relationship between the
Respondent and the Petitioners.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 8 of 28
b. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the
names of the Petitioners did not appear in the seniority list
maintained by the Respondent for the relevant period from
1986 to 1991, which, according to the Respondent, indicates
that the Petitioners were not engaged as workmen by it.
c. It was also contended that no wage vouchers or other
documents evidencing payment of wages were ever signed by
the Petitioners.
d. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that the learned
Labour Court, after considering the pleadings, evidence and
material on record, rightly rejected the claims of the Petitioners.
According to the Respondent, the impugned Award does not
suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference
by this Court.
DISCUSSION/ ANALYSIS
10. The Court has heard the learned Counsels for the respective parties
and perused the record. At the outset, it is noted that no judgments or
precedents were cited on behalf of either party. This Court has, therefore,
proceeded to determine the issues arising for consideration with reference to
the settled principles of law laid down in a catena of decisions of the High
Courts as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. Before adverting to the issues framed in the present Petition, it is
apposite to observe that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 9 of 28
227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an Award passed by the
Labour Court, is supervisory in nature and circumscribed in scope.
12. It is well settled that the High Court does not act as an appellate
authority over the findings returned by the Labour Court. Interference is
warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity,
jurisdictional error, or where material evidence has been ignored.
13. The Supreme Court in the judgment of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan, 1964 AIR 477, clarified the aforesaid position. The
relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
“The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in
issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf
is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or
tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court
or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides
a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected
by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ
of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the saidW.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 10 of 28
finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ
of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we
must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was’ insufficient or inadequate to
sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from
the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ
court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed
Ishaque(1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills
Division and Appeals, Assam(2), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh(3).”
14. Therefore, it is trite that interference is justified only where the Award
is vitiated by patent illegality, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of
the record. The present petition does not call upon this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence or re-evaluate findings of fact, but is confined to scrutinising
the legality and correctness of the relief granted by the learned Labour
Court. Thus, where the Labour Court fails to consider relevant evidence or
misapplies settled principles governing industrial disputes, interference by
this Court would be justified.
15. In that backdrop, in the present case, it becomes necessary to consider
whether the findings returned by the learned Labour Court about the
existence of the employee-employer relationship, the alleged violation of
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 11 of 28
Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the relief to the
Petitioners/Workmen, suffer from any perversity or manifest illegality to
warrant interference in the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.
16. The central dispute in the present case concerns the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the Petitioners and the
Respondent/Management.
17. The Petitioners contend that they were engaged as Mali/Beldar in the
Horticulture Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and had
worked for several years prior to the termination of their services on 26th
September, 1990. The Respondent, however, denies the existence of such a
relationship and relies upon the absence of the Petitioners’ names in the
seniority list for the relevant period.
18. The law relating to proof of an employer-employee relationship is
well settled. The initial burden to establish the existence of such a
relationship lies upon the workman. Only upon discharge of this
foundational burden does the onus shift to the management to rebut the
claim.
19. Nonetheless, the evidentiary burden cannot be considered in isolation.
It has been consistently held that once a workman asserts employment and
calls upon the employer to produce relevant records, the burden shifts to the
employer who is in possession of such records.
20. In the present case, the Petitioners claim to have worked between
1986 and 1990 and have relied upon the muster roll records stated to have
been maintained by the Respondent for the period from 26th June, 1986 to
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 12 of 28
26th September, 1990. Further, the three workmen in the present Petition
have deposed in support of one another, stating that each of them had
worked with the Respondent for a period of approximately four years.
21. The Respondent, along with denying the existence of such a
relationship, has taken the stand that the muster roll records were destroyed
after fifteen years. Additionally, during the proceedings, it was indicated on
behalf of the Respondent that muster roll records for the relevant period had
been seen but could not subsequently be traced.
22. In general, it is safe to assume that employment records such as
muster rolls, wage registers and attendance records are ordinarily maintained
by the employer. Where such records are not produced despite being called
for, the Court is entitled to draw an adverse inference.
23. Considering the above circumstances, the non-production of muster
roll records assumes significance, particularly when such records are within
the exclusive possession of the Respondent.
24. In the circumstances of the present case, this Court takes note of the
fact that no rule or policy governing such destruction of records as asserted
by the Respondent Management has been produced before this Court or the
learned Labour Court. Moreover, the industrial dispute had already been
raised in 1994, and the records in question related directly to the dispute.
25. Further, the muster roll records for the relevant period were neither
produced nor satisfactorily explained despite summons by the Labour Court.
26. At this stage, this Court finds it appropriate to mention the stance of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 13 of 28
Engineer, 2006 (1) SCC 106. The relevant part of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court is extracted hereunder.
“15. A court of law even in a case where provisions of the
Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a
party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the
same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter,
however, would be different where despite direction by a court the
evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-
production of evidence is always optional and one of the factors
which is required to be taken into consideration is the background
of facts involved in the lis. The presumption, thus, is not
obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-
production, other circumstances may exist upon which such
intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on some
reasonable grounds.”
(emphasis applied)
27. In the present case, the failure of the Respondent to produce the
muster roll records, which were material for determining the Petitioners’
employment during the relevant period, and were the best evidence,
warranted such an inference.
28. The learned Labour Court, in the present case, appears to have
accepted the Respondent’s explanation without examining whether the
Respondent had discharged its evidentiary burden. In the present
circumstances, the Labour Court ought to have considered whether the non-
production and destruction of such material records warranted drawing an
adverse inference against the Respondent/Management after the Petitioner
duly discharged its evidentiary burden.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 14 of 28
29. In another case titled “Gopal, Krishnaji Ketkar Vs Mahomed Haji
Latif & Ors., 1968 AIR 1413″, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that
even if the burden of proof does not lie on a particular party, the court may
draw an adverse inference if such a party withholds important documents in
their possession which can throw light on the facts in issue. The relevant
part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
“Mr. Gokhale, however, argued that it was no part of the
appellant’s duty to produce the accounts unless he was called
upon to do so and the onus was upon the respondents to prove the
case and to show that the Dargah was the owner of plot No. 134.
We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Even if the
burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an
adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his
possession which can throw light on the facts at issue. It is not, in
our opinion, a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a
certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the best evidence
which is in their possession which could throw light upon the
issues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of
onus of proof.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Furthermore, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has dealt with a
similar issue as is herein in the judgment of the case titled “M/s Punjab
Steel Works (Through its Partner) vs. Shambhu Saran Singh [W.P.(C)
16721/2024, decided on 11th December, 2025]. The relevant part of the
judgment is extracted hereunder.
“10. [….] It is further evident that the management has failed to
produce any relevant statutory employment records, including the
muster rolls, wage registers, attendance registers or PF/ESIW.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 15 of 28
records before the Labour Inspector on 19.12.2012, despite being
legally obliged to furnish the same. [….]
12. Before I proceed, at this stage, it is necessary to recall the well
-settled legal position regarding the burden and onus of proof in
cases alleging illegal termination. The initial burden is upon the
workman/claimant to prove the engagement and the duration of
service. Once, such foundational evidence is laid, the onus shifts
to the employer/management, who being the custodian of all the
statutory documents, has to produce the same.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. In the present case, the Labour Court proceeded on the premise that
the Petitioners failed to establish their employment, and consequently failed
to adequately consider the effect of non-production of material employment
records by the Respondent. The explanation furnished by the Respondent
regarding the destruction of records was accepted without scrutiny and
without examining whether such records were required to be preserved in
view of the pending industrial dispute.
32. Moreover, the relevant records were admittedly in the custody of the
Respondent. The Petitioners could not reasonably be expected to produce
such records. The Labour Court, however, failed to draw an adverse
inference despite the non-production of material documents. The approach
of the Labour Court, therefore, suffers from material irregularity and hence
is liable to be set aside.
33. Moving on, the Petitioners have also contended that their termination
was effected without compliance with the mandatory provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, particularly Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 16 of 28
Act, 1947. The Petitioners have asserted that no notice or wages in lieu of
notice were provided, and no retrenchment compensation was paid at the
time of termination.
34. Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, lays down
mandatory conditions that an employer must fulfil before retrenching a
workman who has completed continuous service of not less than one year in
an industrial establishment. In essence, it is established that non-compliance
with the mandatory conditions prescribed under Section 25F renders the
termination illegal. The provision reads as follows-
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous
service for not less than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until-
(a) the workman has been given one month ‘s notice in
writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the
period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid
in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment,
compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’
average pay for every completed year of service or any part
thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the
appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in
the Official Gazette.
35. Section 25B, on the other hand, defines the concept of “continuous
service”, which is a jurisdictional precondition for the applicability of
Section 25F, and reads as follows.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 17 of 28
“25B. Definition of continuous service.–For the purposes of
this Chapter,–
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a
period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service,
including service which may be interrupted on account of
sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is
not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due
to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the
meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he
shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an
employer–
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of
twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to
which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the
employer for not less than–
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman
employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period
of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to
which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the
employer for not less than–
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed
below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.–For the purposes of clause (2), the number of
days on which a workman has actually worked under an
employer shall include the days on which–
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted
by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this ActW.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 18 of 28
or under any other law applicable to the industrial
establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the
previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused
by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave;
so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave
does not exceed twelve weeks.]”
36. That being the scenario, a workman is in continuous service if his
employment is uninterrupted, notwithstanding breaks due to sickness,
authorised leave, accident, non-illegal strike, lock-out or cessation of work
not attributable to his fault. Where continuity in fact is not proved, the
provision creates a deeming fiction by treating a workman as having
completed one year of continuous service if he has actually worked for at
least 240 days, or 190 days in the case of underground mine workers, during
the preceding twelve months. For this purpose, lawful lay-off, leave with
full wages, temporary disablement due to employment injury, and prescribed
maternity leave are included.
37. It must be acknowledged that in the present context, Sections 25B and
25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are required to be read conjointly.
By virtue of Section 25B (2), even in cases where service is not
uninterrupted, a workman who has rendered service for 240 days in the
preceding twelve calendar months is deemed to have completed one year of
continuous service. Once the requirement of continuous service, as
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 19 of 28
contemplated under Section 25B, stands satisfied, the employer is
mandatorily required to comply with the conditions stipulated under Section
25F prior to effecting retrenchment. The completion of 240 days, therefore,
attracts the statutory protection under Section 25F, and any retrenchment in
violation thereof would be rendered illegal and unsustainable in law.
38. Therefore, to avail the protection under Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, a workman is required to establish that he has completed 240
days of continuous service in the preceding twelve months, which
constitutes a mandatory evidentiary requirement. In matters of this nature,
the burden of proof initially lies upon the workman.
39. At this point, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Mohd. Ali vs. State of H.P. & Ors., (2018) 15 SCC 641, appears to be
material, and the relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
“It is a well-known fact that the Industrial Disputes Act is a
welfare legislation. The intention behind the enactment of this Act
was to protect the employees from arbitrary retrenchments. For
this reason only, in a case of retrenchment of an employee who
has worked for a year or more, Section 25F provides a safeguard
in the form of giving one month’s prior notice, indicating the
reasons for retrenchment to the employee and also provides for
wages for the period of notice. Section 25B of the Act provides
that when a person can be said to have worked for one year, and
the very reading of the said provisions makes it clear that if a
person has worked for a period of 240 days in the last preceding
year, he is deemed to have worked for a year. The theory of 240
days for continuous service is that a workman is deemed to be in
continuous service for a period of one year, if he, during the
period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of
retrenchment, has actually worked under the employer for not less
than 240 days.”
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 20 of 28
40. That being the case, it is safe to say that the determination of whether
the Petitioners herein had completed the requisite period of service under
Section 25B in the present case, and whether the provisions of Section 25F
were attracted, depends upon the establishment of the employer-employee
relationship and the period of employment.
41. In that aspect, as in this case, once the adverse inference is drawn
against the Respondent for non-production of the muster roll records, as is
done in the present Petition, the Petitioners’ assertion regarding their
engagement between 1986 and 1990 cannot be brushed aside. The finding
of the Labour Court that no employer-employee relationship existed is
thus perverse and liable to be set aside.
42. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the decision
in the impugned Award dated 25th October, 2007, passed by the learned
Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. X, Delhi, in I.D. No. 2016/1994, as
regards the existence of an employer-employee relationship, cannot be
sustained. The learned Labour Court failed to consider the effect of non-
production of muster roll records, which were in the exclusive possession of
the Respondent/Management. The explanation regarding the destruction of
records was accepted without scrutiny and without examining whether an
adverse inference ought to have been drawn. The Petitioners, being casual
daily-rated workers, could not reasonably be expected to produce
documentary records maintained by the employer. It is reiterated that the
approach adopted by the Labour Court, therefore, suffers from material
irregularity.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 21 of 28
43. Now, on the point of burden of proof as to the completion of 240 days
of continuous work in a year, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while taking note
of the case of Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore vs. S. Mani,
(2005) 5 SCC 100, in the judgment of “R.M. Yellatti vs. The Assistant
Executive Engineer (supra)”, has clarified the aforesaid position. The
relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
“Now coming to the question of burden of proof as to the
completion of 240 days of continuous work in a year, the law is
well settled. In the case of Manager, Reserve Bank of India,
Bangalore v. S. Mani reported in (2005) 5 SCC 100, the workmen
raised a contention of rendering continuous service between April,
1980 to December, 1982 in their pleadings and in their
representations. They merely contended in their affidavits that
they had worked for 240 days. The tribunal based its decision on
the management not producing attendance register. In view of the
affidavits filed by the workmen, the tribunal held that the burden
on the workmen to prove 240 days service stood discharged. In
that matter, a three-judge bench of this court held that pleadings
did not constitute a substitute for proof and that the affidavits
contained self-serving statements; that no workman took an oath
to state that they had worked for 240 days; that no document in
support of the said plea was ever produced and, therefore, this
court took the view that the workmen had failed to discharge the
burden on them of proving that they had worked for 240 days.
According to the said judgment, only by reason of non-response to
the complaints filed by the workmen, it cannot be said that the
workmen had proved that they had worked for 240 days. In that
case, the workmen had not called upon the management to
produce relevant documents. The court observed that the initial
burden of establishing the factum of continuous work for 240 days
in a year was on the workmen. In the circumstances, this court set
aside the award of the industrial tribunal ordering reinstatement.”
(emphasis supplied)
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 22 of 28
44. Furthermore, in the case of “R.M. Yellatti vs. The Assistant
Executive Engineer (supra)” itself, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also
considered the decision in “Municipal Corporation, Faridabad vs Siri
Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195″, wherein the concrete principles in respect to the
concept of 240 days by the workman are laid out. The relevant paragraph is
extracted hereunder.
“In the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas
reported in (2004) 8 SCC 195, the employee had worked from
5.8.1994 to 31.12.1994 as a tube-well operator. He alleged that he
had further worked from 1.1.1995 to 16.5.1995. His services were
terminated on 17.5.1995 whereupon an industrial dispute was
raised. The case of the employee before the tribunal was that he
had completed working for 240 days in a year; the purported
order of retrenchment was illegal as the conditions precedent to
section 25-F of Industrial Dispute Act were not complied with. On
the other hand, the management contended that the employee had
worked for 136 days during the preceding 12 months on daily
wages. Upon considering all the material placed on record by the
parties to the dispute, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the
total number of working days put in by the employee were 184
days and thus he, having not completed 240 days of working in a
year, was not entitled to any relief. The tribunal noticed that
neither the management nor the workman cared to produce the
muster roll w.e.f. August, 1994; that the employee did not summon
muster roll although the management had failed to produce them.
Aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal, the employee filed a writ
petition before the High Court which took the view that since the
management did not produce the relevant documents before the
industrial tribunal, an adverse inference should be drawn against
it as it was in possession of best evidence and thus, it was not
necessary for the employee to call upon the management to do so.
The High Court observed that the burden of proof may not be on
the management but in case of non-production of documents, an
adverse inference could be drawn against the management. Only
on that basis, the writ petition was allowed holding that theW.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 23 of 28
employee had worked for 240 days. Overruling the decision of the
High Court, this court found on facts of that case that the
employee had not adduced any evidence before the court in
support of his contention of having complied with the requirement
of section 25-B of Industrial Disputes Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
45. This Court also finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, in the case of Goverdhan vs Chief
Municipal Officer, (Misc. Petition No. 6329 of 2022, pronounced on 17th
October 2025). The relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder.
“5. Considering the argument advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner, on perusal of impugned award so also the record of
Labour Court, I am of the opinion that the trial Court has
committed illegality while shifting burden upon the
claimant/petitioner to prove that he continuously worked in a
calendar year for 240 days. As per settled legal position, though
initial burden lies upon the claimant/workman to prove his claim,
but the movement the claimant/workman deposed about
completion of 240 days of his/her service in the preceding year,
then it is the duty of employer to rebut the oral evidence of the
claimant/workman by producing cogent documentary evidence
and if it is not done by the employer then adverse inference can be
drawn against them. [….]
7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and
the settled legal preposition, it is proper to hold that initial burden
which was upon the workman to prove that he worked
continuously for 240 days had been discharged by him and there
was material available on record to show the same, but when the
burden shifted upon the employer to rebut the stand of the
workman, then they failed to do so and, therefore, under such
circumstances, an adverse inference is drawn against them. Under
the existing scenario, I have no hesitation to say that the order of
petitioner’s termination was passed in violation of provision ofW.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 24 of 28
Section 25(f) of Act, 1947. Furthermore, I have no iota of doubt to
say that the award passed by the Labour Court on 06.08.2022
(Annexure-P/1) is not sustainable in the eyes of law because it was
based upon the incorrect analogy and settled legal position and,
therefore, it is hereby set aside. Thus, the respondent is directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service with 50% back-wages and also
to pay consequential benefits to him accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. It is well settled that for a workman to successfully assail termination
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, two foundational requirements must
be satisfied. First, the existence of an employer-employee relationship must
be established. Second, the workman must demonstrate that he had
completed continuous service within the meaning of Section 25B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, i.e., that he had worked for at least 240 days
in the twelve calendar months preceding the termination. Only upon
satisfaction of these conditions does the protection under Section 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, become applicable. In the absence of
compliance with these statutory requirements, a plea of illegal retrenchment
cannot be sustained.
47. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohal Lal vs.
Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, reaffirms
the afore stated position.
“Before a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in
consonance with section 25F, he has to show that he has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under that employer
who has retrenched him from service. Section 25B is the
dictionary clause for the expression ‘continuous’.”
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 25 of 28
(emphasis supplied)
48. While the first requirement is satisfied in the present case, the position
regarding the completion of 240 days of continuous service remains unclear.
The Petitioners have asserted that they worked with the Respondent for
approximately four years; however, neither in the statement of claim before
the learned Labour Court nor in the pleadings before this Court have the
Petitioners specifically averred that they had completed 240 days of service
in the twelve months preceding the termination. The pleadings are
conspicuously silent on this essential statutory requirement.
49. This Court has also examined the evidence available on record,
including the Evidence Affidavits of the Petitioners and their cross-
examinations forming part of the Labour Court Record. Even upon such
examination, no material is forthcoming to indicate that the Petitioners had
completed 240 days of service in the preceding year before the termination.
The Petitioners have deposed regarding their engagement and the nature of
duties performed; however, there is no categorical assertion or proof relating
to completion of 240 days in any relevant twelve-month period.
50. It is true that in cases involving daily-rated workers, strict
documentary proof may not always be available. However, even in such
cases, a foundational pleading or oral assertion regarding completion of 240
days is required, upon which the burden may shift to the employer. In the
present case, the Petitioners have not even laid such foundational facts. In
the absence of any pleading or evidence to this effect, this Court cannot
presume completion of 240 days of service.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 26 of 28
51. It is trite that the statutory protection under Section 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is attracted only when the workman has
completed one year of continuous service as defined under Section 25B. In
the absence of proof regarding completion of 240 days of service in the
preceding year, the Petitioners cannot claim the benefit of Section 25F.
Consequently, although the termination may appear harsh, it cannot be held
illegal on the grounds of non-compliance with Section 25F.
52. In this context, it is settled that a Court exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot assume facts which remain
unproven. The Court cannot substitute proof with presumption nor grant
relief on equitable considerations contrary to the scheme of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The burden to establish completion of 240 days lies
upon the workman.
53. In the present case, although this Court sympathises with the
Petitioners, particularly in view of their engagement as casual daily-rated
workers and the lapse of considerable time, relief cannot be granted in the
absence of satisfaction of the statutory requirements.
54. Therefore, the impugned Award is set aside to the limited extent of
the findings returned with respect to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, in terms of the aforesaid discussion. However, in view of the
failure of the Petitioners to establish completion of continuous service
within the meaning of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they
are not entitled to the protection under Section 25F. In the absence of such
proof, the termination dated 26th September, 1990, cannot be held illegal for
non-compliance with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 27 of 28
Consequently, the ultimate conclusion rejecting the claim of the Petitioners
does not warrant interference.
55. The present Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
APRIL 01, 2026
MM
W.P.(C) 1162/2008 Page 28 of 28
