Chattisgarh High Court
Kaushik Behra vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 April, 2026
Digitally signed
YOGESH by YOGESH
TIWARI
TIWARI Date: 2026.04.02
17:28:45 +0530
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2026:CGHC:15338
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 18.02.2026
Order Delivered on : 02.04.2026
WPS No. 1488 of 2023
Kaushik Behra S/o Shri Hajaru Behra Aged About 43 Years (Terminated
Constable -1210), R/o Village- Amapali, Police Station - Basna, District
Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department of
Home Affairs, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Director General of Police, Head Office of The Chhattisgarh
Police, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Assistant Director General of Police (Administration) Head
Office of The Chhattisgarh Police, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Lalbag, Jagadalpur
Chhattisgarh.
5 - The Superintendent of Police, District - Bastar -Jagdalpur
Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Roop Ram Naik, Advocate
For State/Respondents : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer
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Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Heard Mr. Roop Ram Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner as
well as Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the
State/respondents.
2. The petitioner, by filing the present writ petition, has assailed the
impugned order dated 29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by
respondent No. 2, whereby the mercy petition/departmental
appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the
order dated 30.09.2020 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.
4 as well as the final order dated 04.10.2019 (Annexure P-3)
passed by respondent No. 5 have been affirmed, seeking
quashment of the said orders and a consequential direction for
reinstatement on the post of Constable with seniority, full back
wages, salary and all consequential benefits, including counting of
the period from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 for all service purposes.
3. The petitioner has sought for following reliefs:-
"10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a appropriate writ/order by
setting aside/quashing the impugned order
dated 29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by
the respondent No. 2 whereby the mercy
petition /departmental appeal of the petitioner
has been dismissed and confirmed the order
dated 30.09.2020 passed by the respondent
No. 4 (Annexure P-2) and final order dated
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04.10.2019 passed by the respondent no. 5
(Annex. P-3).
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a writ/order by directing the
respondent authorities to reinstatement the
petitioner in his service (post of Constable) with
seniority, salary, full back wages and all
consequential benefits with effect from date of
removal from service i.e. 04.10.2019 and also
count/treat the working period from 13.06.2018
to 12.01.2019.
10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to grant other relief which may be
suitable in the facts and circumstances of the
case, may also be granted in the favour of the
petitioner."
4. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was
appointed as a Constable and, after completing his basic PTS and
CIT training in the 5th Battalion, Jagdalpur, was posted at Police
Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha, District Bastar, a naxalite-affected
area. He discharged his duties sincerely and honestly. However,
he remained absent from duty from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 due
to the death of his uncle (who had adopted him), performance of
last rites, his own ill health, his wife's pregnancy and other family
difficulties, and he could not intimate the superior authorities
during that period.
5. A charge-sheet dated 07.02.2019 was issued alleging
unauthorized absence for about 213 days in violation of Rule 64(2)
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(4) of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations and Rule 7 of the Civil
Services Conduct Rules, along with an allegation that he was a
habitual absentee and unfit for service. A departmental enquiry
was instituted and an enquiry officer was appointed. According to
the petitioner, no proper show cause notice was served, nor was
he afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself or cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses.
6. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated 21.05.2019 holding
the charges proved. Thereafter, by order dated 04.10.2019,
respondent No. 5 imposed the major penalty of removal from
service. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before
respondent No. 4, which came to be rejected on 30.09.2020,
affirming the order of removal.
7. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a further appeal/mercy
petition before respondent No. 2 on the grounds of violation of
principles of natural justice and disproportionate punishment. The
same was rejected by order dated 29.09.2021, which was
communicated to the petitioner on 07.01.2023. Aggrieved by the
concurrent orders imposing the major penalty of removal from
service, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
8. Mr. Roop Ram Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the impugned order dated 29.09.2021 passed by the respondent
No. 2 - Director General of Police is illegal, arbitrary and suffers
from complete non-application of mind, as the departmental
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appeal/mercy petition has been rejected mechanically without
proper consideration of the record and the specific grounds raised
by the petitioner. It is contended that the order merely affirms the
punishment imposed by respondent No. 5 without independently
examining whether the departmental enquiry was conducted in
accordance with law and principles of natural justice. It is further
submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable on
12.02.2007 and had successfully completed his training before
being posted in a naxalite-affected area at Camp Jiramgaon, P.S.
Darbha, District Bastar, where he discharged his duties sincerely.
His absence from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 was neither willful nor
deliberate, but was on account of the death of his uncle, who had
adopted him, performance of last rites, his own ill health and
serious family circumstances including his wife's pregnancy.
Despite such compelling circumstances, the disciplinary authority
failed to consider the defence version in its proper perspective.
9. Mr. Naik further submits that the departmental enquiry was
conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. No proper
show cause notice was served prior to initiating the proceedings,
and the petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses or to submit a proper written
representation against the enquiry report. The findings recorded
by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority
are stated to be perverse and unsupported by evidence,
particularly inasmuch as there is no finding that the absence was
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willful or intentional. It is also contended that the punishment of
removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the alleged
misconduct. Under Regulation 226 of the Chhattisgarh Police
Regulations, withholding of increment is prescribed as a suitable
punishment for serious dereliction of duty; however, the
respondents have imposed the extreme penalty of removal,
overlooking the statutory scheme. The appellate and revisional
authorities have also erred in taking into consideration the past
service record without following the procedure contemplated under
Regulation 228.
10. In support of his submissions, Mr. Naik places reliance upon the
judgment in Kudiam Bhima vs. State of C.G. & others, WPS
No. 227/2020, wherein this Court interfered with the order of
removal on the ground of non-consideration of relevant material.
Reliance is also placed on Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of
India & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that in cases of unauthorized absence, there
must be a finding that such absence was willful. Further reliance is
placed on Chhel Singh vs. MGB Gramin Bank, Pali & Others,
(2014) 13 SCC 166, Ramsagar Sinha vs. State of C.G. &
Others, WA No. 172/2025 and Drigpal Singh vs. State of M.P. &
Others, 2014 SCC Online MP 1860, to contend that
disproportionate punishment and violation of natural justice vitiate
the disciplinary proceedings.
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11. On these grounds, it is prayed by Mr. Naik that the impugned
orders be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated with all
consequential benefits.
12. On the other hand, Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer
appearing for the State/respondents, vehemently opposes the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and
submits that the present writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable
to be dismissed. It is contended that the impugned order dated
29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No. 2 - Director
General of Police - has been passed after due consideration of
the mercy petition, the entire departmental enquiry record, and the
service history of the petitioner, and therefore does not suffer from
any illegality, perversity or non-application of mind.
13. Mr. Agrawal further submits that the petitioner remained
unauthorizedly absent for 213 days continuously from 13.06.2018
to 12.01.2019 while posted at Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha,
District Bastar, without any prior sanction of leave or intimation to
the competent authority. Despite issuance of notices dated
26.06.2018, 27.07.2018, 28.08.2018 and 23.10.2018 directing him
to resume duty, the petitioner failed to report back or furnish any
satisfactory explanation. It is argued that such prolonged and
continuous absence in a disciplined force like the police,
particularly in a naxalite-affected area, amounts to gross
indiscipline and serious misconduct. It is further submitted that the
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departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with
law and the applicable rules. The petitioner was served with a
charge-sheet, an enquiry officer was duly appointed, and the
entire proceedings were conducted in his presence. Adequate
opportunity of hearing and defence was afforded to him. The
enquiry was not conducted ex parte, and the petitioner was
allowed to participate and produce defence evidence. The charges
were found proved on the basis of evidence on record, and
thereafter the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of removal
from service by order dated 04.10.2019, which was affirmed in
appeal and in the mercy petition.
14. It is submitted by Mr. Agrawal that the petitioner is a habitual
absentee and had earlier been inflicted with five minor penalties
and two major penalties for unauthorized absence. Despite
repeated opportunities to improve his conduct, there was no
improvement. In such circumstances, retention of the petitioner in
a disciplined force would be detrimental to institutional discipline. It
is argued that the punishment imposed is proportionate to the
gravity of misconduct and cannot be said to be shockingly
disproportionate so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. It is lastly submitted that under Rule 24 of
the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1977, willful
absence renders a Government servant liable to disciplinary
action, and the petitioner admittedly remained absent without
sanctioned leave. The constitutional safeguards under Article
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311(2) of the Constitution of India were duly complied with, as the
petitioner was informed of the charges and given reasonable
opportunity of hearing. Therefore, no interference is called for in
exercise of writ jurisdiction and the petition deserves to be
dismissed being sans merit.
15. Mr. Agrawal, learned State counsel has placed reliance upon the
judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal v.
State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 369, State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, Moti Ram Deka v. General
Manager, North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600 and
State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 to contend
that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in matters arising out of departmental
enquiries and consequential orders of dismissal or removal is
extremely limited. As such, prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
16. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
counsel appearing for the respective respondents and have
perused the pleadings and documents placed on record.
17. From perusal of the order dated 04.10.2019 passed by the
Superintendent of Police, Bastar, Jagdalpur, it is apparent that the
disciplinary authority has recorded a detailed finding regarding the
habitual unauthorized absence of the delinquent employee,
namely Kaushik Behera. The order reflects that the delinquent
remained absent from Camp Jiramgaon, Police Station Darbha,
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with effect from 13.06.2018 without any prior information or
permission and continued to remain absent for 213 consecutive
days, reporting back only on 12.01.2019. Despite repeated notices
and reminders, he neither resumed duty within time nor submitted
any satisfactory explanation in defense of his absence.
18. The order further discloses that the delinquent had a past service
record marked by repeated instances of unauthorized absence
and punishments, including censures, withholding of increments
with cumulative effect, and adjustment of absence periods under
relevant leave rules. The disciplinary authority has specifically
taken into consideration his previous misconduct and the fact that
earlier minor and major penalties failed to bring about any
improvement in his conduct. The charge-sheet was duly served,
and even after receipt of multiple reminders, the delinquent failed
to submit any reply, thereby indicating lack of interest in contesting
the allegations.
19. It is also evident from the order that a regular departmental inquiry
was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
An Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed,
prosecution witnesses were examined, copies of statements were
supplied, and opportunity for cross-examination as well as for
leading defense evidence was granted. The Inquiry Officer, after
detailed analysis of oral and documentary evidence, held Charges
No. 1 and 2 to be fully proved. A copy of the inquiry report was
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supplied to the delinquent along with a notice for representation;
however, he again failed to submit any representation within the
stipulated time despite reminders.
20. Upon independent consideration of the inquiry report, evidence on
record, and the service history of the delinquent, the disciplinary
authority concluded that the misconduct stood fully established
and that the delinquent, being habitually absent, was unfit to be
retained in a disciplined force like the police department.
Consequently, the penalty of "discharge from service" was
imposed with effect from 04.10.2019 (forenoon), and the period of
absence from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 (213 days) was treated
under the principle of "no work no pay."
21. Further, from perusal of the order dated 30.09.2020 passed by the
appellate authority, i.e., the Office of the Inspector General of
Police, Bastar Range, Jagdalpur, it transpires that a detailed
consideration was undertaken of the departmental enquiry
conducted against Kaushik Behera, District Bastar. The appellate
authority noted that the petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent
from Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha, for 213 consecutive days
from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 without any prior information or
permission, thereby violating Para 64(2) & (4) of the
M.P./Chhattisgarh Police Regulations and Rule 7 of the Civil
Services Conduct Rules, and further that he was habitual of
remaining absent from duty despite earlier punishments.
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22. It further transpires that the Superintendent of Police, Bastar had
conducted the enquiry in accordance with Rule 14 of the
M.P./Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, 'Rules of 1966'), appointed an
Enquiry Officer, and after receipt of the enquiry report, supplied a
copy thereof to the petitioner and granted opportunity to submit
representation. However, the petitioner did not submit any
representation. Considering the gravity of the proved charges and
the past service record reflecting imposition of multiple minor and
major penalties for similar misconduct, the disciplinary authority
imposed the penalty of removal from service by order dated
04.10.2019 and treated the period of absence on the principle of
"no work no pay" and the suspension period accordingly.
23. The appellate authority, after examining the entire record under
Rule 27 of the Rules of 1966 and affording personal hearing to the
appellant, recorded that no new grounds or mitigating
circumstances were brought on record warranting interference
with the punishment. It was also observed that despite repeated
opportunities in the past, the petitioner failed to improve his
conduct and that his prolonged unauthorized absence in a
naxalite-affected and sensitive area like Bastar adversely affected
discipline and morale of the police force. Accordingly, the appellate
authority found the punishment proportionate to the misconduct
proved and upheld the order of removal passed by the
Superintendent of Police, Bastar, dismissing the appeal preferred
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by the petitioner.
24. Lastly, from perusal of the impugned order dated 29.09.2021
passed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, it
transpires that the competent authority has undertaken a detailed
examination of the mercy petition submitted by Ex-Constable
Kaushik Behera, District Bastar, along with the other relevant
documents. The authority has specifically considered the grounds
raised by the petitioner regarding alleged violation of principles of
natural justice, personal and family difficulties, and the
proportionality of punishment. The impugned order reflects that
the Director General of Police has recorded a categorical finding
that the departmental inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance
with the prescribed procedure and in compliance with the
principles of natural justice. It has been observed that the
delinquent was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself,
that notices were duly served, and that he participated in the
inquiry proceedings. The plea that the inquiry was one-sided or
that reasonable opportunity was denied has been expressly
rejected as being contrary to the record.
25. It further transpires that the authority has taken into account the
past service record of the petitioner, which discloses repeated
instances of unauthorized absence and imposition of both minor
and major penalties. The impugned order notes that despite earlier
punishments and opportunities to reform, the petitioner remained
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habitually absent and continued to exhibit indiscipline. The
prolonged absence of 213 days from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019
without prior permission or intimation has been treated as grave
misconduct, particularly in the context of service in a disciplined
force like the police department.
26. The Director General of Police has also considered the personal
grounds urged in the mercy petition, including illness of family
members and domestic disputes, but has observed that no
contemporaneous intimation or sanctioned leave was obtained,
nor were satisfactory supporting documents furnished during the
inquiry. Consequently, the authority has concluded that the
punishment of dismissal from service imposed vide order dated
04.10.2019 is neither excessive nor disproportionate and does not
warrant interference in exercise of mercy jurisdiction.
27. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is well settled.
This Court does not sit as an appellate authority to reappreciate
evidence or to substitute its own opinion on the quantum of
punishment unless the same is shockingly disproportionate or
suffers from patent illegality. From a perusal of the orders dated
04.10.2019 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bastar;
30.09.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority; and 29.09.2021
passed by the Director General of Police while rejecting the mercy
petition, it is evident that the authorities have acted strictly within
the framework of law, after affording due opportunity to the
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petitioner and after considering his past service record, gravity of
misconduct and the requirements of discipline in a uniformed
force.
28. Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1977 (as
amended in 2010) deals with the consequences of absence after
expiry of sanctioned leave, which reads as under:-
"24. Absence after expiry of leave.- (1)
Unless the authority competent to grant leave
extends the leave, Government servant who
remains absent after the end of leave, the
period of such absence not covered by grant of
leave shall have to be treated as 'dies-non' for
all purpose including leave. He will not be
entitled to any leave salary for the period of
such absence and that period shall be debited
against his leave account as though it were half
pay leave to the extent such leave is due, the
period in excess of such leave due being
treated as extraordinary leave.
(2) Willful absence from duty after the expiry of
leave renders a Government servant liable to
disciplinary action."
29. A bare perusal of Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services
(Leave) Rules, 1977 (as amended in 2010) goes to show that in
the event a Government servant remains absent after the expiry of
sanctioned leave without extension by the competent authority,
such period of absence is required to be treated as dies-non for all
purposes including leave, and the employee is not entitled to any
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leave salary for that duration; the period is to be debited against
the leave account as half pay leave to the extent due and, for the
excess period, treated as extraordinary leave. More significantly,
sub-rule (2) categorically provides that willful absence from duty
after the expiry of leave renders the Government servant liable to
disciplinary action, thereby making it clear that unauthorized and
willful absence constitutes misconduct inviting initiation of
departmental proceedings in accordance with the applicable
service rules.
30. The legal position regarding dismissal and removal from service
has been settled since the Constitution Bench judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal (supra), wherein the Court
authoritatively held that dismissal or removal from service as a
measure of punishment entails penal consequences and casts a
stigma, but once imposed in accordance with law and after due
inquiry, it cannot be interfered with merely on sympathetic
considerations. The Court clarified that termination by way of
punishment, after compliance with procedural safeguards, is
legally sustainable and does not warrant interference unless
vitiated by mala fides or procedural illegality.
31. Similarly, in the Constitution Bench decision in Moti Ram Deka
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that where
termination is founded on misconduct and preceded by an inquiry
consistent with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, such action is
17
punitive but valid, provided reasonable opportunity has been
afforded. The Court emphasized that the essence lies not in the
form of the order but in its substance; and where misconduct is
duly established in a regular departmental inquiry, the penalty
cannot be invalidated on hyper-technical grounds.
32. In N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, is not required to
reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own conclusions in
place of those arrived at by the competent authority. Interference
is warranted only when the decision-making process is vitiated by
patent illegality, perversity, violation of statutory provisions, or
breach of principles of natural justice.
33. Further in S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court
authoritatively held that in proceedings under Article 226, the High
Court is concerned not with the correctness of the decision but
with the decision-making process. It was categorically observed
that the High Court cannot review the evidence and arrive at an
independent finding on the facts. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence is not a matter for judicial review. The departmental
authorities are the sole judges of facts, and so long as there is
some evidence which reasonably supports the conclusion, the
findings cannot be interfered with. It was also clarified that the
standard of proof applicable in criminal trials proof beyond
reasonable doubt, is not attracted in departmental proceedings,
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where preponderance of probabilities is the governing standard.
34. The principle governing the scope of interference has been further
reiterated in Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran,
(2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down
that in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the
High Court shall not reappreciate evidence, examine adequacy or
reliability of evidence, or substitute its own view for that of the
disciplinary authority, unless the findings are perverse or the
enquiry is vitiated on account of violation of statutory rules or
principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under :-
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is
painfully disturbing to note that the High Court
has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even
the evidence before the enquiry officer. The
finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not
and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its
powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court
can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent
authority;
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(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of
natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no
evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been
conducted in accordance with law;
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(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC
1723] , many of the above principles have been
discussed and it has been concluded thus :
(AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution as a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court in a petition for a writ under
21
Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly
interfere where the departmental authorities
have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or
by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there be some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution."
15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao
[(1975) 2 SCC 557, the principles have been
further discussed at paras 21-24, which read as
follows : (SCC pp. 561-63)
"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
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departmental inquiries has come up before
this Court. Two propositions were laid down
by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no
warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is
not established unless proved by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction
of the Court must be applied. If that rule be
not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry
the High Court in a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution is not competent to
declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court
is not a court of appeal under Article 226
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Second, where there is some
evidence which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support
the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may interfere
23
where the departmental authorities have held
the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there is some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v.
Niranjan Singh [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3
SCR 548] said that the High Court does not
interfere with the conclusion of the
disciplinary authority unless the finding is not
supported by any evidence or it can be said
that no reasonable person could have
reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh
case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548]
this Court held that the High Court exceeded
its powers in interfering with the findings of
24
the disciplinary authority on the charge that
the respondent was instrumental in
compelling the shutdown of an air
compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956.
This Court said that the Enquiry Committee
felt that the evidence of two persons that the
respondent led a group of strikers and
compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face
value. The General Manager did not agree
with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the
evidence. This Court said that it was open to
the General Manager to do so and he was
not bound by the conclusion reached by the
committee. This Court held that the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary
authority should prevail and the High Court
should not have interfered with the
conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction.
The Court exercises it not as an appellate
court. The findings of fact reached by an
inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown
that in recording the said finding, the tribunal
25
had erroneously refused to admit admissible
and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged on the ground that the
relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a
point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC
477] .)
24. The High Court in the present case
assessed the entire evidence and came to its
own conclusion. The High Court was not
justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that
the High Court does not correct a finding of
fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the
present case which was considered by the
Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High
Court to justify the conclusion that there is no
evidence which would justify the finding of
the Tribunal that the respondent did not make
the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High
Court to say that no reasonable person could
26
have arrived at these conclusions. The High
Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as
no evidence. That is precisely what the High
Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari should not do."
16. These principles have been succinctly
summed up by the living legend and
centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 .
To quote the unparalleled and inimitable
expressions : (SCC p. 493, para 4)
"4. ... in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the
Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All
materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no
allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true
that departmental authorities and
administrative tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not
glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not
relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For
this proposition it is not necessary to cite
decisions nor textbooks, although we have
been taken through case law and other
authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of
natural justice. Of course, fair play is the
27
basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias
or surrender of independence of judgment
vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good."
17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court
up to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali
Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4
SCC 108, these principles have been
consistently followed adding practically nothing
more or altering anything.
***
***
20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court,
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into
the proportionality of punishment so long as the
punishment does not shock the conscience of
the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary
authority has come to the conclusion that the
respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are
no measurable standards as to what is integrity
in service jurisprudence but certainly there are
indicators for such assessment. Integrity
according to Oxford Dictionary is “moral
uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep,
probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness,
sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy,
rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness,
28
righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency,
honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability,
purity, respectability, genuineness, moral
excellence, etc. In short, it depicts sterling
character with firm adherence to a code of
moral values.”
35. Similarly, in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation
Limited represented by Managing Director (Administration
and HR) v. C. Nagaraju and another, (2019) 10 SCC 367, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that misconduct involving
indiscipline and repeated unauthorized absence justifies strict
action and that the constitutional courts must not lightly interfere
with penalties imposed after a valid enquiry and observed as
follows :-
“11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on
a judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank [G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] whereby the writ
petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed. In
the said case, the delinquent officer was
charged for an offence punishable under
Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the PC
Act, 1988. He was honourably acquitted by the
criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove
the charge. Thereafter, a departmental inquiry
was conducted and he was dismissed from
service. The order of dismissal was upheld
[G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC
OnLine Guj 487] by the High Court. In the
appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this Court
29was of the opinion that the departmental
proceedings and criminal case were based on
identical and similar set of facts. The evidence
before the criminal court and the departmental
proceedings being exactly the same, this Court
held that the acquittal of the employee by a
criminal court has to be given due weight by
the disciplinary authority. On the basis that the
evidence in both the criminal trial and
departmental inquiry is the same, the order of
dismissal of the appellant therein was set
aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case
are entirely different. The acquittal of
Respondent 1 was due to non-availability of
any evidence before the criminal court. The
order of dismissal was on the basis of a report
of the inquiry officer before whom there was
ample evidence against Respondent 1.
12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya
Chah Mazdoor Sangh [Krishnakali Tea Estate
v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004)
8 SCC 200, this Court was concerned with the
validity of the termination of the services of
workmen after acquittal by the criminal court.
Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this
case, where the acquittal was due to lack of
evidence before the criminal court and
sufficient evidence was available before the
Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that
the judgment in M. Paul Anthony case [M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3
SCC 679 cannot come to the rescue of the
workmen.
30
13. Having considered the submissions made
on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1,
we are of the view that interference with the
order of dismissal by the High Court was
unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal
by a criminal court does not preclude a
departmental inquiry against the delinquent
officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound
by the judgment of the criminal court if the
evidence that is produced in the departmental
inquiry is different from that produced during
the criminal trial. The object of a departmental
inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is
guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for
the purpose of determining whether he should
be continued in service. The standard of proof
in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based
on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal
which is based on the evidence before the
inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings,
which is different from the evidence available to
the criminal court, is justified and needed no
interference by the High Court.”
36. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the petitioner, being a member
of a disciplined police force deployed in a sensitive and naxalite-
affected area, remained unauthorizedly absent for 213
consecutive days from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 without prior
sanction of leave or proper intimation to the competent authority.
The record reflects that repeated notices were issued directing
31
him to resume duty, yet he failed to comply within reasonable time
or furnish any contemporaneous explanation supported by
credible material. In a uniformed force entrusted with maintenance
of law and order, prolonged absence without leave cannot be
viewed as a mere technical lapse; rather, it undermines discipline,
operational preparedness and institutional integrity. The
departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with
the prescribed procedure under the relevant service rules. A
charge-sheet containing definite and specific articles of charge
was served; an Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were duly
appointed; opportunity to participate in the proceedings, cross-
examine witnesses and adduce defence evidence was afforded;
and a copy of the enquiry report was supplied before imposition of
penalty. The petitioner failed to avail several of these opportunities
despite reminders. The disciplinary authority, upon independent
consideration of the enquiry report, evidence adduced and the
petitioner’s past service record, which discloses repeated
instances of unauthorized absence resulting in both minor and
major penalties arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the
misconduct stood proved and that the petitioner had exhibited
habitual indiscipline rendering him unfit for retention in service.
37. The record placed before this Court clearly demonstrates that the
departmental enquiry was conducted by a competent authority
strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
relevant statutory framework, including Rule 14 of the Rules of
32
1966 and Rule 24 of the Rules, 1977 governing imposition of
major penalties. The petitioner was served with a definite and
distinct charge-sheet; an Inquiry Officer was duly appointed; oral
and documentary evidence was recorded; opportunity of cross-
examination and defence was afforded; and a copy of the enquiry
report was supplied before imposition of penalty. Thus, the
mandatory procedural safeguards contemplated under Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India stood fully complied with.
38. The contention of violation of principles of natural justice is not
borne out from the record. On the contrary, it transpires that
despite repeated notices and opportunities, the petitioner failed to
submit timely explanation or representation and did not avail the
opportunities extended to him in full measure. The enquiry was not
conducted ex parte; rather, it was conducted after affording
adequate opportunity. In such circumstances, the plea of denial of
reasonable opportunity is clearly untenable.
39. The charge against the petitioner pertains to prolonged
unauthorized absence for 213 consecutive days while posted in a
sensitive naxalite-affected area. In a disciplined force like the
police, such conduct strikes at the very root of institutional
discipline and operational efficiency. The disciplinary authority has
also taken into consideration the past service record of the
petitioner, which reflects repeated instances of unauthorized
absence and imposition of both minor and major penalties. The
33
finding that the petitioner is a habitual absentee is based on
documentary material forming part of the service record. There is,
therefore, “some evidence” supporting the conclusions reached by
the authorities.
40. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.
Sree Rama Rao (supra), this Court cannot reappreciate the
evidence or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary
authority so long as the enquiry is conducted in accordance with
law and the findings are supported by evidence. Similarly, in P.
Gunasekaran (supra), it has been categorically held that the High
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, shall
not act as a court of appeal in disciplinary matters and shall not
interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on
no evidence. The present case does not fall within any of the
exceptional contingencies enumerated therein.
41. The nature and effect of the penalty of removal from service have
been authoritatively explained by the Constitution Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal (supra), wherein it was held
that removal is a punishment founded upon misconduct or
deficiency personal to the officer. Further, in Moti Ram Deka
(supra), it has been clarified that where termination is punitive and
preceded by a lawful enquiry consistent with Article 311(2), the
same cannot be invalidated merely on sympathetic considerations.
In the case at hand, the penalty of removal has been imposed only
34
after a regular departmental enquiry and upon due consideration
of the gravity of misconduct and the petitioner’s antecedent
service record.
42. The argument of disproportionate punishment also does not merit
acceptance. In N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that the High Court cannot interfere with the quantum of
punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the Court.
Considering the prolonged unauthorized absence of 213 days in a
disciplined force, coupled with the petitioner’s past history of
similar misconduct, the punishment of removal from service
cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate. On the contrary,
the disciplinary authority has recorded cogent reasons as to why
retention of the petitioner in service would be detrimental to
discipline.
43. This Court is also mindful of the observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in C. Nagaraju (supra), wherein it has been held
that misconduct involving indiscipline and repeated unauthorized
absence justifies strict action and that constitutional courts must
exercise restraint in interfering with penalties imposed after a valid
enquiry. The factual matrix of the present case squarely attracts
the said principle.
44. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 is confined to
examining the decision-making process and not the decision itself.
No material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that
35
the enquiry suffered from procedural illegality, that the authorities
were influenced by extraneous considerations, or that the findings
are so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have arrived at
such conclusions. The petitioner essentially seeks reappreciation
of evidence and substitution of punishment, which is impermissible
within the limited scope of judicial review.
45. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that the orders
dated 04.10.2019 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bastar;
30.09.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority; and 29.09.2021
passed by the Director General of Police rejecting the mercy
petition are well-reasoned, lawful and passed after due
compliance with statutory and constitutional safeguards. No case
of perversity, arbitrariness, violation of natural justice or
disproportionate punishment is made out.
46. Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to
be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
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36
Head-Note
Misconduct involving indiscipline and repeated unauthorized absence
constitutes a serious breach of service discipline and justifies the
imposition of strict penalties by the disciplinary authority. The courts
ought not to lightly interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is
shown to be shockingly disproportionate or vitiated by procedural
irregularity, mala fides, or violation of principles of natural justice.
