Delhi District Court
Karamvir vs Radha Raman Enterprises on 15 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVENDER KUMAR JANGALA,
DISTRICT JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT)-01,
NORTH WEST, ROHINI, NEW DELHI
CS (COMM) No.144/19
CNR NO.DLNW010053382019
SH. KARAMVIR @ KARAMBIR
Prop. Of M/s. Jai Mata Transport Company,
S/o Sh.Ramphal
Main Dharuhera Road,
Near Hanuman Mandir,
Vikas Nagar, Maheshwari,
Haryana
..........Plaintiff
VERSUS
M/s RADHA RAMAN ENTERPRISES
At Jhansi Road, Chituvan,
Datia, Madhya Pradesh,
PIN: 475661
Also at: 124-D-45, Govind Nagar,
Kanpur-208006 UP.
Through its Partners
a) Sh. Yogesh Kumar Mishra
S/o Late Sh. Rama Shankar Mishra
&
b) Sh Mayank Mishra
S/o Shri Yogesh Mishra
........Defendants.
SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF RS.6,00,000/-(RUPEES SIX LACS
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 1/33
Digitally signed
by DEVENDER
DEVENDER KUMAR
KUMAR JANGALA
JANGALA Date:
2026.07.15
16:28:42 +0530
ONLY) ALONGWITH PENDENTELITE AND FUTURE
INTEREST.
Date of institution of Suit : 01.06.2019
Date of final arguments : 23.04.2026
Date of Judgment : 15.07.2026
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this judgment I shall adjudicate upon the suit
of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.6,00,000/- alongwith interest @ 15%
per annum from the date of filing of suit till realization.
2.1 Brief facts: The facts of the case in brief as per plaint are
that the plaintiff is the owner/Proprietor of the plaintiff Transport
Company and Mr Yogesh Mishra and Mr Mayank Mishra are partners
and authorized signatories of the defendant company.
2.2 It is stated that as per the Defendant’s order, the plaintiff
had provided his services vide Letter dated 09.09.2018. It is stated that
the defendant issued two cheques bearing No. 036663 dated
22.10.2018 of a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- and 036662 dated 09.11.2018 of
a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- both drawn on BANK OF MAHARASHTRA,
with the assurance that the said cheques would be honoured at the time
of presentation in bank. That the Plaintiff deposited the said cheques
for encashment in his bank, i.e., DELHI STATE COOPERATIVE
BANK LTD., Ghewara Branch, New Delhi, but the said cheques were
dishonored and returned unpaid with the remarks “PAYMENT
STOPPED BY DRAWER” vide cheque return memo dated 12.11.2018
and 14.11.2018. That the Defendants promised to return the said
amount very soon but they have failed to give the said amount. That
when the Plaintiff visited the Defendant’s office time to time, the
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 2/33
defendants again and again made excuses for payment on one pretext
to another.
2.3 It is stated that the defendants failed and neglected to
make the payment to the Plaintiff despite his repeated requests, and the
plaintiff through his advocate, served a Legal Notice dated 24.12.2018
thereby calling them to make the payment of Rs. 6,00,000/-. That the
said Legal Notice was sent by SPEED POST vide Receipt No.
ED587055817IN dated 24.12.2018 and the same was delivered/
received by the Defendant on 27.12.2018 but the Defendants have
failed to make the payment to the Plaintiff, neither given any reply to
the Legal Notice. That the defendants have failed to make the payment,
therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit.
2.4 It is stated that the cause of action for filing the present
suit firstly arose in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant on
the day when the Defendant approached to the Plaintiff for providing
his services. That it further arose when the cheques of the Defendant
got dishonored. That it arose on all the occasions when the Defendant
failed to make the payment of the said amount and the when the
Plaintiff requested the Defendant to make the payment and the said
Defendant failed to make the payment. That it finally arose on
24.12.2018, when the Plaintiff served Legal Notice through his
counsel to the Defendants who have failed and neglected to make the
payment. That the cause of action is continuing and still subsisting as
the defendants have failed to make the payment.
2.5 It is stated that this Court has pecuniary and territorial
jurisdiction to try this suit as the cheques has been dishonored in Delhi,
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 3/33
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the cause of action
has also arisen at Delhi.
2.6 It is prayed that the decree for recovery of Rs. 6,00,000/-
with future interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of
institution of the suit till realization may kindly be passed in favour of
plaintiff and against the defendant. The plaintiff has also prayed for the
cost of the suit.
3. On 16.03.2021 it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for
plaintiff that it is a regular suit but inadvertently it was mentioned in
the index that this is a suit under order XXXVII CPC. In view of
submission, the suit was treated as regular Commercial suit and the
summons for settlement of issues were issued to the defendants. The
defendant on being served put the appearance and filed the written
statement.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
4.1 In its written statement, the defendants have pleaded that
the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable in terms of provisions
of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure as this Court has
no territorial jurisdiction to try the present suit as defendant’s ‘offices’
address mentioned in suit is at Madhya Pradesh and plaintiff’s address
mentioned in suit at Haryana. That the cheques in question are drawn
on Bank of Maharasthra, Branch, Kanpur U.P. and no cause of action
arose in Delhi and thus, this court has no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.
4.2 It is stated that the suit of the plaintiffs is not
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 4/33
maintainable as the same has been filed with malicious intent and
unclean hands by suppressing the material facts. It is submitted that the
suit filed by the plaintiff is nothing but an intriguing effort on the part
of the plaintiff to harass and humiliate the defendant. That the suit filed
by the plaintiff is without any cause of action in favour of the plaintiff.
It is stated that the suit is also not maintainable as the plaintiff has not
annexed any bill issued by him to the defendant and in absence of any
bill and statement of work/log book done by plaintiff, no relief of
recovery can be granted to the plaintiff. That the averments on merits
of the case are denied. It is stated that the plaintiff company contacted
to the defendant for providing their services to the defendant-company
and accordingly defendant agreed to take the service of plaintiff and
thus, defendant issued letter to the plaintiff regarding rate of service as
well terms and condition of service and accordingly plaintiff agreed
the terms and condition of defendant and requested the defendant to
handover the two security cheques. That in good faith defendant
handed over two signed cheques to the plaintiff company.
4.3 It is stated that the plaintiff company as per agreed terms
provided Hywa Truck on monthly rental basis and as agreed the
defendant paid rent to plaintiff on the monthly basis through RTGS,
NEFT, cheque as well as cash and nothing is due against the defendant.
That the defendant company requested the plaintiff to return the
security cheques but plaintiff did not return the same on the ground that
the same is not traceable and will handover the same as soon as be
traced. That immediately thereafter, the defendant stopped payment of
the above said cheques in his bank, but with malafide intention, the
plaintiff has misused the said security cheques. It is prayed that the suit
of the plaintiff may kindly be dismissed.
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 5/33
REPLICATION
5. The plaintiff filed detailed replication to the written
statement of the defendant, thereby denying the averments of the
defendant and re-affirming his claim.
6. After completion of pleadings of parties, following issues were
framed vide order dated 05.02.2026:-
1. Whether the cheque bearing no.036663 was issued by the
defendant as security cheque, which has been misused by the
plaintiff? (OPD)
2. Whether this Court is having the territorial jurisdiction to
try and entertain the present suit? (OPP)
3. Whether the plaintiff has provided the services to the
defendant as alleged? (OPP)
4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the decree of recovery of
Rs.6,00,000/-, as prayed, in its favour and against the
defendant? (OPP)
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any interest?, if yes, at
what rate and for which period? (OPP)
6. Whether plaintiff is entitled for costs? (OPP)
7. Relief.
7. After framing of issues, the matter was fixed for evidence of
the parties. In view of powers under order XV A Rule 6(o) and (p)
CPC, the evidence of the parties was directed to be recorded on
commission basis by Sh. Chandra Shekhar, Ld. Retired District Judge.
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 6/33
PLAINTIFF EVIDENCE
8. Before the Ld. Local Commissioner, the plaintiff Sh.Karamvir
@ Karambir examined himself as PW-1. He tendered his evidence by
way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit Ex. PW1/A, the PW-1 has
reiterated the averments made in the plaint and relied upon the
following documents:-
1. Copy of letter dated 09.09.2018 Mark A.
2. Original cheques exhibited as Ex. PW-1/2 (Colly).
3. Original return memo exhibited as Ex. PW-1/3 (Colly).
4. Copy of bank statement Mark B.
5. Copy of legal notice dated 24.12.2018 exhibited as Ex.
PW-1/5,
6. Speed post on the same date exhibited as Ex. PW-1/6,
7. Computer-generated tracking report dated 27.12.2018
exhibited as Ex. PW-1/7.
9. PW-1 was cross-examined at length by Ld. Counsel for
defendant. The detailed cross-examination of PW-1 is reproduced as
under:-
“I know what is written in my Affidavit already exhibited as Ex.
PW-1/A. Sh. Karamvir is the owner of M/s Jai Mata Transport
Company. I have already placed on record document of GST, which
shows that Sh. Karamvir is the owner of the aforesaid transport
company. In the document Mark A, GST no. is specifically
mentioned.
It is incorrect to suggest that I have not filed any document on judicial
record issued from the Govt. of India which shows that Sh. Karamvir
is the owner of the M/s Jai Mata Transport Company.
Ques- Can you tell from where you received the document Mark A?
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 7/33
Ans- I cannot read English as I am 8th pass.
I cannot tell the nature of document Mark A.
My company deals in transport of building material, rent out the
transport vehicles such as Hywa, JCB and Trucks, etc. My company
had supplied two Hywas to Defendant Company in the month of June
2018. The Defendant had returned the said Hywas in the month of
December 2018. My company had also provided services of the
driver to operate the said two Hywas to the Defendant company. My
company used to bear the expenses/ salary of the said two drivers.
Sometimes my company used to take the same from the Defendant.
In between June 2018 to December 2018, Defendant did not pay any
amount towards expenses/ salary of the said two drivers. In the
aforesaid period I had visited multiple times at the site where the said
Hywas were provided to the Defendant. The two drivers were
operating one Hywa one after the other. My company used to pay the
expenses of the four drivers daily at the rate of Rs. 300 (Rupees Three
Hundred) per day through one Dhaba of Fauji which was near the
site. The said amount was paid in cash by the company to the said
Dhaba. At the relevant time, the company used to file ITR. In the ITR,
Debtor/ Creditors list was not filed/mentioned. Initially, there was no
written agreement between my company and Defendant. The
agreement was made either in September 2018 or in October 2018,
though the Hywas were supplied to the Defendant in the month of
July 2018. The agreement between my company and Defendant was
to pay a sum of 1,80,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Eighty Thousand) per
Hywa per month. Again said both the Hywas were supplied by my
company to the Defendant in the month of June 2018. When the
payment was not received from the Defendant for a considerable
period, then a written agreement was made either in October or
November 2018. Again said it was made in October 2018. The
written agreement was got drafted by Defendant and it was sent on
my WhatsApp. I had not signed that agreement as the amount was
reduced in the said agreement by the Defendant from Rs. 1,80,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh Eighty Thousand) per month to Rs. 1,60,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh Sixty Thousand) per month only.
In reply to the question whether there was any agreement in writing
with regard to payment of Rs. 1,60,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Sixty
Thousand) per month per Hywa the witness replies as under:
I had visited the site and discussed the matter regarding payment with
Defendant, thereafter it was agreed that Defendant shall take theCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 8/33
services of one driver per Hywa only. The Defendant availed the
services of two driver with two Hywas for the month of November
and December 2018 instead of four drivers. During the month of July
2018 to October 2018, Defendant had availed the services of two
Hywas and four drivers. When I had visited the site, no written
agreement was executed between my company and the Defendant.
The Defendant had handed over three cheques amounting to Rs.
3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs) each. The two cheques were
dishonoured. I do not know if the aforesaid fact regarding handing
over of three cheques and bouncing of two cheques is written in the
plaint. I also do not know if in the plaint it is mentioned that
defendant had sent written agreement on my WhatsApp reducing the
amount.
The bank account of my company is at Village Ghevra in Haryana.
My company had not given any bill to the Defendant. The expenses
of the aforesaid drivers and providing of the said Hywas were
recorded in Rough/ Kacha Diary. I have not placed the copy of
Rough/Kacha Diary on judicial record. I can produce the copy of
Rough/ Kacha Diary. Again said some record is on my WhatsApp
and today I have brought the print of the same. The print out was
taken by me today. I am not using the said mobile now which I
was using in the year 2018. The print was taken by my son Sh.
Bobby Chhillar today from some shop at Bahadurgarh,
Haryana. The said printed documents are collectively marked as
Mark X1.
I have not brought the Rough/ Kacha Diary which was asked to be
brought today. It is correct that I was not maintaining any Rough/
Kacha Record. Again said I was maintaining the Rough/ Kacha
Records but now I am not in a position to bring the same. I cannot
bring any Rough/ Kacha Record, whatever was with me, I have
already filed the same. The documents which I have filed are all
Pakka Record. I have not filed original invoice. I cannot bring the
same. I cannot bring any record of GST as I had only provided the
trucks to get rent on monthly basis. Initially there was no agreement
in writing but when payments were not received on time from
Defendant, then in the month of September 2018 an agreement was
made in writing. Again said there was no agreement executed
between Plaintiff and defendant in writing. The Defendant had sent
an agreement on WhatsApp but that was in English so I did not sign
the same as I don’t understand English. The cheques in question were
given to me by Sh. Yogesh Sharma of M/s Radha Raman Enterprise,
the same were given in the month of either September 2018 orCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 9/33
October 2018. I am not able to remember the exact date and time of
handing over of the said cheques to me due to lapse of time. The said
cheques were given to me by Sh. Yogesh Sharma in his company at
Kanpur. I cannot tell the office address of the Defendant situated in
Kanpur. I met Sh. Yogesh Sharma thrice. I cannot tell the date and
time when I met Sh. Yogesh Sharma. I met Sh. Yogesh Sharma first
time in the month of September 2018. Second time I had met him at
his house at Vikas Nagar perhaps. Third time I had met him in the
November 2018 at the site. I cannot show any document which
suggests that I was working at the site of Sh. Yogesh Sharma in the
month of October and November 2018. I had received Rupees One
Lakh in my account, prior to receiving of the above said cheques. In
total I have received an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakh
and fifty thousand) including the aforesaid amount of Rupees One
Lakh. [Voluntary stated that the said amount was received as part
payment prior to receiving of the aforesaid cheques.]
The amount of business was deposited in my A/c no. 039005001095
and some other account also which was maintained by me in Axis
Bank, Sarai Aurangabad, Bahadurgarh, Haryana. In my A/c no.
039005001095. there is no other business transaction of any other
businessmen. All the transactions are with M/s Radha Raman
Enterprises and there is no business transaction shown in the said
account with any other party. It is correct prior to putting the cheques
in question in the said account, the account was inoperative. I got it
operative before putting the cheques in question in the said account. I
was having office at Bahadurgarh in Haryana since 2008 till 2021. I
do not know about any other office of Defendant except as stated by
me in Kanpur. I had worked with Defendant at Datiya, Madhya
Pradesh. The cheques exhibited as Ex. PW-1/2 (Colly) were handed
over to me by Sh. Yogesh duly signed and filled condition. It is wrong
to suggest that the said exhibits bear the signatures of Sh. Yogesh. It is
correct that the said cheques were not signed by anyone in my
presence. The said two cheques were handed over to me. After
bouncing of the cheques, a legal notice was sent by my Counsel who
had expired during COVID. Now due to lapse of time I do not
remember the name of the said Counsel. The cheques were put by me
in my account after the date of the cheques mentioned on them, this
was done on the request of Defendant. I do not remember now after
how many days from date of the cheques I had put them in my
account. When after considerable period Defendant stopped
attending my mobile phones, I put the said cheques in my account.
The Defendant was not attending my phone calls before fifteen days
of putting the cheques in my account. I came to know about the owner
of M/s Radha Raman Enterprises at the time of handing over theCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 10/33
cheques to me.
It is wrong to suggest that I was providing only two Hywa vehicles in
between the period from 12.07.2018 to 10.09.2018. It is wrong to
suggest that cheques in question were only given for security
purposes and not for encashing the same. It is wrong to suggest that
no amount is due and payable by the defendant. It is wrong to suggest
that documents marked as Ex. X1 are forged and fabricated. It is
wrong to suggest that forgery is reflected from the fact that the said
documents were not filed alongwith the petition. It is wrong to
suggest that no balance amount is due against the defendant. It is
wrong to suggest that I have deliberately not filed invoices and GST
documents as there were no dues balanced against the Defendant. It is
wrong to suggest that WhatsApp chats relied upon by me are
manipulated and fabricated. It is wrong to suggest that manipulation
and fabrication is evident from the fact that the said WhatsApp chats
were not filed alongwith the petition. It is wrong to suggest that I have
filed the present case falsely to harass the Defendant. It is wrong to
suggest that Sh. Yogesh Sharma is the proprietor of M/s Radha
Raman Enterprises. It is wrong to suggest that I have deposed
falsely.”
10. The plaintiff also examined Sh. Virender Singh,
Assistant Manager of Delhi State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Ghevra,
Main Bus Stand, Village Ghevra, Delhi-110081 as PW-2. He has
produced on record statement of account of A/c No. 039005001095
of the plaintiff for the period 01.11.2018 to 09.01.2024, which was
marked as Mark PW-2/A. PW-2 was cross-examined by Ld.counsel
for defendant. The cross-examination of PW-2 is reproduced as under:-
“The bank account of Sh. Karambir is in his individual name and not in
the name of his proprietorship concern. The said account has been used
only once or twice and at present it is inoperative. I do not know if Sh.
Karambir had given any document showing his address of Delhi. I do
not know if Sh. Karambir resides in Delhi or not”.
11. No other witness was examined on behalf of plaintiff
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 11/33
and PE was closed vide statement/order dated 07.03.2026.
DEFENDANT EVIDENCE
12. Sh. Yogesh Kumar Mishra, one of the partner of the
defendant in support of his case has examined himself as DW1. He
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. DW1/A.
13. DW1 was cross-examined at length by Ld.counsel for
plaintiff. The material cross-examination of DW1 is reproduced as
under:-
“I have done B.Sc. and LLB. I had given two security cheques. I don’t
remember the date and month, when the said cheques were given, but
the same were given in the year 2018.
Question: You have stated in para no. 3 of the evidence by way of
Affidavit “that ..” what do you mean by this agreement whether at the
time of agreement… it was oral or written?
Answer: Initially, in the month of July 2018, it was an oral agreement.
The written agreement had taken place in September 2018. The written
agreement was executed at my office in Kanpur. I do not remember,
whether said written agreement is placed on judicial record or not.
At this stage judicial file is shown to the witness, after seeing the same
witness states that the written agreement dated 09th September 2018 is
on judicial record, which was exhibited as PW-1/1, but later on it was
marked as Mark A. This agreement was filed by me on judicial record.
Question: Can you tell me the name of the witnesses, in whose
presence, the alleged agreement was executed?
Answer: I do not remember the names of the witness. The names of the
witnesses might be in the aforesaid documents Mark A.
At this stage the document Mark A is shown to the witness, after seeing
the same witness states that no witness has signed the said document.
The three mobile no(s). mentioned on document Mark A are official
no(s). My mobile no. is not mentioned on document Mark A. The
mobile numbers mentioned on document Mark A are at point DWX.
My mobile no. is 8888622224. It is correct that said document Mark A
does not bear my signatures or signatures of plaintiff. It is incorrect to
suggest that the document Mark A does not bear signatures of either
party as it was never executed in my office. It is incorrect to suggest
that the document Mark A was only sent by my office to the mobile of
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 12/33
plaintiff. It is incorrect to suggest that I had not given the aforesaid
cheques as security. I do not remember whether plaintiff had informed
on my WhatsApp before putting the said cheques in his bank.
Question: Till what period plaintiff had provided services to the
defendant?
Answer: The plaintiff had provided services about two months i.e. 10th
of July to 12th September 2018.
The defendant sometimes made payment in cash and sometimes
through NEFT. The payment was made as per requirement shown by
the plaintiff or as per bill. It is incorrect to suggest that plaintiff
provided services for about six months. I had maintained the accounts.
I have not placed the said document of accounts on judicial record. It is
incorrect to suggest that I have purposefully not placed the accounts
maintained by me as it was showing my liabilities against the plaintiff.
The official email ID of my firm is [email protected]. Mr. Manish
was earlier, one of the employees in my firm, he was also authorized
signatory at that time. Mr. Mayank Mishra is my son and he is also one
of the partners in the defendant partnership firm. His mobile no. is
8318793432.
Question: Can you tell whose mobile no. 9990798210 is this
Answer: I do not remember.
It is incorrect to suggest that I am not admitting the fact that aforesaid
Mobile no.is of my son Mayank Mishra. It is incorrect to suggest that I
have deposed falsely.”
14. No other witness was examined on behalf of defendant.
In view of submissions and statement dated 01.04.2026, DE was
closed.
15. I have already heard the arguments at length advanced
by Sh. Bharat Bhushan Jain, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff and Sh. Shashi
Bhushan Jha, Ld. Counsel for defendant. Written submissions on
behalf of defendant also filed.
16. It is argued on behalf of plaintiff that the cheques issued
by the defendant for payment of services rendered by the plaintiff were
dishonoured on presentation. That in view of deposition of PW-1 and
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 13/33
PW-2 and material produced on record, the defendant is liable to make
payment of the outstanding amount. It is prayed that the decree for
recovery alongwith interest as prayed may kindly be passed.
17. On the other hand it is argued on behalf of defendant
that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed being without cause
of action against the defendant. That the cheques given as security
have been misused by the plaintiff and there is nothing outstanding
against the defendant. That the plaintiff has failed to file any bill issued
to the defendant and in the absence of any bill and statement of
work/log book, no relief of recovery can be granted to the plaintiff. It is
prayed that the suit may kindly be dismissed.
18. I have considered the submissions made by Ld.counsel
for parties and perused the entire material on record.
19. It is settled position of law that in civil proceedings, the standard
of proof is governed by the principle of preponderance of probabilities.
The court is not required to attain absolute certainty, rather, it must
assess whether, on the basis of the material on record, one version
appears more probable than the other. If the evidence leads the court to
conclude that a fact is more likely than not to have occurred, the burden
of proof stands discharged. However, where the probabilities are
evenly balanced, the party bearing the burden must fail.
20. This standard is not uniform in its application and may admit
of varying degrees depending upon the nature and gravity of the
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 14/33
subject-matter involved. In cases involving serious allegations or
grave consequences, the court is expected to exercise greater caution
and require a higher degree of probability, though still within the civil
standard. Thus, while proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required,
the evidence must inspire sufficient confidence to persuade the court
that the version advanced is reasonably probable and worthy of
acceptance.
21. Thus, proof of a fact depends upon the probability of its
existence. The finding of the court must be based on the test of a
prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists and in
the context and circumstances of a particular case. (See “proved”
under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 2(1)(j)
of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023).
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha
Ranjan Debbarma, decided on 04.01.2023, reported as (2023) 19
SCC 782 stated that the proving of a fact is to be based on the person
who asserts it in terms of Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). The
relevant porition of Smriti Debbarma (supra) is reproduced below:
“37. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies
upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence
of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief.
(See Addagada Raghavamma (supra). This is mandated in terms of
Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden of proving the
fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on
the party which is denying it. This rule may not be universal and has
exceptions, but in the factual background of the present case, the general
principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both
parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail. Onus of proof, no doubt
shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence,
but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the plaintiff hasCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 15/33
been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the
defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.
(See Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.
Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752). The weakness of the defence cannot be a
justification to decree the suit. (See Union of India v. Vasavi Coop.
Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 66).”
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chowdamma v. Venkatappa,
decided on 25.08.2025, reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1814
discussed the difference between burden of proof and onus of proof.
The relevant paras of Chowdamma (supra) are extracted as follows:
“BURDEN OF PROOF AND ONUS OF PROOF
43. This Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558
observed thus:
“19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be
borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and
onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It
assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of
onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is
to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate the
duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition
at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a
proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an
indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the
others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms
of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he
discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to
a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those
circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the
same.”
44. Also, in Addagada Raghavamma (supra), this Court observed
as follows:
“12. … There is an essential distinction between burden of
proof and onus of proof : burden of proof lies upon the person
who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof
shifts. …Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances
of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of
onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. …” ”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
24. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Ashish Tewari vs. G.P. Tewari
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 16/33
& Anr., decided on 24.04.2026, reported as 2026:DHC:3411 on
Section 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872 observed as under:
“59. In terms of Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter ‘Evidence Act‘), the burden of proof lies on the party who
asserts the existence of a fact and seeks relief on that basis. The initial
onus, therefore, was on the plaintiff to establish his entitlement to rendition
of accounts by placing on record cogent evidence in support of his claim
that the suit properties were purchased by Sh. J.P. Tewari from the sale of
ancestral lands in the village which he has failed to discharge. It is only
upon discharge of such initial burden that the onus would shift to the
defendants to rebut the same. Consequently, the burden never shifted
upon the defendants. It was not for the defendants to prove that the suit
properties were purchased from the personal income and savings of Sh. J.P.
Tewari. Reference in this regard may be to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 .”
(Emphasis supplied in Bold)
25. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Smt. Chaman Lata Bhardwaj &
Ors. vs. Smt. Nirmal Devi, decided on 12.05.2026, reported as
2026:DHC:4173 laid down as under:
“38. A mere plea of forgery taken by the Appellants, without any
particulars, proof, or even an attempt at cross-examination, cannot displace
documentary evidence proved through primary witnesses and supported by
bank records and cheque return memos. Once execution of Loan
Agreement and issuance of cheques, to establish the friendly loans
advanced, are proved, the burden shifted squarely on the Defendant to
rebut the presumption that such cheques were not issued or were not
towards a legally enforceable liability. If the defendant fails, the
Plaintiff is entitled to a decree, on the standard of preponderance of
probabilities.”
(Emphasis supplied in Bold)
26. Thus, as can be observed from various landmark judicial
pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court in Smriti Debbarma (supra)
and Chowdamma (supra), and recent pronouncements of our own
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Ashish Tewari (supra) and Chaman
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 17/33
Lata Bhardwaj (supra), the burden of proof lies upon the party
asserting a fact and never shifts, though the onus of proof shifts
continuously in the evaluation of evidence. There exists an essential
distinction between the two, inasmuch as the initial onus is always
upon the Plaintiff, and it is only upon discharge thereof the onus shifts
upon the Defendant to rebut the same.
27. Before adjudicating on the respective contentions of the
parties, issue-wise, it is necessary to discuss whether the present
suit has been filed within the prescribed period of limitation as per
the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The law of limitation is not a mere technicality but a
substantive and salutary principle of law designed to ensure legal
certainty. As the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held in Popat and
Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, decided
on 29.08.2005,, reported as (2005) 7 SCC 510:
“Bar of limitation does not obstruct the execution. It bars the
remedy. (See V. Subba Rao and Ors. v. Secretary to Govt.
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Govt. of A.P. and
Ors. (1996 (7) SCC 626.) Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused
by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a life-span
for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit.
During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching
the courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is
thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the generalCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 18/33
welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of
time. (See N. Balakrishanan v. M. Krishna Murthy (1998 (7)
SCC 123).”
29. Thus, the law of limitation does not extinguish the
underlying right, it merely restricts the enforceability of the remedy
through courts after the prescribed period. Its purpose is not to defeat
legitimate claims, but to ensure that parties act with reasonable
diligence and do not indulge in unnecessary delay. The legal system
provides remedies to redress injuries, but such remedies cannot be kept
open indefinitely. Thus, limitation law is grounded in considerations of
public policy, encapsulated in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium, meaning that it is in the interest of the State that litigation
must come to an end. The legislative intent is to ensure that every legal
remedy is pursued within a fixed and reasonable time.
30. As per the plaint, the disputed cheques were dishonoured
and returned unpaid with the remarks ‘PAYMENT STOPPED BY
DRAWER’ vide cheque return memo dated 12.11.2018 and
14.11.2018. The present suit has been instituted on 01.06.2019, which
is well – within the limitation period of three years as prescribed under
the Limitation Act, 1963.
31. Having considered the pleadings, evidence led by the
plaintiff, the applicable principles governing burden of proof and
onus to prove, and the submissions advanced on behalf of the
parties, the issue-wise findings of this Court are as follows:-
ISSUE NO. 2
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 19/33
2. Whether this Court is having the territorial jurisdiction to
try and entertain the present suit? (OPP)
32. As the issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the suit,
Issue No. 2 is taken up first. The onus to prove this issue was upon the
plaintiff. It is not in dispute that the registered office of the plaintiff is
situated at Haryana and that the defendant carries on business at Datia,
Madhya Pradesh and Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, and that the cheques in
question are drawn on Bank of Maharashtra, Kanpur. However, it
stands established from cheque returning memos Ex. PW 1/3 (Colly.)
that the said cheques were dishonoured in Gheora, Branch of Delhi
State Cooperative Bank Ltd., situated in Delhi. The plaintiff has also
brought on record the independent witness namely Sh. Virender Singh,
Assistant Manager of Delhi State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Ghevra, who
has proved on oath the statement of Account of the Plaintiff bank
Account situated in the Gheora Branch, Delhi Branch of Delhi State
Cooperative Bank Ltd.
33. Section 20 CPC provides, inter alia, that a suit may be
instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. It is well settled that a cause of
action is a bundle of essential facts and that it is not necessary for the
entire bundle of facts to arise within the jurisdiction of one Court alone.
Even if a part of the cause of action arises within the local limits of a
Court, that Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. This principle was authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies,
(1989) 2 SCC 163, decided on 13.03.1989, where it was held that
where the whole or a part of the cause of action arises within the
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 20/33
jurisdiction of a Court, the plaintiff is at liberty to institute the suit in
that Court.
34. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, since the cheques in question were presented for
encashment and were dishonoured at Delhi State Cooperative Bank
Ltd., Ghevra Branch, New Delhi, being the bank where the plaintiff
maintains his account, a part of the cause of action for the present suit
arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court within the meaning
of Section 20 (c) CPC, notwithstanding that the parties themselves
reside and carry on business outside Delhi. Hence, this Court is having
the territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Issue No. 2 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
ISSUE NO. 01
1. Whether the cheque bearing no.036663 was issued by the
defendant as security cheque, which has been misused by the
plaintiff? (OPD)
35. The onus to prove this issue was upon the defendant. It
is the case of the defendant that the two cheques in question, including
cheque bearing no.036663, were handed over to the plaintiff purely by
way of security and that nothing was due and payable to the plaintiff at
the time, and the said cheques were misused by presenting the same for
encashment.
36. DW1, in his cross-examination, has himself admitted
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 21/33
that he had given two security cheques to the plaintiff. DW1 has further
admitted that the defendant used to maintain accounts of the payments
made to the plaintiff, but the same have not been placed on judicial
record. No explanation has been furnished by the defendant for
withholding the said accounts, which were the best evidence available
with him to substantiate his plea that the entire amount payable to the
plaintiff already stood discharged through RTGS, NEFT, cheque and
cash payments. An adverse inference within the meaning of Section
114 Illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is liable to be
drawn against the defendant for withholding of the said accounts.
37. It is also relevant to note that the written agreement dated
09.09.2018, relied upon by the plaintiff and filed on judicial record as
document Mark A, though filed only as a photocopy, stands admitted
by the defendant. DW1, upon being shown the judicial record in his
cross-examination, admitted that the written agreement dated
09.09.2018 is on judicial record and is the very document marked
Mark A, and further admitted that a written agreement had in fact been
executed between the parties in September 2018, his only objection
being as to the place of its execution and the absence of signatures and
attesting witnesses thereon. Once a party admits the existence and
contents of a document in his cross-examination, the mode in which
the said document was originally filed, namely as a photocopy, ceases
to be of any consequence, since facts admitted need not be proved.
Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 53, Bharatiya
Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) provides that no fact need be proved in any
proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at
the hearing. In view of the admission of DW1, the document Mark A
stands duly proved on record, and any objection as to the mode of its
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 22/33
proof stands waived.
38. It is also relevant that the cheques were returned unpaid
with the remark “PAYMENT STOPPED BY DRAWER” and not for
want of funds or any technical defect, which shows that the dishonour
was a result of a deliberate instruction issued by the defendant to its
bank rather than any infirmity attached to the cheques themselves. The
defendant has not disputed the signing and issuance of the cheques in
question. Once the issuance of the cheques stands admitted, a
presumption arises that the same were issued for a legally enforceable
debt or liability, and it was for the defendant to rebut the said
presumption by cogent evidence, which the defendant has failed to do.
39. In view of the above, the defendant has failed to
discharge the onus of proving that the cheque bearing no.036663
was purely a security cheque with nothing whatsoever due and
payable to the plaintiff, or that the same was misused by the
plaintiff without any corresponding liability.
Issue No. 1 is accordingly decided against the defendant and in
favour of the plaintiff.
ISSUE NO.3
3. Whether the plaintiff has provided the services to the
defendant as alleged? (OPP)
40. The onus to prove this issue was upon the plaintiff. The
case of the plaintiff is that it supplied two Hywa vehicles alongwith
drivers to the defendant on rental basis for a period commencing
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 23/33
June/July 2018 upto December 2018. PW-1, in his cross-examination,
has been unable to speak with certainty or consistency as to the exact
month in which the Hywas were supplied, the rate of rent agreed
between the parties, and whether any written agreement existed
between the parties at the inception. No invoice, GST record, or
Rough/Kaccha Diary evidencing the running account between the
parties has been placed on judicial record despite the plaintiff claiming
to be in possession of the same.
41. As discussed while discussing Issue No.1 above that the
written agreement dated 09.09.2018, document Mark A, stands duly
proved on account of its admission by DW1 in his cross-examination,
notwithstanding that it was filed only as a photocopy. The said
agreement, being a written agreement governing the engagement of the
plaintiff’s Hywa vehicles by the defendant, further corroborates the
case of the plaintiff that services were in fact rendered by the plaintiff
to the defendant pursuant to a concluded arrangement between the
parties, and lends further assurance to the finding already returned
above that the plaintiff did provide services to the defendant.
42. At the same time, DW1 in his cross-examination has
himself admitted that the plaintiff provided services to the defendant,
though he has restricted the said period to about two months, that is,
from 10th July 2018 to 12th September 2018. This admission on the
part of DW1 is an admission against the interest of the defendant and
squarely establishes that services were in fact rendered by the plaintiff
to the defendant using the Hywa vehicles in question, even if the
plaintiff has not been able to substantiate the extended period of
engagement running upto December 2018 as pleaded in the plaint.
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 24/33
43. In view of the admission of DW1 read with the
testimony of PW-1, it stands established that the plaintiff provided
its services to the defendant, though only to the extent admitted by
the defendant himself and not to the full extent as originally
alleged in the plaint.
Issue No. 3 is accordingly decided partly in favour of the plaintiff,
and against the defendant.
ISSUE NO. 4
4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the decree of recovery of
Rs.6,00,000/-, as prayed, in its favour and against the
defendant? (OPP)
44. The onus to prove this issue was upon the plaintiff. In
view of the findings returned on Issue No. 1, it stands established that
the defendant has failed to prove that the cheques in question were
mere security cheques with nothing due and payable to the plaintiff.
The cheques bearing no.036663 dated 22.10.2018 and no.036662
dated 09.11.2018, each for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-, cumulatively
amounting to Rs.6,00,000/-, stand admitted by the defendant, and the
dishonour thereof on account of “payment stopped by drawer” remains
unrebutted.
45. The issuance of these cheques towards discharge of the
outstanding liability furnishes an independent pillar of the plaintiff’s
case and simultaneously undermines the case of defendant. Under
Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 25/33
referred to as “NI Act“), every negotiable instrument is presumed to
have been made for consideration. Under Section 139 NI Act, it is
further presumed that the holder of a cheque received it in discharge of
a legally enforceable debt or liability. These are rebuttable
presumptions, but the burden of displacing them rests upon the drawer,
on the standard of a preponderance of probabilities in civil cases and
beyond shadow of reasonable doubt in criminal cases. The aforesaid
legal position has been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, decided on 07.08.2024, reported
as (2024) 8 SCC 573. The relevant portion is provided as under:
“18. As the presumption contemplated by virtue of Section 118 of the
NI Act, 1881 entails, Section 139 was similarly introduced to provide for
a presumption that the holder of cheque had received the issued
cheque concerned towards discharging of the liability of the drawer,
either in whole or in part. Therefore, at this juncture, it is ideal to make a
reference to Section 118 of the NI Act, 1881, which is reproduced as:
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.–Until the
contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made–
(a) of consideration : that every negotiable instrument was
made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument
when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date : that every negotiable instrument bearing a date
was made or drawn on such date;
(c) as to time of acceptance : that every accepted bill of
exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and
before its maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer : that every transfer of a negotiable
instrument was made before its maturity;
(e) as to order of indorsement : that the indorsements
appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in
which they appear thereon;
(f) as to stamp : that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or
cheque was duly stamped;
(g) that holder is a holder in due course : that the holder of a
negotiable instrument is a holder in due course:
Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its
lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by
means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker
or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for unlawfulCS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 26/33
consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in
due course lies upon him.”
19. Chapter XIII of the NI Act, 1881, of which Section 118 is a part,
lays down special rules for evidence to be adduced within the scheme of the
Act herein. As the text of the said provision showcases, it raises a
rebuttable presumption as against the drawer to the extent that the
negotiable instrument concerned was drawn and subsequently
accepted, indorsed, negotiated, or transferred for an existing
consideration, and the date so designated on such an instrument is the
date when the negotiable instrument concerned was drawn. It is also
further presumed that the same was transferred before its maturity and
that the order in which multiple indorsements appear on such an
instrument, that is, the deemed order thereon. Lastly, the holder of a
negotiable instrument is one in its due course, subject to a situation
where the instrument concerned while being obtained from a lawful
owner and from his or her lawful custody thereof through undertaking
of an offence as contemplated under any statute or through the means
of fraud, the burden to prove him or her being a holder in due course,
instead, lies upon such a holder.
20. Accordingly, to begin with, the bare provision of Section 139 of the
NI Act, 1881 is reproduced herein below:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.–It shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received
the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
The aforesaid presumption entails an obligation on the court conducting the
trial for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 to presume that
the cheque in question was issued by the drawer or accused for the
discharge of a particular liability. The use of expression “shall presume”
ameliorates the conundrum pertaining to the right of the accused to present
evidence for the purpose of rebutting the said presumption. Furthermore,
the effect of such presumption is that, upon filing of the complaint
along with relevant documents, thereby prima facie establishing the
case against the drawer, the onus of proof shifts on the drawer or
accused to adduce cogent material and evidence for rebutting the said
presumption, and as established in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of
Gujarat [Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375 : (2012)
4 SCC (Cri) 283] , based on preponderance of probabilities.
21. While describing the offence envisaged under Section 138 of the NI
Act, 1881 as a regulatory offence for largely being in the nature of a civil
wrong with its impact confined to private parties within commercial
transactions, the three-Judge Bench in the decision
of Rangappa [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184] highlighted Section 139 of the NI Act,
1881 to be an example of a reverse onus clause. This is done so, as the
Court expounds, in the light of Parliament’s intent, which can be
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 27/33
culled out from the peculiar placing of act of dishonour of cheque in a
statute having criminal overtones. The underlying object of such
deliberate placement is to inject and enhance credibility of negotiable
instruments. Additionally, the reverse onus clause serves as an
indispensable “device to prevent undue delay in the course of
litigation”. While acknowledging the test of proportionality and having
laid the interpretation of Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881 hereof, it was
further held that an accused cannot be obligated to rebut the said
presumption through an unduly high standard of proof. This is in light
of the observations laid down by a coordinate Bench in Hiten P.
Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath
Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 960], whereby it was clarified
that the rebuttal ought not to be undertaken conclusively by an accused,
which is reiterated as follows: (SCC p. 25, para 23)
“23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the
basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the
court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not
preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn
from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be
proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court
either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists
[ Section 3, Evidence Act] .
Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively
established but such evidence must be adduced before the court
in support of the defence that the court must either believe the
defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably
probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the
“prudent man”.”
22. Therefore, it may be said that the liability of the defence in cases
under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 is not that of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
23. In light of the aforesaid discussion, and as underscored by this
Court recently in the decision of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh [Rajesh
Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 567 : (2024) 1
SCC (Cri) 1] , an accused may establish non-existence of a debt or
liability either through conclusive evidence that the cheque concerned
was not issued towards the presumed debt or liability, or through
adduction of circumstantial evidence vide standard of preponderance
of probabilities.
…
24. Since a presumption only enables the holder to show a prima
facie case, it can only survive before a court of law subject to contrary
not having been proved to the effect that a cheque or negotiable
instrument was not issued for a consideration or for discharge of any
existing or future debt or liability. In this backdrop, it is pertinent to make
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 28/33
a reference to a decision of three-Judge Bench in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] , which went on to hold that if a
signature on a blank cheque stands admitted to having been inscribed
voluntarily, it is sufficient to trigger a presumption under Section 139
of the NI Act, 1881, even if there is no admission to the effect of
execution of entire contents in the cheque.
…
27. A comprehensive reference to Sections 118, 139 and 140 of the NI Act,
1881 gives birth to a deemed fiction which was also articulated by this
Court in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan [K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, (2001) 8
SCC 458 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 14] as follows : (SCC p. 459, para 6)
“6. … Under Section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be
presumed that the negotiable instrument (including a cheque) had
been made or drawn for consideration. Under Section 139 the
court has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the
holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole
or in part, of a debt or liability. Thus in complaints under Section
138, the court has to presume that the cheque had been issued
for a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However
the burden of proving that a cheque had not been issued for a
debt or liability is on the accused. The Supreme Court in Hiten P.
Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath
Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 960] has also taken an
identical view.”
28. Furthermore, on the aspect of adducing evidence for rebuttal of the
aforesaid statutory presumption, it is pertinent to cumulatively read the
decisions of this Court in Rangappa [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11
SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184] and Rajesh
Jain [Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ)
567 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] which would go on to clarify that the accused
can undoubtedly place reliance on the materials adduced by the
complainant, which would include not only the complainant’s version
in the original complaint, but also the case in the legal or demand
notice, complainant’s case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in
the reply notice, his Section 313CrPC, 1973 statement or at the trial as
to the circumstances under which the promissory note or cheque was
executed. The accused ought not to adduce any further or new
evidence from his end in the said circumstances to rebut the statutory
presumption concerned.”
(Emphasis supplied in Bold)
46. Thus, as can be gathered from Dattatraya (supra), the issuance of
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 29/33
the cheques in question in favour of the plaintiff furnishes an
independent statutory foundation for the case of the plaintiff. These
presumptions, though rebuttable, place the burden of proof upon the
drawer, to be discharged on the standard of preponderance of
probabilities as prevalent in civil cases.
47. In the present case, DW1 has himself admitted in his cross-
examination to having given the cheques in question to the plaintiff.
The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the said Act
accordingly stand attracted, and it was for the defendant to rebut the
same. The defendant, however, has neither placed any accounts, bills,
or bank records on judicial record in support of his plea of prior
discharge, nor pointed to any material in the plaintiff’s own pleadings,
notice, or testimony supporting such a plea. The bare assertion of DW1
that the cheques were given only by way of security, unsupported by
any material of the nature contemplated in the aforesaid decisions, falls
short of rebutting the statutory presumptions in favour of the plaintiff.
48. However, PW-1 has himself, in his cross-examination,
voluntarily stated that he had received a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- from the
defendant, including Rs.1,00,000/- credited to his account, as part
payment prior to receiving the cheques in question. This admission of
the plaintiff’s own witness is binding upon the plaintiff and has to be
given due weight while computing the amount actually due and
payable, since a plaintiff cannot be permitted to recover an amount
which, on his own showing, already stands part paid.
49. Accordingly, giving credit to the defendant for the said
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 30/33
sum of Rs.2,50,000/- already received by the plaintiff as part payment
prior to the cheques being obtained, the amount actually due and
payable by the defendant to the plaintiff lefts only Rs.3,50,000/-
(Rupees Three Lakhs Fifty Thousand only).
50. In view of the above, the plaintiff is held entitled to a
decree for recovery of Rs.3,50,000/- against the defendant, and not
the entire sum of Rs.6,00,000/- as prayed.
Issue No. 4 is accordingly decided partly in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, to the extent indicated above.
ISSUE NO. 5
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any interest?, if yes, at
what rate and for which period? (OPP)
51. The onus to prove this issue was upon the plaintiff. The
plaintiff has prayed for pendente lite and future interest @ 15% per
annum on the principal sum from the date of institution of the suit till
realization. In view of the findings returned on Issue No.4, it stands
established that the defendant is liable to pay the outstanding amount
to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is accordingly entitled to interest on the
said amount.
52. In the present case, the transaction in question arises out
of rendition of transport services and no specific rate of interest was
agreed upon between the parties at the time of the transaction itself.
The rate of 15% per annum claimed by the plaintiff, in the absence of
any contractual stipulation to that effect, appears to be on the higher
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 31/33
side. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, this Court deems it
appropriate to award simple interest @ 9% per annum on the
decretal amount of Rs.3,50,000/- from the date of institution of the
suit till realization.
Issue No. 5 is decided accordingly in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
ISSUE NO. 6
6. Whether plaintiff is entitled for costs? (OPP)
53. The onus to prove this issue was upon the plaintiff.
Since the plaintiff has substantially succeeded in the present suit, the
plaintiff is held entitled to proportionate costs of the suit from the
defendant.
Issue No. 6 is decided accordingly in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
ISSUE NO. 7
7. Relief
54. In view of the findings on Issue Nos. 1 to 6 above, the
suit of the plaintiff is decreed in part. Accordingly, a decree for
recovery of Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Fifty Thousand
only) is hereby passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to pendente lite and
future interest @ 9% per annum on the said decreetal amount,
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 32/33
from the date of institution of the suit till realization. The plaintiff
is also entitled to proportionate costs of the suit.
Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
File be consigned to record room, after due compliance.
Announced in the open Court today
on this 15th day of July, 2026
(DEVENDER KUMAR JANGALA)
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01
North-West/Rohini/New Delhi
15.07.2026.
CS (Comm.) No.144/19 Sh. Karamvir @ Karambir Vs. M/s Radha Raman Enterprises 33/33
