Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Kantipudi Veeravenkata Satyanarayana vs Jadapolu Sreeramulu on 9 July, 2026
APHC010197952022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
[3548]
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE 9th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3207/2022
Between:
1. KANTIPUDI VEERAVENKATA SATYANARAYANA, SON OF
PRASADA RAO, AGED 43 YEARS, DOOR NO.3/172, RB KOTHURU,
RB PATNAM, PEDDAPURAM MANDAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT
2. KANTIPUDI CHAITANYA GOLI, WIFE OF VEERA VENKATA
SATYANARAYANA, AGED 37YEARS, DOOR NO.3/172, RB
KOTHURU, RB PATNAM, PEDDAPURAM MANDAL, EAST
GODAVARI DISTRICT
3. KANTIPUDI SATYA RAO, SON OF PRASAD RAO, AGED 45YEARS,
DOOR NO.3/172, RB KOTHURU, RB PATNAM, PEDDAPURAM
MANDAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1. JADAPOLU SREERAMULU, SON OF BUTCHAIAH, AGED ABOUT
46YEARS, H.NO.12-28 PORUMAMILLA TOWNAND MANDAL-516193
YSR KADAPA DISTRICT AP
2. THE STATE REP BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Petition under Section 437/438/439/482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS,
praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of
Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to quash the entire
proceedings in CC.No.284 of 2021 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil
2
Judge at Badvel, against the Petitioners/accused and grant such other relief or
reliefs
IA NO: 1 OF 2022
Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS, praying that in
the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition,
the High Court may be pleased to grant stay all further proceedings including
the appearance of the petitioners/ accused in CC.No.284 of 2021 on the file of
the Additional Junior Civil Judge at Badvel, pending disposal of the Criminal
Petition and to pass
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1. T SREEDHAR
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
2. Annareddy Chandrasekhar Reddy
The Court made the following:
3
ORDER:
Heard Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel representing
Mr.T.Sreedhar, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr.T.Sreedhar,
learned counsel for the petitioners, who advanced arguments on behalf of the
petitioners, Mr.A.Chandrasekhar Reddy, learned counsel for the de facto
complainant/respondent No.1, and Mr.G.Neelothpal, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State/respondent No.2.
2. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the petitioners,
marked his arguments on three occasions. For better clarification, the matter
was adjourned to enable him to secure instructions as to whether the
complaints which were registered at two different places, having different
jurisdictions regarding the same cheque bearing No.9294.
3. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would submit that
the very registration of complaints at two different places regarding the said
cheque, and that the entertainment of one such complaint by the Porumamilla
Police Station through registration of Crime No.97 of 2021 for the offences
punishable under Sections 406 and 408 read with 34 of IPC, is wholly
unwarranted. He would submit that, on this ground alone, the charge sheet
which is now in question is liable to be quashed. He would further submit that,
on 12.08.2022, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in I.A.No.1 of 2022, while
taking into consideration the submissions made regarding the complaint dated
25.03.2021 which was lodged before the Station House Officer, Hennur Police
Station, Bangalore, Karnataka State, and the second complaint at Station
House Officer, Porumamilla Police Station, YSR Kadapa District, which
contained inconsistent stands and variations, passed an interim order staying
all further proceedings in C.C.No.284 of 2021 on the file of learned Judicial
Magistrate of First Class-cum-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Badvel.
4. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would argue that the
complaint which is lodged before the Hennur Police Station, Bangalore, on
25.03.2021 by the de facto complainant (Ravi Kumar Kanaka) on behalf of
4
Jadapolu Sreeramulu, the present de facto complainant, reflects that the
cheque which is presented before the ICICI Bank was stolen from the office
during the period when the accused frequently visited the office and was on
good terms with Mr.Jadapolu Sreeramulu.
5. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would submit that
the complaint specifically stated that the cheque which was allegedly stolen
and which was presented with the ICICI Bank on 12.03.2021 was unsigned.
The relevant wording in the complaint reads as follows:
―…. Mr. Sreeram checked his account with ICICI Bank he
was surprised to note that on 12-03-2021 the said Mr. Satya
had withdrawn a sum of Rs.9,95,000/- even though Mr. Sreeram
had not given any signed cheques to Mr. Satya. After making
enquiries with the bankers, it came to our knowledge the said
Mr. Satya had withdrawn the said amount of Rs.9,95,000/-
through the cheques belonging to Mr. Sreeram.‖
6. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would submit that
there is no allegation in the complaint that the cheque was forged and
presented before the Bank. He would further submit that in the complaint
dated 25.03.2021 merely alleges that the cheque was stolen from the office
pertaining to Mr.Sreeramulu. He would also submit that, on 17.05.2021,
another complaint was instituted before the Station House Officer,
Porumamilla Police Station, YSR Kadapa District, pursuant to which Crime
No.97 of 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406
and 408 read with 34 of IPC. Upon completion of investigation, the charge
sheet is filed, which was taken on file as C.C.No.284 of 2021. He pointed out
that paragraph 2 of the charge sheet states as follows:
“In that time A1 to A3 were stolen LW1 ICICI cheque book
that LW1 had signed. In that cheque book LW1 used Cheques
vide No’s 9292, 9293, 9295, 9296 only.”
7. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would further submit
that cheque No.9294 is not mentioned in the charge sheet and the cheque
which is not signed as admitted by the de facto complainant himself would
5
indicate that the complaint which is foisted is only to harass the petitioners,
which amounts to a sheer abuse of the process of law.
8. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, would place reliance
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Lal Chawla and
others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another1, wherein, at paragraph 8, it
was held as follows:
―8. We are cognizant of the fact that in the present case, no
investigation had begun pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 filed by
the Respondent No. 2 for a certain period. However, the overall
concern expressed by this Court in Upkar Singh, about the
misuse of successive complaints by the same party, where the
second complaint is clearly propped up to materially improve on
the earlier one, resonates with us. We regret to say that the same
thing which this Court had categorically prohibited in Upkar Singh
has happened in the present case.‖
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further places reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Ghai and others vs.
State of West Bengal and others2, wherein, at paragraph 47, it was held as
follows:
―47. The order of the High Court is seriously flawed due to
the fact that in its interim order dated 24.03.2017, it was observed
that the contentions put forth by the Appellant vis-Ã -vis two
complaints being filed on the same cause of action at different
places but the impugned order overlooks the said aspect and
there was no finding on that issue. At the same time, in order to
attract the ingredients of Section of 406 and 420 IPC it is
imperative on the part of the complainant to prima facie establish
that there was an intention on part of the petitioner and/or others
to cheat and/or to defraud the complainant right from the
inception. Furthermore it has to be prima facie established that
due to such alleged act of cheating the complainant (Respondent
No. 2 herein) had suffered a wrongful loss and the same had
resulted in wrongful gain for the accused(appellant herein). In
absence of these elements, no proceeding is permissible in the
eyes of law with regard to the commission of the offence
punishable u/s 420 IPC. It is apparent that the complaint was
lodged at a very belated stage (as the entire transaction took
place from January 2008 to August 2009, yet the complaint has
been filed in March 2013 i.e., after a delay of almost 4 years) with1
(2021) 5 SCC 435
2
(2022) 7 SCC 124
6the objective of causing harassment to the petitioner and is bereft
of any truth whatsoever.‖
10. Learned counsel would further place reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anukul Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
another3, wherein, at paragraphs 18, 19 and 20, it was held as follows:
―18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v.
State of Uttaranchal and others, it was emphasized that
criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of
harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of
Assam, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass
the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an
abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh
R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others , this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a
substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery
cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the
dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to
direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled
principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in
this context:
―9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an
oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4
might have parted with some money in accordance with the
oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein owes
a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4.
However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of
cheating could be said to have been committed by the
appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that
to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something
more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of
the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the
inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any
element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of ―Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh‖ reported in (2024)
10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what
constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively
has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very
decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of3
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 948
7looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court
thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that
too by making payment of Rs.25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent
as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High
Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may
either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or
may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is
made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help
the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the
accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the
case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery
of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code,
2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the
entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for
the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit
or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the
money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery
of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more
particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a
First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police.
This amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to
recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any
other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be
permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High
Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first
directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the
Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before
the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of
settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do
in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a
miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other
criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to
look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR
along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court
seems to have forgotten the well- settled principles as
enunciated in the decision of this Court in the ―State of
Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others‖ Reported in 1992
Supp.(1) SCC 335.‖
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case,
it is manifest that the dispute – concerning repayment of loan
money and the alleged coercion in execution of documents – is
8
purely civil in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or
forgery are not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple
FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had
already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of
mala fides.‖
11. In oppugnation to the said arguments advanced by the
Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel, Mr.A.Chandrasekhar Reddy,
learned counsel for the de facto complainant, would draw the attention of this
Court to the two complaints registered. He would submit that the earlier
complaint was lodged by the Managing Director, Ravi Kumar Kanaka, on
behalf of the owner, Mr.Sreeramulu (de facto complainant).
12. Mr.A.Chandrasekhar Reddy, learned counsel, would further
submit that the subsequent complaint which is instituted on 17.05.2021 by the
de facto complainant himself, who is the authorized signatory to the bank
account, has instituted with the correct facts. He would also submit that the 1st
complaint which was instituted within the jurisdiction of Hennur Police Station,
Bangalore, was not taken on file and was closed as Non-Cognizable Report
(NCR).No.178/2021. Since no cognizance is taken on the said
letter/complaint, the 2nd complaint was instituted with the Station House
Officer, Porumamilla Police Station, YSR Kadapa District, having jurisdiction
and the same cannot be faulted with. He would also submit that all these
issues can be elucidated only through trial and this Court exercising its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., ought not to interfere with
the proceedings.
13. Mr.G.Neelothpal, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, would
submit that, though a holistic reading of both the complaints differs and
contains contradictions and inconsistent stands, yet the allegations will remain
attracting Sections 405 and 408 of IPC. He would further submit that the trial
Court may be allowed to proceed with the trial instead of quashing the
proceedings in C.C.No.284 of 2021 in this Criminal Petition under Section 482
of Cr.P.C.
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14. Mr.G.Naga Satyanarayana, learned counsel representing
Mr.T.Sreedhar, learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the
arguments advanced on behalf of the de facto complainant cannot have any
legal stance, since the complaint which was instituted on 25.03.2021 was
obtained by the petitioners/accused under Right to Information Act, 2005, and
when any document secured through RTI, it would become a public document
and every submission made in the said complaint would be binding on the
de facto complainant, and any subsequent contrary stands taken would
amount to inconsistent and contradictory stands.
15. Mr.T.Sreedhar, learned counsel for the petitioners, who
subsequently joined, argued that there is no mens rea attributed against the
petitioners, and at the threshold itself, filing of two complaints amplifies that
instituting complaints against the accused does not constitute any offence
under Sections 406 and 408 of IPC. He would draw the attention of this Court
to the essence of Sections 405, 406 and 408 of IPC.
16. For better appreciation, Sections 405, 406 and 408 of IPC are
extracted hereunder:
―405. Criminal breach of trust.–
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with
any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or
converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or
of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made
touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other
person so to do, commits ―criminal breach of trust‖.
Explanation 1.– A person, being an employer of an
establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the
Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 (19 of 1952), or not who deducts the employee’s
contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit
to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any
law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been
entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by
him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution
to the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to
10have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in
violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.
Explanation 2.– A person, being an employer, who deducts the
employees’ contribution from the wages payable to the
employee for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund
held and administered by the Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation established under the Employees’ State Insurance
Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted
with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he
makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said
Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have
dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation
of a direction of law as aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person,
dishonestly disobeys the law which directs him to divide the
effects according to the will, and appropriate them to his own
use. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z going on a journey, entrusts his
furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be returned on
payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse room. A dishonestly
sells the goods. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi. There
is an express or implied contract between A and Z, that all sums
remitted by Z to A shall be invested by A, according to Z’s
direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with directions to A to
invest the same in Company’s paper. A dishonestly disobeys
the direction and employs the money in his own business. A has
committed criminal breach of trust.
(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good
faith, believing that it will be more for Z’s advantage to hold
shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z’s directions, and buys
shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying
Company’s paper, here, though Z should suffer loss, and should
be entitled to bring a civil action against A, on account of that
loss, yet A, not having acted dishonestly, has not committed
criminal breach of trust.
(e) A, a revenue-officer, is entrusted with public money and is
either directed by law, or bound by a contract, express or
implied, with the Government, to pay into a certain treasury all
the public money which he holds. A dishonestly appropriates the
money. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by
land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the property. A
has committed criminal breach of trust.
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406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.–
Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
408. Criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant.–
Whoever, being a clerk or servant or employed as a clerk or
servant, and being in any manner entrusted in such capacity
with property, or with any dominion over property, commits
criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine.‖
17. Mr.T.Sreedhar, learned counsel for the petitioners, would argue
that neither the ingredients of Section 405 nor Section 408 of IPC are
attracted based on the complaints instituted by the de facto complainant. He
would submit that, as argued earlier, the very basis for the offence would not
be made out through a complaint and for the said reason, this Court, at the
earlier stand itself, interdicted by staying all further proceedings in C.C.No.284
of 2021 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class-cum-Additional
Junior Civil Judge, Badvel, on 12.08.2022, on the sole ground that
inconsistent stands are made in two different complaints.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Abhishek vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh4, at paragraph 21, observed as follows:
―21. Applying the aforestated edicts to the case on hand,
we may take note of certain glaring inconsistencies and
discrepancies. Though Bhawna had earlier alleged that her
mother-in-law, Kusum Lata, and her brother-in-law, Abhishek,
had taken away all her jewellery after her marriage on the
pretext of safekeeping, she specifically stated in her deposition
before the Family Court, Narsinghpur, in Civil Suit No. 153A of
2015, that her entire stridhan jewellery was with Nimish and in
spite of repeated demands, he was not returning it to her.
Further, during her cross-examination therein, she admitted that4
(2023) 16 SCC 666
12she had made a complaint to the High Court against Abhishek.
The complaint was styled as an anonymous one, but Bhawna
voluntarily owned up to being its author. This aspect bears out
her animosity against her in-laws and more particularly,
Abhishek.‖
19. Having heard both the sides, this Court is of the opinion that the
complaints which are lodged against the petitioners/accused contain varying
and inconsistent stands, which do not constitute any mens rea. On the other
hand, the proceedings appear to be an attempt to subject the petitioners to an
abuse of the process of law. The essential ingredients required to constitute
an offence under Section 405 of the IPC are not made out from the allegations
contained in the complaints. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that, in order to attract the offence of criminal breach of trust, the
ingredients of sections should be attracted necessarily, and in the absence
thereof, the offence cannot be held as maintained or attracted.
20. Resultantly, in view of the aforesaid discussion and reasoning,
the Criminal Petition is allowed, and the proceedings in C.C.No.284 of 2021
on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class-cum-Additional Junior
Civil Judge, Badvel, are hereby quashed. Further, this Court appreciates the
arguments advanced by Mr.A.Chandrasekhar Reddy, learned counsel for the
de facto complainant/ respondent No.1.
As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
___________________________
TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA, J
Date : 09-07-2026
BMS
