Kanchan Sonwani Minor vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Anr on 12 March, 2026

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    Chattisgarh High Court

    Kanchan Sonwani Minor vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Anr on 12 March, 2026

    YOGESH Digitally signed by
           YOGESH TIWARI
    
    TIWARI 17:42:41 +0530
           Date: 2026.03.17
    
    
    
    
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                                                                                        2026:CGHC:11820
                                                                                                      NAFR
    
                                          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
    
    
                                                         CRA No. 1208 of 2014
    
                                 Shobhit @ Choti S/o . Prem Singh Aged About 22 Years R/o. Vill.
                                 Machabhata     P.S.   Bhatapara    Rural   Distt.   Baloda   Bazar   C.G.,
                                 Chhattisgarh
                                                                                              --- Appellant
                                                                   Versus
                                 State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Bhatapara Rural, Distt. Baloda
                                 Bazar C.G., Chhattisgarh
                                                                                          --- Respondent
    
                                                           ACQA No. 35 of 2015
    
    
                                 Kanchan Sonwani Minor D/o Amarnath Sonwani Aged About 16 Years
                                 Through Her Mother Smt. Rajni, W/o Amarnath Sonwani, Aged About
                                 36 Years, R/o Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara, Tahsil Simga,
                                 District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
                                                                                              --- Appellant
                                                                   Versus
                                 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bhatapara Rural,
                                 District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
                                 2 - Shobhit Alias Choti S/o Prem Singh Aged About 22 Years R/o
                                 Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara Rural, District Baloda Bazaar-
                                 Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
                                                                                         --- Respondents
    
                                           (Cause title taken from Case Information System)
                                         2
    
    
    
    For Appellant in        : Mr. Neelkanth Malivya and Mr. Arvind Dubey,
    CRA No.1208/2014          Advocates
    For State               : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy Advocate
                              General
    
    
                   Hon'ble Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, Judge
                Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
    
                             Judgment on Board
    12.03.2026
    Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
    

    1. Since both the Criminal Appeal filed on behalf of the

    accused/appellant and the Acquittal Appeal preferred by the

    SPONSORED

    complainant arise out of the same judgment passed by the

    learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge

    (POCSO Act), Balodabazar, C.G., and as the issues involved in

    both the appeals are interconnected and based on the same set

    of facts and evidence, it was considered appropriate and in the

    interest of justice to hear them together. Accordingly, both the

    appeals have been clubbed, heard analogously, and are being

    disposed of by this common judgment.

    2. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been preferred on behalf of

    the accused/appellant, whereas Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 has

    been filed by the complainant/victim, assailing the legality, validity

    and propriety of the judgment dated 22.11.2014 passed by the

    learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge

    (POCSO Act), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara
    3

    (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 30/2014. By the said

    judgment, the learned trial Court acquitted the appellant/accused,

    namely Shobhit @ Choti, of the charges punishable under

    Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC“) and

    Sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual

    Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “POCSO Act“). However, the

    appellant was convicted and senteced for the offences

    punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC, as

    follows :-

                      Conviction                     Sentence
              Under Section 354 of the     : Rigorous imprisonment for
                       IPC                   three years with a fine of
                                             ₹1,000/-, in default of
                                             payment of fine, additional
                                             rigorous imprisonment for
                                             three months.
    
              Under Section 506 Part-II    : Rigorous imprisonment for
                     of the IPC              two years with a fine of
                                             ₹1,000/-, in default of
                                             payment of fine, additional
                                             rigorous imprisonment for
                                             three months.
    
                      Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
    
    
    
    
    

    3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.06.2014 the

    victim lodged a report at Police Station Bhatapara Rural alleging

    that on the said date she had returned to Bhatapara by train from

    Tilda and was proceeding from the railway station towards her

    village on the motorcycle of the accused. When they reached a
    4

    secluded place near village Pendri, the accused allegedly

    stopped the motorcycle, caught hold of her hand and attempted

    to drag her towards a nearby field with the intention of outraging

    her modesty. When the victim protested and told the accused that

    she would disclose the incident to her parents, the accused

    threatened to kill her and warned her not to disclose the incident

    to anyone. Thereafter, the accused again made her sit on the

    motorcycle and dropped her near her house.

    4. It is further the case of the prosecution that after reaching home,

    the victim informed her parents, namely the father of the victim

    and the mother of the victim, about the incident and thereafter the

    matter was reported to the police. On the basis of the said report,

    a case was registered against the accused for the offences

    punishable under Sections 354 and 506 of the IPC. During the

    course of investigation, the spot map of the place of occurrence

    was prepared in the presence of the victim and the father of the

    victim on 15.06.2014, which has been exhibited as Ex.P-2.

    5. Thereafter, on 16.06.2014 the victim submitted a written

    complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Balodabazar,

    which has been exhibited as Ex.P-3. On the same day, the father

    of the victim also submitted a written report at Police Station

    Bhatapara Rural alleging that the accused had forcibly committed

    sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on the date of the

    incident and had threatened her with dire consequences if she
    5

    disclosed the incident to anyone. The said written complaint has

    been exhibited as Ex.P-5, wherein the father of the victim also

    requested that the victim be medically examined.

    6. During the course of investigation, the accused was arrested and

    his arrest memo was prepared vide Ex.P-7. The underwear worn

    by the accused was seized under seizure memo Ex.P-4 and was

    sent for examination by issuing requisition Ex.P-11. Another

    seizure memo relating to the undergarments was prepared as

    Ex.P-6 and the same was also sent for examination through

    requisition Ex.P-13.

    7. The victim was medically examined and the doctor handed over

    sealed samples including vaginal swab, slides, pubic hair and

    undergarments, which were produced before the Investigating

    Officer by the Lady Constable Manju Tandon and were seized

    vide seizure memo Ex.P-12.

    8. On 18.06.2014 the statement of the victim was recorded during

    investigation, wherein she stated that the accused had taken her

    on a motorcycle from Bhatapara and had stopped the vehicle

    near a deserted field at village Pendri. It was alleged that the

    accused dragged her towards the field, forcibly removed her

    clothes and, despite her resistance, committed sexual intercourse

    with her. The victim further stated that due to the threats

    extended by the accused she did not initially disclose the entire

    incident but later informed her grandmother when she
    6

    experienced pain the next morning. The statements of other

    witnesses including the grandmother of the victim and the father

    of the victim were also recorded during investigation, who

    supported the version narrated by the victim. The statements of

    PW-6 and other witnesses were also recorded on 22.06.2014.

    9. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet

    against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections

    354, 506B, 376 and 511 of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the

    POCSO Act.

    10. In order to prove the above charges against the accused, a total

    of 9 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution being

    PW-1 to PW-9 and 15 documents have been exhibited as Ex. P-1

    to Ex. P-15, contrary to which, on behalf of the defence, one

    defence witness has been examined and he has exhibited 2

    documents marked as Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2. In his statement

    under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for

    short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), the accused denied all allegations, asserted his

    innocence, and stated that he had been falsely implicated.

    11. The learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the parties and

    appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment

    convicted and sentenced the accused / appellant – Shobhit @

    Choti for the offence punishable under Sections 354 and 506

    Part-II of the IPC and acquitted him for the offence punishable

    under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections 4 and 8 of the
    7

    POCSO Act, against which, aforementioned Criminal Appeal and

    Acquittal Appeal have been filed by the respective parties i.e. the

    accused and the complainant/victim.

    12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal

    No.1208/2014 would submit that the impugned judgment passed

    by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and the evidence

    available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has

    failed to prove the allegations against the appellant beyond

    reasonable doubt and the conviction recorded by the learned trial

    Court for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506

    Part-II of the IPC is not sustainable in law.

    13. Learned counsel would further submit that the statement of the

    victim suffers from material inconsistencies and improvements. It

    is argued that the version given by the victim in the initial report is

    materially different from the statement subsequently recorded

    during investigation, particularly with regard to the allegation of

    sexual assault. It is contended that such material discrepancies

    create serious doubt about the veracity and reliability of the

    prosecution case. It is also submitted that the prosecution has

    failed to produce any independent witness to support the alleged

    incident. Learned counsel would argue that the place of

    occurrence is not shown to be so secluded that no independent

    witness could have been available. Furthermore, the medical

    evidence and other documentary evidence brought on record do
    8

    not conclusively corroborate the allegations made against the

    appellant, and therefore the benefit of doubt ought to have been

    extended to him.

    14. Learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that the

    learned trial Court itself found the evidence insufficient to

    establish the charges under Section 376 of the IPC and Sections

    4 and 8 of the POCSO Act and acquitted the appellant of the said

    charges. It is submitted that once the more serious allegations

    were disbelieved, the conviction of the appellant for the offences

    under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC on the same set of

    evidence is not justified and the appellant deserves to be

    acquitted of the said charges as well.

    15. Alternatively, learned counsel would submit that even if the

    conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is maintained, the

    sentence awarded to the appellant is on the higher side. It is

    submitted that the appellant is a young person with no prior

    criminal antecedents and has already undergone a substantial

    period of incarceration during the pendency of the proceedings.

    Therefore, it is prayed that the sentence imposed upon the

    appellant be reduced to the period already undergone in the

    interest of justice.

    16. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would

    support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court

    to the extent it records the conviction of the appellant for the
    9

    offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the

    IPC. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has properly

    appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on

    record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the

    prosecution has succeeded in proving the said offences against

    the appellant. He would further submit that the testimony of the

    victim is natural, cogent and trustworthy and there is no reason to

    disbelieve her version. It is contended that the victim has

    consistently stated about the conduct of the appellant in catching

    hold of her hand, dragging her towards the field and threatening

    her with dire consequences. Such conduct clearly attracts the

    ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and

    506 Part-II of the IPC.

    17. It is also submitted that the evidence of the victim is duly

    supported by the statements of other prosecution witnesses

    including the father of the victim and other witnesses examined

    during trial. The documentary evidence such as the spot map and

    seizure memos further corroborate the prosecution case.

    Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court does

    not call for any interference by this Court. He would also submit

    that the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is

    proportionate to the gravity of the offence and has been awarded

    after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the

    case. As such, no case is made out either for interference with

    the conviction or for reduction of the sentence awarded to the
    10

    appellant. Accordingly, it is prayed that Criminal Appeal

    No.1208/2014 filed by the appellant be dismissed.

    18. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

    considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also

    went through the records with utmost circumspection.

    19. The pivotal question that arose for consideration before the

    learned trial Court was whether the prosecution had been able to

    establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had

    committed rape upon the victim and thereby made himself liable

    for punishment under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections

    4 and 8 of the POCSO Act, or whether the evidence on record

    only established the commission of the offences punishable

    under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC.

    20. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and

    documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, first

    examined whether the victim could be held to be a “child” within

    the meaning of the POCSO Act. In this regard, the Court noticed

    that though the prosecution had claimed that the victim was about

    15 years of age at the time of the incident, no documentary

    evidence such as a birth certificate, school admission register, or

    any other reliable record was produced before the Court to

    establish her age. The investigating officer also admitted in his

    cross-examination that no document regarding the age of the

    victim was collected during investigation. In absence of such
    11

    reliable evidence, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution

    had failed to conclusively prove that the victim was below 18

    years of age on the date of the incident.

    21. The learned trial Court thereafter examined the allegation of rape

    in light of the medical evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who had

    conducted the medical examination of the victim, deposed that

    upon examination of the private parts of the victim there were no

    signs of recent injury, no bleeding, and the hymen was found

    intact. The doctor further opined that there were no medical

    indications of recent sexual intercourse. The trial Court found that

    this medical evidence did not corroborate the allegation of forcible

    sexual intercourse made by the victim.

    22. The trial Court further observed that although the victim had

    stated in her evidence that the accused had committed rape upon

    her, the medical findings did not support the allegation of

    penetrative sexual assault. The Court therefore held that the

    prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients

    required for constituting the offence of rape under Section 376 of

    the IPC or penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act.

    23. The learned trial Court also considered the arguments advanced

    on behalf of the defence that the statements of the victim and her

    parents contained certain omissions and improvements when

    compared with the contents of the First Information Report.

    However, the Court observed that minor discrepancies in the
    12

    statements of witnesses were not sufficient to discard the entire

    prosecution case, particularly when the core allegation regarding

    the conduct of the accused remained consistent.

    24. The trial Court found that the testimony of the victim regarding the

    conduct of the accused in stopping the motorcycle at a secluded

    place, dragging her towards a field, and using criminal force upon

    her was supported by the statements of other prosecution

    witnesses including the father of the victim and her grandmother.

    The Court further noted that the presence of scratch marks near

    the buttock of the victim, as noticed by the medical officer, lent

    some corroboration to her version that she had resisted the

    accused and had struggled during the incident.

    25. The defence had also attempted to suggest that the accused had

    been falsely implicated due to some prior dispute. However, the

    learned trial Court found that no cogent evidence had been

    produced to substantiate the alleged enmity between the parties.

    The defence witness examined on behalf of the accused also

    failed to establish any circumstance that could probabilize the

    defence theory of false implication.

    26. Upon cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence available on

    record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that

    although the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations of

    rape and penetrative sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt,

    the evidence clearly established that the accused had used
    13

    criminal force against the victim with the intention of outraging her

    modesty and had also threatened her with dire consequences if

    she disclosed the incident to anyone.

    27. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had

    not succeeded in proving the charges under Section 376 of the

    IPC and Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable

    doubt and the accused was entitled to acquittal in respect of

    those charges. However, the evidence on record was found

    sufficient to establish the offences punishable under Sections 354

    and 506 Part-II of the IPC.

    28. Consequently, the learned trial Court convicted the accused for

    the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of

    the IPC. While considering the question of sentence, the trial

    Court took into account the fact that the father of the victim had

    reposed trust in the accused by asking him to drop the victim at

    her home, but the accused had misused the said trust and had

    taken the victim to a secluded place where he committed the

    aforesaid acts. Considering the nature and gravity of the offence,

    the learned trial Court sentenced the accused as detailed in the

    preceding paragraph of the judgment.

    29. We shall first deal with the appeal filed by the complainant/victim

    being Acquittal Appeal No.35/2015.

    30. The acquittal appeal challenges the acquittal by the learned trial

    Court under Section 372 Cr.P.C. While exercising appellate
    14

    jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the

    trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour

    and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the

    benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a

    doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere

    theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core

    prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court

    must ensure the trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and

    extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles.

    31. As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair,

    AIR 2003 SC 182, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha,

    AIR 2004 SC 1053, an appellate Court should not substitute its

    own view unless the trial Court’s findings are perverse or

    relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored,

    providing compelling reason for interference.

    32. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab,

    AIR 1987 SC 1083, clarify that while an appellate Court can

    examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The trial Court has

    the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility.

    Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a

    manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a

    conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor

    discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible

    testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is
    15

    justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so

    would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as

    under:-

    “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is
    inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to
    reach a conclusion which is at variance with the
    one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the
    Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient
    ground for setting aside the acquittal. The
    jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an
    appeal against an order of acquittal is
    circumscribed by the limitation that no interference
    is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the
    approach made by the lower Court to the
    consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated
    by some manifest illegality or the conclusion
    recorded by the Court below is such which could
    not have been possibly arrived at by any Court
    acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore,
    liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two
    views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence
    adduced in the case and the Court below has taken
    a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court
    cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal
    even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the
    Court below on its consideration of the evidence is
    erroneous.”

    33. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC

    984, the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must

    exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The

    trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial

    conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted

    only in exceptional cases–where the trial Court committed a

    manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on

    conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor
    16

    contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core

    prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate

    Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly,

    extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and

    substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:-

    “8. The scope of interference in an appeal against
    acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the
    view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it
    is not permissible to interfere with the finding of
    acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not
    permissible to set aside an order of acquittal,
    merely because the Appellate Court finds the way
    of conviction to be more probable. The interference
    would be warranted only if the view taken is not
    possible at all.”

    34. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of

    Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, the Supreme Court held as under:-

    “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal
    by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate
    Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view
    can be termed as a possible one, particularly when
    evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason
    is that an order of acquittal adds up to the
    presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
    Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in
    reversing the order of the trial court rendering
    acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of
    the accused does not get weakened but only
    strengthened. Such a double presumption that
    enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed
    only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal
    parameters.”

    35. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, this

    Court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence in its entirety,
    17

    including both oral testimony and documentary material. The

    purpose is not merely to review whether the trial Court followed

    procedural formalities, but to examine whether the evidence, as a

    whole, supports the conclusions reached. The appellate Court

    must assess whether the trial Court properly weighed the

    evidentiary value of each piece of material, evaluated the

    credibility of witnesses, and provided cogent and valid reasons

    for its findings. Where the conclusions of the trial Court are found

    to be unsustainable, manifestly erroneous, or perverse, the

    appellate Court is not only empowered but obliged to arrive at its

    own independent conclusion based on the cumulative

    assessment of the evidence.

    36. Applying these principles, we have undertaken a comprehensive

    examination of the prosecution’s case. Each witness statement

    has been scrutinized for credibility, internal consistency, and

    corroboration with other evidence. Documentary exhibits have

    been evaluated for their probative value, authenticity, and

    relevance. Inferences drawn from the facts have been examined

    for logical coherence and alignment with established legal

    principles. The ultimate task is to ensure that justice is done, not

    merely to defer to the trial Court’s judgment. The appellate

    scrutiny is, therefore, both thorough and independent, aimed at

    determining whether the acquittal was justified or whether the

    cumulative evidence necessitates a different conclusion.
    18

    37. In the present case, the victim’s deposition, recorded as PW-2,

    requires careful scrutiny. She claimed that on the day of the

    incident, the accused forcibly attempted sexual intercourse.

    However, her testimony, when compared with other evidence,

    reveals several material contradictions, omissions, and

    improvements, which materially affect her credibility.

    38. PW-2, the victim, in her examination-in-chief, provided a detailed

    account of the alleged incident, claiming that on the day in

    question, she had accompanied the accused under the pretext of

    traveling a familiar route within the village. According to her

    testimony, at a point which she described as relatively secluded,

    away from the view of other villagers, the accused stopped the

    motorcycle and forcibly restrained her movements. She stated

    that the accused grabbed her arm and attempted to pull her into a

    nearby open field, which, in her words, was “isolated and hidden

    from the main path leading to the village.” She further alleged that

    the accused forcibly removed her clothing, including her upper

    garments, and forcibly attempted sexual intercourse. PW-2

    emphasized that despite her repeated protests and resistance,

    the accused overpowered her. She described the struggle in her

    own words, noting that she tried to push him away and called out

    for help, but the accused allegedly threatened her with dire

    consequences, including harm to her person and her family,

    should she reveal the incident to anyone. She explicitly stated
    19

    that these threats induced a fear of immediate harm, which

    prevented her from raising an alarm or escaping at that moment.

    39. PW-2 further deposed that the accused’s conduct continued until

    he had allegedly satisfied his intentions, after which he released

    her and allowed her to return home. She described the emotional

    and psychological impact of the incident, noting that she felt

    terrified, humiliated, and coerced, which contributed to her delay

    in approaching the authorities. According to her testimony, the

    accused repeatedly warned her not to disclose the events to her

    family or the police, asserting that any disclosure would result in

    serious consequences, including threats to her life and well-

    being. In addition to her verbal testimony, PW-2 stated that the

    scene of occurrence was isolated, and that no other person was

    present in the vicinity. She claimed that she was conscious of the

    potential witnesses nearby but felt compelled by fear and

    intimidation not to resist openly or seek immediate help. She also

    elaborated that she did not preserve her clothing or other items

    for forensic evidence immediately after the incident due to fear

    and confusion, which she admitted later complicated the

    collection of material evidence.

    40. During cross-examination, however, several aspects of her

    narrative revealed material contradictions. She admitted that the

    path to the borewell and surrounding garden was frequented by

    other villagers, and she had continued visiting the accused’s
    20

    premises even after the alleged incident. She also acknowledged

    that she did not see the accused taking any video or

    photographs, although she claimed that such recordings existed.

    Furthermore, no external or internal injuries were identified during

    the medical examination conducted shortly thereafter, and the

    forensic reports did not corroborate her allegations of sexual

    assault. Taken together, PW-2’s testimony presents a detailed,

    emotive, and narrative account of the alleged assault,

    emphasizing coercion, threats, and fear. However, her version

    also contains inconsistencies and omissions, particularly

    regarding the timing, location, subsequent conduct, and absence

    of corroborative medical or forensic evidence, which have been

    critically examined by the trial Court.

    41. On the other hand, the medical and forensic evidence on record

    presents a significant divergence from the allegations of forcible

    sexual assault. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who medically examined

    the victim on 15.06.2014, provided detailed testimony regarding

    the physical condition of the victim at the time of examination.

    She deposed that no external injuries, abrasions, contusions, or

    marks of violence were observed on any part of the victim’s body,

    including the private areas. The doctor specifically noted the

    absence of signs indicative of physical struggle or restraint, which

    would ordinarily accompany a forcible sexual assault. Further, the

    medical examination revealed no evidence of bleeding, trauma,

    or inflammation suggestive of recent sexual intercourse. The
    21

    hymen was found intact, and the uterus was of normal size. Dr.

    Verma also testified that no semen or other biological material

    typically associated with sexual assault was detected on the

    garments or through laboratory analysis.

    42. The absence of corroborative forensic evidence is particularly

    material when considered in the context of the gravity of the

    allegations made by the victim. The prosecution’s case rests

    heavily on the assertion of forcible sexual intercourse, which

    would ordinarily produce some observable or detectable physical

    evidence, especially given that the victim alleged a struggle and

    coercion. However, the medical findings do not corroborate such

    a scenario. The petticoat and other garments examined showed

    only whitish stains, which the medical officer clarified could be

    naturally present in a married woman and were not indicative of

    sexual assault. The forensic report did not detect the presence of

    semen, spermatozoa, or any other biological material that could

    link the accused to the act alleged. In sum, the medical and

    forensic findings are neutral or non-corroborative, which

    materially weakens the prosecution case.

    43. In addition to the forensic and medical evidence, the conduct of

    the victim following the alleged incident further casts serious

    doubt on the veracity of the allegations. PW-2 admitted during her

    cross-examination that she delayed lodging the FIR for nearly six

    months, providing fear of the accused as the reason for the delay.
    22

    While delay in reporting may be explainable in cases of

    intimidation, the substantial passage of time without complaint,

    coupled with continued interactions with the accused, undermines

    the credibility of the narrative of sustained fear and coercion.

    Specifically, she acknowledged that she continued to visit the

    accused’s premises to fetch water from the borewell even after

    the alleged incident, which suggests a level of comfort and

    freedom inconsistent with her claim of terror and immediate

    threat. Further, despite claiming to have been forcibly restrained

    in a public area, she did not raise any alarm, call for help, or seek

    assistance from other villagers, even though she admitted that

    the borewell and surrounding premises were frequently visited by

    other members of the community. This conduct, in conjunction

    with the absence of corroborative medical evidence, is highly

    material and casts serious doubt on the reliability of her account.

    44. Taken together, the totality of the medical, forensic, and

    behavioral evidence indicates that the victim’s testimony, while

    detailed and specific, suffers from significant inconsistencies and

    lacks independent corroboration. The trial Court was, therefore,

    justified in observing that the prosecution had failed to establish

    the essential ingredients of forcible sexual assault beyond

    reasonable doubt. The absence of injury, the neutral forensic

    report, and the victim’s post-incident conduct collectively weaken

    the prosecution’s version and lend substantial plausibility to the

    acquittal recorded by the trial Court.

    23

    45. The testimony of other witnesses examined by the prosecution

    fails to provide independent corroboration of the alleged sexual

    assault, and largely relies on what the victim had narrated to

    them after the alleged incident. PW-1, the mother of the victim,

    corroborated that the victim had been threatened by the accused

    and that she had communicated her ordeal to him. However, his

    evidence was entirely based on what he was told by the victim

    months after the incident, and he did not witness any physical

    assault, struggle, or coercion himself. Similarly, PW-3, the

    grandmother of the victim, deposed that the victim had narrated

    the incident to her, yet she could not identify any direct act of

    assault or threat. Other family members or witnesses, including

    PW-4 (father of the victim) and PW-5, largely provided statements

    based on hearsay, without firsthand knowledge of the incident,

    and could not offer any independent or contemporaneous

    confirmation of the alleged conduct of the accused.

    46. Material discrepancies were also noted when the FIR, the initial

    written complaint, and the statement recorded during

    investigation were compared. The sequence of events narrated

    by the victim varied across these documents, particularly

    regarding the precise location to which she was taken, the

    manner in which her clothes were removed, and the form and

    content of the threats allegedly made by the accused. Such

    inconsistencies, while not always fatal, erode the reliability and

    precision of the prosecution narrative. Further, during cross-
    24

    examination, the victim admitted that she washed and reused the

    same clothes for several months after the alleged incident, which

    contradicts the standard expectation that garments worn during a

    sexual assault would be preserved for forensic examination to

    detect seminal stains or other biological evidence. In addition,

    while she alleged that the accused recorded a video and

    circulated it, she admitted that she did not personally see the

    video being made, thereby weakening reliance on electronic

    evidence purportedly supporting the prosecution case.

    47. The documentary evidence adduced during trial also does not

    materially strengthen the prosecution’s case. The spot map

    (Ex.P-2) and Patwari map (Ex.P-3) show the layout of the village

    and the surrounding areas near the borewell, indicating that the

    location where the incident allegedly occurred was not completely

    isolated, with other villagers routinely accessing the borewell,

    casting doubt on the claim of absolute seclusion. Other exhibits,

    including the medical examination consent form (Ex.P-5), seizure

    memos (Ex.P-6), and related documents, confirm procedural

    compliance but do not substantively corroborate the occurrence

    of forcible sexual intercourse. No physical or forensic evidence

    was recovered directly from the scene that could unequivocally

    link the accused to the alleged sexual assault, leaving the

    prosecution case heavily dependent on inconsistent and largely

    hearsay testimony.

    25

    48. Taken together, the witness testimony and documentary evidence

    fail to establish the essential elements of sexual assault or

    coercion beyond reasonable doubt. While minor discrepancies or

    omissions in the victim’s statements could be explained, the

    cumulative absence of independent eyewitnesses, corroborative

    medical evidence, forensic proof, and reliable electronic evidence

    renders the prosecution version doubtful and justifies the trial

    Court’s decision to acquit the accused of the offences under

    Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act.

    49. Applying the principles of law, including C. Antony (supra),

    Ramanand Yadav (supra), Tota Singh (supra), and

    Jafarudheen (supra), interference in acquittal appeals is

    warranted only in exceptional circumstances where the trial

    Court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly untenable.

    An appellate Court must not reverse an acquittal simply because

    it might have arrived at a different view; it can interfere only when

    the trial Court ignored cogent evidence or misappreciated the

    facts.

    50. In the present case, the learned trial Court undertook a

    meticulous and comprehensive scrutiny of all evidence, including

    oral testimony, documentary exhibits, and forensic reports. The

    trial Court carefully examined the statements of the victim (PW-2)

    and other prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5), noting
    26

    areas of consistency, contradictions, and potential

    embellishments

    51. The trial Court carefully considered the minor discrepancies and

    omissions in the testimony of the victim, such as variations in the

    sequence of events, the handling and reuse of clothing, and the

    description of threats. While such minor inconsistencies do not

    automatically discredit a witness, the Court rightly observed that

    they must be considered alongside other factors, particularly in

    cases alleging sexual assault, where corroboration is essential.

    52. Equally important, the Court evaluated the absence of medical

    corroboration and forensic evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9)

    found no external or internal injuries, no signs of trauma, and an

    intact hymen, while the petticoat examined only showed whitish

    stains that could naturally occur in a married woman. No semen

    or other biological evidence suggestive of sexual assault was

    detected. The Court noted that the victim continued visiting the

    accused’s premises after the alleged incident, delayed lodging

    the FIR for nearly six months, and did not raise an alarm despite

    the presence of other villagers using the same borewell. These

    factors collectively cast serious doubt on the veracity of the

    prosecution case.

    53. The trial Court also weighed documentary evidence, including the

    spot map (Ex.P-2), Patwari map (Ex.P-3), seizure memos (Ex.P-

    6), and consent forms (Ex.P-5), in light of the village layout and
    27

    routine activity in the area. It concluded that the alleged site of the

    incident was not entirely secluded, undermining the claim that no

    independent witness could have observed the occurrence.

    Furthermore, the purported electronic evidence, including

    references to a video allegedly recorded by the accused, was

    unsupported by seizure of the original device or Section 65-B

    certification, and thus lacked probative value.

    54. Taking all these factors together, the trial Court balanced the

    minor discrepancies in the statements, the absence of

    corroborative medical and forensic evidence, the delay in

    reporting, and the inconsistent conduct of the victim, and

    concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the

    offences under Section 376 IPC or Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO

    Act beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied settled legal

    principles, including the presumption of innocence, the need for

    corroboration in sexual assault cases, and the high threshold of

    proof required for conviction.

    55. On a comprehensive review, it is manifestly clear that the trial

    Court’s conclusion is plausible, reasoned, and supported by

    evidence. There is no evidence of perversity, misappreciation of

    facts, or illegality in the trial Court’s approach. The trial Court

    meticulously evaluated witness credibility, analyzed

    contradictions and omissions in testimony, assessed
    28

    documentary and forensic evidence, and applied the correct legal

    standards in reaching its conclusion.

    56. For all these reasons, the acquittal of the accused under Section

    376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act is affirmed. The

    Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the complainant/victim is

    hereby dismissed.

    57. Now, we shall proceed to deal with appeal filed by the appellant

    being Criminal Appeal No.1208/2014.

    58. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been filed by the

    accused/appellant, challenging both the conviction and sentence

    imposed by the learned trial Court under Sections 354 and 506

    Part-II IPC. The appellant contends that the conviction is

    unsustainable and, in the alternative, seeks reduction of sentence

    on grounds of being a first-time offender, absence of prior

    criminal history, and the disproportionate nature of the sentence

    imposed.

    59. A detailed and careful re-appreciation of the evidence adduced at

    trial clearly demonstrates that the prosecution has successfully

    established the essential elements of the offences under Sections

    354 and 506 Part-II IPC, namely:

    (a) Use of criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty

    of the victim (Section 354 IPC):

    29

    • The victim (PW-2) deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was

    taken by the accused on a motorcycle from the railway

    station towards her village. During the course of this

    journey, she stated that the accused forcibly restrained her

    movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field, and

    physically handled her clothes and body in a manner which

    caused her fear and distress.

    • Though minor discrepancies exist regarding the sequence

    of events or the exact manner in which the clothes were

    removed, the core allegation that the accused applied

    criminal force intending to outrage her modesty remains

    consistent throughout her statements, including her

    examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and statement

    under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

    • The testimony of PW-1 (mother of the victim) and PW-3

    (grandmother) corroborates that the victim conveyed to

    them the intimidating conduct of the accused, including

    threats and forcible restraint, thereby lending indirect

    support to the essential elements of Section 354 IPC.

    • Documentary evidence, such as Ex.P/2 (spot map) and

    Ex.P/3 (Patwari map), illustrates that the accused

    deliberately led the victim to a relatively secluded location,

    reinforcing the deliberate nature of his actions and the intent

    to outrage the modesty of the victim.

    30

    • The fact that the victim continued to face coercion, fear, and

    threat during this encounter satisfies the statutory

    requirement of intent under Section 354 IPC, as it

    demonstrates that the accused’s actions were not

    accidental or incidental but carried a clear mens rea to

    outrage modesty.

    (b) Criminal intimidation by threatening the victim with dire

    consequences (Section 506 Part-II IPC):

    • The victim (PW-2) deposed in her examination-in-chief that

    the accused repeatedly threatened her with severe and dire

    consequences if she revealed the incident to anyone,

    including her parents, neighbors, or other villagers. She

    stated that these threats were specific, credible, and

    instilled a genuine fear of harm, both to herself and

    potentially to her family. The victim further explained that

    this fear was so overwhelming that it directly influenced her

    decision to delay lodging the FIR for nearly six months,

    which underscores the effectiveness and coercive nature of

    the threats. Her testimony also highlighted that the threats

    were accompanied by gestures and conduct which made

    her feel powerless and constrained, demonstrating the

    intentional use of intimidation to enforce silence.

    • PW-1 (mother of the victim) corroborated that the victim had

    narrated the threats to him in detail, including the nature
    31

    and intensity of the consequences the accused had warned

    her about. PW-3 (grandmother of the victim) similarly

    confirmed that the victim had described being threatened,

    emphasizing the psychological impact and fear generated

    by the accused’s conduct. While neither PW-1 nor PW-3

    witnessed the actual acts of restraint or force, their

    testimonies provide independent corroboration of the

    communicated threats and demonstrate the real effect on

    the victim, satisfying a key requirement under Section 506

    Part-II IPC.

    • The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) provide

    additional corroboration regarding the location where the

    accused allegedly carried out the acts. The maps indicate

    that the area was relatively secluded and partially enclosed,

    supporting the victim’s account that she was isolated during

    the incident, which amplifies the credibility and deliberate

    nature of the threats. The maps, when considered with the

    testimonies, illustrate that the accused’s actions were

    calculated to instill fear and ensure compliance, as the

    victim had little opportunity to seek immediate help from

    nearby villagers.

    • Taken together, the evidence demonstrates that the

    accused’s threats were real, deliberate, and aimed at

    coercing the victim into silence. The cumulative effect of the
    32

    threats, the physical restraint, and the isolated location

    establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim

    reasonably feared that disclosing the incident could result in

    serious harm to herself or her family. This satisfies the

    statutory requirement for criminal intimidation under Section

    506 Part-II IPC, as the accused intentionally created a

    credible apprehension of injury, thereby fulfilling the mens

    rea and actus reus of the offence.

    60. Considering the detailed testimony of the victim (PW-2), coupled

    with the corroborative accounts of PW-1 (mother of the victim)

    and PW-3 (grandmother of the victim), it is evident that the

    prosecution has successfully established both the use of criminal

    force to outrage the modesty of the victim and criminal

    intimidation by threats of dire consequences, thereby fulfilling the

    essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC. The

    victim’s account provides a vivid narration of the accused forcibly

    restraining her, attempting to drag her to a secluded location, and

    issuing repeated threats designed to instill fear and compel

    silence. PW-1 and PW-3 independently corroborate that the

    victim communicated these threats to them, demonstrating the

    real and lasting impact of the accused’s coercive conduct, even

    though they did not personally witness the physical acts.

    61. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) reinforce the

    victim’s testimony, indicating that the location of the incident was
    33

    sufficiently secluded to allow the accused to carry out his threats

    and apply criminal force without interference from bystanders.

    The procedural documentation, including the FIR, written

    complaint, seizure memos, and medical examination records,

    collectively confirm the formal steps taken by the authorities and

    substantiate the context in which the offences occurred.

    62. While minor discrepancies exist in peripheral details such as the

    exact sequence of movements, handling of clothing, and precise

    timing, these do not detract from the reliability of the core

    allegations. The deliberate actions of the accused, the isolation of

    the victim, and the clear communication of threats all point to

    intentional and unlawful conduct aimed at outraging the victim’s

    modesty and coercing her through intimidation. Taken

    cumulatively, the evidence satisfies the statutory requirements for

    both offences and demonstrates that the prosecution has proven

    beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is criminally liable

    under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC.

    63. The victim, PW-2, deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was taken by

    the accused on his motorcycle from the railway station towards

    her village. She stated that the accused forcibly restrained her

    movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field near the

    village, and repeatedly threatened her with severe consequences

    should she disclose the incident to anyone, including her family

    members or neighbors. While there were minor variations in her
    34

    statements regarding the exact sequence of events and the

    handling of her clothing, the central allegation of criminal force

    and intimidation remained consistent throughout the FIR (Ex.P/1),

    written complaints, and statements recorded during investigation.

    The testimony of PW-2 demonstrates that she experienced fear

    and coercion, which directly influenced her decision to delay

    lodging a formal complaint for several months, highlighting the

    efficacy and impact of the threats made by the accused.

    64. PW-2’s account finds some corroboration in the procedural and

    documentary records. The FIR lodged at the relevant police

    station provided a contemporaneous account of the incident,

    establishing the temporal and factual context. The spot map

    (Ex.P/2) illustrates the location of the alleged incident, showing

    that while the area was somewhat secluded, it was not

    completely inaccessible, thereby demonstrating that the

    accused’s act of taking the victim to this location was deliberate

    and not incidental. The Patwari map (Ex.P/3) further confirms the

    layout of the village, aiding in visualizing the movements alleged

    by the victim. The consent form for medical examination (Ex.P/5)

    and the seizure memo pertaining to the victim’s clothing (Ex.P/6)

    indicate procedural compliance in preserving evidence, although

    forensic corroboration was limited, as the victim had washed and

    reused the clothes in the months following the incident.

    Additionally, PW-2 admitted that she could not personally observe
    35

    any alleged video recordings referenced in her statements,

    casting doubt on electronic evidence mentioned.

    65. PW-1, the mother of the victim, testified that the victim narrated

    the threats and coercive conduct of the accused to him. Although

    he did not witness any physical assault personally, his testimony

    provides indirect corroboration of criminal intimidation, as it

    demonstrates that the accused’s threats were communicated and

    caused the victim genuine fear. PW-3, the grandmother of the

    victim, similarly confirmed that the victim narrated the incident to

    her. While she could not personally identify any act of sexual

    assault, her testimony reinforces the element of intimidation and

    forced restraint, consistent with the victim’s account. PW-4 father

    of the victim and PW-5, other family member, largely provided

    hearsay evidence about the incident and could not independently

    verify any physical assault; nevertheless, their statements

    contribute to the overall narrative of coercion and intimidation,

    supporting the prosecution’s claim that the accused intentionally

    used force and threats to control the victim.

    66. The medical examination conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9)

    on 15.06.2014 revealed that there were no external or internal

    injuries on the victim’s body, no signs of bleeding or trauma

    indicative of forcible sexual intercourse, and the hymen was intact

    with a uterus of normal size. No semen or other biological

    material suggestive of sexual assault was detected. The petticoat
    36

    examined showed only whitish stains, which the doctor clarified

    could naturally occur. While the absence of medical corroboration

    contradicts allegations of penetrative sexual assault, it does not

    detract from the offences under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC,

    which relate to the application of criminal force, intent to outrage

    modesty, and intimidation, all of which are sufficiently established

    by oral testimony and documentary evidence.

    67. The Court has also considered the documentary evidence in its

    entirety. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and the Patwari map (Ex.P/3)

    corroborate the victim’s account regarding the movement to a

    somewhat secluded field, highlighting the deliberate nature of the

    accused’s actions to isolate and threaten the victim. The consent

    form for medical examination (Ex.P/5) and seizure memo

    (Ex.P/6) establish procedural compliance but do not

    independently substantiate forcible sexual assault. Other seizure

    documents (Ex.P/4, Ex.P/11, Ex.P/12, Ex.P/13) reflect the chain-

    of-custody of the victim’s clothing and other samples, although

    forensic testing did not yield evidence supporting sexual assault.

    These documents, however, confirm that the victim was in the

    custody of the accused and subjected to coercion, and they

    support the victim’s narrative of being forcibly restrained and

    threatened.

    68. A comprehensive review of all evidence demonstrates that the

    prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
    37

    accused applied criminal force intending to outrage the modesty

    of the victim and threatened her with dire consequences, thereby

    satisfying the essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II

    IPC. The core acts of restraint, intimidation, and threats are

    consistently supported by the testimony of the victim,

    corroborative accounts of PW-1 and PW-3, and documentary

    evidence showing the location and circumstances of the incident.

    Minor discrepancies, such as variations in the sequence of

    events, handling of clothing, or the victim’s inability to observe

    certain electronic evidence, do not dilute the established facts.

    On the contrary, the cumulative evidence demonstrates that the

    accused acted deliberately, used coercion effectively, and caused

    the victim to reasonably fear serious consequences, fulfilling the

    statutory requirements for criminal force and criminal intimidation.

    69. Therefore, the conviction under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC

    is fully justified, as the evidence establishes beyond reasonable

    doubt that the accused forcibly restrained the victim, attempted to

    isolate her, and threatened her with serious consequences. The

    oral testimony, corroborative witness accounts, procedural

    documentation, and location evidence collectively form a reliable

    and coherent narrative, sufficient to sustain the conviction even in

    the absence of medical corroboration of sexual assault.

    70. In the present case, minor discrepancies were noted in the

    evidence, including variations in the sequence of events as
    38

    narrated in the FIR, written complaint, and statement recorded

    during investigation. There were also differences regarding the

    handling and washing of the victim’s clothing, which limited the

    scope for forensic verification, as well as slight variations in the

    description of the exact location and route taken by the accused

    and victim. These differences, however, are peripheral and do not

    affect the core elements of the offences, namely the use of

    criminal force with intent to outrage modesty and the act of

    threatening the victim with dire consequences. The Court concurs

    with the trial Court’s finding that the prosecution has successfully

    established the essential ingredients of Sections 354 and 506

    Part-II IPC beyond reasonable doubt, and that the accused’s

    actions were deliberate, coercive, and intended to intimidate the

    victim.

    71. Turning to the question of sentence, the trial Court had imposed

    rigorous imprisonment of three years for the offence under

    Section 354 IPC with a fine of ₹1,000/-, and rigorous

    imprisonment of two years for the offence under Section 506

    Part-II IPC, also with a fine of ₹1,000/-. In default of payment, the

    trial Court directed that the accused undergo additional rigorous

    imprisonment for three months on each count. Upon careful

    examination, this Court finds the sentence to be disproportionate

    to the circumstances of the case. While the offences are

    undoubtedly serious and demand deterrence, several mitigating

    factors must guide the assessment of the appropriate sentence.
    39

    Notably, the accused is a first-time offender with no prior criminal

    antecedents. Further, there was no physical injury caused to the

    victim, and the accused’s age, social background, and general

    circumstances warrant consideration in accordance with the

    principles of proportionality and reformative justice. Excessively

    harsh sentences in such circumstances would not serve the

    rehabilitative objectives of criminal law effectively, nor would they

    promote societal interests in a measured and balanced manner.

    72. Taking all these factors into account, including the nature of the

    offence, the evidence of restraint, threats, and criminal force, as

    well as the mitigating circumstances of first-time offender status,

    this Court finds it just and equitable to modify the sentence while

    upholding the conviction. Accordingly, the sentence for the

    offence under Section 354 IPC is reduced to rigorous

    imprisonment for one year instead of rigorous imprisonment for

    three years, with a fine of ₹20,000/-. In default of payment of the

    fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six

    months. Similarly, for the offence under Section 506 Part-II IPC,

    the sentence is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year

    instead of rigorous imprisonment for two years, with a fine of

    ₹10,000/-, and in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months.

    Both sentences shall run concurrently, ensuring that the

    punishment is proportionate to the gravity of the offences while

    also reflecting the principles of deterrence, reformative justice,

    and proportionality.

    40

    73. It is stated at Bar that the appellant – Shobhit @ Choti in CRA

    No.1208/2014 is on bail, he is directed to surrender forthwith to

    serve the remaining part of the sentence.

    74. In conclusion, the conviction of the accused under Sections 354

    and 506 Part-II IPC is maintained, as the prosecution has proved

    beyond reasonable doubt that the accused applied criminal force

    with intent to outrage the modesty of the victim and threatened

    her with dire consequences, satisfying all statutory elements of

    the offences. At the same time, the modification of sentence

    ensures that justice is served in a measured and balanced

    manner, upholding both the seriousness of the offences and the

    principles of proportionality, deterrence, and reformative justice.

    The Court is thus satisfied that the modified sentence adequately

    addresses the objectives of criminal punishment without imposing

    an excessive or unduly harsh penalty on a first-time offender.

    75. In the result:

    (i) Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the

    complainant/victim is dismissed, and the acquittal of the

    accused under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the

    POCSO Act is confirmed;

    (ii) Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 filed by the

    accused/appellant is allowed in part, with the conviction

    under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC maintained, the

    sentence modified to one year rigorous imprisonment for
    41

    each offence with a fine of ₹20,000/- for the offence

    punishable under Section 354 of the IPC and ₹10,000/-

    for the offence punishable under Section 506 Part-II of

    the IPC, in default six months’ rigorous imprisonment for

    each offence, both sentences to run concurrently, and the

    appellant is directed to surrender for undergoing the

    remaining part of the sentence.

    76. The fine amount deposited shall be paid to the victim as

    compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal

    Procedure, 1973, under the head of victim compensation.

    77. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along

    with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned

    forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

                           Sd/-                                   Sd/-
                   (Sanjay S. Agrawal)                (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
                         Judge                                   Judge
    
    
    
    Yogesh
     



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