Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Kana Ram vs State Of Rajasthan on 17 April, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:15909]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal (Sb) No. 745/2022
Kana Ram S/o Sh. Shravan Lal @ Ramji Lal Patwari, Aged About
41 Years, Chhila B, Teh. Kolayat No. 2, Bajju, Bikaner R/o Nangal
Tajavatan, Dausa.
----Appellant
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Madhav Mitra, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Kapil Meena
Mr. Shreyash Ramdev
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Surendra Bishnoi, AGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
REPORTABLE
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 21/01/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED : 21/01/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART : Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 17/04/2026
BY THE COURT:-
1. The instant criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant
assailing the judgment dated 21.05.2022 passed by the learned
Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Bikaner in
Sessions Case No. 12/2013, whereby the appellant came to be
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convicted for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
1.1 By the said judgment, the learned trial Court sentenced the
appellant to undergo two year’s simple imprisonment along with a
fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence under Section 7 of the Act, and
in default of payment of fine, to further undergo three month’s
simple imprisonment. For the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the Act, the appellant was sentenced
similarly.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the
complainant, Likhma Ram, approached the office of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau (ACB) on 16.04.2012 and submitted a written
complaint stating that he had purchased 22 Bighas 8 Biswas of
land situated in Murabba No. 98/49, Chak 2 CD, in the name of his
mother, Bhira. The complainant intended to obtain a loan on the
said land for the purpose of fountain irrigation, for which he
contacted the accused. It was alleged that the accused demanded
a bribe of ₹10,000 for issuing the Jamabandi and passbook.
2.1 Upon receipt of the complaint, the ACB verified the demand
and initiated trap proceedings. A trap was laid with two
independent witnesses, and on 17.04.2012, the accused was
caught red-handed at Sub-Tehsil Bajju while accepting ₹3,500 as
illegal gratification. Upon noticing the raiding party, the accused
attempted to throw away the money and flee, but was
apprehended on the spot. Necessary formalities, including seizure
and hand-wash procedures, were duly carried out.
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2.2 After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed,
and the learned Trial Court took cognizance and framed charges
against the accused. During trial, the prosecution examined
witnesses and exhibited documents in support of its case. The
statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
wherein he denied the allegations and claimed that he had been
falsely implicated due to enmity. Being aggrieved by the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.05.2022, the
appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Court.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in law and facts,
and the findings recorded are perverse and contrary to the
material on record. The prosecution has failed to prove the
essential ingredients of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification beyond reasonable doubt. There is no evidence to
show that any work of the complainant was pending with the
appellant or that he was in a position to extend any favour. The
alleged verification proceedings are doubtful due to material
contradictions and lack of scientific evidence. Mere recovery of
tainted money, in absence of proof of demand and acceptance, is
insufficient to sustain conviction. Hence, the impugned judgment
deserves to be quashed.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently
opposed the prayer so advanced on behalf of the appellant.
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5. I have heard the counsels appearing on behalf of the parties
and have also perused the material available on record.
6. To start with, it is apposite to discuss the relevant provisions
of the PC Act. For ease of reference, Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and
13(2) are reproduced hereinbelow: –
7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed.–
Any public servant who,–
(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any
person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform
or cause performance of public duty improperly or
dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform
such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or
(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue
advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or
dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to
perform such duty either by himself or another public
servant; or
(c) performs or induces another public servant to perform
improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear
performance of such duty in anticipation of or in
consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any
person,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than three years but which may extend to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1.–For the purpose of this section, the
obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue
advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the
performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has
not been improper.
Illustration.–A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give
him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his
routine ration card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an
offence under this section. Explanation 2.–For the purpose
of this section,–
(i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts to
obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public
servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to obtain, any
undue advantage for himself or for another person, by
abusing his position as a public servant or by using his
personal influence over another public servant; or by any
other corrupt or illegal means;
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(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a
public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the
undue advantage directly or through a third party.
From a bare perusal of Section 7 of the PC Act, it is manifest
that the legislature intends to criminalise not only the acceptance
but even the mere demand or attempt to obtain any undue
advantage by a public servant. The essence of the offence lies in
the corrupt motive to perform a public duty improperly,
dishonestly, or to forbear from its due discharge. It is further
evident that actual improper performance of duty is not a sine qua
non, as the offence stands complete with the act of demand or
acceptance itself. The provision also takes within its sweep indirect
obtainment through abuse of position or via third parties. Thus,
the section is couched in wide terms to preserve the sanctity of
public office and to deter even the slightest taint of corruption.
6.1 Section 13 of the PC Act reads as:-
13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant. —
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct, —
(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any
other person any gratification other than legal remuneration
as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any
valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration
which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he
knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be
concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or
about to be transacted by him, or having any connection
with the official functions of himself or of any public servant
to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he
knows to be interested in or related to the person so
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (6 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]property entrusted to him or under his control as a public
servant or allows any other person so to do; or
(d) if he, —
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or
for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or
if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or
has, at any time during the period of his office, been
in possession for which the public servant cannot
satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or
property disproportionate to his known sources of
income.
Explanation. –For the purposes of this section, “known
sources of income” means income received from any lawful
source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance
with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time
being applicable to a public servant.
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for
a term which shall be not less than one year but
which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine.
A bare perusal of Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of
the PC Act, it is manifest that “criminal misconduct” by a public
servant is attracted where he, by corrupt or illegal means or by
abusing his official position, secures for himself or for another any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. The provision further takes
within its fold cases where such advantage is obtained without any
public interest, thereby striking at arbitrary exercise of power. It
also contemplates possession of disproportionate assets for which
no satisfactory account is furnished. The gravamen of the offence
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lies in the misuse of public office for private gain, whether direct
or indirect. Once such misconduct is established, Section 13(2)
prescribes stringent punishment, extending from one year up to
seven years’ imprisonment, along with fine. Thus, the section is
designed to ensure purity in public administration and to deter
enrichment through abuse of official position.
7. At the outset, the complainant PW-5, namely Likhmaram,
upon whose complaint (Ex. P-10) the entire prosecution is
founded, has turned hostile and has categorically denied the
allegations of demand, payment, and even the trap proceedings.
He has further deposed that he never met the appellant and
instead interacted with one Gudduram. In view of the settled
proposition of law as laid down in Banarasi Das v. State of
Haryana reported in (2010) 4 SCC 450 whereby Hon’ble the
Supreme Court noted that the primary witnesses were declared
hostile, and the evidence of demand and acceptance was not
corroborated beyond reasonable doubt; here in this case,
sustainability of the judgment does not seem safe. The Apex Court
emphasized that conviction cannot be based on inference alone
and requires direct or circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the
Supreme Court set aside the conviction, granting the appellant the
benefit of the doubt, and acquitted him. In N. Sunkanna v. State
of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2016) 1 SCC 713, the Apex
Court found that there was no proof of demand for illegal
gratification, as the complainant turned hostile and no other
evidence supported the demand. So, when the complainant does
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not support the prosecution case, the burden lies heavily upon the
prosecution to establish demand and acceptance through
independent and unimpeachable evidence, which is conspicuously
absent in the present case.
8. After thoroughly perusing the material and evidence
available on record, it is further manifest that no work was
pending with the appellant. The appellant was admittedly a
Patwari in the Colonisation Department, whereas the issuance and
maintenance of jamabandi falls within the domain of the Revenue
Department. This position stands fortified by the testimony of
PW1. The documentary evidence, particularly Ex. P-35, reflects
that copies of the relevant documents had already been issued to
the complainant much prior to the lodging of the FIR. Additionally,
Ex. P-21 (Mutation Register) establishes that the mutation in
favour of the complainant’s mother had already been effected.
Thus, there existed no occasion or necessity for the appellant to
either demand or facilitate issuance of such documents.
9. Moving on to the allegations of demand, being the sine qua
non for constituting an offence under the PC Act, has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant has denied the
demand in unequivocal terms. PW-4, who accompanied the
complainant for verification, has not supported the prosecution
and admitted that he neither heard nor witnessed any demand.
PW-12’s testimony is riddled with contradictions and fails to inspire
confidence. Furthermore, there are material inconsistencies
regarding the amount allegedly demanded, varying from Rs.
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10,000/- to Rs. 5,000/- then Rs. 4,000/- which ultimately changed
to Rs. 3500/- during the trap, which strikes at the root of the
prosecution case. In light of the law laid down in Neeraj Dutta v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 18 SCC 251
wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court affirmed that circumstantial
evidence could suffice in proving demand and acceptance of a
bribe and the court clarified the legal standards for proving such
offenses, emphasizing the role of circumstantial evidence when
direct evidence is unavailable. In Madan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan reported in (2025) 4 SCC 624 the Apex court found
inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony and noted that
independent witnesses did not corroborate the prosecution’s
version of events. The court concluded that the prosecution failed
to establish the demand and acceptance of the bribe beyond
reasonable doubt.
9.1 The trap proceedings and the element of acceptance are
equally doubtful. The recovery of the alleged tainted money from
the ground and not from the conscious possession of the
appellant, coupled with the consistent and immediate denial by
the appellant, creates a serious dent in the prosecution case. The
testimonies of PW-8, PW-9, and PW-10 reveal that none of them
conclusively witnessed the exchange of money and that the
money was allegedly thrown on the ground by the appellant. In
such circumstances, the essential ingredient of “acceptance”
remains unproved.
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9.2 In the present matter, there is no direct evidence on record
to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offence. Even
if, for the sake of argument, reliance is placed upon circumstantial
evidence to infer demand and acceptance, the prosecution has
failed to bring on record such cogent and reliable circumstances.
In the absence of both direct and circumstantial evidence, the
foundational facts of demand and acceptance remain unproved.
Consequently, when the very substratum of the prosecution case
is not established, no adverse inference can be drawn against the
accused.
10. Coming to the admissibility of evidence in electronic form
and compliance of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter to be referred as “IEA”). For the ease of reference,
Section 65B of the IEA is reproduced hereinbelow:-
65B. Admissibility of electronic records. — (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any
information contained in an electronic record which is
printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or
magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter
referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be
also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section
are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in
question and shall be admissible in any proceedings,
without further proof or production of the original, as
evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated
therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect
of a computer output shall be the following, namely: —
(a) the computer output containing the information was
produced by the computer during the period over which the
computer was used regularly to store or process information
for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over
that period by the person having lawful control over the use
of the computer;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained
in the electronic record or of the kind from which the(Uploaded on 20/04/2026 at 12:36:21 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (11 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]information so contained is derived was regularly fed into
the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the
computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect
of any period in which it was not operating properly or was
out of operation during that part of the period, was not such
as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its
contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record
reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the
computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or
processing information for the purposes of any activities
regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause
(a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by
computers, whether–
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that
period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that
period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in
succession over that period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation
over that period, in whatever order, of one or more
computers and one or more combinations of computers, all
the computers used for that purpose during that period shall
be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a
single computer; and references in this section to a
computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a
statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate
doing any of the following things, that is to say, —
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the
statement and describing the manner in which it was
produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the
production of that electronic record as may be appropriate
for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was
produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions
mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be
signed by a person occupying a responsible official position
in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the
management of the relevant activities (whichever is
appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the
certificate; and for the purposes of this sub- section it shall
be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the
knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section, —
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(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer
if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether
it is so supplied directly or (with or without human
intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any
official, information is supplied with a view to its being
stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a
computer operated otherwise than in the course of those
activities, that information, if duly supplied to that
computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of
those activities;
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced
by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or
(with or without human intervention) by means of any
appropriate equipment.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section any reference
to information being derived from other information shall be
a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation,
comparison or any other process.]
10.1 At the outset, it is apposite to observe that Section 65B of
the IEA constitutes a special provision governing the admissibility
of electronic records, engrafting a legal fiction whereby any
information contained in an electronic record, when produced in
the form of a printout, CD, or other media, is deemed to be a
document, provided the statutory conditions are duly satisfied.
The provision, in its scheme, mandates that such computer output
becomes admissible without production of the original device,
subject to fulfillment of the requirements enumerated in sub-
sections (2) and (4). Sub-section (2) lays down foundational
conditions, namely that the computer was in regular use, the
information was fed in the ordinary course of activities, the device
was operating properly, and the output is derived from such data,
thereby ensuring the authenticity and reliability of the electronic
record. Sub-section (3) further clarifies that in cases involving
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interconnected systems or multiple devices, the same shall be
treated as a single computer. However, the heart and soul of the
provision lies in sub-section (4), which mandates the furnishing of
a certificate identifying the electronic record, describing the
manner of its production, providing particulars of the device
involved, and certifying compliance with the conditions of sub-
section (2). Such certificate must be signed by a person occupying
a “responsible official position,” which expression has to be
construed to mean a person who is directly concerned with the
operation of the device or management of the relevant activities
and is competent to vouchsafe the integrity and accuracy of the
data, such as a system administrator or authorised officer; it does
not necessarily denote a high-ranking officer but must have a
clear nexus with the device and the data in question. It is trite
that the requirement of such certification is not a mere procedural
formality but a condition precedent to make the document
admissible in evidence, ensuring the sanctity and chain of custody
of electronic evidence, and in absence thereof, the electronic
record is rendered inadmissible in evidence, the mandate of the
statute being strict and obligatory.
10.2 Upon a careful scrutiny of the record, it transpires that the
alleged CDs containing the conversation are stated to have been
prepared on 17.04.2012 during the course of trap proceedings.
However, the certificate mandated under Section 65B of the IEA,
which constitutes a sine qua non for admissibility of electronic
evidence, came to be furnished only on 30.05.2018, after an
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inordinate and unexplained delay of more than six years. The
transcripts (Ex. P-6 to P-15), though admittedly prepared from the
original tape recorder, stand juxtaposed with a certificate issued
qua the CDs, thereby creating a patent inconsistency.
Significantly, the original device was never produced before the
Court, and the CDs, when played during trial, were not even
audible, thereby further eroding the evidentiary worth of the
material relied upon.
10.3 This Court is constrained to observe that the requirement of
a certificate under Section 65B is not an empty or procedural
formality, but a mandatory condition precedent, going to the very
root of admissibility of electronic evidence. The legal position
stands authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 and
reaffirmed in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1, wherein it has been
unequivocally held that compliance with Section 65B is
indispensable and non-negotiable.
10.4 At the very outset, no such certificate was produced
alongwith the charge-sheet. The record further reveals that PW-
12, Niyaz Mohammad, appeared before the Court on 06.03.2018
for recording of his statement and, thereafter, in continuation of
his statements, on 30.05.2018, he moved an application stating:
“मेरे द्वारा प्रकरण संख्या 91/12 के संबंध में धारा 65 बी का प्रमाण पत्र सहवन से रहने
के कारण आज पेश कर रहा हूँ “, and it is only on that date that the
certificate surfaced for the first time.
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (15 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]10.5 This Court cannot remain oblivious to the fact that such a
foundational document, which ought to have been in existence at
the inception of the evidentiary process, was conspicuously absent
at the stage of filing of the charge-sheet and came to be
introduced at a belated stage during trial. It is further borne out
that at the time when PW-12 entered the witness box, he was
posted as DSP, Kolayat, District Bikaner, whereas the incident in
question pertains to a period when he was posted with the ACB at
an outpost. The interregnum of several years, coupled with the
change in his official capacity and posting, assumes material
significance and casts a shadow on the credibility of the
subsequent certification.
10.6 This Court is, therefore, constrained to entertain a serious
and well-founded doubt that upon his appearance before the
Court, and either upon noticing the glaring absence of the
requisite certificate or being advised by the prosecutor; an
attempt was made to prepare such document instantly, ostensibly
to fill up a lacuna. The certification dated 30.05.2018, coinciding
with the date of his deposition, in respect of recordings allegedly
heard and transcripts prepared on 17.04.2012, renders the entire
exercise suspect. A certification which purports to vouch for
events of six years prior, without any contemporaneous record,
continuity of custody, or demonstrable linkage with the original
device, is nothing but a hollow and perfunctory formality, lacking
in legal sanctity.
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (16 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]10.7 It is manifestly clear that PW-12 did not come to the Court
equipped with the requisite record. On the day of his deposition,
he was neither in possession of the CD nor of any recording device
through which he could have independently verified the contents,
nor even the concerned file. It appears that only upon entering
the Court premises, and possibly upon being so advised by the
learned Public Prosecutor or some other person, he perused the
file and upon noticing the absence of the mandatory certificate,
hastily caused a certificate to be typed within the Court campus
and appended his signature thereto before producing the same.
At the cost of repetition, it must be emphasized that the law
mandates certification upon due verification of the electronic
record by actually hearing or examining the source material. The
legislative intent was never to countenance a mechanical exercise
whereby a few lines are casually typed, signed, and tendered to
confer legality upon an otherwise inadmissible document. Such a
perfunctory compliance strikes at the very root of the sanctity and
reliability of electronic evidence and cannot be accorded judicial
imprimatur.
10.8 At this juncture, it becomes imperative for this Court to
dwell upon and underscore the true import, scope, and legislative
intent behind the expression “responsible official” as employed
under Section 65B of the IEA. The legislature, in its conscious
wisdom, has not used this expression lightly or redundantly. The
phrase “responsible official” embodies a substantive safeguard,
intended to ensure authenticity, accountability, and reliability of
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (17 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]electronic evidence, which by its very nature is susceptible to
manipulation, alteration, duplication, fabrication, or any kind of
mannual interference. A “responsible official” is not a mere
signatory or a formal attestor who affixes his signature upon a
document at convenience or upon suggestion. Rather, such an
official must be a person who is directly connected with the
operation of the device, or who has lawful control over the use of
the device, or who has personally handled, monitored, or
supervised the process of recording, copying, or extraction of the
electronic data. The responsibility envisaged by the statute is not
symbolic but real, not retrospective but contemporaneous, and not
superficial but substantive. The obligation cast upon such
responsible official is multi-fold, firstly, to ensure that the device in
question was in proper working condition at the relevant time;
secondly, to verify that the process of recording or copying was
carried out in a reliable and secure manner; thirdly, to affirm that
the contents reproduced are a true and faithful representation of
the original data; and lastly, to certify that no tampering,
alteration, or interference has occurred at any stage. Such
certification must be rooted in personal knowledge, derived from
direct involvement at the time of the event, and not based upon
conjecture, assumption, or post facto reconstruction or supplied
information.
10.9 Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the conduct
of PW-12 falls woefully short of the standard so envisaged. A
person who, by his own admission and conduct, did not prepare or
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (18 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]furnish the certificate at the relevant point of time, and who seeks
to assume such responsibility after a lapse of six years, cannot, by
any stretch of legal imagination, be regarded as a “responsible
official” within the meaning of Section 65B. The very essence of
responsibility would be the immediacy and accountability at the
time of occurrence, and not a belated assumption of authority
when the evidentiary lacuna is brought to fore. The assertion, in
substance, that “six years earlier, the recording was heard, found
to be correct, the device was functioning properly, and no
interference was detected,” when such assertion is made for the
first time at the stage of deposition and not contemporaneously
recorded, is devoid of credibility, bereft of assurance, and lacks
evidentiary sanction and value as well. Such a statement, in the
considered view of this Court, is nothing more than an exercise in
empty formalism, undertaken to give a semblance of compliance
to a mandatory statutory requirement.
10.10 This Court must also observe, in no uncertain terms, that
such practice borders on reducing the legislative mandate to a
mockery. The statutory requirement is sought to be converted into
a ritualistic exercise, where the certificate is generated not at the
time of creation of the electronic record, but at the time when its
absence is noticed during trial. This is impermissible in law. The
certificate under Section 65B is not a curative tool to fill up
lacunae, nor is it a document that can be manufactured at
convenience to salvage an otherwise inadmissible piece of
evidence.
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (19 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]10.11 It is further to be clarified that the certificate under
Section 65B stands on an entirely different footing from other
forms of documentary evidence, such as expert reports or FSL
opinions, which may, in certain circumstances, be permitted to be
brought on record at a later stage. The certificate in question
pertains to the very foundation of admissibility and reliability of
the electronic record itself. Therefore, the law mandates that such
certification must be contemporaneous with the event, i.e., at the
time when the electronic record is created, copied, or first
extracted. In other words, the certification must bear the same
temporal nexus as the event sought to be proved, and cannot be
divorced from it by a substantial lapse of time.
10.12 In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has no
hesitation in holding that the certificate under Section 65B, having
been produced after an inordinate delay of six years, lacking
contemporaneity, and suffering from intrinsic inconsistencies,
cannot be relied upon. Consequently, the electronic evidence
sought to be adduced by the prosecution, being unsupported by a
valid and lawful certification by a truly “responsible official,” is
rendered inadmissible and deserves to be eschewed from
consideration.
11. It is also noteworthy that the investigation suffers from
serious procedural lapses, including doubtful chain of custody of
the alleged tainted money, inconsistencies in preparation of
documents, absence of independent corroboration, and
contradictions in testimonies of material witnesses. The
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (20 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]cumulative effect of these infirmities renders the prosecution case
wholly unreliable.
12. In the considered opinion of this Court, the complainant, who
constitutes the primary and most material witness of the
prosecution, has not supported the case and has resiled from his
earlier version. In such a situation, the evidentiary value of the
prosecution case stands substantially weakened. At best, the
concerned officer can depose as to what was allegedly stated to
him by the complainant; however, such a statement, being a mere
reiteration of what was told by another person, does not carry the
force of substantive evidence and squarely falls within the realm
of hearsay, which is inadmissible in law. It is no doubt true that
merely because a witness is declared hostile, his entire testimony
does not stand effaced, and the Court may rely upon such part of
his deposition which is found to be credible and trustworthy.
However, such reliance must be founded upon legally admissible
evidence. In the present matter, the prosecution has sought to
place reliance on alleged electronic evidence to establish demand.
Yet, unless such electronic record satisfies the mandatory
requirements of admissibility, including compliance with Section
65B of the IEA, the same cannot be looked into. Had the electronic
evidence been duly proved and rendered admissible in accordance
with law, and further had it been established that the voices
contained therein were of the accused and the complainant, more
so, when the complainant himself identifies his voice, then, on the
basis of such authenticated conversation, an inference with regard
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (21 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]to demand could have been legitimately drawn. However, in the
absence of such admissible and reliable material, the foundational
fact of demand remains unproved. The fact that neither the
recorder was produced in the Court nor the copies in the form of
compact disc were clearly audible when tried to play in courtroom
further puts a serious dent in the case of prosecution and in such
circumstances, it would be safe for this Court to held that the
prosecution miserably failed to substantiate the charge and no
conviction can be sustained on such deficient evidence. The
prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts of
demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt
13. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby
allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence
dated 21.05.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention
of Corruption Act Cases, Bikaner in Sessions Case No. 12/2013 is
hereby set aside.
13.1 The appellant stands acquitted of all the charges levelled
against him. His bail bonds are hereby discharged. The record be
sent back.
13.2 The accused shall furnish requisite bonds to the satisfaction
of the trial Court within one month from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order, undertaking that in the event of any appeal
being preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, he shall duly
appear as and when directed.
14. Before parting and in order to obviate recurrence of such
lapses, it is deemed appropriate to suggest the Director General,
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (22 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]Anti-Corruption Bureau, to issue suitable circulars/instructions to
all officers of the ACB that whenever any electronic device is used
for recording, and the same is heard or transcribed, the
responsible officer shall, on the very same day or in exceptional
cases, contemporaneously prepare and issue a certificate in
compliance with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act / Section
63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. This certificate must
specify the specifications of the device, its make, identification
particulars, the manner of recording, the process of extraction,
and certifying the correctness, integrity, and authenticity of the
contents. Such certification shall not be deferred, postponed, or
prepared at a later stage, and shall invariably form part of the
case record at the earliest stage, preferably along with the charge-
sheet. Any deviation from this mandate shall be viewed seriously,
as it not only undermines the evidentiary value of such material
but also strikes at the very root of a fair, transparent, and credible
investigation.
15. This Court is equally constrained to observe, with a measure
of concern, that on account of such lapses, cases which are
otherwise capable of being duly proved by the prosecution are
rendered vulnerable. At times, even a culpable person succeeds in
escaping the clutches of law, not on merits, but owing to technical
infirmities attributable to the negligence of the investigating
officers. It is trite that the criminal justice system rests upon the
foundational principle that the guilty must be punished and the
innocent must be set at liberty. However, when avoidable
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[2026:RJ-JD:15909] (23 of 23) [CRLAS-745/2022]procedural lapses and casualness on the part of the police
machinery give rise to technical defects, the very administration of
justice is imperilled, resulting in undeserved advantage to the
guilty and erosion of public confidence in the system.
16. Stay petition and all pending applications stands disposed of.
(FARJAND ALI),J
170-Mamta/-
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