Kerala High Court
K.T.Razak vs The Secretary on 6 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL 2026 / 16TH CHAITHRA, 1948
CRL.REV.PET NO. 301 OF 2020
JUDGMENT DATED 03.02.2020 IN Crl.A NO.15 OF 2019 OF II ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
COURT, KOZHIKODE
ORDER DATED 30.12.2017 IN ST NO.1094 OF 2003 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF
FIRST CLASS -II, THAMARASSERY
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
K.T.RAZAK, AGED 53 YEARS,
S/O. BEERANKUTTY, APPATTE HOUSE, MAPPARAM, CHERUVAYOOR P.O.,
VAZHAKKADU, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.P.V.ANOOP
SRI.PHIJO PRADEESH PHILIP
SHRI.M.P.PRIYESHKUMAR
SRI.K.V.SREERAJ
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT & STATE:
1 THE SECRETARY,
KODIYATHUR GRAMA PANCHAYAT, KODIYATHUR, KOZHIKODE
DISTRICT, PIN-673 602.
2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH
COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI-682 031.
BY ADVS.
R1 BY SHRI.JACOB ABRAHAM
R2 BY SRI. SANAL P. RAJ, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
SMT.KOCHUMOL KODUVATH
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
01.04.2026, THE COURT ON 06.04.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JOHNSON JOHN, J.
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Crl. R.P. No. 301 of 2020
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Dated this the 6th day of April, 2026
ORDER
This revision petition is filed by the accused against the concurrent
findings of the trial court and the appellate court that he is guilty of the
offence under Section 210 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (‘Act,
1994’ for short) and sentencing him to imprisonment till rising of the
court and to pay Rs.40,322/- to the complainant as compensation under
Section 357(3) Cr.P.C and in default of payment, to undergo simple
imprisonment for two months.
2. The prosecution case is that the accused participated in the
competitive auction for conducting ferry service at Parayangotte Kadavu
for the period from 01.04.2002 to 31.03.2003. As he was the highest
bidder for an amount of Rs.46,000/-, an agreement was executed on
03.04.2002. But, after executing the agreement, he committed default
in paying the amount as per the agreement and even after issuance of
demand notice, he failed to pay the amount. As he was not having any
assets within the limits of the Panchayat, recovery of the amount by
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distraint warrant was found impracticable and hence, the criminal
prosecution was initiated.
3. Heard Sri. Junaid S., the learned counsel representing the
learned counsel for the revision petitioner, Sri. Jacob Abraham, the
learned counsel for the first respondent Panchayat and Sri. Sanal P. Raj,
the learned Public Prosecutor for the second respondent, State of Kerala.
4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that the
Panchayat has not complied with the conditions as required under the
second proviso to Section 210 of the Act, 1994 before initiating the
prosecution and therefore, the complaint itself is not maintainable. It is
also argued that the Panchayat has not initiated any proceedings against
the country boat owned by the revision petitioner and that there is no
proper explanation regarding the difference in the amounts mentioned in
Exhibits P3 to P5 notices issued by the Panchayat.
5. The learned counsel for the first respondent Panchayat argued
that Exhibits P3 to P5 notices and Exhibit P6, distraint warrant, are
documents filed along with the complaint and it is specifically stated in
the complaint that the Secretary of the Panchayat was satisfied that
recovery of the amount by issuance of the distraint warrant is
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impracticable and therefore, the argument against the maintainability of
the complaint is not legally sustainable. It is also argued that apart from
making a vague suggestion while cross examining PW1 that the accused
owns a country boat, no document is produced to show that the accused
is in ownership of any country boat.
6. Section 210 of the Act, 1994 is extracted below for reference:
“210. Recovery of arrears of tax, cess, etc. – Any arrear of cess, rate,
surcharge or tax imposed or fees levied under this Act shall be recoverable as an
arrear of public revenue under the law relating to the recovery of arrears of public
revenue for the time being in force:
Provided that the Secretary of a Village Panchayat may directly recover by
distraint, under his warrant, and sale of movable properties of the defaulter
subject to such rules as may be prescribed:
Provided further that, if for any reason the distraint or a sufficient distraint of a
defaulter’s property is impracticable, the Secretary may prosecute the defaulter
before a Magistrate.”
7. The fact that the revision petitioner/accused was the highest
bidder and he executed Exhibit P2 agreement dated 03.04.2002 is not in
dispute. Exhibits P3, P4 and P5 are the demand notices issued by the
Panchayat. The distraint warrant dated 17.2.2003 is marked as Exhibit
P6 and the endorsement dated 19.2.2003 on the reverse side of Exhibit
P6 by Abdurahman S., L. D Clerk, Kodiyathoor Panchayat, shows that
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the defaulter is residing outside the jurisdiction of Kodiyathoor Grama
Panchayat and therefore, attachment of the property is impracticable.
Further Rule 24 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Taxation, Levy and Appeal)
Rules, 1996 provides that distraint to be confined to properties within
the Panchayat area.
8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the
order of this Court in Crl. M.C Nos. 431 of 2020 and 1385 of 2020 and
argued that initiation of revenue recovery proceedings and
impracticability to realise the amount by issuance of a distraint warrant
are essential pre-requisite for launching the prosecution. But, as noticed
earlier, there is specific averment in the complaint regarding the
impracticability in effecting recovery by issuance of distraint warrant and
further, the endorsement on the reverse side of Exhibit P6 distraint
warrant also shows the impracticability in realising the amount through
distraint warrant and in that circumstance, I find that the facts and
circumstances in the decisions relied on by the revision petitioner are
different from the facts and circumstances involved in this case and
hence, not applicable.
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9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that in
Exhibit P3 notice, the exact amount due is not stated and in Exhibit P4
notice, the amount mentioned as due is Rs.46,000/-. Whereas, in Exhibit
P5, the amount due is shown as Rs.35,317/- and in Exhibit P6 distraint
warrant and the complaint, the amount due is shown as Rs.35,322/-.
The learned counsel for the first respondent argued that the trial court
has elaborately considered this aspect in paragraph 8 of the judgment
and also pointed out that in Exhibit P3 notice, it is specifically stated that
3 instalments as per Exhibit P2 agreement dated 03.04.2002 is due.
10. It is also pointed out that in Exhibit P5 notice dated
28.01.2003, the total amount due with interest and notice charge is
shown as Rs.35,317/- and in Exhibit P6 distraint warrant, the warrant
fee of Rs.5/- is also added and hence, the total amount was shown as
Rs.35,322/- and in the absence of any specific challenge in cross
examination of PW1 regarding the exact amount due, the revision
petitioner is not entitled to raise such a contention before the revisional
court.
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11. It is well settled that the revisional court cannot act as an
appellate court and the power of the revisional court under Sections 397
to 401 Cr.P.C cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court. In
State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri
[(1999) 2 SCC 452 = 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], the Honourable Supreme
Court held thus:
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence
or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of
justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power
of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion
on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring
feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing
the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid
standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the
High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction
of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
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12. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke [(2015) 3 SCC 123 = (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], the
Honourable Supreme Court held thus:
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the
view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order,
merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not
meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional
jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in
accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional
power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated
with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is
sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is
based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or
where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the
courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional
jurisdiction.”
13. In the present case, the trial court and the appellate court
found that the complaint is maintainable under Section 210 of the Act,
1994, in as much as the complaint was filed after the issuance of
Exhibits P3 to P5 notices and Exhibit P6 distraint warrant. As noticed
earlier, Exhibit P6 distraint warrant was returned with a report that the
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defaulter is residing outside the jurisdiction of Kodiyathoor Grama
Panchayat and it is impracticable to effect recovery through distraint
warrant. Therefore, I find that the judgment under challenge is not
vitiated due to any illegality, irregularity or error of law.
For the aforesaid reasons, I find that this revision petition is devoid
of merit and is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this Crl. R.P is
dismissed.
sd/-
JOHNSON JOHN,
JUDGE.
Rv
