Himachal Pradesh High Court
Junaid Khan vs State Of Hp on 8 July, 2026
2026:HHC:27513
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1011 of 2026
.
Decided on : 08.07.2026
Junaid Khan .... Petitioner
Versus
State of HP .... Respondent
of
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (oral)
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 93 of 2025 dated 19.04.2025, registered at
Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
2. It has been asserted that the police received secret
information on 19.04.2025 at 02:10 p.m. that the
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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petitioner/accused was in possession of heroin, which he was
attempting to sell at the bus stand. The police completed the
.
formalities and joined Hemant Sharma and Karan. The police
apprehended the petitioner near a Punjabi restaurant and found
111 grams of heroin in his possession. The police arrested the
petitioner and seized the heroin. The petitioner has been behind
of
bars for about 1 year. The prosecution has failed to complete the
evidence, and this violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.
rt
The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the
Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 19.04.2025.
They received secret information that the petitioner was about to
sell the heroin near the bus stand. A huge quantity of heroin
could be recovered by his search. The information was credible,
and the delay in procuring the search warrant would have led to
the destruction of the case property. Hence, the information was
reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer. The
police joined Hemant Sharma and Karan and went towards the
spot. The petitioner was found near Punjabi Dhaba. The police
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searched the bag being carried by the petitioner and recovered 112
grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin. The heroin was
.
sent to the FSL, and as per the report of analysis, it was found to
be a sample of Alprazolam. 112 grams of Alprazolam is a
commercial quantity. FIR No. 1 of 2019, FIR No. 698 of 2017 and
FIR No. 700 of 2017 have been registered against the petitioner.
of
Hence, the status report.
4.
rt
I have heard Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State.
5. Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely
implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence
despite the lapse of one year, which violates the petitioner’s right
to a speedy trial. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the quantity of Alprazolam
found in the possession of the petitioner was commercial, and
the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present
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case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid
down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to
.
bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the petitioner be released on bail.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
of
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
rt
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person undertrial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted asunder: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is thevital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
.
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
of
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
rt
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
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prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
.
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
of
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
rt
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
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regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court’s decision to grant
.
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
of
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
rt
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as.
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time whileconsidering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,of
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
rt
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard tothe vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow aconviction vis-Ã -vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
.
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
of
11. The status report shows that the police searched the
bag being carried by the petitioner and recovered 112 grams of
rt
heroin from his possession. The police sent the heroineto FSL,
and it was found to be Alprazolam. The Central Government has
notified 100 grams of Alprazolam as the commercial quantity,
which means that the petitioner was found in possession of a
commercial quantity of Alprazolam.
12. Police had recovered a commercial quantity of
Alprazolam. Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
apply to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section
27A, and also for offences involving commercial::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own bond
unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
.
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
of
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
rt
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being
in force, on granting of bail.”
13. This section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was ob-
served:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They
are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that
.
as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily
satisfied in addition to the normal requirements
under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other
of
enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
rt reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
14. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail
moved by the accused involved in offences under theNDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors.,
(1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits the murder
of one or two persons, while those persons who
are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental
in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard
to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513continue their nefarious activities of trafficking
and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The
reason may be the large stake and illegal profit.
involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under
the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about
the adverse effect of such activities in DurandDidier vs. Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,
(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out
of
that the organised activities of the
underworld and the clandestine
smuggling of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances into this
rt country and illegal trafficking in such
drugs and substances have led to drugaddiction among a sizeable section of the
public, particularly the adolescents and
students of both sexes and the menace
has assumed serious and alarmingproportions in recent years. Therefore, in
order to effectively control and eradicate
this proliferating and boomingdevastating menace, causing deleterious
effects and a deadly impact on society asa whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has
made effective provisions by introducingAct 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory
minimum imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial
unless the mandatory conditions provided in
Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty
of such offence; and::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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(ii) that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail are satisfied. The
High Court has not given any justifiable.
reason for not abiding by the aforesaid
mandate while ordering the release of
the respondent accused on bail. Instead
of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
of
dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with
which Parliament, after due
rt deliberation, has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the
limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC
but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section
37, which commences with the non-obstante clause.
The operative part of the said section is in the
negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to
any person accused of the commission of an offence
under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied.
The first condition is that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to oppose the application, and
the second is that the Court must be satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two
conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
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the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the
.
limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law
for the time being in force, regulating the grant of
bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
15. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
of
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
rt
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-
A and also for offences involving a commercial quantityare:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportu-
nity to oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of
such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to com-
mit any offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench
of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v.
Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC
(Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-
11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It con-
notes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged, and this reasonable belief, contemplated
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in turn, points to the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the ac-
.
cused is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to
act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
of
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p.
2258 states that it would be unreasonable to
expect an exact definition of the word “reason-
rt
able”. Reason varies in its conclusions accord-
ing to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and
the times and circumstances in which he
thinks. The reasoning which built up the old
scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of
a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v.
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC
p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sew-
erage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.
[Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC
532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accor-
dance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it
is a question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, depends on the circum-
stances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act,
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2026:HHC:27513
is not called upon to record a finding of not
guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially
confined to the question of releasing the ac-
.
cused on bail, that the court is called upon to
see if there are reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the accused is not guilty and records
its satisfaction about the existence of such
grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of ac-
quittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
of
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
rt
granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has not committed an of-
fence and whether he is likely to commit any offence
while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences pun-
ishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the
menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent
parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act
have been prescribed.”
16. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control Bu-
reau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was
observed:
“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante
clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions
imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are
certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when
granting bail to a person accused of having committed an
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations
imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to
be factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of
Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by
an accused person for release, and (ii) if such an
application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied.
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
person accused is not guilty of such an offence.
Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for
discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of
Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCCof
549, a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this
Court, it has been held thus: —
“7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when
rt
the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart
from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor,
the other twin conditions which have relevance so far asthe present accused-respondent is concerned, are the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty ofthe alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. The conditions are
cumulative and not alternative. The satisfactioncontemplated regarding the accused being not guilty
has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression“reasonable grounds” means something more than prima
facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes
for believing that the accused is not guilty of the allegedoffence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.” [emphasis added]
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for
discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122,
and this Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27513contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires.
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at
hand, the High Court seems to have completelyoverlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in
addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or
any other law for the time being in force, regulating theof
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail
under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis
added]
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used
rt
in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean
credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believethat the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence.
For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and
circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the
Court to believe that the accused person would not havecommitted such an offence. Dovetailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an
application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the
Court is not required to record a finding that the accused
person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weighthe evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused
has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not. The
entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at this
stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus,
the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he
has been charged with and that he is unlikely to commit an
offence under the Act while on bail.
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17. In the present case, the petitioner has not satisfied the
twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he
.
cannot be held entitled to bail.
18. It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a
of
speedy trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner. The
rt
petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheet to
demonstrate the delay. The petitioner was prima facie found in
possession of a commercial quantity of Alprazolam, and he is not
entitled to bail without satisfying the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:
INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged
incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: –
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:27513on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control and.
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
of
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
rt
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference tothe material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizureof narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with theprosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising theconsignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
19. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:27513the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPSAct is made out in the present matter.”
20. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v.
of
Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein it was
observed: –
rt
9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of
contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditionsunder Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory
and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the
accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during thependency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a
duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its
satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that thereexist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he isnot likely to commit any offence while on bail. The
recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a
mandatory precondition, the non-observance of whichvitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has
held in no uncertain terms that the recording of
satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is
mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order
granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands
vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands
reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not
record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)
(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction,
the High Court has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:27513Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind
the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an approach is plainly
contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and.
deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to
speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is
undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in
matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS
Act, particularly where the recovery is of a commercial
quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised
within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed
of
into service solely on the ground of delay to override it.
The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special
provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read
harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other.
rt
The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the
twin conditions under Section 37, has, in this Court’s view,
committed an error.
****
9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters
involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms.
Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application,
the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon
recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions:
first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, thatthe accused is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere
formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court in
Kashif (supra) has held, in plain terms, that the non-
recording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in
nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A
similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo
(supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).
10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled
position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the
impugned order, which carries the weight of the
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2026:HHC:27513
reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin
conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS
Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the
.
proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial”.
The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional
guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as
the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right
has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the
of
mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin
satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may have
escaped the attention of the High Court.
21. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the
rt
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
22. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not
communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to
bail on this consideration. This submission is only stated to be
rejected. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State
of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication
of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply
prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the
judgment. It was observed:
“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding requirement mandating the written
communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an
arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:41 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:27513of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation
would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal
justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore,.
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied)
23. This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench of
this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was
observed:
of
“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as
previously there existed no consistent or binding
rt
requirements mandating written communication of the
grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairnessand legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure
as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make
directions issued therein prospective.”
24. This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of
HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the
requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective.
This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar
@Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore,
the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were
not communicated to him.
25. A reference was made to the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India and anr,
SLP Criminal 3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026, however, in the
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2026:HHC:27513
said case, it has nowhere been stated that the provisions of
supplying the grounds of arrest laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs
.
State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024, would be
retrospective, therefore, no advantage can be derived from the
cited judgment.
of
26. No other point was urged.
27. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
rt
28. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
8th July, 2026
(Nikita)
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