Punjab-Haryana High Court
Joginder Singh vs Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. And … on 17 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
209
1. CWP-9863-2022
Date of decision: 17.07.2026
Joginder Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & ors. .....Respondents
2. CWP-12628-2010 (O&M)
Date of decision: 17.07.2026
Joginder Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & ors. .....Respondents
3. CWP-8525-2014
Date of decision: 17.07.2026
Joginder Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & ors. .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. M.L. Saggar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Sunny Saggar, Advocate
for the petitioner in CWP-9863-2022 and
CWP-12628-2010.
Mr. Sarbjit Singh Khaira, Advocate
for the petitioner in CWP-8525-2014.
Mr. Saksham Dudeja, Advocate
for the respondents-PSPCL in CWP-9863-2022.
Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate
for respondents No.1 to 3 in CWP-12628-2010.
Mr. Ish Karan Singh Chhabra, Advocate for
Mr. A.D.S. Sukhija, Advocate
for the respondents-PSPCL in CWP-8525-2014.
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -2-
NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. This order shall dispose of the above-referred three
petitions filed by the same petitioner. CWP-8525-2014 and CWP-9863-
2022 have been filed by the petitioner under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the
chargesheet dated 22.07.2011 (Annexure P-1), enquiry report dated
26.11.2013 (Annexure P-3) and order dated 25.04.2014 (Annexure P-
4), vide which promotion of the petitioner from the post of Additional
Assistant Engineer has been withdrawn along with all the financial
benefits relating to the promotion with effect from 20.05.2005. CWP-
12628-2010 has been filed for issuance of directions to the respondents
to promote the petitioner as Assistant Engineer (Electrical) with effect
from the date of the order dated 30.05.2010 (Annexure P-5), vide which
respondents No.5 to 7, junior to the petitioner, have been promoted
with all consequential benefits.
CWP-8525-2014 and CWP-9863-2022
2. The brief facts of the case as have been pleaded in the
present petitions are that the petitioner, who is a diploma holder in
Electronics, was initially appointed as Lineman on 01.11.1978. He was
subsequently promoted to the post of Junior Engineer-II on 19.10.1984,
and was thereafter further promoted to the post of Junior Engineer-I
(Additional Assistant Engineer) on 01.07.2005. Subsequently, vide
order dated 30.05.2010, certain juniors to the petitioner were promoted
to the post of Assistant Engineers, whereas the petitioner was denied
such promotion. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner challenged the said
promotion order by filing CWP No.12628 of 2010 and claimed
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promotion as Assistant Engineer. During the pendency of the aforesaid
petition, the petitioner was issued a chargesheet dated 22.07.2011
(Annexure P-1) alleging therein that at page 4 of the service book part-
2, an entry has been made showing that he had passed the Engineering
Subordinate Accounts Departmental Examination held in December,
1985, the result whereof has been shown to be declared, vide order
dated 04.05.1986 of Secretary, P&R. The petitioner’s name was shown
at Sr. No.152 against Roll No.165 as having passed the said
examination. It was further alleged that a complaint was received in the
office against the petitioner asserting that a bogus entry regarding his
having passed the aforesaid departmental examination had been made
in his service book and whereas he did not even appear in the said
examination. The inquiry of this complaint was got conducted by the
office of the Superintending Engineer (Circle Gurdaspur) from
Engineer N.K. Malik, Additional Superintending Engineer (Sub
Division, Pathankot), and according to the inquiry report, the bogus
entry was found in the service book. Consequently, the petitioner was
placed under suspension for being guilty of getting made bogus entry of
passing the Engineering Subordinate Accounts Departmental
Examination for his self interest and for securing undue financial
benefits directly due to this bogus entry in the service book. The
petitioner submitted reply to the chargesheet on 04.11.2011. Thereafter,
Additional Executive Engineer/Operations, Punjab State Power
Corporation Limited, Rayya Circle, Beas, was appointed as an inquiry
officer, who conducted the inquiry as per regulations of the
Commission submitted his inquiry report, vide memo dated 26.11.2013
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(Annexure P-3) and concluded as under:-
“CONCLUSION:-
Sh. Joginder Singh, AAE, was not eligible for
promotion from JE-2 to JE-1 at that time. The in genuine
benefit of bogus entry of having passed the Departmental
Accounts Examination was availed on that time which he
has not passed. Inspite of having known to bogus entry of
having passed the Departmental Accounts Examination, he
got the promotional as well as financial benefits for which
he was not entitled for. Therefore, all promotional benefits
given to the employee were wrong and the allegations of
fraud with the department, against the employees are
proved and the financial and promotional benefits
received by him are to be withdrawn and the employee is
liable to be punished.
Sd/-
Inquiry Officer-cum-Additional Executive Engineer/Operations
Punjab State Power Corporation Lt.
Rayya Circle, Beas.”
3. The said inquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner for
his comments/representation which were submitted by the petitioner,
and after affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner,
the punishing authority, vide order dated 25.04.2014 (Annexure P-4)
withdrew the promotion of the petitioner made to the post of Junior
Engineer-I (Additional Assistant Engineer) and also withdrew all the
financial benefits given to him relating to his promotion. The said order
has been impugned in the present petitions.
4. Written statement on behalf of respondents No.1 to 4 has
been filed, wherein it has been stated as under:-
“1. That present petition is liable to be dismissed as
petitioner has not approached this Hon’ble High Court
with clean hands as per service record petitioner had
joined the department as lineman on 01/11/1978 and was
promoted as JE on 19/10/1984. He was promoted as AAE
on 01/07/2005. However, it is pertinent to mention here
that Passing of Subordinate Engineering Department
Exam is pre-requisite condition for promotion from the
post of JE to the post of AAE asper Regulation 9(8) and
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -5-Condition No. 1 of Regulation 9 of PSEB Technical
Service Class-III Regulations, 1996. Petitioner was
promoted to the post ofAAE, since there was an entry of
passing of Subordinate Engineering Departmental Exam
in petitioner’s service book at page No.4 part 2, therefore,
he was promoted as AAE. When a complaint was received,
thematter was examined, during the enquiry or otherwise
petitioner could notsubstantiate his passing of
examination. As per official record, the roll numberunder
which petitioner alleges to have passed departmental exam
does notrelate to petitioner, thus an bogus and false entry
was made in his servicebook, resultantly petitioner’s
promotion as AAE from the post of JE was resultof fraud
and bogus entry made by petitioner however it deserves
mentioning that passing of it all this promotion was a
result of fraud that is played by the petitioner with a soiled
intention with Respondent Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
3. That the para no.3needs no reply to the extent of Joining
and promotion of petitioner as Junior Eng inner (JE),
Passing of Subordinate Engineering Department Exam is
pre-requisite condition for promotion from the post of JE
to the post of AAE asper Regulation 9(8) and Condition
No. I of Regulation 9 of PSEB Technical Service Class-III
Regulations, 1996. Petitioner was promoted to the post
ofAAE, since there was an entry of passing of Subordinate
Engineering Departmental Exam in petitioner’s sevice
book at page No.4 part 2, therefore, he was promoted as
AAE. When a complaint was received, thematter was
examined, during the enquiry or otherwise petitioner could
notsubstantiate his passing of examination. As per official
record, the roll numberunder which petitioner alleges to
have passed departmental exam does notrelate to
petitioner, thus an bogus and false entry was made in his
servicebook, resultantly petitioner’s promotion as AAE
from the post of JE was resultof fraud and bogus entry
made by petitionerhowever it deserves mentioning that
passing of it all this promotion was a result of fraud that is
played by the petitioner with a soiled intention with
Respondent Corporation.”
5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner had duly passed the Engineering Subordinate Accounts
Departmental Examination and entry to this effect has rightly been
made in the service book. The petitioner has not committed any fraud
and consequently, on the basis of the said entry, he was promoted to the
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complaint, the Corporation has initiated the proceedings and had
withdrawn the promotion given to the petitioner. The petitioner, at this
stage, is not having any document to prove the fact that he had duly
appeared in the said examination and had passed the same as the said
examination was held in the May, 1986 and the petitioner has retired
from service on 30.04.2014. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be
sustained and is liable to be set aside.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits
that the petitioner has committed fraud with the department by making
a bogus entry in the service book and on the basis of the same, got
promotion to the post of Additional Assistant Engineer. Furthermore,
on receipt of the complaint, firstly preliminary inquiry was conducted
by the Corporation, wherein it was held that the entry of passing the
said examination is bogus and thereafter, the petitioner was issued a
chargesheet and after following the due procedure, the punishing
authority has passed the impugned order withdrawing the promotion
given to the petitioner. He further submits that the power of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited to the
extent of finding as to whether there is any procedural irregularity in
conducting the inquiry.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner got
promotion to the post of Additional Assistant Engineer on 01.07.2005
on the basis of an entry made in the service book with regard to the
passing of the Engineering Subordinate Accounts Departmental
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Examination, which was found to be bogus. A preliminary inquiry was
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conducted which was followed by a regular departmental inquiry which
was conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Rules of the Corporation. Pursuant thereto, the impugned order was
passed withdrawing the petitioner’s promotion and ordering recovery of
the financial benefits relating to the promotion. The principal question,
therefore, is not whether this Court should re-appreciate the evidence
recorded in the departmental proceedings, but whether the decision-
making process suffers from any illegality or violation of principles of
natural justice warranting interference. The scope of judicial review has
been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 AIR Supreme Court
1723, wherein it has been held that the High Court is not a Court of
appeal which examines the merits of the findings recorded in the
departmental inquiry and the power of judicial review is confined to;
whether the inquiry was held by a competent authority; according to the
procedure prescribed and whether rules of natural justice have been
followed.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and
another v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the
scope of interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India has held he as under: –
“13. Despite the well-settled settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of
its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -8-India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced
by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear
to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
Supreme Court 1723, many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal
over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -9-competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent pendent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of
it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on
similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if
the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557, the principles have been
further discussed at paragraph paragraph-21 to 24, which
read as follows :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing wit with
departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two
propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P.
v. S. Sree Rama Rao Rao. First, there is no warrant for
the view that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If
that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry
the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The
High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over
the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned
to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -10-justice are not violated. Second, where there is some
evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may
interfere where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of
it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some
legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the
Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that
the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of
the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not
supported by any evidence or it can be said that no
reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In
Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court
exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the
disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent
was instrumental in compelling the shut- down of an air
compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This
Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that at the
evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of
strikers and compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The
General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry
Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted
the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the
General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the
conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the High Court should not have
interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court
exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact
reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -11-appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not
an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no
evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the
ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain
a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a
point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire
evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court
was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the
High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the
ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the
evidence in the present case which was considered by the
Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify
the conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did
not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say
that no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence,
reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as
no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should
not do.”
These principles have been succinctly summed summed-up
by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna
Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh,
(1977) 2 SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable
expressions:
“4. …. in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated
rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not
apply. All materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to
hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and
credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating
such material and should not glibly swallow what is
strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence
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Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -12-decisions nor text books, although we have been taken
through case case-law and other authorities by counsel on
both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of natural justice.
Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or
arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held
good….”
10. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v.
Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682, wherein it has been held as under: –
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the
High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he
fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without
assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary
Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which
could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really
suffering from illness. It was further held that the
delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a
local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into
the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of
evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence
is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments
(R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as
follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry
has been fairly and properly held and the findings are
based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings
of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where
such findings are based on no evidence or where they are
clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived
at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record.
The courts will however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or
statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -13-extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of India
v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 : (1997) 7 SCC
463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 1036 and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.”
11. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said
judgment it has been held as under: –
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government
of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216
and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this
Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others,
1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4
SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion,
upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent
error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision
of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board
Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently
by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v.
Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471.
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of
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the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure
fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in
any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is
to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was
held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of
natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and
authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of
fact or conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not
the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of
enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree
with the findings recorded by the former, in case of
disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the
reasons for disagreement and after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his
own findings if the evidence available on record be
sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the
enquiry officer for further enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
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CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -15-
proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity,
i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and
with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained.”
12. To the similar effect is the judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India and others : 1996(1) SCT 617 and Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora : (1997) 3 SCC 72.
13. In the present case, the allegations levelled in the
chargesheet have been duly proved in the inquiry proceedings, which
has been held strictly as per the procedure laid down in the regulations
of the Corporation. Nothing has been shown that there is any
procedural irregularity in conducting the inquiry or that there is any
violation of principles of natural justice.
14. A perusal of the record leaves no manner of doubt that the
disciplinary proceedings were conducted after following the prescribed
procedure in its entirety and in due compliance with the principles of
natural justice. The petitioner was served with a chargesheet,
participated in the enquiry proceedings, and submitted his defence, was
afforded an opportunity to make representation against the enquiry
report, and was granted a personal hearing before the disciplinary
authority. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was denied adequate or reasonable opportunity, or that the proceedings
stand vitiated on account of any procedural infirmity.
15. The challenge raised in the present writ petitions, in
substance, seeks re-appreciation of the factual findings returned in the
departmental proceedings and reassessment of the evidentiary material
VINAY
2026.07.22 18:02
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order/judgment
CWP-9863-2022 & connected matters -16-
on record. Such an exercise is plainly impermissible in writ jurisdiction.
This Court does not sit as an appellate forum over the findings recorded
by the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority and it cannot go into
the adequacy or inadequacy of evidence, examine the reliability of
evidence as if sitting in appeal, or substitute its own view for the view
taken by the competent authorities. Unless the findings are shown to be
perverse, based on no evidence, rendered in breach of the principles of
natural justice, or unless the punishment imposed is so disproportionate
as to shock the conscience of the Court, no interference is warranted. In
the facts of the present case, none of the aforesaid contingencies is
made out.
16. Keeping in view the above, finding no merit in the present
writ petitions, the same are hereby dismissed.
17. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
CWP-12628-2010
18. In view the order passed hereinabove in CWP-8525-2014
and CWP-9863-2022, no further relief can be granted in the present
petition, which stands dismissed accordingly.
19. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
17.07.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Vinay JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
VINAY
2026.07.22 18:02
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authenticity of this
order/judgment
