Orissa High Court
Jaya Chandra Mishra vs Union Of India & Others on 6 July, 2026
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.40736 of 2021
Jaya Chandra Mishra ... Petitioner
Mr. Jaya Chandra Mishra, (In person)
-versus-
Union of India & others ... Opp. Parties
Mr. P.K. Parhi, DSGI
along with Mr. S.K. Samantray, CGC
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S. DIXIT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Hearing: 24.06.2026
Date of Judgment: 06.07.2026
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. This Writ Petition is directed against the judgment and order
dated 29.10.2021 passed by the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 643 of 2019, whereby
the learned Tribunal dismissed the Original Application filed by the
Petitioner and declined to interfere with the orders passed by the
Railway authorities in connection with the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him.
2. The fact matrix of the case, as recapitulated from the Writ
Petition, is that the Petitioner joined the services of the South Eastern
Railway as an Assistant Station Master in the year 1984. In the course
of service, he earned promotion to the post of Station Master in the year
1987 and thereafter to the post of Deputy Station Superintendent in the
year 1999. While discharging his duties in the said capacity, the
Petitioner met with an accident on 09.12.1999 and suffered amputation
of his right leg below the knee. Following medical treatment and fitting
of an artificial limb, he was medically decategorised and came to be
accommodated in the post of OS-II. Ultimately, he was posted as Chief
Office Superintendent in the Operating Department under the
Divisional Railway Manager, Sambalpur, East Coast Railway.
While so continuing, the Petitioner was transferred from
Sambalpur to Titlagarh by order dated 28.03.2008. Assailing the said
transfer, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack
Bench, in O.A. No.197 of 2008. An interim order having been granted
in his favour, the Petitioner continued at Sambalpur. The Original
Application was eventually disposed of on 27.07.2009 with a direction
to the competent authority to consider the claim of the Petitioner for
retention at Sambalpur in the light of the DoP&T Office Memorandum
dated 10.05.1990 concerning transfer of employees suffering from
disabilities. Pursuant thereto, the competent authority considered the
matter but declined the request of the Petitioner and maintained the
order of transfer. The challenge carried further by the Petitioner before
the higher authority also did not meet with success.
The Petitioner asserts that on 12.10.2009 he applied for casual
leave for two and a half days for attending to his aged mother at his
native place and thereafter sought grant of leave on average pay for a
further period of twenty days on account of her deteriorating health
condition. According to him, the said request was also communicated
through telegram. However, upon his reporting back, he found that the
leave sought for had not been sanctioned and that he had been treated as
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 2 of 19
unauthorisedly absent from duty. Thereafter, a memorandum dated
05.11.2009 proposing initiation of major penalty proceedings came to
be issued alleging unauthorised absence from duty during the period
from 12.10.2009 to 04.11.2009.
In the meantime, the Petitioner challenged the order passed in
O.A. No.197 of 2008 as well as the proceedings arising therefrom
before this Court in W.P.(C) No.3514 of 2010. According to the
Petitioner, by virtue of the interim orders passed therein, he continued
to remain at Sambalpur. Simultaneously, the disciplinary proceedings
initiated pursuant to the charge memorandum dated 05.11.2009
progressed. An Inquiry Officer was appointed and, eventually, the
enquiry culminated in findings adverse to the Petitioner. The
disciplinary authority, by order dated 15.10.2012, imposed the penalty
of removal from service. The appeal preferred by the Petitioner under
the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules also came to be
dismissed. Thereafter, in revision, the penalty was modified from
removal from service to compulsory retirement.
Questioning the orders passed by the disciplinary, appellate and
revisional authorities and seeking various consequential service
benefits, the Petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Cuttack Bench, by filing O.A. No.643 of 2019. The learned Tribunal,
upon consideration of the rival pleadings and materials on record,
dismissed the Original Application by judgment and order dated
29.10.2021. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner has instituted the present
Writ Petition.
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 3 of 19
3. Mr. Jaya Chandra Mishra, appearing in person, assailed the
impugned judgment of the learned Central Administrative Tribunal as
being contrary to the facts on record and the settled principles
governing disciplinary proceedings. It was contended that though the
penalty of compulsory retirement has ultimately been imposed upon
him, he has not been extended any terminal benefits, including
pensionary dues, till date. It was further submitted that on the date of
imposition of punishment, the Petitioner still had about seven years of
service left and has, during the pendency of the present proceeding,
attained the age of superannuation. Elaborating his challenge, the
Petitioner submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the
procedural irregularities which vitiated the disciplinary proceeding.
According to him, the enquiry was conducted ex parte without
affording him an effective opportunity of participation and the
disciplinary authority proceeded to impose punishment without duly
considering his defence. It was further contended that the learned
Tribunal failed to examine whether the punishment imposed was
proportionate to the nature of the charge, particularly when the
Petitioner had rendered more than twenty-eight years of service without
any blemish prior to the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding.
The principal plank of the Petitioner’s argument was that the
very foundation of the charge was unsustainable in law. It was
submitted that the Petitioner had duly applied for casual leave as well
as leave on average pay on account of the deteriorating health condition
of his aged mother and had duly intimated the competent authority in
that regard. Merely because the leave was not sanctioned, the same
would not ipso facto render his absence wilful. According to the
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 4 of 19
Petitioner, neither the Inquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority
recorded any finding that his absence from duty was deliberate or
wilful. In the absence of such a finding, it was argued, unauthorised
absence by itself could not constitute misconduct warranting a major
penalty. Reliance was placed on the principle that unless the absence is
found to be wilful and devoid of any reasonable explanation, the same
cannot be treated as misconduct attracting the rigours of disciplinary
action. It was further urged that even assuming the allegation of
unauthorised absence for about twenty-two and a half days to be
correct, the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the
charge levelled against the Petitioner. Emphasis was laid on his long
and otherwise unblemished service career, his physical disability
suffered in the course of employment, and the absence of any previous
misconduct. On the aforesaid premises, the Petitioner prayed for setting
aside the judgment of the learned Tribunal as well as the consequential
orders passed by the disciplinary authorities.
4. Per contra, Mr. P.K. Parhi, learned Deputy Solicitor General of
India appearing for the Opp. Parties, supported the judgment of the
learned Tribunal. He submitted that the conduct of the Petitioner
throughout revealed a persistent attempt to avoid compliance with the
transfer order issued in his favour and to thwart the administrative
decisions of the Railway authorities. According to the Opp. Parties,
from the time the Petitioner was transferred to Titlagarh, he resorted to
multiple proceedings before different forums questioning the transfer
order and, by virtue of interim orders obtained therein, continued at
Sambalpur without joining at the transferred place of posting.
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 5 of 19
Learned DSGI further submitted that adequate and repeated
opportunities were afforded to the Petitioner at every stage of the
disciplinary proceeding. However, instead of participating in the
enquiry and defending himself on merits, the Petitioner repeatedly
questioned the competence of the authorities, challenged interlocutory
decisions before different forums and ultimately abstained from the
enquiry proceedings. It was contended that despite the best efforts of
the disciplinary authority to secure his participation and accommodate
his grievances, the Petitioner remained uncooperative, compelling the
authorities to proceed ex parte in accordance with law. It was further
argued that the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority, the
revisional authority as well as the learned Tribunal have concurrently
recorded findings against the Petitioner upon due consideration of the
materials available on record. Such findings, being neither perverse nor
unsupported by evidence, do not warrant interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. Learned DSGI submitted that having regard to the nature
of duties discharged by employees of the Railways, where discipline
and devotion to duty are of paramount importance, unauthorised
absence cannot be lightly viewed. It was, therefore, contended that the
penalty imposed upon the Petitioner is commensurate with the
misconduct proved against him and cannot be characterised as
disproportionate. On the aforesaid premises, learned DSGI prayed for
dismissal of the Writ Petition.
5. Heard the Parties at length and perused materials placed on
record.
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 6 of 19
Whether the misconduct of unauthorised absence stood established in
the absence of a finding that the Petitioner’s absence was wilful?
6. The charge against the Petitioner emanates from his absence
from duty during the period from 12.10.2009 to 04.11.2009. The record
reveals that prior to proceeding on leave, the Petitioner had applied for
casual leave and subsequently sought sanction of leave on account of
the deteriorating health condition of his aged mother. It is also not in
dispute that the leave sought for by the Petitioner was not sanctioned by
the competent authority and that the said period was ultimately treated
as unauthorised absence, forming the foundation of the disciplinary
proceeding.
7. At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that non-sanction of
leave and wilful absence from duty are not synonymous expressions.
Merely because leave sought for by an employee is declined or remains
unsanctioned, it does not inexorably follow that the employee’s absence
thereafter becomes deliberate, contumacious or wilful. The disciplinary
authority is still required to examine the explanation furnished by the
employee and arrive at a definite conclusion as to whether the absence
was intentional and without any justifiable cause. The refusal of leave
may establish the factum of unauthorised absence; however, it does not
by itself establish the misconduct flowing from such absence. The
distinction assumes significance in the facts of the present case.
Throughout the disciplinary proceeding, the Petitioner’s explanation
remained consistent. According to him, he was constrained to remain
away from duty owing to the serious illness of his mother, who
required his personal attendance and medical care. Significantly,
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 7 of 19
neither the enquiry report nor the consequential orders record any
finding that the explanation furnished by the Petitioner was false,
fabricated or lacking in bona fides. The charge was essentially
sustained on the premise that the leave sought for by him had not been
sanctioned and that he nevertheless remained absent from duty.
8. The legal position governing the issue is no longer res integra.
In Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and Another, (2012) 3
SCC 178, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
“16. The question whether `unauthorised absence from duty’
amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour
unbecoming of a Government servant cannot be decided
without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or
because of compelling circumstances.
17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances
under which it was not possible to report or perform duty,
such absence can not be held to be wilful.
18. Absence from duty without any application or prior
permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does
not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities
due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including
compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness,
accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee
cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or
behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant.
19. In a Departmental proceeding, if allegation of
unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary
authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in
absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to
misconduct.
20. In the present case the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of
evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly
absent from duty but failed to hold the absence is wilful; the
disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed
to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.
21. The question relating to jurisdiction of the Court in
judicial review in a Departmental proceeding fell forW.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 8 of 19
consideration before this Court in M.B. Bijlani vs. Union of
India and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 wherein this
Court held:
“It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is
limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-
criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the
charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are
not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all
reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the
enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon
analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there
had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges
on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot
take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to
consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of
proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses
only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot
enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer
had not been charged with.”
22. In the present case, the disciplinary authority failed to
prove that the absence from duty was wilful, no such finding
has been given by the Inquiry Officer or the Appellate
Authority. Though the appellant had taken a specific defence
that he was prevented from attending duty by Shri P.
Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur who prevented him to sign
the attendance register and also brought on record 11 defence
exhibits in support of his defence that he was prevented to
sign the attendance register, this includes his letter dated 3rd
October, 1995 addressed to Shri K.P. Jain, JD, SIB,
Ahmedabad, receipts from STD/PCO office of Telephone
calls dated 29th September, 1995, etc. but such defence and
evidence were ignored and on the basis of irrelevant fact and
surmises the Inquiry Officer held the appellant guilty.”
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the above decision has observed
that where compelling circumstances render it difficult or impossible
for an employee to report for duty, the absence cannot ipso facto be
treated as misconduct. It was further held that in a disciplinary
proceeding founded on unauthorised absence, the disciplinary authority
is required to establish that the absence was wilful and, in the absence
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 9 of 19
of such a finding, the charge of misconduct cannot be sustained.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we find
that neither the Inquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority recorded
any finding that the Petitioner’s absence was deliberate or wilful. What
emerges from the record is merely a conclusion that the Petitioner
remained absent despite non-sanction of leave. While such conduct
may expose an employee to disciplinary scrutiny, the authorities were
nonetheless required to undertake the further exercise of examining
whether the circumstances pleaded by the Petitioner furnished a
reasonable explanation for his absence and whether such absence was
intentional and devoid of justification. That exercise is conspicuously
absent in the present case.
10. That said, the aforesaid circumstances cannot substitute the
foundational requirement of proving the misconduct alleged. The
existence of disputes between the Parties or the Petitioner’s litigious
approach could not relieve the disciplinary authority of its obligation to
determine whether the absence constituting the charge was wilful. The
issue before the disciplinary authority was not whether the Petitioner
had been difficult in his dealings with the administration, but whether
the particular absence which formed the subject matter of the charge
was deliberate and intentional. On that aspect, the findings are
conspicuously silent.
11. In such view of the matter, we hold that the finding of
misconduct recorded against the Petitioner, insofar as it proceeds on the
basis of unauthorised absence without a corresponding finding of
wilfulness, does not satisfy the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 10 of 19
Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra). The learned Tribunal, while
affirming the action of the disciplinary authority, also failed to examine
this crucial distinction between unauthorised absence and wilful
absence, which goes to the very root of the matter.
Whether the penalty of compulsory retirement satisfies the doctrine of
proportionality?
12. Even assuming that the charge against the Petitioner stood
proved, and having regard to the elaborate submissions advanced by the
Parties on the nature and nature of punishment imposed, as well as the
fact that the learned Tribunal has affirmed the same, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the penalty ultimately inflicted upon
the Petitioner withstands scrutiny on the touchstone of the doctrine of
proportionality, which is now firmly entrenched in administrative and
service jurisprudence.
13. It is well settled that in matters arising out of disciplinary
proceedings, the scope of judicial review does not ordinarily extend to
substituting the decision of the disciplinary authority with that of the
Court. The disciplinary authority is generally regarded as the best judge
of the requirements of discipline in service and the appropriate
punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent employee. Nevertheless,
where the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the gravity of
misconduct proved in the exercise of discretion, judicial intervention
becomes permissible.
14. The doctrine of proportionality, which has now become an
integral facet of judicial review in administrative law, traces its origin
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 11 of 19
to the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness. While the traditional
test examined whether a decision was so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could have arrived at it, the doctrine of
proportionality permits a deeper scrutiny into whether the decision-
maker has struck a proper balance between the misconduct proved and
the consequences flowing therefrom. In Chairman, All Railway
Recruitment Board vs. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while tracing the development of the doctrine
in English and Indian administrative law, observed that proportionality
requires the reviewing Court to examine not merely whether the
decision is reasonable, but also whether the balance struck by the
authority is commensurate with the competing interests involved. The
Court held as follows:
17. Ground of irrationality takes in Wednesbury
unreasonableness propounded in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947)2
All ER 680, Lord Greene MR alluded to the grounds of attack
which could be made against the decision, citing
unreasonableness as an `umbrella concept’ which covers the
major heads of review and pointed out that the court can
interfere with a decision if it is so absurd that no reasonable
decision maker would in law come to it. In GCHQ Case
(supra) Lord Diplock fashioned the principle of
unreasonableness and preferred to use the term irrationality as
follows:
“By `irrationality’ I mean what can now be succinctly
referred to as “Wednesbury’s unreasonableness”, ……. It
applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question
to be decided could have arrived at it.”
18. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Brind (1991) 1 All ER 720, the House of Lords re-
examined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 12 of 19
Secretary’s discretion to issue a notice banning the
transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish
Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. Court
ruled that the exercise of the Home Secretary’s power did not
amount to an unreasonable exercise of discretion despite the
issue involving a denial of freedom of expression. House of
Lords however, stressed that in all cases raising a human
rights issue proportionality is the appropriate standard of
review. The House of Lords in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department (2001) 2 AC 532 demonstrated how
the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness has
moved towards the doctrine of necessity and proportionality.
Lord Steyn noted that the criteria of proportionality are more
precise and more sophisticated than traditional grounds of
review and went on to outline three concrete differences
between the two:-
(1) Proportionality may require the reviewing Court to
assess the balance which the decision maker has struck,
not merely whether it is within the range of rational or
reasonable decisions.
(2) Proportionality test may go further than the
traditional grounds of review in as much as it may
require attention to be directed to the relative weight
accorded to interests and considerations.
(3) Even the heightened scrutiny test is not necessarily
appropriate to the protection of human rights.
19. Lord Steyn also felt most cases would be decided in the
same way whatever approach is adopted, though conceded for
human right cases proportionality is the appropriate test.
20. The question arose as to whether doctrine of
proportionality applies only where fundamental human rights
are in issue or whether it will come to provide all aspects of
judicial review. Lord Steyn in R. (Alconbury Development
Limited) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport
and the Regions (2001) 2 All ER 929 stated as follows:-
“I consider that even without reference to the Human
Rights Act, 1998 the time has come to recognize that
this principle (proportionality) is part of English
administrative law not only when Judges are dealing
with Community acts but also when they are dealing
with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep theW.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 13 of 19
Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate
compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and
confusing”.
15. More recently, in Punjab & Sind Bank vs. Raj Kumar, 2026
LiveLaw (SC) 322, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, upon an exhaustive
consideration of the earlier authorities including Ranjit Thakur vs.
Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611, Om Kumar vs. Union of India,
(2001) 2 SCC 386, State of Gujarat vs. Anand Acharya, (2007) 9 SCC
310 and S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602, reiterated
that although Courts must exercise restraint while interfering with
disciplinary punishments, intervention would be warranted where the
punishment is strikingly disproportionate to the gravity of the
misconduct proved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:
“9. What follows from the precedents noted above is that
courts should exercise restraint while interdicting orders of
punishment. Normally, no court in exercise of its power of
judicial review should interfere with an order of punishment
imposed on a delinquent as a measure of disciplinary action
by the competent authority and substitute its own judgment
for that of the former. This is premised on the reason that the
disciplinary authority is the best judge of the situation, and the
requirements of maintaining discipline within the work force.
While it is not the law that the courts should invariably stay at
a distance when legality and/or propriety of a particular
punishment is questioned, judicial scrutiny of the disciplinary
action by way of punishment could arise only if the
circumstances are such that no reasonable person would
impose the punishment which is questioned and/or such
punishment has the effect of shocking the conscience of the
court. To put in simpler words, interference could be
warranted if it appeals to the court that the disciplinary
authority has ‘used a sledgehammer for cracking a nut’. A
punishment, which is strikingly or shockingly
disproportionate and is not commensurate with the gravity of
misconduct, proved to have been committed in course ofW.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 14 of 19
inquiry or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend
Article 14 of the Constitution.
10. Where a court, upon due consideration, arrives at the
conclusion that the punishment imposed is disproportionate,
its intervention is circumscribed in nature. Judicial scrutiny
and interference, if at all, has to be based on reasons in
support of the court’s ultimate satisfaction that the
disciplinary authority has faltered in the exercise of his
discretion. In such a situation, the court may adopt one of two
courses: it may remit the matter to the competent authority for
reconsideration of the punishment; or, in the rarest of cases, it
may substitute the punishment while supporting such a course
with cogent reasons”
16. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, the facts of the present
case assume significance. The misconduct attributed to the Petitioner is
unauthorised absence from duty for a period of approximately twenty-
two and a half days. The record does not disclose any allegation of
dishonesty, moral turpitude, financial irregularity, corruption,
insubordination resulting in loss to the administration or any conduct
prejudicial to public interest. The charge is confined solely to absence
from duty during the aforesaid period.
17. Equally relevant is the fact that the Petitioner had served the
Railway administration for nearly twenty-eight years prior to initiation
of the disciplinary proceeding. During such long tenure, no material has
been brought to our notice indicating any previous misconduct of
comparable gravity. The record further reveals that the Petitioner was a
person who had suffered permanent physical disability during service
consequent upon an accident and was thereafter functioning with an
artificial limb. The explanation furnished by him for remaining away
from duty was that he had to attend to his seriously ailing mother, who
required constant care and medical attention. As already noticed
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 15 of 19
hereinbefore, the bona fides of such explanation were never disbelieved
by the disciplinary authority.
18. We are not oblivious to the submission advanced on behalf of
the Opp. Parties that the Petitioner’s overall conduct during the relevant
period was far from satisfactory. The materials on record indicate that,
following his transfer, the Petitioner engaged the administration in
multiple rounds of litigation concerning his transfer and other service
matters and repeatedly questioned or challenged the actions and
competence of the authorities at different stages. While an employee
aggrieved by an administrative action is undoubtedly entitled to avail of
remedies recognised by law, persistent diversion of attention to
collateral disputes and repeated challenges to every administrative step
seldom advance the substantive grievance and often impede an
expeditious resolution of the core dispute. The record does suggest that
the Petitioner’s approach contributed, at least in part, to the
prolongation of the controversy, and such conduct cannot receive the
imprimatur of this Court. Nevertheless, even after viewing the
Petitioner’s conduct in the least favourable light and taking the same at
its highest against him, the question that still falls for consideration is
whether the extreme penalty of compulsory retirement can reasonably
be regarded as commensurate with the nature and gravity of the charge
ultimately proved.
19. In our considered view, the answer must be in the negative. The
punishment imposed bears little proportion to the misconduct alleged.
The authorities appear to have treated the Petitioner’s absence as an
infraction warranting the severest possible civil consequences short of
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 16 of 19
dismissal or removal. Such an approach overlooks not only the
surrounding circumstances under which the absence occurred but also
the Petitioner’s long tenure of service, his physical condition and the
absence of any finding that his conduct was actuated by deliberate
defiance of authority. The resultant punishment, therefore, travels
beyond the realm of disciplinary correction and enters the domain of
disproportionality.
20. Applying the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in K. Shyam Kumar (supra), Raj Kumar (supra) and the
authorities noticed therein, we are satisfied that the penalty imposed
upon the Petitioner is one which no reasonable disciplinary authority,
properly directing itself to the relevant facts and circumstances, would
have considered commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct
alleged. The punishment, therefore, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.
21. Ordinarily, upon finding fault with the punishment imposed in a
disciplinary proceeding, the matter would be remitted to the competent
authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment. However,
the power of remand is not an invariable rule and must yield where its
exercise would serve no useful purpose.
22. The present case arises out of disciplinary proceedings initiated
more than sixteen years ago. The Petitioner has already crossed the age
of superannuation and has remained embroiled in litigation for a
considerable part of his service career and thereafter. At this distant
point of time, relegating the Parties to another round of proceedings
before the disciplinary authority would neither advance the cause of
justice nor serve the interests of administrative efficiency. We are also
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 17 of 19
mindful of the fact that the Petitioner cannot be completely absolved of
blame. The record demonstrates that he repeatedly engaged the
administration in successive rounds of litigation and often allowed
ancillary disputes to overshadow the principal controversy. Such
conduct undoubtedly contributed to the prolongation of the dispute and
cannot be ignored while moulding the relief.
23. Nevertheless, for the reasons already recorded, we are satisfied
that the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed upon the
Petitioner is disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and cannot be
sustained in law. Consequently, the judgment and order dated
29.10.2021 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,
Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.643 of 2019, as well as the
consequential orders affirming the penalty of compulsory retirement,
are hereby set aside.
24. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, particularly the long lapse of time, the Petitioner’s attainment of
the age of superannuation and his own contribution to the prolongation
of the litigation, we do not consider it appropriate to direct full back
wages. Instead, the Petitioner shall be entitled to 50% of the back
wages for the period commencing from the date of compulsory
retirement till the date on which he would have ordinarily attained the
age of superannuation.
25. The Opp. Parties are further directed to treat the Petitioner as
having continued in service till his normal age of superannuation for the
limited purpose of computation of retiral and pensionary benefits. The
requisite pension, gratuity and all other admissible terminal dues shall
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 18 of 19
be recalculated accordingly and released in favour of the Petitioner
within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of this
judgment.
26. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed with the aforesaid
directions.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
(Krishna S. Dixit)
Judge
Bijay/Sarbani
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SARBANI DASH
Designation: Junior Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 07-Jul-2026 13:51:36
W.P.(C). No.40736 of 2021 Page 19 of 19
