Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Jalla Balaji vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 20 January, 2026
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITION NO: 315/2026
Between:
1. JALLA BALAJI, S/O JALLA RAMMURTHY AGE ABOUT 27 YEARS,
OCCUPATION SOFTWARE HCL TECHNOLOGIES BANGALORE -
560 105
2. JALLA RAMMURTHY, S/O JALLA SIDDAPPA AGE ABOUT 55 YEARS,
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURE - 517 370
3. JALLA SIDDAMMA, W/O JALLA SIDDAPPA AGE ABOUT 75 YEARS.
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURE ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF D.NO.5-21,
KOTHAPALLE VILLAGE H/O GUMMASAMUDRAM VILLAGE
B.KOTHAKOTAMANDALAM ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT - 517 370
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPTD BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY HOME DEPT, SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI VILLAGE,
AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT ANDHRA PRADESH PIN CODE
522238
2. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT AT
RAYACHOTY - 516269
3. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, B.KOTHAKOTA ANNAMAYYA
DISTRICT-517370
4. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, ANNAMAYYA AT RAYACHOTY -517370
5. THE TAHSILDAR, B.KOTHAKOTA ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT, ANDHRA
PRADESH -517370
6. THE ONE STOP CENTER WOMEN DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD
WELFARE DEPARTMENT, RAYACHOTY ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT
REPT BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR AND MANAGER, SMT.ATHAR
FEEMA ANJUM - 516269
2
7. K NAGAVENI, W/O JALLA RAMAMURTHY AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
DOK.MUNIRATHNAM NEAR RAMASWAMY GUDI VEEDHI
KATTAKANDIPALYEM VILLAGE PUNGANUR MANDALAM CHITTOOR
DISTRICT - 522241
...RESPONDENT(S):
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 20.01.2026
3
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
4
* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ WRIT PETITION NO: 315/2026
% 20.01.2026
# Between:
1. JALLA BALAJI, S/O JALLA RAMMURTHY AGE ABOUT 27 YEARS,
OCCUPATION SOFTWARE HCL TECHNOLOGIES BANGALORE -
560 105
2. JALLA RAMMURTHY, S/O JALLA SIDDAPPA AGE ABOUT 55 YEARS,
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURE - 517 370
3. JALLA SIDDAMMA, W/O JALLA SIDDAPPA AGE ABOUT 75 YEARS.
OCCUPATION AGRICULTURE ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF D.NO.5-21,
KOTHAPALLE VILLAGE H/O GUMMASAMUDRAM VILLAGE
B.KOTHAKOTAMANDALAM ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT - 517 370
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPTD BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY HOME DEPT, SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI VILLAGE,
AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT ANDHRA PRADESH PIN CODE
522238
2. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT AT
RAYACHOTY - 516269
3. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, B.KOTHAKOTA ANNAMAYYA
DISTRICT-517370
4. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, ANNAMAYYA AT RAYACHOTY -517370
5. THE TAHSILDAR, B.KOTHAKOTA ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT, ANDHRA
PRADESH -517370
6. THE ONE STOP CENTER WOMEN DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD
WELFARE DEPARTMENT, RAYACHOTY ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT
REPT BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR AND MANAGER, SMT.ATHAR
FEEMA ANJUM - 516269
7. K NAGAVENI, W/O JALLA RAMAMURTHY AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
5
DOK.MUNIRATHNAM NEAR RAMASWAMY GUDI VEEDHI
KATTAKANDIPALYEM VILLAGE PUNGANUR MANDALAM CHITTOOR
DISTRICT - 522241
...RESPONDENT(S):
! Counsel for the Petitioners :S.S.Bhatt
^Counsel for the Respondents :1. Sri David, Assistant Government Pleader
for Women Dev Child Welfare &
2. Sri P.Ajay Babu, Assistant Government
Pleader for Home
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2019) 2 SCC 329
2. (1992) 4 SCC 61
3. 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1212
4. 2004 SCC OnLine AP 29
6
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 315/2026
ORDER:
The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking the following relief:
“…to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly, one in the nature of
Mandamus, declaring the action of the Respondent no. 3, respondent no. 5
and 6 in asking the petitioners to go to their offices and agree for a
settlement with R7 and asking the petitioners to put signatures on some
blank stamp and white papers regards the settlement of the house
property with R7 situate in an extent of 3/4 kunta that is in an extent of
55.76 sq. yards in syno.701 bearing d.no.16/517, Jayasree colony,
B.kothakota town annamayya district admeasuring east to west 27 1/2 feet
and north to south 18 1/4 feet without conducting any enquiry and not to
insist the petitioners to vacate the subject house property without prior
notice to the petitioners and without following the due process of law as
illegal arbitrary and unconstitutional and consequently direct the authorities
R3, R5 and R6 to not call for the petitioners to their offices and not to insist
the petitioners to go for a settlement with R7 for the above house property
and not to force them to sign stamp papers and empty white papers and
not to ask them to vacate from the said house and not to damage the civil
rights and claims of the petitioners in the subject property which are
standing on the name of the R7 detrimental to the rights and interests of
the petitioners…”
2. Sri S.S.Bhatt, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the very
substratum of the present Writ Petition rests upon the arbitrary and
unconstitutional interference of the respondent authorities into what is
essentially a civil dispute. The Petitioners, being lawful residents of the subject
house property, have been coerced and summoned by Respondent Nos.3, 5
and 6 without issuance of any statutory notice, without adherence to due
process, and without jurisdictional competence. Such coercive measures,
undertaken at the behest of Respondent No.7, who is none other than the
mother of Petitioner No.1, amount to a blatant transgression of Articles 14 and
7
21 of the Constitution of India, thereby infringing upon the Petitioners’ civil
liberties and proprietary rights.
3. It is further contended that the genesis of the dispute lies in the subject
house property situated at Jayasree Colony, B. Kothakota town, which was
constructed exclusively from the ancestral nucleus and agricultural income of
Petitioner No.2. The documentary evidence, including pattadar passbooks and
sale deeds of ancestral lands, unequivocally establish that the financial
contributions emanated solely from Petitioner No.2 and Petitioner No.1, while
Respondent No.7’s contribution was nil. The mere fact that the house was
registered in the name of Respondent No.7, as a measure of convenience to
avoid familial bickering, does not ipso facto confer absolute ownership upon
her. The settled principle of law is that title must be traced to the source of
funds, and not merely to the nominal holder of the document.
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Respondent No.7,
instead of availing herself of the remedies available under civil law, has
chosen to invoke the machinery of the police and revenue authorities, thereby
converting a civil dispute into purported criminal enquiry. The Respondents
herein, by compelling the Petitioners to attend their offices, by threatening
them with dire consequences, and by insisting upon signatures on blank
papers, have acted in excess of jurisdiction and in derogation of the rule of
law.
5. It is submitted that the Petitioners are not mere trespassers or strangers
to the property, but lawful heirs with vested rights in the estate of Petitioner
No.2. The attempt of Respondent No.7 to alienate the subject house in favour
8
of her daughter, to the exclusion of Petitioner No.1, amounts to deprivation of
legitimate inheritance. Such deprivation, if permitted, would render Petitioner
No.1 destitute and pauperized, thereby violating his right to livelihood and
dignity under Article 21. This Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226, is empowered to protect such fundamental rights from
arbitrary executive interference.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the conduct of
Respondent No.6, who has been using abusive and unparliamentary
language while summoning Petitioner No.1, is wholly unbecoming of a public
servant and constitutes malice in law. The threat to foist false cases upon the
Petitioners if they fail to attend the so-called enquiry is a clear manifestation of
colourable exercise of power.
7. It is therefore urged that the present Writ Petition is the only efficacious
remedy available to the Petitioners, as no other suit or proceeding has been
instituted for the same relief. The Petitioners seek not merely protection of
their proprietary rights but also safeguarding of their civil liberties against
unwarranted intrusion by executive authorities. The relief sought in mandamus
is squarely maintainable, as the Respondents have acted without jurisdiction,
without authority of law, and in violation of constitutional guarantees.
8. Sri S.S.Bhatt, learned Counsel for the Petitioners urges that this Court
may be pleased to declare the actions of Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6 as
illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional, restrain them from coercing the
Petitioners into attending their offices or signing blank papers, and direct them
not to interfere with the Petitioners’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
9
subject house property. Such intervention of this Court is imperative to uphold
the majesty of law, to protect the sanctity of civil rights, and to prevent the
abuse of executive power in matters which are purely civil in nature.
9. Sri David, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for
Respondent No.6, has submitted that on the representation given by
Respondent No.7 to the District Collector/Respondent No.4concerned, the
same was in turn forwarded to the Police Department at the behest of
Respondent No.7. Counselling was conducted on 24.12.2025 and
26.12.2025. The grievance of Respondent No.7 resulted in that she was given
mental support by Respondent No.6 through the One Stop Centre, Women
Development and Child Welfare Department, Rayachoty, Annamayya District.
It is mentioned in the written instructions from Respondent No.6 that, to lessen
the issues from both sides, to ventilate them, and to sort out the issue,
counselling was conducted. However, as some of the petitioners did not
attend the counselling sessions, Respondent No.7 addressed a letter from the
One Stop Centre stating that she would make her issues legal.
10. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for
Respondent Nos.1 to 4 submits that Respondent No.7 is the wife of Petitioner
No.2; Respondent No.7 is the mother of Petitioner No.1; and Petitioner No.3 is
the mother-in-law of Respondent No.7. It appears that there are certain civil
disputes regarding the immovable property between the petitioners and the
Respondent No.7. The learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits
that the respondent/police called the Petitioners only for a preliminary enquiry
on PGRS petition submitted by the Respondent No.7.
10
11. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the present Writ
Petition is misconceived and devoid of merit. The Petitioners have sought to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, alleging arbitrary interference by Respondent Nos.3, 5,
and 6. However, the factual matrix clearly demonstrates that the Respondents
acted only upon a complaint lodged by Respondent No.6 before the District
Collector through the PGRS mechanism, which was duly endorsed to the
Station House Officer for preliminary enquiry. The role of the police was
confined to conducting a preliminary enquiry and advising the parties to
approach the competent Civil Court, as the dispute pertains to property rights,
a matter purely civil in nature.
12. It is further submitted that the allegations of coercion, threats, and use
of unparliamentary language attributed to Respondent No.6 and the officials
are wholly baseless, invented solely to sustain the present Writ Petition. The
Respondent/police, in discharge of their statutory duties, merely called the
Petitioners for preliminary enquiry based on the complaint received. At no
point did the Respondent No.3 compel the Petitioners to sign blank papers or
force them to vacate the subject property. The settled principle of law is that
police authorities cannot adjudicate civil disputes, and in the present case,
they have scrupulously adhered to that principle by advising both parties to
seek redress before the Civil Court.
13. Sri P.Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits
that the One Stop Centre, functioning under the Department of Women and
Child Welfare, was involved only to provide temporary shelter and counselling
11
services to Respondent No.7, who approached the police department seeking
protection. The Centre Administrator, upon referral, assigned the matter to a
Psycho-Social Counsellor, who interacted with Respondent No.7 and provided
counselling and mental support. The record unequivocally establishes that the
counsellor did not use any abusive or unparliamentary language but merely
attempted to facilitate dialogue between the parties. The Petitioners’ refusal to
attend the counselling sessions cannot be construed as coercion or illegality
on the part of the authorities.
14. It is contended that the Writ Petition seeks to convert a private family
dispute into a constitutional grievance against the State machinery. Such an
attempt is impermissible in law. The Petitioners’ apprehensions of being
dispossessed are unfounded, as no coercive steps have been initiated by the
Respondents. The entire narrative of threats and arbitrary action is a figment
of imagination, designed to malign the Respondent authorities.
15. Learned Assistant Government Pleader eventually prays that this Court
may be pleased to dismiss the Writ Petition as against the Respondent police
and the One Stop Centre, holding that the Respondents have acted strictly
within the bounds of law, without any arbitrariness or mala fides. The
Petitioners, if aggrieved, have adequate remedies before the competent Civil
Court to ventilate their claims. The invocation of Article 226 in the present
circumstances is wholly unwarranted, and dismissal of the Writ Petition would
serve the ends of justice and uphold the sanctity of constitutional remedies.
12
16. In this regard it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T1wherein at paragraph Nos.14, 17 &
19 it is held as under:
“14. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit is the
appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property
rights between the private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some
statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases,
the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority
concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional
jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under
the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it
is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or
application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should
not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant.
17. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while so directing exceeded
its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had virtually
converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a civil court. In our
view, it was not permissible.
19. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for
Respondent 1 for the reasons that first there did exist a dispute between
the appellant and Respondent 1 as to who was in possession of the flat
in question at the relevant time; second, a dispute regarding possession
of the said flat between the two private individuals could be decided only
by the civil court in civil suit or by the criminal court in Section 145 CrPC
proceedings but not in the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
17. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani
Rajgaria (Smt.)2, at paragraph No.6 held as under:
“6. Mr Arun Jaitley, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent 1 has supported the impugned judgment on the ground that
prayer for issuing a direction against Delhi Administration and
Commissioner of Police who were respondents 1 and 2 was also made.
It has to be appreciated that the present appellants were respondents 3
and 4 before the High Court; and the High Court has by the impugned
order, considered it fit to allow the prayer of the respondents against
them for removal of the grills for access to the backyard. According to
the stand of the landlord-respondent, since the police were taking a
partisan attitude against her, the filing of a writ petition became
necessary. We are unable to follow this argument. There is no doubt that1
(2019) 2 SCC 329
2
(1992) 4 SCC 61
13the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable
property. Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house-
property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some
other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The
respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ
petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and
the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account
of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ
petition before the High Court. It has repeatedly been held by this Court
as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate
remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between
private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on
the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the Court
will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real
grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal
proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must
avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal
Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional
jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under
the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to
replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to
a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be
exercised casually or lightly. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was
in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their
judgment under appeal. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the
impugned judgment is set aside and the writ petition of the respondents
filed in the High Court is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.”
18. A learned single Judge of this Court also in S. Masthan Saheb v. P.S.R.
Anjaneyulu3, at paragraph No.14 held as under:
“14. The various provisions to which a brief reference is made would
show that the power of the police to collect: intelligence regarding any
design to commit cognizable offences and prevent commission Of
cognizable offences is considered to be the inherent power of the police
organization. Whether or not there is a special enactment, the police are
expected to perform its functions; namely, maintenance of peace and
public order and prevention of cognizable offences. When all these
statutes dealing with police in Andhra Pradesh deal with duty of the
police relating to cognizable offences, a Police Officer would not be
justified in saying that he/she is looking into a complaint made by a
person which has, ex facie, trappings of the civil dispute. Indeed, under
sub-section (1) of Section 154 of Cr. P.C., it shall be within the power
and duty of the police officer to register only a cognizable offence.
Though under Section 155 of Cr. P.C. a police officer can make an entry
in the appropriate register about the information as to non-cognizable
offence, such police officer shall not investigate a non-cognizable
offence without the order of the Magistrate. As a necessary corollary, it
must be concluded that any effort on the part of the police „to look into‟
any complaint by any person which does not contain allegations of
commission of cognizable offences would not only violate the various3
2002 SCC OnLine AP 1212
14provisions of the Andhra Act, as in this case, but also would violate
Section 155(2) of the Cr. P.C. Any such action would be ex facie illegal,
whatever be the ipse dixit of the police. There is no presumption in law
that every rift in human relations would lead to a civil dispute and civil
dispute would likely to result in clashes, resulting in offences against
human body. Any such effort on the part of the police to look into the
complaints regarding civil disputes is not even the part of the Code of
Conduct of the Police, which was communicated by the Government of
India in 1987 which reads as under:
Code of Conduct for the Police in India [ Union Ministry of Home Affairs
Letters No. VI-24021/97/84-GPAI, dated 4-7-1985 and 10-7-1985.]
1. The Police must bear faithful allegiance to the Constitution of India
and respect and uphold the rights of the citizens as guaranteed by it.
2. The Police should not question the propriety or necessity of any law
duly enacted. They should enforce the law firmly and impartially, without
fear or favour, malice or vindictiveness.
3. The Police should recognize and respect the limitations of their
powers and functions. They should not usurp or even seem to usurp the
functions of the judiciary and sit in judgment on cases to avenge
individuals and punish the guilty.
4. In securing the observance of law or in maintaining order, the Police
should as far as practicable, use the methods of persuasion, advice and
warning. When the application of force becomes inevitable, only the
irreducible minimum of force required in the circumstances should be
used.
5. The prime duty of the Police is to prevent crime and disorder and the
Police must recognize that the test of their efficiency is the absence of
both and not the visible evidence of Police action in dealing with them.
6. The Police must recognize that they are members of the public, with
the only difference that in the interest of the society and on its behalf
they are employed to give full time attention to duties, which are
normally incumbent on every citizen to perform.
7. The Police should realize that the efficient performance of their duties
will be dependent on the extent of real co-operation that they receive
from the public. This, in turn, will depend on their ability to secure public
approval of their conduct and actions and to earn and retain public
respect and confidence.
8. The Police should always keep the welfare of the people in mind and
be sympathetic and considerate towards them. They should always be
ready to offer individual service and friendship and render necessary
assistance to all without regard to their wealth or social standing.
9. The Police should always place duty before self, should remain calm
in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule and should be ready to sacrifice
their lives in protecting those of others.
10. The Police should always be courteous and well mannered; they
should be dependable and impartial; they should possess dignity and
courage; and should cultivate character and the trust of the people.
11. Integrity of the highest order is the fundamental basis of the prestige
of the Police Recognizing this, the Police must keep their private lives
scrupulously clean, develop self-restraint and be truthful and honest in
thought and deed, in both personal and official life, so that the public
may regard them as exemplary citizen.
12. The Police should recognize that their full utility to the State is the
best ensured only by maintaining a high standard of discipline, faithful
performance of duties in accordance with law and implicit obedience to
15the lawful directions of commanding ranks and absolute loyalty to the
force and by keeping themselves in a state of constant training and
preparedness.
13. As members of a secular, democratic State, the Police should strive
continually to rise above personal prejudices and promote harmony and
the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people in India
transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities and
to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women and
disadvantaged segments of the society.”
19. Furthermore,the very same learned Single Judge of this Court also in J.
Lakshmi v. Commissioner of Police4, at paragraph No.4 held as under:
“4. It is well settled that Police cannot interfere in civil disputes. In W.P.
No. 12737 of 2003 disposed of on 21-11-2003, I have considered the
question regarding the power of Police to interfere in civil disputes and
coerce people to compromise civil disputes. After referring to my earlier
judgment in S. Masthan Saheb v. P.S.R. Anjaneyulu 2002 (2) An. W.R.
582 (A.P.) as well as the code of conduct for the Police prescribed by
Union of India vide Ministry of Home Affairs Letters No. VI-24021/97/84-
G.P.A. I, dated 4-7-1985 and 10-7-1985, summarized the legal position
as under.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when the dispute is purely
of civil nature, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot
be exercised. The Supreme Court also repeatedly laid down that when
the dispute between the two citizens is of civil nature and no crime is
registered, police have no jurisdiction to interfere in the civil dispute.
Further, when there is a civil litigation either before the court of law or
before the tribunal, the police have no jurisdiction to interfere in the civil
disputes. Further, when there is a civil litigation either before a court of
law or before a tribunal, the police cannot interfere and even if a
complaint is made in relation to such dispute pending in a civil court, the
citizens have to be advised to resolve the dispute through a duly
constituted court of law.
In the scheme of the Constitution of India, the duty to resolve civil
disputes is entrusted to judiciary. Police have no such power. Any
interference by police in a pending civil dispute or a potential civil dispute
between two citizens or two groups of citizens is not within the province
of the police. Furthermore, if a cognizable offence is reported to the
police, it is the duty of the police to register the crime under Section 154
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) and take up
investigation immediately. In a given case, even if a civil dispute, to say
a land dispute, is pending before a civil court and if the quarrel between
the two warring parties has a potential of resulting in a law and order
problem posing threat to the society at large, the police can always take
up the case only after registering the crime under Section 154 Cr. P.C.
Without registering the crime and without any reason the police cannot
interfere.”
20. Indeed, once a petition is submitted by Respondent No.7 concerning
issues relating to immovable property, Respondent No.6 or Respondent No.2
4
2004 SCC OnLine AP 29
16
his police officers oг even Respondent No.4 is not competent to entertain or
initiate any form of conciliation, as such matters fall exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court. However, the District Collector or the
Superintendent of Police may, at their discretion, forward the said
representation of Respondent No.7 to the District Legal Services Authority or
the Mandal Legal Services Committee concerned, as the case may be or to
the Mediation Centre.
21. It is a settled principle of law that the police machinery cannot intrude
into disputes which are, on the face of the record, purely civil in character. The
Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly affirmed that when the lis pertains to rights
over immovable property between private individuals, the extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked as a
substitute for the remedies available under ordinary civil law. In matters where
no cognizable offence is disclosed, the police have neither jurisdiction nor
statutory authority to summon parties, coerce them into compromise, or
assume an adjudicatory role. The scheme of the Constitution entrusts
resolution of civil disputes exclusively to the judicial forum competent to
determine questions of title, succession, and possession, and the police
cannot usurp that function under the pretext of enquiry.
22. Consistent with these principles, even when a complaint is lodged
before the police during the subsistence of a civil dispute, the jurisdiction of
the police is limited to registering a cognizable offence where the statutory
ingredients exist. The police cannot enlarge their role to undertake fact-finding
in a civil dispute, initiate counselling, compel attendance, or insist upon
17
compromise between family members in matters relating to proprietary rights.
Any such attempt amounts to overreach and stands in direct violation of the
statutory limitations contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(for
brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) or the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for
brevity ‘the BNSS’) and reiterated by judicial precedent. Unless the complaint
prima facie discloses a cognizable offence, the police are duty-bound to
refrain from interference and to advise the complainant to seek redress before
the competent Civil Court.
23. When viewed in the context of the present Writ Petition, the allegations
brought by Respondent No.7 do not even remotely suggest the commission of
a cognizable offence but relate solely to intra-familial conflict concerning
ownership and possession of the subject house property. The attempts of
Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6 to summon the Petitioners, call them for
counselling, or persuade them to settle their civil dispute fall far outside the
boundaries of lawful police authority. Their actions, therefore, cannot be
sustained in the eye of law. The appropriate remedy for both sides lies before
the Civil Court, which alone is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate such
disputes, and the police are expected to remain within the confines of their
statutory function without interfering in a matter that is essentially civil in
nature.
24. Although Section 173(3)(i) of ‘the BNSS’ empowers the Station House
Officer to undertake a preliminary enquiry into the alleged commission of a
cognizable offence, subject to obtaining prior approval of the Sub-Divisional
Police Officer, such authority is circumscribed by its very object, namely, the
18
ascertainment of the existence of ingredients constituting a cognizable
offence. The statutory mandate does not extend to matters devoid of criminal
complexion. In the present case, a bare and prima facie evaluation of the
complaint submitted by Respondent No.7 unmistakably reveals that the
dispute pertains exclusively to competing civil claims over immovable property
and inheritance. Thus, the invocation of police machinery under the guise of a
preliminary enquiry stands wholly without jurisdiction, being ultra vires the
contours delineated under ‘the BNSS.’
25. Consequently, in controversies such as the one at hand, where the
substratum of the allegations arises solely from familial discord and
proprietary entitlements, the police authorities are denuded of any
competence to initiate, entertain, or continue proceedings under the pretext of
enquiry. Their role is confined to a minimal procedural referral. The only legally
permissible course available to them is to relegate the disputing parties to the
forums recognised under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for brevity,
‘the Act’) or Mediation Act, 2023, which are vested with the statutory
framework for conciliation, mediation, and amicable settlement of civil
disputes. Any endeavour by the police to traverse beyond this limited remit
would amount to an unwarranted encroachment into the adjudicatory domain
of civil courts, which exclusively possess jurisdiction to resolve issues
pertaining to title, ownership, and succession.
26. The Mediation Act, 2023 provides a structured statutory framework for
mediation in India, formalising it as a primary mode of resolving civil and
commercial disputes. It mandates under Section 5 of the Mediation Act, 2023,
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pre-litigation mediation to encourage settlement and reduce judicial burden,
andempowers Courts and competent authorities to refer parties to mediation,
recognising that property and family-related disputes are better resolved
through structured dialogue rather than police intervention. Under this Act,
mediation service providers and Legal Services Authorities are authorised to
facilitate mediation, offer counselling, and assist parties in arriving at lawful
settlements in line with Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
The Act also ensures confidentiality, mediator neutrality, enforceability of
mediated settlement agreements, and recognises community mediation for
maintaining local harmony. Accordingly, disputes arising from intra-familial
discord over immovable property must be channelled to mediation or legal
services forums, as police authority is confined only to procedural referral and
cannot extend to adjudicatory functions. Thus, the Mediation Act, 2023
reinforces the Court’s view that, in cases of this nature, mediation before
legally recognised bodies is the only lawful and non-coercive route for
resolution.
27. Further under Section 19 of ‘the Act’, Andhra Pradesh State Legal
Services Authority or District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) or the Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee or High Court Legal Services Committee or,
Mandal Legal Services Committee, as the case may be,are empowered to
provide legal aid, conduct Lok Adalats even at pre-litigation stages, and
facilitate amicable settlement of disputes. In matters such as the present,
where familial discord has culminated in litigation over immovable property,
the DLSA or the Mandal Legal Services Committee concerned may, upon
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reference by the District Collector or Superintendent of Police, endeavour to
mediate between the parties, provide counselling, and assist them in
accessing appropriate legal remedies. Such statutory bodies are vested with
the jurisdiction to promote conciliation and settlement in a manner consistent
with law, thereby reducing the burden on regular courts and ensuring that
vulnerable parties, particularly women, are afforded legal protection and
support.
27. Upon meticulous consideration of the pleadings and submissions
advanced by both the counsel, this Court is constrained to observe that the lis
between the Petitioners and Respondent No.7 is quintessentially civil in
nature, arising out of competing claims to immovable property. The record
discloses that the subject house property was constructed from the ancestral
nucleus and agricultural income of Petitioner No.2, though registered in the
name of Respondent No.7. The Petitioners allege coercion and arbitrary
interference by Respondent Nos.3, 5, and 6, whereas the official Respondents
contend that their role was confined to conducting a preliminary enquiry upon
receipt of a representation of Respondent No.7 through the PGRS
mechanism. It is trite law that Police and Revenue Authorities cannot
adjudicate civil disputes in general nor compel parties to execute documents
in respect of proprietary rights.
28. The allegations of coercion, threats, and use of unparliamentary
language remain unsubstantiated by cogent material. The Respondents have
categorically denied such imputations and have placed on record that
counselling was conducted only to provide temporary shelter and psycho-
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social support to Respondent No.7, who had approached the One Stop Centre
under the Department of Women and Child Welfare. The apprehension of
dispossession voiced by the Petitioners is speculative, as no coercive steps
have been initiated by the Respondents. The proper remedy for the
Petitioners or for Respondent No.7 lies before the competent Civil Court,
which alone, in general, has jurisdiction to determine title, ownership, and
succession rights in respect of immovable property.
29. Considering the above, this Court holds that the Respondents had not
acted within the confines of their statutory authority, and no arbitrariness or
mala fides can be attributed to them. However, to obviate further
apprehensions and to ensure that the petitioners’ civil rights are not
jeopardized, this Court deems it appropriate to direct Respondent Nos.2 to 5
not to summon the Petitioners for any preliminary enquiry in respect of the
dispute pending between them and Respondent No.7 concerning immovable
property. The Petitioners and Respondent No.7 are at liberty to ventilate their
grievances before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, which shall
adjudicate the matter uninfluenced by any observations herein.
30. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as
to costs.
As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.
________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dt: 20.01.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o
PRA/VTS