Delhi High Court
Jagrit Kathuria And Ors vs Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha … on 27 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
$~3
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27th April, 2026.
+ W.P.(C) 14516/2022 & CM APPL. 56647/2023
JAGRIT KATHURIA AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Nikhilesh Kumar, Advocate.
versus
GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTHA UNIVERSITY & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Harish Malhotra, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Shivani Kher, Mr. Rakesh
Lakra and Mr. Rishabh Shivhare,
Advocates for R-2.
Ms. Manisha Agrawal N. and Mr.
Nipun Jain, Advocates for R-3.
Ms. Pearl Sharma, Advocate for R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1. The Petitioners, who were engaged as teaching faculty in HMR
Institute of Technology & Management, have filed this petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the termination notices dated 16 th
September, 2022 issued by Respondent No. 2. They also seek reinstatement
with consequential benefits.
Facts
2. The dispute, in substance, arises from the termination of teaching
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faculty by a private unaided college affiliated to the University. The
Petitioners were engaged at different stages between 2011 and 2015. Some
of them entered service as Lecturers and were later appointed as Assistant
Professors. The appointment record is not uniform in expression. Certain
earlier letters described the engagement as temporary or contractual. The
later orders, however, referred to appointment as Assistant Professor,
placement either in a pay scale or on consolidated salary, probation,
selection by a committee, self-appraisal, and governance by the rules and
regulations of the University concerned, the State Government and
HMRITM. At the same time, the appointment documents contained a clause
permitting termination by one month’s notice or salary in lieu of notice.
3. The Petitioners rely on their length of service, the later appointment
orders and the material submitted by the Institute to AICTE to contend that
they were regular employees. They also refer to the faculty data forming part
of the AICTE/RTI material on record, where some teachers were described
as “Regular” and others as “Contract”. Their submission is that Respondent
No. 2 cannot project them as regular faculty before the regulator, and yet
describe them before this Court as employees whose services could be
brought to an end as a matter of ordinary contract.
4. The Petitioners place the impugned action in the context of their
earlier grievances against the Institute. They had approached this Court in
WP(C) 1314/2021 seeking pay fixation in terms of the 6th and 7th Central
Pay Commission recommendations. They had also submitted a
complaint/representation to AICTE in August 2021 alleging that the Institute
had furnished incorrect information for extension of approval, had failed to
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had used the credentials of contractual faculty for regulatory purposes, and
had not provided adequate institutional facilities.
5. The AICTE Standing Complaint Scrutiny Committee thereafter
considered the complaint. It recorded that the Institute had placed documents
showing salary transfers to around 110 faculty members for the preceding
six months, as against the stated faculty requirement of about 75 on the
applicable student-faculty ratio. The Committee also noted that material
relating to insurance and infrastructure had been furnished, along with
photographs said to show that some of the complainants were either not
discharging duties or were found sleeping during office hours. On that basis,
the complaint was closed with the observation that no further action was
required.
6. Soon thereafter, on 16th September, 2022, Respondent No. 2 issued
the impugned notices. The notices are materially similar. They refer to the
Petitioners’ earlier appointment letters and later orders of appointment,
collectively describe those documents as the “Appointment Letter”, invoke
Clause 3, and state that the Institute had decided that the Petitioners’
services were no longer required. The notices also tendered amounts towards
pay in lieu of notice, salary for the days worked in September, 2022,
security deposit and gratuity.
7. The impugned notices do not rest the termination on any allegation of
misconduct. They make no reference to any charge, inquiry, adverse finding,
disciplinary proceeding or stigmatic conclusion. On their face, they purport
to effect termination simpliciter under the contractual termination clause.
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Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners
8. The Petitioners submits that the impugned action is arbitrary,
retaliatory and legally unsustainable. They had served the Institute for
several years, in some cases for nearly a decade, and their services continued
well beyond the period of probation. The subsequent appointment orders and
regulatory disclosures made by the Institute, they contend, show that they
were not casual or short-term appointees, but formed part of the regular
teaching faculty. On that footing, it is urged that Respondent No. 2 could not
have brought their services to an end in the manner adopted. In the
alternative, even if the Petitioners were treated as contractual or temporary
employees, their services could not have been dispensed with without
adherence to the principles of natural justice, including a prior opportunity
of hearing. In this regard, reliance is placed on Dr. M.P. Chaudhary v.
9. The impugned termination notices were issued en bloc and in a
mechanical manner. The notices do not disclose any reasons and merely
state that the services of the Petitioners are no longer required, without
reference to any charge, inquiry, adverse material or discernible basis. The
issuance of identical notices to a group of teachers, in close proximity to
their pursuit of service-related grievances, reflects a colourable exercise of
power.
10. The impugned action is a counterblast to their earlier writ petition
concerning pay fixation, as well as to the complaint made to AICTE
1
2023:DHC:4474.
2
(1986) 3 SCC 156.
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regarding regulatory non-compliances. Emphasis is laid on the sequence of
events: the Petitioners first pursued claims relating to pay; thereafter,
complaints were addressed to AICTE; memoranda were issued to certain
faculty members; the AICTE Committee closed the complaint on 30 th
August, 2022; and within a short span thereafter, the impugned termination
notices were issued. This sequence clearly indicates a retaliatory motive.
11. The Petitioners could not have been removed without adherence to the
applicable statutory and regulatory regime. Reliance is placed on the
provisions of the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University Act, 1998 and
the Statutes framed thereunder to contend that an affiliated institution is
bound to comply with the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations of the
University. Particular reliance is placed on Clause 22 of the First Statute,
which mandates that a teacher may be removed only for a justified cause and
after being afforded a reasonable opportunity of showing cause. Moreover,
in view of Section 31 of the Act, the terms of any contract of service cannot
be inconsistent with the statutory framework, and therefore, a contractual
termination clause cannot be invoked to defeat these safeguards.
12. Respondent No. 2 cannot evade the writ jurisdiction of this Court by
describing itself as a private unaided institution. The Institute performs a
public function in the field of education, is affiliated to a statutory
University, is subject to regulatory control, and is bound by statutory
obligations. In such circumstances, its actions are amenable to judicial
review under Article 226. In support of maintainability, reliance is placed on
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Anandi Mukta Sadguru & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani,3 and Ramesh Ahluwalia v.
State of Punjab.4
13. The replacement of the Petitioners by another set of contractual
appointees is impermissible in law. In this regard, reliance is placed on
Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana,5 and Hargurpratap Singh v. State of
Punjab,6
14. On this foundation, the Petitioners contend that the notices violate
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and deserve to be quashed.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 2
15. Respondent No. 2 raises a preliminary objection to maintainability. It
is submitted that Respondent No. 2 is a private unaided educational
institution run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860. It receives no Government aid and is not under Government control. It
is affiliated to Respondent No. 1 only for academic and regulatory purposes.
It is not “State” within Article 12 and the dispute, arising out of termination
of service, pertains to a contract of personal service with no public law
element. In this regard, reliance is placed on Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P.
Sebastian,7 K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and
Drainage,8 and St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad
Bhargava.9
16. The Petitioners seek no substantive relief against the University, the
Government of NCT of Delhi or AICTE. Those authorities, Respondent No.
3
(1989) 2 SCC 691.
4
(2012) 12 SCC 331.
5
(1985) 4 SCC 43.
6
(2007) 13 SCC 292.
7
(2009) 14 SCC 360.
8
(2015) 4 SCC 670.
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2 submits, have been impleaded only to give a public law complexion to
what is otherwise a private employment dispute. The cause of action arises
from the termination notices issued by Respondent No. 2, and the operative
relief is directed against Respondent No. 2 alone. The mere presence of
public authorities in the array of parties cannot render maintainable a writ
petition which, in substance, seeks enforcement of a private contract of
service.
17. On merits, Respondent No. 2 argues that the Petitioners were engaged
on contractual/temporary terms. Their appointment letters expressly
reserved to the Institute the right to terminate service by one month’s notice
or salary in lieu thereof. The impugned notices merely invoked that clause.
The Petitioners were paid salary in lieu of notice, salary for the days worked,
security deposit and gratuity. The Petitioners accepted the cheques and
stopped reporting for duty.
18. Respondent No. 2 denies that the impugned action was retaliatory or
actuated by mala fides. The earlier writ petition for pay fixation has no
nexus with the impugned notices. Further, the AICTE complaint was found
to be without substance and closed. The memoranda issued to certain faculty
members were part of ordinary administration and discipline, and cannot be
treated as proof of mala fides.
19. The service conditions of the Petitioners are governed by their
contracts of employment and not by the provisions of the Guru Gobind
Singh Indraprastha University Act, 1998 or the Statutes framed thereunder,
which are inapplicable to employees of a private unaided institution.
Moreover, the termination was effected in accordance with the requirements
9
2022 SCC OnLine 1091.
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of the institution, including the need to maintain appropriate faculty strength
in light of student intake and course structure.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 1 University
20. Respondent No. 1 University submits that no relief has been sought
against it. Respondent No. 2 is merely an affiliated college and that the
University does not exercise control over the day-to-day administration of
such institutions, including matters relating to appointment, selection or
termination of their teaching and non-teaching staff.
21. Respondent No. 2 is affiliated with the University, and the conditions
of such affiliation are governed by Statute 24 and the letter of affiliation.
Statute 24 does not lay down any provision governing the termination of
services of employees of an affiliated college. Similarly, the letter of
affiliation for the academic session 2022-23 does not contain any stipulation
in respect of termination of teaching or non-teaching staff.
22. The University also relies on the principles in K.K. Saksena and St.
Mary’s Education Society to submit that the dispute remains one of private
service and cannot be transformed into a public law dispute merely because
Respondent No. 2 imparts education or is affiliated to a statutory University.
Issues
23. Upon consideration of the aforesaid facts and submissions advanced,
the following issues arise for determination:
(i) Whether the writ petition is maintainable against Respondent No. 2, a
private unaided affiliated educational institution, in respect of termination of
service of its teaching faculty?
(ii) Whether the impleadment of the University, GNCTD and AICTE in
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element into what Respondent No. 2 describes as a private employment
dispute?
(iii) If the petition is assumed to be maintainable, whether the termination
notices dated 16th September, 2022 suffer from arbitrariness, mala fides,
breach of natural justice or violation of any statutory obligation so as to
warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?
Analysis
On Maintainability
24. The first and central question is whether this writ petition is
maintainable against Respondent No. 2. There is no dispute about the
institutional character of Respondent No. 2. It is a private unaided
educational institution, run by a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, and affiliated to the University. It receives no grant-
in-aid from the Government and is not shown to be under the administrative
or financial control of the Government or any instrumentality of the State.
Respondent No. 2 is, therefore, not “State” within the meaning of Article 12
of the Constitution.
25. That, by itself, does not conclude the matter, since Article 226 is
wider than Article 12. Yet, the width of Article 226 does not mean that
every private body, or every decision taken by such body, is open to judicial
review. A writ may issue against a private body only in exceptional
circumstances, where it performs a public duty and the action complained of
bears a public law character. A writ of mandamus is not a remedy for
enforcing a purely private contract of personal service.
26. The Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn this line. In Binny Ltd. v.
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V. Sadasivan,10 the Court held that judicial review under Article 226 is
concerned with public law remedies and does not ordinarily extend to
private wrongs arising out of contract. In K.K. Saksena v. International
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage,11 the Court reiterated that even
where Article 226 may reach a non-State body, the duty sought to be
enforced must be a public duty. The most direct authority for the present
case is St. Mary’s Education Society, where the Supreme Court held that
although a private unaided educational institution may perform a public
function by imparting education, a service dispute raised by its employee is
not maintainable under Article 226 unless the service action is governed or
controlled by statutory provisions.
27. The distinction is important. An institution may perform a public
function in one field and yet act in a private capacity in another. Imparting
education may attract regulatory oversight, affiliation conditions and
academic control. But an employment decision taken by a private unaided
institution in relation to its staff does not become a public law action merely
because the employer runs a college. The Court must therefore examine not
only who the Respondent is, but what duty is sought to be enforced and
whether the impugned action is traceable to a statutory obligation.
28. Applying that test, the present dispute does not disclose the necessary
public law element. The impugned action is the termination of the
Petitioners’ services by Respondent No. 2. The relief is directed, in
substance, against Respondent No. 2 alone. The University, GNCTD and
AICTE have been arrayed as parties, but the termination notices do not
10
(2005) 6 SCC 657.
11
(2015) 4 SCC 670.
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emanate from them. Nor is it shown that any of those authorities exercised,
approved, directed or declined to exercise any statutory power in relation to
the impugned terminations. The presence of public authorities in the array of
parties cannot change the nature of the lis.
29. The Petitioners seek to bring the matter within public law by relying
on the GGSIPU Act, the Statutes framed thereunder, and the conditions of
affiliation. This submission does not carry the case far enough. Statute 24,
on which reliance is placed, concerns the conditions subject to which an
institution may be granted or continued affiliation. It deals with regulatory,
academic, infrastructural and administrative requirements. On the material
placed before this Court, it does not regulate termination of teaching staff in
a private unaided affiliated institution. Nor does it impose a statutory
restraint requiring prior approval, inquiry or adjudication before Respondent
No. 2 may act under the termination clause contained in the appointment
documents.
30. The Petitioners also rely on clauses in the appointment documents
stating that their services would be governed by the rules and regulations of
the University concerned, the State Government and HMRITM. That recital
does not, by itself, confer statutory status upon the employment. A party
invoking a statutory protection must identify the statutory rule, establish its
applicability to the service relationship, and demonstrate how its breach
vitiates the impugned action. A general reference in an appointment letter to
University or State rules cannot convert a private contract of service into
statutory employment, particularly when the very appointment documents
also contain a termination clause permitting cessation of service by one
month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof.
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31. The material relied upon from AICTE, including faculty lists and
information obtained under the Right to Information Act, stands on no
higher footing for the purpose of maintainability. At its highest, it shows
how the Institute described its faculty for regulatory purposes, including by
using expressions such as “Regular” and “Contract”. Such material may
have evidentiary value in an appropriate proceeding on the character of
engagement. It does not, however, amount to regularisation in law. Nor does
it create a statutory status, tenure, or right to reinstatement enforceable in
writ jurisdiction.
32. The distinction between regulatory oversight and statutory control
over service conditions must remain clear. AICTE may prescribe norms
relating to faculty strength, approval and institutional standards. The
University may regulate affiliation. But those forms of regulatory
supervision do not, without more, create statutory control over every
employment decision of a private unaided affiliated institution. There is also
a distinction between breach of a regulation or an affiliation requirement and
breach of a statutory condition governing termination. If an affiliated
institution fails to comply with the norms prescribed by AICTE of the
university, the regulator may have remedies available under the governing
statue, regulations or conditions of approval. But such non-compliance does
not automatically render an individual termination void or confer a right or
reinstatement in writ proceedings. Unless a statute, statutory rule, binding
regulation or condition of affiliation is shown to govern the impugned
termination, the dispute remains one arising from the contract of
employment.
33. In the present case, no such statutory restraint has been shown. The
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termination notices were issued by Respondent No. 2 under the appointment
documents. They were not issued by the University, GNCTD or AICTE.
Nor is it shown that any of those authorities were required, by statute or
binding regulation, to approve, review or control the termination. The
controversy, therefore, does not acquire a public law character merely
because Respondent No. 2 is affiliated to the University or regulated by
AICTE.
34. The Petitioners also rely on the length of their service. That
circumstance may explain their sense of grievance, but it does not alter the
legal character of the relationship. Continuance in service, even for a
considerable period, does not by itself confer public law status. Nor can it
override the express terms of appointment. In the absence of a statutory
framework governing termination, length of service cannot furnish an
independent basis for invoking writ jurisdiction.
35. The objection to maintainability must, therefore, be upheld. In the
facts of the present case, the dispute arises from termination of a contract of
personal service by a private unaided institution. It does not disclose any
enforceable public duty or statutory breach in relation to the impugned
notices. The controversy remains within the realm of private law and is,
therefore, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226.
36. Nonetheless, having regard to the fact that the petition has remained
pending since 2022 and that submissions have been addressed on merits, this
Court proceeds to examine the matter on merits as well, assuming, for the
sake of completeness, that the petition is maintainable. Even on that
assumption, no case for interference is made out in exercise of jurisdiction
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under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
On Merits
37. The impugned notices are termination simpliciter. They do not cast
any stigma, nor do they record any finding of misconduct, indiscipline,
incompetence or moral blame. The Petitioners have not been visited with
any adverse finding in a disciplinary proceeding, nor has any charge been
framed or adjudicated. The Institute has merely invoked the termination
clause contained in the appointment documents and tendered salary in lieu
of notice along with other dues.
38. The Petitioners contend that, even in such circumstances, the
termination could not have been effected without adherence to the principles
of natural justice. This submission does not commend acceptance. The
decisions relied upon by the Petitioners operate in materially distinct
contexts. In Dr. M.P. Chaudhary, the requirement of a prior hearing arose
in the backdrop of a statutory framework governing service conditions in a
public university. Likewise, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation
Ltd. concerned a State instrumentality and the invalidation of an
unconscionable contractual clause on grounds of arbitrariness under Article
14. Neither decision applies to the facts of the present case, which concerns
a private contractual employment and a non-stigmatic termination
simpliciter.
39. The Petitioners also contend that the absence of reasons makes the
action arbitrary. That argument cannot be accepted in the present contractual
framework. Where the governing appointment document permits
termination by notice or salary in lieu, and the termination is not founded on
misconduct, the employer is not required to hold a disciplinary inquiry
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merely because the employee has served for a long period. Natural justice is
not an empty incantation; it applies where the law, the contract, or the nature
of the action calls for a hearing. A contractual termination simpliciter,
without stigma and in accordance with a notice clause, does not ordinarily
attract a pre-decisional hearing.
40. The appointment documents placed on record uniformly contain a
clause permitting termination by one month’s notice or salary in lieu thereof.
This position runs consistently across the initial and subsequent appointment
letters, including those issued upon selection and those placing the
Petitioners in pay scales.
41. It is true that the appointment record is not entirely one-sided. Some
documents speak of appointment through a duly constituted selection
committee. Some refer to pay scale. Ankur Sharma’s earlier appointment
letter uses the expression “regular basis”. Some later orders say that service
would be governed by University, State Government and HMRITM rules.
These features were pressed by the Petitioners with some force. But those
very documents also contain a termination clause. Several of them say that
the appointment does not guarantee permanent employment. Some place the
employee on probation or make continuation subject to self-appraisal and
other conditions. The documents therefore cannot be read selectively.
42. The Petitioners’ submission would require the Court to give decisive
weight to those parts of the appointment record which assist them, while
treating the termination clause as if it had no operative force. That approach
cannot be accepted. The appointment documents must be read as a whole.
So read, they do not confer an unconditional right to remain in service until
superannuation. They create an employment relationship governed by
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specified terms, one of which permits termination by notice or salary in lieu
of notice.
43. The use of the word “regular” in some of the appointment documents
does not carry the matter any further. In the regulatory or administrative
context, that expression may distinguish a faculty member from visiting,
part-time or purely ad hoc staff. It may also indicate that the employee
formed part of the regular faculty strength of the Institute. But, in the
absence of a statutory rule, a binding service regulation, or a clear tenure
clause, the description “regular” does not extinguish the express termination
clause or create immunity from termination in accordance with the
appointment documents.
44. The next question is whether the termination has been shown to be
mala fide or retaliatory. The Petitioners rely substantially on chronology.
That chronology does invite scrutiny. The Petitioners had pursued pay-
related claims. A complaint had been made to AICTE. Memoranda were
issued to some faculty members. The AICTE/SCSC file was closed on 30 th
August, 2022. The termination notices followed on 16th September, 2022.
45. Chronology, however, is not proof by itself. Mala fides must be
pleaded with particulars and established through material which shows a
clear nexus between the protected action and the adverse decision. In the
exercise of writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot, on the present record, infer
retaliation merely because an adverse employment decision followed a
complaint or pending litigation.
46. The memoranda relied upon by the Petitioners show that the
relationship between some faculty members and the management had
become strained. The memoranda relate, among other things, to non-
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availability in the department, research work, student performance, mask
compliance and institutional discipline. The Petitioners replied to them and
disputed the allegations. These documents may show friction between the
parties, but they do not, by themselves, prove that the later termination
notices were issued as punishment for the Petitioners having pursued
complaints or legal remedies.
47. It is also material that the termination notices do not rely on these
memoranda. Respondent No. 2 did not convert the memoranda into
disciplinary charges. It did not dismiss the Petitioners on the ground of
misconduct. Having defended the notices as termination simpliciter under
the appointment documents, Respondent No. 2 cannot invite the Court to
treat the memoranda as the real foundation of the termination. Conversely,
the mere existence of those memoranda is insufficient for the Petitioners to
establish that the notices, otherwise issued under the termination clause,
were punitive in character.
48. The allegation that Respondent No. 2 appointed fresh contractual
faculty in the same posts also remains inadequately proved. The Petitioners
have pleaded that they “reliably learnt” about such appointments. That
assertion, without appointment records, advertisements, staff lists after
termination, or a clear admission, cannot form the basis for a writ of
reinstatement.
49. The decisions in Rattan Lal, and Hargurpratap Singh do not assist
the Petitioners on these facts. Those cases arose in settings involving public
employment or public authorities, where the State or an instrumentality of
the State sought to replace one set of ad hoc/temporary employees with
another similar set. The principle that one ad hoc employee should not
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ordinarily be replaced by another ad hoc employee. It cannot be
mechanically extended to enforce reinstatement against a private unaided
institution in a contractual service dispute, particularly when actual
replacement on identical terms has not been proved.
50. The Petitioners also argue that Respondent No. 2 accepted the benefit
of their service for many years and therefore could not remove them by a
one-month notice. This Court, in these proceedings, cannot rewrite the
employment contract merely because the arrangement continued for long. A
long contractual relationship remains contractual unless law, rule or conduct
recognised by law changes its character.
51. Respondent No. 2 has also argued that the Petitioners accepted
termination by encashing the cheques. The Court however does not rest the
decision on waiver. An employee may receive admitted dues while still
disputing termination. Encashment of salary, gratuity or security deposit
cannot, in every case, be treated as abandonment of challenge. But the
tender of such payment does show that Respondent No. 2 acted in the
manner contemplated by the notice clause. That is enough for the limited
purpose of this proceeding.
52. Finally, the Court must have regard to the nature of the relief sought.
The Petitioners seek quashing of the termination notices and reinstatement
with consequential benefits. In substance, this amounts to enforcement of a
contract of personal service. It is well settled that such relief is not ordinarily
granted, save in recognised exceptions, namely: (i) where a public servant is
removed in violation of constitutional or statutory protection; (ii) where a
workman seeks relief under industrial law; and (iii) where an employee of a
statutory body is dismissed in breach of a mandatory statutory provision.
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The present case falls in none of these categories.12 Courts do not ordinarily
compel a private employer and employee to continue a relationship of
personal service once it has been brought to an end in accordance with the
terms of the contract.
53. For the foregoing reasons, no case for interference under Article 226
is made out. Even assuming maintainability, the termination is traceable to
the appointment documents, non-stigmatic, and effected in terms of the
contractual stipulation of notice or pay in lieu. No statutory breach or mala
fides has been established.
54. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
55. It is clarified that the observations in this judgment are confined to the
adjudication under Article 226 and shall not preclude the Petitioners from
pursuing such remedies as may be available to them in law, including in
appropriate civil or other competent fora, in accordance with law.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
APRIL 27, 2026/hc
12
Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (1976) 2
SCC 58.
Signature Not Verified
Dgitally Signed
By:AKANSHA SINGH W.P.(C) 14516/2022 Page 19 of 19
Signing Date:01.05.2026
14:24:56