Jagganath Barman vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 26 May, 2026

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    Gauhati High Court

    Jagganath Barman vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 26 May, 2026

    Author: M. Zothankhuma

    Bench: Michael Zothankhuma

                                                                              Page No.# 1/19
    
    GAHC010048922024
    
    
    
    
                                                                         2026:GAU-AS:7242-
    DB
    
                                 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
         (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
    
                                    Case No. : Crl.A./82/2024
    
                JAGGANATH BARMAN
                S/O- LATE BRAJENDRA BARMAN, R/O- UTTAR KALABHANGA, P.S.-
                BARPETA ROAD, ASSAM-781315.
    
                VERSUS
    
                THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
                REPRESENTED BY PP ASSAM.
    
                2:NIKHIL BARMAN (INFORMANT)
                 S/O- SRI SUNIL BARMAN
                 R/O- UTTAR KALAHBHANGA
                 P.S.-BARPETA ROAD
                ASSAM - 781315
    
    Advocate for the appellant       : Mr. A. Gautam, Adv.
    Advocate for the respondent No.1 : Ms. A. Begum, Addl. P.P., Assam

    Advocate for the respondent No.2 : Ms. M.K. Brown, Amicus Curiae
    :::BEFORE:::

    HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
    HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA

    Date on which judgment is reserved : 21.05.2026
    Date of pronouncement of judgment : 26.05.2026
    Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A
    Page No.# 2/19

    operative part of the judgment ?

    Whether the full judgment has been : Yes
    pronounced?

    JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)

    (M. Zothankhuma, J)

    1. Heard Mr. A. Gautam, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms.
    A. Begum, learned Addl. P.P, Assam appearing for the State respondent and Ms.
    M.K. Brown, learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent No.2.

    2. This is an appeal against the impugned Judgment & Order dated
    29.11.2023 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge
    (POCSO), Barpeta in Special (POCSO) Case No.95/2022, by which the appellant
    has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to
    undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default,
    to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 years.

    3. The conviction has been made in view of the learned Trial Court having
    found the appellant guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual
    assault on a 4 ½ year old victim girl.

    SPONSORED

    4. The appellant’s counsel submits that a case under Section 6 of the
    POCSO Act has not been made out, inasmuch as, the Medical Doctor (PW-6) in
    his opinion stated that there was no evidence of recent sexual intercourse
    detected at the time of examination, though the genital findings were
    suggestive of vaginal manipulation. Further, the Doctor had stated that there
    Page No.# 3/19

    was no evidence of violence detected on the private parts of the victim, except
    the redness and tenderness around the hymen. The learned counsel for the
    appellant thus submits that at best the appellant could have been convicted
    under Section 9 of the POCSO Act. He also submits that as can be seen from
    the evidence of the defence witnesses, Nikhil Barman, Pradip Barman, Biplab
    Barman and Uttam Saha had been seen beating up the appellant, on the
    allegation that the appellant had raped the victim. However, Biplab Barman and
    Uttam Saha had not been made Prosecution witnesses. He also submits that
    though the informant’s father, Sunil Barman had gone to the house of the
    appellant to pick up the victim, the said Sunil Barman has not been made a
    Prosecution witness, as he could have corroborated the evidence of the victim
    and her mother (PW-3).

    5. The appellant’s counsel’s further case is that there was a delay in filing
    the FIR, inasmuch as, the same had been filed at 1 p.m. on 26/04/2022, while
    the incident had occurred on 25/04/2022 at 5 p.m, thus, giving time to the
    Prosecution to make embellishments to the case and concoct a false story. He
    also submits that the evidence of the defence witnesses go to show that there
    was a land dispute between the informant and the appellant, due to which, a
    false case had been registered against the appellant. In support of his
    submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision
    of the Supreme Court in the case of Thulia Kali Vs. The State of Tamil
    Nadu
    , reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393; State of Karnataka Vs. F. Nataraj,
    reported in (2015) 16 SCC 752 and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the
    case of Pappu Vs. State of Delhi, reported in 2009 SCC OnLine, Del 1642.

    6. On the other hand, the learned Addl. P.P. and the counsel for the
    Page No.# 4/19

    respondent No.2 submit that there is no infirmity with the decision of the
    learned Trial Court in convicting the appellant, inasmuch as, penetration of the
    male organ to any extent in the vagina of the victim 4 ½ year old victim could
    be to any extent to attract Section 3(a) or 3(c) and Section 5(m) of the POCSO
    Act. They also submit that the Doctor having stated in his evidence that the
    genital findings were suggestive of vaginal manipulation, coupled with the
    evidence of the victim, showed that the appellant’s case fell squarely within
    Section 3(a) and/or Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. They also submit that the
    absence of any injury or the hymen remaining intact did not mean that no rape
    had occurred. Further, the evidence of the defense witnesses who saw the
    victim coming out of the house of the appellant crying, was suggestive of the
    fact that something bad had occurred to her. On considering the above facts
    with the evidence of the victim, the same corroborates the fact that the
    appellant had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim. In
    support of their submissions, they have relied upon the judgment of the
    Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Babul Nath, reported in
    (1994) 6 SCC 29 and in the case of Ranjit Hazarika Vs. State of Assam,
    reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635.

    7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

    8. The brief facts of the case is that an FIR dated 26/04/2022 was
    submitted to the O/c of the Barpeta Road Police Station by PW-1, who was the
    father of the victim. The FIR stated that on 25/04/2022 at around 5 p.m, the
    appellant took his daughter to his room, saying that he would give her a
    chocolate. However, he raped her and when the victim came home, she
    disclosed everything to her mother. Pursuant to the said FIR, Barpeta Road
    Page No.# 5/19

    Police Station Case No.84/2022 under Section 376 AB IPC, read with Section 4
    of the POCSO Act was registered.

    9. After investigation was completed by the Investigating Officer, charge
    sheet was submitted against the appellant, wherein a prima facie case under
    section 376 AB IPC read with section 4 of the POCSO Act was found established
    against the appellant.

    10. The learned Trial Court thereafter framed charge under section 6 of the
    POCSO Act, on the ground that the appellant had committed an offence falling
    under section 5 (m) of the POCSO Act. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
    charge and claimed trial.

    11. The learned Trial Court thereafter examined 7 Prosecution Witnesses
    and 3 Defence Witnesses. After examining the appellant under section 313
    Cr.PC, the learned Trial Court came to a finding that the appellant had
    committed an offence punishable under section 6 of the POCSO Act and
    convicted him accordingly.

    12. The evidence of the informant (PW-1) is to the effect that he knew the
    appellant and that his daughter was 5 years as on the date he gave evidence.
    On the day of the incident, when he reached home at around 9-9.30 p.m., his
    wife who was crying, told him that the appellant had taken their daughter to his
    house. Their daughter came home crying with a chocolate in hand and told her
    that the appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina. The appellant had also
    bitten the victim on her chest. On coming to know about the incident from his
    wife, he went to the house of the appellant and tried to bring him to their
    Page No.# 6/19

    house. However, the appellant managed to run away. Later the appellant was
    caught at about 11-12 pm and was handed over to the Police. On the next day
    at about 10/11 a.m, he lodged an FIR, which he exhibited as Ext. P/1 and
    identified his signature. PW-1 further stated that the Birth Certificate of his
    daughter was seized and that her date of birth was 08/06/2017.

    13. In his cross examination, PW-1 stated that the appellant was
    apprehended by one Kanak Barman, Bulbuli Barman and some other persons.
    The appellant was initially tied up with a rope and questioned about the
    incident, which he denied. On the Police being informed, the Police came and
    took away the appellant. PW-1 further stated that the appellant showed his
    affection towards the victim even before the incident and used to give the victim
    chocolates on previous occasions.

    14. The learned Trial Court, prior to recording the evidence of the victim
    (PW-2), who was about 5 years old, put a few preliminary questions to her, to
    test her capacity to understand questions and give rational answers to the
    same. On being satisfied that the child was able to give rational answers to the
    questions put to her, the court felt that the victim had sufficient intelligence and
    maturity to give answers and knew the necessity of speaking the truth.
    Accordingly, she answered questions put to her wherein she clearly stated that
    the appellant’s penis had been inserted into her vagina. The relevant portion of
    the victim’s testimony before the learned Trial Court is reproduced herein below
    as follows:-

    “Q) Do You know accused?

    Ans: Yes I know him. I call him “Jethu”.

    Page No.# 7/19

    Q) What did “Jethu” do to you?

    Ans: One day in the evening Lime Jethu called me to his house by saying
    that he would give me a chocolate and he then put his “nunku” in my
    “sunu”.

    (When asked what she means by “Nunku”, she pointed towards the front
    side area of the toy where male organ exists)

    (When asked about she means by “sunu” she pointed to her vagina.)

    Jethu also bit me here (by putting her finger in her chest) Jethu also
    asked me not to disclose the same to my mother saying that if she tells
    her he would beat me up. I came home and told the incident to my
    mother.

    My mother did not ask me to tell anything false against the accused I was
    taken for medical examination after the incident. Police asked me about
    the incident. Jethu used to show affection to me. Jethu also gives
    chocolates to me. At the time of the incident there were other persons in
    the house of Jethu.”

    15. The evidence of PW-3, who is the mother of the victim and the wife of
    the informant, is to the effect that she knew the appellant. On 25/04/2022, at
    about 5.00-6.00pm, while working in the veranda, the victim was playing
    outside their house. Then the appellant came and tried to take away her
    daughter from their house. Though PW-3 objected to the same, the appellant
    assured PW-3 that he would again drop her daughter to their house after some
    time. The appellant then took the victim to his house. However, as her daughter
    did not return, PW-3 asked her father-in-law to go to the house of the appellant
    to bring back her daughter. PW-3’s father-in-law went to the house of the
    Page No.# 8/19

    appellant and came back, telling PW-3 that the appellant would drop her
    daughter on his own. About half an hour later, the victim came home and closed
    the door. Her daughter while telling her what ‘bad act’ the appellant had done to
    her after removing her pants, threw her pant away. She started weeping and
    also told PW-3 that she was having pain in her private parts. On inspecting her
    private parts, PW-3 saw redness in the private parts of the victim. When her
    husband came home at about 9.30 pm, PW-3 narrated the incident to him. PW-
    3 and her husband then went to the house of the appellant to inquire about the
    incident. At that moment, the appellant fled away. However, the family members
    of the appellant caught him and assaulted him for committing the crime. On her
    husband informing the Police about the incident, the Police picked up the
    appellant and took him to the Police Station on the same night. The FIR was
    then lodged by PW-1 the next morning and the victim was sent for medical
    examination. The victim and PW-3 were also brought before the magistrate and
    their statements were recorded.

    16. In her cross-examination, PW-3 stated that the house of the appellant
    was about 5 minutes walking distance from their house. The appellant used to
    visit their house of and on. Further, her husband was a carpenter and used to
    work at Nalbari. PW-3 also stated that the police had seized the pant and the
    sporting (T-shirt)of her daughter. She also stated that as it was late night, her
    husband lodged the FIR the next morning though the Police had asked the
    informant to lodge the FIR on the night of the incident. PW-3 also denied the
    suggestion that her husband owed money to the appellant, due to which a false
    FIR had been submitted against the appellant.

    17. The evidence of PW-4 is to the effect that he knew the informant and
    Page No.# 9/19

    the appellant. He also stated that he was a seizure witness though he did not
    exactly remember what was seized and he did not remember the colour of the
    T-shirt that was seized.

    18. The evidence of PW-5, who is the Senior Scientific Officer, Serology
    Division, Forensic Science Laboratory, Kahilipara, Assam, is to the effect that he
    examined various articles which had been seized by the police. The examination
    of the purple T-shirt one blue coloured jeans (half pant), one white coloured
    ganjee and one blue coloured gamosha, gave negative test for human blood
    and semen. The drops of blood in the filter paper and the blood sample of the
    appellate gave positive test for human blood, alhough there was no similarity
    with the other seized articles.

    19. The evidence of PW-6, who is the Associate Professor of Department of
    Forensic Medicine, Fakaruddin Ali Ahmed Medical College and Hospital, Barpeta,
    is to the effect that he examined the victim aged about 4 years, on 26/04/2022,
    in connection with Barpeta Road PS case no. 84/2022. Her medical examination
    showed that her hymen was intact though there was redness and tenderness on
    touch around the hymen. Her final opinion on the examination of the victim is
    reproduced herein below as follows:-.

    “Final Opinion: On the basis of physical (including dental) examination,
    laboratory & radiological investigation done on Nikita Barman, I am of the
    opinion that:

    (1) No evidence of recent sexual intercourse detected at the time of
    examination. However, genital finding suggestive of vaginal manipulation.

    (2) No evidence of violence mark detected on her private parts except the
    Page No.# 10/19

    redness and tenderness around the hymen.

    In this connection, I have submitted my report. Ext.P-5/PW6 is the
    medical report submitted by me and Ext.P-5(i) and Ext.P-5(ii) are my
    signatures.”

    In his cross-examination, PW-6 stated that in case of forceful penetration
    upon a minor girl, there will be a tear in her hymen, which she did not find in
    the victim.

    20. The evidence of PW-7 is to the effect that on 26/04/2022, an FIR was
    received at the Police Station, pursuant to which Barpeta Road PS case no.
    84/2022 under section 376 (AB) IPC read with section 4 of the POCSO Act was
    registered. He took up investigation and examined the witnesses and the victim.
    He visited the place of occurrence and drew a sketch map of the place of
    occurrence. He also apprehended the appellant and interrogated him. He also
    stated that the statement of the victim and her mother was recorded under
    section 164 Cr. PC on 27/04/2022. He also seized one purple coloured T-shirt
    and one blue coloured jeans (half pant) of the victim. He also seized the birth
    certificate of the victim which recorded her date of birth as 07/06/2017. He also
    seized a white coloured Ganjee (vest) and blue coloured Gamosa of the
    appellant. Blood samples of the appellant were also collected and he sent all of
    them to the FSL for examination.

    21. The evidence of DW-1, who is the younger brother of the appellant, is
    to the effect that he knew the informant who was his cousin. He also stated that
    the allegation that the appellant had raped the victim girl was false. He stated
    that on 25/04/2022 at about 5-5.30 pm, he was in his house and on that day at
    Page No.# 11/19

    the relevant time, the victim was with the appellant in their house. At 9.30 pm
    when DW-1 went to attend the call of nature, a commotion took place outside
    their house. On reaching there, he noticed the appellant being assaulted by PW-
    1, PW-4, Biplab Barman and one Uttam Saha, on the allegation that the
    appellant had raped the daughter of the informant (PW-1). Later Police came at
    about 12.30 a.m. and took the appellant to the Police Station. DW-1 stated that
    no rape took place and the case was filed only due to suspicion. DW-1 further
    stated that the victim girl always played with the appellant. He also stated that
    there was a land dispute between the informant and the appellant, due to which
    a false case had been filed.

    In his cross examination, DW-1 stated that he did not know who brought
    the victim to their house on the day of the incident, but she came to their house
    at about 4.00-5.00 pm.

    22. The evidence of DW-2, who is the mother of the appellant, is to the
    effect that she knew the informant (PW-1), who was her nephew. DW-2 stated
    that at about 9.00 pm, while having dinner, she heard her son (appellant)
    screaming. On coming out from the house, she saw the informant (PW-1), PW-4
    and Uttam Shah assaulting the appellant. DW-1 further stated that prior to the
    incident of assault, the victim girl had come out of their house crying at about
    4.00 pm. DW-2 further stated that a false case had been filed against the
    appellant, because of a land dispute between the informant’s father Sunil
    Barman and the appellant.

    23. In his cross-examination, DW-2 stated that she had not brought any
    documents to show that there was a land dispute between the informant’s
    Page No.# 12/19

    father and the appellant. DW-2 admitted that the victim went away crying from
    their house at about 4.00 pm, on the day of the incident. DW-2 further stated
    that the victim girl did not tell them why she was crying. DW-2 also stated that
    there were three rooms in their house and the appellant stayed in a separate
    room. She also stated that the appellant was assaulted because of the bad act
    committed by him.

    24. The evidence of DW-3 is to the effect that he knew the informant and
    the appellant. The incident took place on 25/04/2022. DW-3 stated that on the
    day of the incident, the victim girl went to the house of the appellant in the
    evening time at about 5.00 pm, during which time he was in a shop near his
    house. A little later, he saw the victim girl coming out of the house of the
    appellant crying. The victim girl proceeded towards her house. He later learnt
    that the victim girl fell from a bed inside the house of the appellant and that the
    appellant was present in his house at that time. DW-3 stated that he later heard
    that a case had been filed against the appellant on the grounds that he had
    raped the victim girl. In his evidence, DW-3 stated that there was a land dispute
    between the father of the informant Sunil Barman and the appellant. In his
    cross examination, DW-3 stated that he had not inspected the land documents
    showing there was a land dispute between the informant’s side and the
    appellant.

    25. In his examination under section 313 Cr. PC, the appellant stated that a
    false case had been lodged against him and that he had nothing to say in the
    matter. He however clarified that his mother and the father of the informant
    were brothers and sisters. He also stated that to deprive his mother of the share
    of the property of his grandfather, a false case had been lodged against him.

    Page No.# 13/19

    26. The statement of the victim recorded under section 164 Cr.PC is to the
    effect that the appellant had put his penis into her vagina and sucked her
    breasts. He had assaulted her and said that he would kill her if she told her
    mother. The appellant also kissed her buttocks. She further stated that he called
    her from his home in the evening and said that he would give her toffee. After
    returning home, she told her mother and took off the pants uttering “chi” (shit).
    It is seen that prior to recording the statement of the victim under section 164
    of Cr. PC, a few questions were asked and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta,
    who recorded the victim’s statement, was satisfied that the child had the
    capacity to understand the questions put to her.

    27. The statement of the victim’s mother (PW-3) under section 164 of Cr.
    PC is to the effect that at about 5 p.m. on 25.04.2022, while she was lighting
    the lamp, the appellant who was the uncle of the victim, came to their home
    and told PW-3 that he will send the victim back after giving her toffee. Saying
    thus, the appellant took the victim away even though she disapproved. At 5.30
    p.m., the victim came home alone and closed the door of the house and told her
    that her uncle took off her pants and inserted his penis into her vagina and that
    she screamed in pain. Then she took her pants off, urinated twice, put on
    different pants, while uttering “chi”. She threw the earlier pants on the sewing
    machine. PW-3 also stated that the victim told her to go and check outside and
    while going outside, she found nobody. When asked as to what happened, the
    victim told PW-3 that the appellant had bitten her breast, inserted his penis into
    her vagina and bit her vagina. On checking the victim’s vagina, PW-3 found the
    upper side was red and inside it was “illegible”. The victim told PW-3 that she
    came home alone. She then told her husband about the incident around 9.00
    p.m. PW-3 further stated that prior to the victim coming home, she had sent the
    Page No.# 14/19

    victim’s grandfather to bring her back from the appellant’s house, but the
    appellant did not let him bring her back.

    28. In the case of F Nataraj (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that
    though it may be true that the rupture of the hymen may not occur in all cases
    of sexual intercourse, but it is the burden of the prosecution to extract from the
    medical examiner examining a rape victim, whether the nature of the hymen
    was such that it could remain intact despite there being intercourse with the girl
    on several occasions within a period of 15 to 20 days.
    The Supreme Court
    further held
    that the medical examiner in the above case of F Nataraj (Supra)
    had merely mentioned that there were no signs of recent sexual intercourse,
    which was inadequate to establish that sexual intercourse took place before that
    at all. We are of the view that the above decision is not applicable to the facts of
    this case, inasmuch as, this is not a case of there being intercourse on several
    occasions. This is a case where the victim has been allegedly subjected to
    penetrative sexual assault once. A reading of section 3 of the POCSO Act
    provides that penetration to any extent would amount to penetrative sexual
    assault. There is nothing to show that there was full penetration of the penis of
    the appellant into the private parts of the 4 year old girl. A minute penetration
    or partial penetration may not rupture the hymen.
    Further, in terms of Medical
    Jurisprudence (5th edition by Dr. R. M. Jhala and V. B. Raju) provides that next
    to the hymen in positive importance but more than that in frequency are injuries
    on the labia majora, which are the first to be encountered by the male organ.
    They are subjected to blunt forceful blows, depending on the vigour and force
    used by the accused and counteracted by the victim. In case of girls under 12
    years where examination of hymen may not prove useful, examination of labia
    majora gives conclusive evidence. The narrowness of the canal makes it
    Page No.# 15/19

    inevitable for the male organ to inflict blunt, forceful blows on the labia, which
    invariably lead to contusion, because of looseness and vascularity.

    29. The evidence of the doctor and the medical report shows that though
    the hymen of the victim was intact, there is redness and tenderness on touch
    around the hymen. This could in all probability be the labia majora. Further, the
    final opinion of the doctor is that there is no evidence of recent sexual
    intercourse detected at the time of examination or violence mark, except the
    redness and tenderness around the hymen. However, the genital finding was
    suggestive of vaginal manipulation.

    30. On considering the evidence of PW-2, which is corroborated by her
    statement under section 164 Cr.P.C, is to the effect that the penis of the
    appellant had been put inside her vagina, points to the fact that there was
    penetration of the appellant’s penis into the vagina of the victim. This
    penetration would, in all probability, be to a very small extent, keeping in view
    the fact that the victim was only 4 years old at that time. The question of
    whether there was penetration of the penis into the vagina of a victim would
    depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, we
    are convinced with the truthfulness of the evidence of the victim girl, which has
    been corroborated by her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C, even though the
    penetration of the appellant’s penis into the vagina of the victim girl would, in all
    probability, be to a small extent.

    31. The above being said, in the case of Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of
    Assam
    reported in (1998) 8 SCC 635, the Supreme Court has held that non-
    rupture of the hymen nor the absence of injuries on the private parts does not
    Page No.# 16/19

    belie the statement of the prosecutrix that she was subjected to sexual
    intercourse. The Supreme Court further held that the opinion of the Doctor that
    no rape appeared to have been committed, was based only on the absence of
    the rupture of the hymen and injuries on the private parts of the prosecutrix.
    This opinion could not throw out an otherwise cogent and trustworthy evidence
    of the prosecutrix. The Supreme Court also held that unless there were
    compelling reasons, which necessitated looking for corroboration of the
    statement of the prosecutrix, the Court should find no difficulty to act on the
    testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused, where her
    testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable.

    32. In the case of State of UP v. Babul Nath reported in (1994) 6 SCC
    29, the Supreme Court held that Section 375 of the IPC defined rape and the
    explanation to Section 375 stated that penetration was sufficient to constitute
    the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. To constitute the
    offence of rape, Section 375 IPC nor the explanation required complete
    penetration of the penis into the private parts of the victim. It also did not
    require rupture of the hymen. Even a partial or slightest penetration of the male
    organ within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda or even an attempt into
    the private parts of the victim, would be enough for the purpose of Section 375
    and 376 IPC to constitute rape.

    33. In the present case, Section 3 of the POCSA Act states as follows:-

    “3. Penetrative sexual assault.–A person is said to commit
    “penetrative sexual assault” if–

    (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra
    Page No.# 17/19

    or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other
    person; or

    (b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being
    the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the
    child to do so with him or any other person; or

    (c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause
    penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child
    or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or

    (d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or
    makes the child to do so to such person or any other person.”

    34. If we have to go by the final opinion of the Doctor with regard to
    whether there was penetration, it may be possible to come to a finding that
    there was no penetration of the penis into the vagina of the victim. However,
    the genital findings were suggestive of vaginal manipulation by his penis, with
    an attempt to insert it. Keeping in view the above and the fact that the victim’s
    evidence was to the effect that the appellant’s penis had to some extent been
    put into her vagina, the same would positively attract Section 3(b) of the POCSO
    Act.

    35. Keeping the above in view and the fact that the child was less than 12
    years at the relevant time, Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act is attracted and thus
    Section 6 would have to be applied, the offence being punishable under Section
    6
    of the POCSO Act.

    Page No.# 18/19

    36. With regard to the stand taken by the appellant’s counsel that there
    was a delay in lodging the FIR as the FIR had been lodged the day after the
    incident, we find that though the mother of the victim had come to know about
    the incident sometime around 5.00 p.m. on 25/04/2022, the same was told by
    her to her husband (PW-1) at around 9.30 pm. The appellant was apparently
    arrested sometime around 12.30 a.m. of 26/04/2022 and the FIR was lodged at
    around 12.50 noon on 26/04/2022. On considering the fact that the victim
    resided in a village in the district of Barpeta, we do not find any real delay in
    filing the FIR.

    37. No doubt an FIR should be filed at the earliest opportunity as held by
    the Supreme Court in Thulia Kali (Supra), to avoid embellishments and
    concoction of facts. However, this is a case where there has been an aggravated
    penetrative sexual assault on a 4 year old girl and the events as it unfolded,
    shows that there is little time difference between the arrest of the appellant and
    the FIR filed on the same day, around 12.50 noon.

    38. The above being said, not only do we find that the evidence of the
    prosecutrix has been corroborated by her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C,
    but we also find that her presence in the house of the appellant has been
    corroborated by the Defence Witnesses. The fact that the victim was seen
    leaving the appellant’s house crying is also not denied by the Defence
    Witnesses. The appellant and the Defence Witnesses have not given any reason
    as to why the victim had left the house of the appellant crying. However, the
    victim had gone home alone from the house of the appellant, even though the
    appellant had promised the mother of the victim that he would bring the victim
    back to the house after some time. Further, the appellant had apparently fled
    Page No.# 19/19

    from his house when PW-1 and others wanted to inquire about what happened
    to the victim.

    39. In view of all the reasons stated above, we do not find any ground to
    interfere with the conviction of the appellant under section 6 of the POCSO Act.
    The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

    40. Send back the TCR.

    41. In appreciation of the assistance provided by Ms. M.K. Brown, learned
    Amicus Curiae, her fees shall be paid by the Gauhati High Court Legal Service
    Committee.

                                                JUDGE                        JUDGE
    
    
    
    
    Comparing Assistant
    
    
                                                  Kuntal
                                                                  Digitally signed
                                                                  by Kuntal Datta
                                                                  Date:
                                                  Datta           2026.05.26
                                                                  10:54:08 +05'30'
     



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