Chattisgarh High Court
Jagdish Prasad Bansal vs Shivkumar Dansena on 2 July, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1 / 18
CGHC010352872024 2026:CGHC:27879-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA No. 198 of 2024
Jagdish Prasad Bansal S/o Late Ramphal Bansal, Aged About 67 Years R/o
Ward No. 11, Sakti, Tehsil Sakti, District-Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) -----(Plaintiff)
... Appellant(s)
versus
Shivkumar Dansena The Then Nayab Tehsildar/tehsildar/executive
Magistratet, Sakti, Tehsil-Sakti, District-Sakti (C.G.) At The Time Of Filing Of
The Civil Suit He Was Posted At Kharsiya As Tehsildar Kharsiya, District-
Raigarh Now At Present He Is Posted As Tehsildar Raigarh, District-Raigarh
(C.G.) -----(Defendant)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Amrito Das, Senior Advocate with Ms. Juhi
Jaiswal, Advocate
D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput
Judgment on Board
02/07/2026
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J.
1. By this appeal, appellant has challenged the legality and sustainability
of the impugned order dated 28.09.2024 passed in Civil Suit
No.18-B/2023 by learned First District Judge, Sakti, District – Janjgir
Digitally
signed by
PRAVEEN
KUMAR
SINHA
Date:
2026.07.09
18:49:55
+0530
2 / 18Champa, whereby learned trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the
appellant/plaintiff under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
2. Facts relevant for disposal of the present appeal are that the
appellant/plaintiff instituted a civil suit against the respondent/defendant
seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 33,95,000/- as compensation for the
alleged illegal demolition of his office, mental agony, and defamation.
The plaintiff pleaded, inter alia, that while the respondent-defendant
was posted as Nayab Tehsildar/Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate at Sakti,
District Sakti, he misused his official powers and illegally demolished
the plaintiff’s office on 26.03.2018, thereby causing substantial loss. It
was specifically averred in the plaint that the entire demolition action
was mala fide, arbitrary, and contrary to law. It was further pleaded that
despite the grant of a stay order by the Board of Revenue, the
respondent proceeded to demolish the entire building, resulting in
considerable financial loss and mental suffering to the plaintiff.
3. At the stage of filing the written statement, the respondent/defendant
filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, seeking
rejection of the plaint. It was specifically contended that the action
challenged in the suit had been undertaken by the defendant in his
official capacity as Nayab Tehsildar. It was submitted that a Tehsildar or
Nayab Tehsildar apart from being a Revenue Officer under Section 11
of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, “the Code of
1959”), is also a Revenue Court within the meaning of Section 31 of
the said Code. In that capacity, such officer is empowered to initiate
proceedings against unauthorized occupants of Government land
under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 and to pass orders of eviction
3 / 18
thereunder. It was further contended that, by virtue of Sections 2 and 3
of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, a Tehsildar or Nayab Tehsildar is
deemed to be a “Judge” in respect of acts performed and orders
passed while exercising powers under the Code of 1959 and is,
therefore, entitled to the protection afforded under Section 3(1) of the
Act. Consequently, no civil suit or criminal proceeding can be instituted
against such officer in respect of any act done or order passed in the
discharge of his quasi-judicial functions. The suit seeking
compensation for actions taken by the defendant in exercise of his
statutory powers as Revenue Court was expressly barred under
Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, rendering the suit not
maintainable.
4. Learned trial Court, after considering the pleadings of the parties,
material available on record, and the relevant statutory provisions,
allowed the application filed by the respondent/defendant under Order
7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Consequently, by the impugned order dated
28.09.2024, learned trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule
11(d) of the CPC, holding that the suit was barred in view of the
provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Aggrieved by the said
order, the appellant/plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that learned
trial Court committed error in allowing the application under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC considering the facts and material placed before it by
defendant overlooking the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC . He
contended that trial Court failed to appreciate the order passed by
Board of Revenue dated 20.05.2020 and the order of High Court of
4 / 18
Chhattisgarh in Writ Appeal No.370/2023. It is contention of learned
counsel for appellant that the action of demolition of the building of
appellant on 26.03.2018 after passing of interim order in favour of
appellant and bringing the knowledge of defendant/respondent, cannot
be said to be an act of respondent to be in good faith, but the act of
respondent- defendant is with malafide. The act of defendant to be
malafide is a mixed question of fact and law which can be decided only
after full-fledged trial. Act of respondent to be in good faith or with
malafide can be proved only after recording of evidence of parties. The
finding recorded by trial Court is without there being any evidence on
record and therefore suit filed by appellant- plaintiff ought not to have
been dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. The act of
respondent/defendant which is pleaded in plaint will not fall within the
ambit of “discharge of his judicial duty” and, therefore, the said act is
not covered under sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of Judges (Protection)
Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 1985”). He also contended
that the order passed by the trial Court dismissing the entire suit under
Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC is per se illegal and therefore it be set
aside. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant
places reliance upon the decision in case of Shaifali Gupta Vs. Vidya
Devi Gupta & Ors. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1181), Producin Pvt. Ltd
Vs. Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce (T & D) & Ors (First
Appeal No.65 of 2013, decided on 07.03.2022), Sought Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. Vs. M/s Rajendra Kumar Poddar (WP227 No. 488 of
2021 decided on 11.11.2022 ), E.S. Sanjeeva Rao Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation (CBI) Mumbai and Ors. (2012 SCC OnLine Bom
1908), Rachapudi Subba Rao Vs. Advocate General (1981) 2 SCC
5 / 18
577 and Deepali Jadhav Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
(Criminal Revision No.1592 of 2021 , decided on 8th March 2022),
6. Learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would vehemently
oppose submission of learned counsel for the appellant and would
submit that respondent-defendant was serving as a Nayab
Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate on 26.03.2018 and in compliance
of/execution of order passed by his predecessor in the year 2015 under
Section 248 of the Code of 1959, he had removed the encroachment
by demolishing the superstructure. It is his contention that demolition of
illegal construction on Govt. land has been done following due
procedure of law. Order of removing encroachment under Section 248
of the Code of 1959 passed by Tehsildar was put to challenge before
higher authorities i.e. Sub Divisional Officer/Collector/Commissioner.
He contended that in the revision application, there is no pleading
made by the appellant that respondent defendant has acted malafide.
Board of Revenue also has not recorded any finding about the conduct
of respondent defendant to be not of in good faith on 26.03.2018.
Respondent being a Revenue Officer acting as a quasi- judicial
authority has acted to execute the order passed by the authority in
revenue case, under the provision of Section 248 of the Code of 1959
and therefore the act of respondent -defendant is in good faith under
the authority of law. He therefore is protected under Section 3 of the
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 in order to safeguard the Judges and the
Presiding Officer of Revenue Courts from false and frivolous
prosecution. He submits that there is no dispute that suit can be
dismissed under the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC considering
6 / 18
the complaint averment. Tehsildar is a Revenue Officer within the
meaning of Section 11 of the Code of 1959 and functions as quasi-
judicial Officer in Revenue Court. He contended that act of respondent
defendant is covered under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1985. No cause
of action would legally arise against the respondent personally for the
act performed by him in discharge of his official duties. Learned trial
Court upon considering the averments contained in the plaint and the
applicable statutory provision held that suit was expressly barred under
the law and rejected the suit filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. In
support of his submissions, he places reliance upon the decision in
case of Rajkumar Tamboli Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (CRMP
No.1461 of 2023 and other connected matters decided on 29.04.2024),
P.K. Gupta Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (CRMP No.366 of 2015,
decided on 17.01.2020), Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs.
N. Sailesh Prasad and Ors. (2022) 5 SCC 736 and K. Akbar Ali Vs.
K. Umar Khan & Ors (2021) 14 SCC 51.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and also
perused the records of the case.
8. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by learned trial Court
whereby the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the
defendant/respondent was allowed and the suit filed by the
appellant/plaintiff was dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC
recording a finding that respondent/defendant while holding post of
Nayab Tehsildar/In-Charge Tehsildar, Sakti, has initiated proceeding of
ejectment and removal of superstructure and therefore he is protected
under the Judges (Protection) Act 1985.
7 / 18
9. From the pleadings made in the plaint itself it is clear that the
plaintiff/appellant has pleaded that Tehsildar while considering the case
registered against the plaintiff/appellant has passed an order of
ejectment. Order passed by the Tehsildar was upheld by Commissioner
and after passing of order by the Commissioner on 21.03.2018, notice
was issued for removing superstructure and vacating land subject
matter of revenue proceedings and upon date fixed for removing
encroachment in the notice, superstructure was demolished and get
the land vacated. Nayab Tasildar is a Revenue Officer under Section 11
of the Code of 1959. Section 11 of the Code of 1959 is relevant in the
facts of case and it is extracted below for ready reference:
“11. Revenue Officers.- There shall be the following
classes of the Revenue Officers, namely :-
(1) Commissioner, Land Records;
(2) Additional Commissioner, Land Records;
3) Commissioner,
(4) Additional Commissioner;
(5) Collector and District Survey Officer,
(6) Additional Collector,
(7) Sub-Divisional Officer (Sub Divisional Officer
(Revenue) and Deputy Survey Officer,
(8) Assistant Collector,
(9) Joint Collector,
(10) Deputy Collector,
(11) Tahsildar and Assistant Survey Officer;
(12) Additional Tahsildar (Additional Tahsildar);
(13) Superintendent of Land Records;
(14) Naib Tahsildar, and
(15) Assistant Superintendent of Land Records.]
8 / 18
10. Section 31 of the Code of 1959 provides for conferral of status of
Courts on Board and Revenue Officers which reads as under :
“31. Conferral of Status of Courts on Board
and Revenue Officers- The Board or a Revenue
Officer, while exercising power under this Code
or any other enactment for the time being in force
to enquire into or to decide any question arising
for determination between the State Government
and any person or between parties to any
proceedings, shall be a Revenue Court.
11. Section 32 provides inherent power to Revenue Courts, which is also
re-produced herein-under:
“32. Inherent power of Revenue Courts.-
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Revenue Court to make such orders as may be
necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court.”
12. Section 2 of the Act of 1985 defines “Judge”. Definition of Judge is also
extracted below for ready reference:
“2. Definition.–In this Act, “Judge” means not
only every person who is officially designated as
Judge, but also every person–
(a)who is empowered by law to give in any
legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a
judgment which, if not appealed against, would
be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed
by some other authority, would be definitive; or
(b) who is one of a body of persons which
body of persons is empowered by law to give
such a judgment as is referred to in clause (a).”
9 / 18
13. While exercising the power under Section 248 of the Code of 1959,
Nayab Tahsildar decided the revenue case and according to Section 31
of the Code of 1959, he is conferred with the status of Revenue Court,
while discharging the proceeding under Section 248 of the Code of
1959 and executing its order.
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rachapudi Subba Rao (supra) has
considered the issue of protection to the Judicial Officer and observed
thus :
“9. As pointed out by this Court in Anwar Hussain V.
Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee & Ors. the Section affords
protection to two broad categories of acts done or
ordered to be done by a judicial Officer in his judicial
capacity. In the first category fall those acts which are
within the limits of his jurisdiction. The second category
encompasses those acts which may not be within the
jurisdiction of the judicial Officer, but are, nevertheless,
done or ordered to be done by him, believing in good
faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them
to be done.
10. In the case of acts of the first category committed
in the discharge of his judicial duties, the protection
afforded by the statute is absolute, and no enquiry will
be entertained as to whether the act done or ordered
to be done was erroneous, or even illegal, or was done
or ordered without believing in good faith.
11. In the case of acts of the second category, the
protection of the statute will be available if at the time
of doing, ordering the act, the judicial officer acting
judicially, in good faith believed himself to have
jurisdiction to do or order the same. The expression
“jurisdiction” in this Section has not been used in the
10 / 18limited sense of the term, as connoting the “power” to
do or order to do the particular act complained of, but
is used in a wide sense as meaning “generally the
authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the matters”.
Therefore, if the judicial officer had the general
authority to enter upon the enquiry into the cause,
action, petition or other proceeding in the course of
which the impugned act was done or ordered by him in
his judicial capacity, the act, even if erroneous, will still
be within his `jurisdiction’, and the mere fact that it was
erroneous will not put it beyond his “jurisdiction”. Error
in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with
lack of jurisdiction in entertaining the cause or
proceeding. It follows that if the judicial officer is found
to have been acting in the discharge of his judicial
duties, then, in order to exclude him from the
protection of this statute, the complainant has to
establish that (1) the judicial officer complained against
was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever, and (2)
he was acting without good faith in believing himself to
have jurisdiction.”
15. High Court of Bombay in case of N.V. Shamsunder Civil Judge
(Senior Division) V. Savitabai reported in 2006 Lawsuit (Bom.) 1230
has considered the suit filed against Civil Judge for not investing the
amount of compensation as directed by the Appellate Authority
awarded in the land acquisition matter, and it observed thus :
“6. I have considered the submissions made by the
learned Counsel and perused the record. Since the
immunity is claimed by the defendant No. 1 under the
above two Acts, it would be appropriate to quote
Section 1 of the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act of
1850 and Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act,
11 / 181985. Section 1 of the Judicial Officers Protection Act
of 1850 reads as under:
1. Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially,
for official acts done in good faith and of officers
executing warrants and order:- No Judge,
Magistrate, Justice of Peace, Collector or other
person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued
in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to
be done by him in the discharge of his judicial
duty, whether or not within the limits of his
jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time in good
faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or
order the act complained of; and no officer of any
Court or other person, bound to execute the
lawful warrants or orders of any such judge,
Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or
other person acting judicially shall be liable to be
sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any
warrant or order, which he would be bound to
execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person
issuing the same.
Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads
as under:
Additional protection to Judges :- (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force and subject to the
provisions of Sub-section (2), no Court shall
entertain or continue any civil or criminal
proceeding against any person who is or was a
Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done
or spoken by him when, or in the course of acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in Sub-
section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner
the power of the Central Government or the State
Government or the Supreme Court of India or
12 / 18
any High Court or any other authority under any
law for the time being in force to take such action
(whether by way of civil, criminal or departmental
proceedings or otherwise) against any person
who is or was a Judge.
7. From the bare perusal of the Section 1 of The 1850
Act, it is clear that the Judicial Officer acting judicially
is protected in respect of any act done or ordered to be
done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty
provided he in good faith believed himself to have
jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of.
Insofar as Section 3 of The 1985 Act, which provides
additional protection to Judges clearly stipulates that
no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal
proceedings against any person who is or was a Judge
for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken
by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or
function. Thus, Section 3 gives complete immunity to a
Judge or Ex-Judge in respect of any act, thing or word
committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the
course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official or judicial duty or function. Section 4 of
the said Act also provides that provision of this Act
shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force
providing for protection of Judges. The conjoint
reading of sections 3 and 4 makes it clear that the
protection given to a Judge or Ex-Judge for any act,
thing or word committed, done or spoken by him while
discharging official or judicial function is absolute.
Under Section 1 of The 1850 Act the protection from
being sued in civil suit is available to a Judge or
Magistrate for any act done or ordered to be done by
him in the discharge of his judicial duty provided he in
good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or
13 / 18
order the act complained of. As such the protection
available to a Judge under The 1850 Act is in respect
of any action taken in good faith whereas the
protection available under The 1985 Act is absolute
and is even available not only to a sitting Judge but
also to an Ex-Judge in respect of the actions taken or
words spoken by him while discharging his official or
judicial function. The reason behind giving absolute
protection by The 1985 Act is quite obvious. If such an
absolute protection is not given, the Judge or Ex Judge
runs the risk of facing civil action at the instance of the
disgruntled litigants who may have been aggrieved by
adverse orders passed against them. If such an
absolute protection is not given, a Judge or an Ex-
judge is likely to face frivolous suits at the instance of
the litigants who are aggrieved by adverse orders
passed by the Judge or Ex-Judge. Therefore, in order
to give absolute protection to the Judge not only during
his tenure but even thereafter, the Legislature thought
it fit to enact The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. A bare
reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act makes the
intention of the legislature to give complete protection
to a Judge sitting or retired clear. That being the
position, in my view, there is considerable merit in the
submission of Mr. Bhangde that the trial Court
exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the
application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. It is the case of the defendant No. 1
that the suit filed against the defendant No. 1 was
clearly barred and, therefore, the plaint was liable to be
rejected as against the defendant No. 1 under Order
VII, Rule 11(d) of Civil Procedure Code on the ground
that there was a bar to file the suit. Since the suit was
clearly barred under Section 3 of the 1985 Act, the
application filed by the defendant No. 1 ought to have
been allowed by the trial Court. I am, therefore, of the
14 / 18
opinion that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction
illegally in rejecting the application filed by the
defendant No. 1. I am unable to accept the submission
of Mr. Darda appearing on behalf of the respondents 1
to 6 that the respondents 1 to 6 have filed the suit
against the defendants in good faith believing that the
suit is the only remedy available in view of the
communication of the Registrar and the notice under
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure issued to the
defendants. The suit must have been filed by the
plaintiffs against the defendants after obtaining legal
advise and if the plaintiffs have been wrongly advised
in filing the suit which is patently not maintainable, they
cannot come with the plea that the suit was filed in
good faith. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the
application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code
of Civil Procedure by the defendant No. 1 in the trial
Court was vehemently contested in the trial Court by
respondents 1 to 6. They have also contested the
present Revision Application. Therefore, I am unable to
accept the submission of Mr. Darda, I am, therefore, of
the opinion that the impugned order deserves to be
quashed and set aside.”
16. In case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if
the revenue officer in quasi-judicial adjudication has wrongly exercised
his jurisdiction, that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That can not
always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the
officer while he is acting as quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in
mind that being a quasi- judicial authority, he is always subject to
judicial supervision in appeal.
15 / 18
17. In case of Balram & Ors. Vs. Aswani Kumar Yadav & Ors. reported
in MANU/MP/0175/2001, High Court of Madhya Pradesh has observed
thus:
” The non-applicant No. 1 was empowered to give a definite
judgment in a legal proceeding. It does not matter that for
the purpose of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, the
judgment is mentioned as an order. The definition given in
Section 2 of the Act is much wider and it includes an order
which determines the right of the parties, for the reasons
given in it. If the non-applicant No. 1, exercising his power
under the M.P. Land Revenue Code, is a Judge, then he
is entitled to protection under Section 3(1) of the Act and
no Court could entertain any civil or criminal proceedings
against him for any act, thing or word committed, done or
spoken by him, or in the course of acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or
function. It cannot be said that if the non-applicant No. 1 is
charged of the offences which the applicant-complainant
wants him to be charged with, the action taken by him
during the course of passing of the judicial order of
mutation, will not form part of the offences.”
18. In the pleadings made in the plaint, there is no specific pleading that
respondent /defendant has acted without jurisdiction, but the pleading
is that Tehsildar (defendant) even after bringing to his knowledge of the
interim order of stay of order of ejectment has demolished the
superstructure and got the appellant/plaintiff evicted.
19. Definition of Judge as provided under the Act of 1985 is very wide. It
also includes a person empowered under law to give in legal
proceeding a definite judgment. The respondent while acting in the
16 / 18
officiating capacity of Tehsildar was executing the order passed under
Section 248 of the Code of 1959 in Revenue Case.
20. Section 3 of the Act of 1985 provides for additional protection to Judges
which reads as under :
“3. Additional protection to Judges.–
(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force and subject to the provisions
of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue
any civil or criminal proceeding against any person
who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word
committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the
course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official or judicial duty or function.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in
any manner the power of the Central Government or
the State Government or the Supreme Court of India
or any High Court or any other authority under any law
for the time being in force to take such action (whether
by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings
or otherwise) against any person who is or was a
Judge.”
21. Perusal of the afore extracted provision under the Act of 1985 would
show that there is bar for entertaining or continuing of any civil or
criminal proceedings against any person who is or was Judge for any
act, thing or word committed.
22. The act of the person being a Judge is protected. It is not in dispute
that respondent while acting as Tehsildar was discharging his duties
and functions under Section 248 of the Code fo 1959 and in
compliance of order passed under Section 248 further action of
removal of encroachment was initiated by him.
17 / 18
23. The argument which is advanced by learned counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff is that whether the act committed by
respondent/defendant is in discharge of his duty or not can only be
proved by evidence, which in the opinion of this Court is not
sustainable. It is not disputed by the appellant that respondent
/defendant was not posted as officiating Tehsildar, the demolition is in
execution of the order passed under Section 248 of the Code of 1959.
In above facts of the case and the provision under the Act of 1985 as
also provision of Section 31 of the Code of 1959 we are of the
considered view that respondent/ defendant is protected under the Act
of 1985 as the respondent-defendant acted in capacity of Nayab
Tahsildar a Revenue Officer under Section 11 of the Code of 1959 and
has exercised jurisdiction under Section 248 of the Code of 1959 being
a revenue Court. The act of respondent defendant is protected . In the
plaint there is no specific pleading that action taken by respondent is
without jurisdiction.
24. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in case of
Rachapudi Subba Rao (supra) is considered by this Court in
preceding paragraph.
25. In case of Deepali Jadhav (supra) criminal case was registered
against the applicant therein under Section 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 along with other offences of IPC
and in that facts of case High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that in
view of conduct of judicial officer, applicant was not entitled for
protection under the Act of 1985.
18 / 18
26. As civil proceeding initiated against respondent/defendant is barred
under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 and therefore in the opinion of this
Court, learned trial Court has not committed any illegally or infirmity in
allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and dismissing
the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Act of 1985.
27. For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
The first appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. The
impugned judgment and decree dismissing the suit under Order 7 Rule
11(d) CPC are affirmed.
28. Let a decree be drawn accordingly.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge Judge
Praveen
S
