Bangalore District Court
Jagan Mohan Reddy vs Ramadevi on 21 May, 2026
Crl.A. 25363/2025
KABC0A0032692025
IN THE COURT OF THE LXXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL
& SESSIONS JUDGE AT MAYO HALL
BENGALURU, (CCH-73)
Present:
Sri. Sreepada N,
B.Com., L.L.M.,
LXXII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
Dated this the 21st day of May 2026
Crl. Appeal. No.25363/2025
Appellant:- Sri. Jagan Mohan Reddy
@ Jagan P.G.
S/o Ramakrishna Reddy,
Aged about 41 years,
R/at Site No.5, Sai Thulasi Enclave,
Phase-1, Gowlidoddi, Rangareddy,
Telangana, PIN - 500032.
Also at
R/at No.1-47, Chellagirigala Village,
Porumamilla Mandal,
Kadapa District, PIN-516505
Andrapradesh
(By Sri. Ashwath U- Adv.,)
V/s
Respondent:- R1. Smt. Ramadevi,
W/o Jagan Mohan Reddy,
Aged 35 years,
R2. Kumari Lohithakshara
D/o Jagan Mohan Reddy,
Aged about 5½ years, Represented by
her Natural mother R1.
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R/at No.04, Venkateshwara Nilaya,
Swatantra Nagar, Opp: To Petrol Bunk,
K.R. Puram, Bengaluru. PIN-560049.
(By Smt. C.R.- Adv.,)
JUDGMENT
The Appellant/ husband has filed the present
appeal against the order passed by the MMTC-I in
Crl.Misc.No.94/2024 dtd: 6.5.2024 before this
Court on 14.10.2025.
2. For the sake of convenience the parties
herein after will be referred to with their ranking
assigned before the Trial Court.
3. The Petitioners have filed petition U/Sec.12
of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 against the Respondent claiming protection
and maintenance order under Section 23(2) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.
4. The Appellant herein has not filed any
objections to the said main petition, as it appears
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from the order sheet that the trial court has passed
ex-parte interim order.
5. The Trial Court vide order dtd: 6.5.2024
was pleased to allowed the IA filed by the
Respondents herein in part U/sec. 23(2) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and
directed the respondent herein to pay maintenance
of Rs. 10,000/- per month each to the respondents
till further orders. Further also directed the
appellant to bear all the educational expenses of the
respondent No.2.
6. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the
Respondent is in appeal on the following grounds:-
a). On Careful perusal of the affidavit filed
along with application filed U/sec.23(2)
of PWDV act no such domestic violence
is narrated by the respondent even
prima-facie on a bald and vague
allegations Hon’ble trial court granted
ad-interim order directing appellant to
pay sum of Rs. 20,000/- per month is
abuse of process of law.
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b). It is submitted that, to substantiate her
version narrated in the affidavit she has
not filed single document before Hon’ble
trial court to show that the appellant
have source of income.
c). It is submitted that, after receipt of
hand summons the respondent
appeared before Hon’ble trial court on
28.3.2025. Later on Hon’ble trial court
set down above matter for objections to
main petition the appellant came to
known about ad-interim orders passed
by Hon’ble trial court.
d). It is submitted that, the issue of interim
maintenance is decided on the basis of
documents, so as to make a prima facie
amount to be awarded, but in the
instant case the respondent have
concealed her source of income due to
non-disclose the correct details, and
suppress vital information.
e). The Respondent filed an petition U/sec.
12 of PWDV act along with her petition
she filed an “Assets and Liabilities” in
which she stated that, she is 30 years
old having M.A. Graduation and also
stated that, she is not working but, she
never produced her Aadhar card and
her PAN card before Hon’ble Trial Court,
being a M.A. Graduate she purposefully
lied before Hon’ble trial court. If her
words taken as true and correct the
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appellant would have produce the same
before Hon’ble court or the appellant
will be locate where she works. Which
itself shows that, the respondent is
capable to maintain herself and she is
not in need of monies as she was
earning but, she concealed the same
before Hon’ble court. Certified copy of
Assets and Liabilities and list of
documents filed by respondent are
herewith produced at Annexure-C and
D.
f). The Trial Court did not see that as per
Section 12 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, the
Appellant was not properly served with
the notice or given adequate time to
respondent to the aggrieved person’s
claim.
g). In the same “Assets and Liabilities” at
Column No. E she stated that child was
joined to School and by her parents
were bearing school fee but, she never
mentioned in which school he was
joined for her studies and not produced
materials to show for school fee paid.
h). It is submitted that, the appellant is
bound to take care of his aged parents
and their age old medicines, cloth/s,
food and also manage himself due to no
job he unable to maintain himself and
also his aged parents.
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7. On the aforesaid grounds, the Appellant
prayed for setting aside the orders dtd. 6.5.2024 by
allowing the appeal.
8. The Respondents appeared through their
counsel and filed objections to the IAs.
9. Heard Counsel for Appellant. Perused the
written arguments filed by the Learned Counsel for
the Respondent.
10. On perusal of the order of the Trial Court,
the points that would emerge for the consideration
of this court are as follows:
1. Whether the appellant has made
out sufficient grounds to
condone the delay of 426 days
in preferring this appeal and
thereby I.A. No. 1/2026 filed
U/sec. 5 of Limitation Act
deserves to be allowed?
2. Whether the order of the Trial
Court calls for interference by
the hands of this court?
3. What Order?
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11. My finding on the above points are as
under:
Point No.1 and 2 : In the Negative.
Point No. 3 : As per final order for
the following :
REASONS
12. Point No.1 & 2:-
The present appeal has been preferred by the
Appellant/husband against the interim order
passed by the MMTC-I in Crl.Misc.No.94/2024 dtd:
6.5.2024 before this Court on 14.10.2025.
13. The Trial Court vide order dtd: 6.5.2024
was pleased to allow the IA filed by the
Respondents herein in part Section 23(2) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and
directed the respondent herein to pay maintenance
of Rs. 10,000/- per month each to the respondents
till further orders. Further also directed the
appellant to bear all the educational expenses of the
respondent No.2.
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14. The Appellant while preferring appeal
against the above application also filed
IA.No.1/2025 U/Sec. 5 of Limitation Act for condone
the delay of 426 days in preferring this appeal and
also filed I.A. No. 2/2025 U/sec. 29 of DV Act
prayed to stay the further operation of the said
interim order. This Court has not allowed the both
applications and issued notice of the said IAs to the
respondents.
15. The main ground urged by the Appellant herein
in the appeal memo as well as the Learned Counsel
for the Appellant in his arguments that the
Appellant has not at all caused any sort of domestic
violence against the Respondent herein and he is
not in the position to pay the interim maintenance
granted by the trial court. The impugned order
passed by the Trial Court is arbitrary and
unsustainable and against the principles of natural
justice. Further contended that, the Respondent
No.1 is MA Graduate and she is doing job as such
she has not produced her aadhar card and PAN
card. The respondent No.1 has not produced details
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Crl.A. 25363/2025
of the school in which respondent No.2 joined. The
appellant is having responsibility to look after his
aged parents. Therefore he is unable to pay any
maintenance to the respondents. The findings of the
Trial Court while passing impugned orders is not
supported with any materials. Accordingly, the
Appellant has prayed to set aside the impugned
order.
16. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent
in his written argument contended that the Trial
Court after properly considering the prima-facie
materials, passed impugned order. Further
contended that, the appellant has not explained the
reasons for delay of 426 days in preferring this
appeal. The appellant is running a PG and earning
Rs. 2,00,000/- per month. Even he is having his
own accommodation and also having 2 acres of
agricultural land. Till today the appellant is not
paying any interim maintenance to the respondents
as ordered by the trial court. Already before the trial
court, the case has been set down for cross of PW.1.
In order to delay the trial court proceedings, the
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Crl.A. 25363/2025
present appeal has been filed without having any
merits. Therefore, if the present appeal is allowed,
definitely the respondents will be put to great
hardship and irreparable loss. On the other hand, if
the interim order passed by the Trial Court is
continued till disposal of the petition pending before
the Trial Court, no injustice would cause to the
Appellant herein. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the
appeal.
17. The appellant in support of I.A. No.
1/2026 filed his affidavit wherein contended that,
after receipt of notice through whats-app he
appeared through his counsel before the trial court
on 16.6.2025 and then on 3.9.2025 he came to
know about the interim maintenance order dated
6.5.2025. Thereafter he filed copy application on
3.9.2025 and preferred this appeal. Hence, the
delay has been caused in preferring this appeal.
Admittedly, no supporting documents produced
along with I.A. No. 1/2026 to condone long delay of
426 days in preferring this appeal. Therefore, as
contended by the respondents the reasons
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furnished by the appellant to condone the delay is
prima-facie not at all acceptable.
18. It is appropriate to refer the rulings of the
Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 1969 (1) SCR 1006
(Shakuntala Devi Jain V/s Kuntal Kumari and
(1972) 1 SCC 366 (State of West Bengal V/s
Administrator, Howrah Municipality).
a) In the latter judgment the Hon’ble Apex
Court at para No.13 observed thus:
“When there is reasonable ground
to think that the delay was
occasioned by the party deliberately
to gain time, then the court should
lean against acceptance of the
explanation. While condoning the
delay, the court should not forget the
opposite party altogether. It must be
borne in mind that he is loser and he
too would have incurred quite large
litigation expenses.”
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b) In a latest ruling the Hon’ble Apex in Civil
Appeal No.5867 of 2015 (Sheo Raj Singh(D)
Tr.Lrs.. vs Union Of India and Another) at Para
29 observed thus:
Considering the aforementioned
decisions, there cannot be any
quarrel that this Court has stepped
in to ensure that substantive rights
of private parties and the State are
not defeated at the threshold simply
due to technical considerations of
delay. However, these decisions not
with standing, we reiterate that
condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily
depend upon the sufficiency of the
cause shown and the degree of
acceptability of the explanation, the
length of delay being immaterial.
Sometimes, due to want of sufficient
cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of
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whereas, in certain other cases, delay of
long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and
acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is
designed to give someone all of the facts
and lay out the cause for something. It
helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person
to point out that something that has
happened is not his fault, if it is really
not his fault.”
c). In the very same paragraph at the end it
is observed thus:
Thus said, there is no formula
that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation
of delay based on existence or absence
of sufficient cause has to be decided
on It is true to suggest that, own
facts.
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19. Keeping in view of broad principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid
decisions, let me appreciate the reasons assigned by
the Appellant for the delay in filing the above appeal.
20. It is an admitted fact that, it is the
mandatory duty on the part of the appellant herein
to explain each days delay by placing sufficient
material documents and reasons. However, there is
no reasonable explanation for the same. Even the
affidavit of the appellant does not provide required
particulars of delay. If the I.A. No. 1/2026 is
allowed definitely the respondents will be put to
untold hardship. Further it is not the case of the
appellant is that, he has complied the order of the
trial court. Hence, I.A. No. 1/2026 deserves to be
dismissed.
21. It is an admitted fact that, the trial court
has passed interim order directing the appellant
herein to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 20,000/-
to the respondents till further orders and also bear
educational expenses of Respondent No.2. As
aforesaid no documents have been produced by the
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Crl.A. 25363/2025
appellant to show that, he has complied the above
order. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for
Respondents in his written argument specifically
stated that, though the appellant was fully aware
about the interim order dated 6.5.2024 of trial court
till today has not at all complied the same and
disobeyed the order of the trial court and failed to
deposit amount as ordered by the trial court. In view
of above same both respondents are suffering lot.
22. Coming to impugned order passed by the trial
court it is clear that, though the respondents herein had
sought interim maintenance of Rs. 50,000/- per month,
but the trial court after perusal of prima facie materials
of the respondents and also considering the contents of
assets and liabilities affidavit filed by the Respondent
No.1 and so also considering the immediate need of the
Respondents has rightly passed an order directing the
appellant herein to pay monthly maintenance of Rs.
20,000/- to the respondents and also directed the
appellant to bear the educational expenses of
Respondent No.2.
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23. In the present appeal the appellant without
producing any materials simply filed the appeal and
contending that, Respondent No.1 is capable to
maintain herself and Respondent No.2 and also he is
not in the position to pay maintenance to the
Respondents etc,. No doubt the trial court has passed
the interim order in the absence of objection of the
appellant. If really the appellant is highly aggrieved by
the said order and he also he is having any sufficient
materials to show that, the impugned order passed by
the trial court is causing great injustice to him, he can
file necessary objection to the said interim application
filed by the respondents for seeking maintenance by
placing documents. Therefore, at this stage of the
proceedings there is no materials forthcoming from the
side of the Appellant herein to set aside or modify the
interim order i.e., the order on the application filed
under Section 23(2) of Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act. On the other hand the order of
the trial court is appears to be supported with proper
materials and sound reasons.
24. There are no bonafide and reasonable
grounds made out by the appellant herein to interfere
with the order of the trial court dated 6.5.2024.
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However, it is open for the Appellant herein to put forth
his defense by placing his objections and materials
before the Trial Court in connection with interim
application filed by the respondents U/sec. 23(2) of
PWDV act and till passing considered order on the said
application by the trial court appellant shall pay interim
maintenance as ordered by the trial court dated
06.05.2024.
[
25. As discussed above the appellant has filed
I.A. No. 1/2026 to condone the delay of 426 days in
preferring this appeal but he has not stated any
reasonable and bonafide grounds to condone said long
delay. Therefore, question of condoning the delay of
426 days in preferring this appeal does not arise.
Accordingly, Point No.1 and 2 are answered in
the Negative.
26. Point No.3:
In view of the findings on the above point the
appeal filed by the Appellant deserves to be
dismissed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the
following:-
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ORDER
The I.A. No. 1/2026 filed by
the Appellant U/sec. 5 of
Limitation Act is hereby rejected.
Accordingly, the appeal filed
by the Appellant U/sec. 29 of
Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act is hereby
dismissed with cost of
Rs. 1,000/- to the Respondents.
Send the copy of this Order to
the trial court for its reference.
(Dictated to the Typist, typed by her,
corrected and then pronounced by me, in the
open court on this the 21st day of May 2026.)[Sri. Sreepada N]
LXXII Addl. City Civil & Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru. (CCH-73).
