Delhi District Court
Indu Bala vs Kokila Gupta on 15 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE-06, SOUTH EAST
DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS: NEW DELHI
Presiding Judge: Neha, DHJS
RCA DJ 59/25
CNR NO. DLSE01-008311-2025
In the matter of :-
Indu Bala
D/o Late Sh. K L Chugh
R/o H. No. E-53, Block-E,
South Extension, Part-I,
New Delhi-110049 ....APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. Kokila Gupta @ Koyal
W/o Late Sh. Manik Chugh,
R/o H. No. 26, Sambha Bazar,
Near Sai Baba, Bijnor, U.P
Also at
H. No. E-53, Block E,
South Extension, Part 1,
New Delhi-110049.
2. The State of NCT of Delhi
Represented through
Concerned SDM, Delhi
Revenue Department, Govt of Nct of Delhi,
Office of District Magistrate, Defence Colony,
South-East District
3. Kathak Kendra
National Institute of Kathak Dance
Mandir Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 1of 33
4. Canara Bank
Through its Bank Manager
Having its branch at Agha Khan Hall
6, Bhagwan Dass Road, New Delhi-110001
5. Life Insurance Corporation of India
Through its Divisional / Senior Manager
Branch no 12 B, A-15
Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate
Mathura Road, New Delhi-110044
6. Canara HSBC Oriental Bank Commerce
Life Insurance Company Limited
Through its Divisional / Senior Manager
Unitech Trade Centre/2nd Floor,
C-Block, Sushant Lok, Phase-1
Sector-43, Gurugram, Haryana-122009 ..... RESPONDENTS
Date of Institution : 07.08.2025
Arguments concluded on : 26.05.2026
Date of Judgment : 15.07.2026
(APPEAL UNDER SECTION 388(2) OF THE INDIAN SUCCESSION
ACT, 1925 AGAINST THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT/ORDER
DATED 28.05.2024 AND 30.07.2025 PASSED BY THE LD. ACJ-
CUM-CCJ-CUM-ARC (SOUTH-EAST) SAKET COURTS)
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal is preferred impugning order dated 28.05.2024
and judgment dated 30.07.2025 passed by Ld. ACJ cum CCJ ARC
South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi.
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 2of 33
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of present appeal are that
respondent no.1 Kokila Gupta @ Koyal (hereinafter referred as
‘Kokila’) got married to Manik Chugh (since deceased). Respondent
Kokila was living with Manik Chugh and his sister Nidhi Chugh after
marriage. Nidhi Chugh died on 01.01.2019 and Manik Chugh died on
17.01.2019. Nidhi Chugh was unmarried. After death of Nidhi Chugh
and Manik Chugh, respondent Kokila filed petition bearing no. Succ.
Court no. 51/19 for grant of Succession Certificate under Section 372 of
Indian Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ISA’) for various
policies, deposits etc of Manik Chugh and Nidhi Chugh before the Court
of Ld. ACJ cum CCJ ARC South-East District, Saket Court. The
appellant moved an application under Order I rule 10 CPC for
impleadment as party and raised objections to grant of succession
certificate to the respondent no.1 on the ground that Kokila Gupta was
disqualified u/s 25 of Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as
‘HSA’). The said application of the appellant was dismissed by the Ld.
Trial Court vide order dated 28.05.2024. Thereafter, Ld. Trial Court
recorded evidence and vide judgment dated 30.07.2025, Succession
Certificate has been granted in favour of respondent Kokila by Ld. Trial
Court. Hence, the appeal has been filed to set aside impugned order
dated 28.05.2024 as well as impugned judgment dated 30.07.2025
passed by Ld. ACJ-sum-CCJ-cum-ARC (South-East) Saket Courts, New
Delhi in Succ. Court 51/19.
3. TCR was also summoned. Notice of appeal was issued to the
respondents. No reply was filed by respondent no. 1. However, written
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arguments were filed on behalf of respondent no. 1. Reply was filed by
respondent no. 5 LIC. Written arguments also filed by the appellant. Oral
arguments were also heard in appeal. The present appeal is contested
only by the respondent no. 1.
4. Ld. Counsel for the appellant would argue that Manik Chugh and
Nidhi Chugh were son and daughter of brother of appellant namely Late
Ashok Kumar Chugh. Late Ashok Kumar Chugh had accommodated
himself in two bedroom flat on first floor of property no. E-53, South
Extension Part-I and the rest of the said property was in the possession
of Late Sh. K.L. Chugh (father of Sh. Ashok Chugh). Sh. Ashok Chugh
died on 13.08.2010. Manik Chugh and Nidhi Chugh were sugar patients
and respondent Kokila Gupta was aware of this fact. She preferred to get
married to Manik Chugh with intention to usurp his property after his
death. Manik Chugh had disclosed to respondent Kokila before marriage
that only two rooms of the first floor were in his temporary possession as
only those two rooms were given to his father Late Ashok Chugh by
grandfather Sh. KL Chugh. The appellant had also disclosed to
respondent Kokila about the sale deed of the ground floor and Will dated
10.12.2010 and other documents in favour of the appellant and Hema
Chugh. After knowing all these facts, respondent Kokila started
harassing Nidhi Chugh and Nidhi Chugh was not allowed to access the
kitchen. On 04.11.2018 Hema Chugh (cousin sister of Nidhi Chugh)
found Nidhi Chugh in really bad condition. Nidhi Chugh was tortured
and she was forcefully thrown out of the house by respondent Kokila.
Respondent Kokila also pressurized Manik Chugh and she even left the
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 4of 33
company of Manik Chugh saying that unless Nidhi Chugh was thrown
out of the house, she would not come back. Due to this, Nidhi Chugh
was shifted to rental property of paternal aunt. On 01.01.2019, Nidhi
Chugh expired in Max Hospital. Respondent Kokila was enjoying party
at that time on eve of new year. Respondent Kokila, being wife of Manik
Chugh, never took care of Manik Chugh. With the passage of time,
Manik Chugh was in such a bad condition that he was unable to stand on
his own. Whenever any full time servant was kept for taking care of
Manik Chugh, respondent Kokila used to stop their services as she never
wanted any one from outside to have any information as what was going
on. On 05.11.2018, Manik Chugh was taken to Moolchand Hospital
because of some health issues, however, Manik Chugh left the Hospital
against medical advice ‘LAMA’ and it was respondent Kokila who had
signed on the medical document. Manik Chugh was a person with very
sound financial background and he preferred to go for LAMA but the
respondent did not even object. Manik Chugh was also having medical
insurance upto 08.01.2019 but the same was not renewed. On
13.12.2018, Manik Chugh was again admitted in Max Hospital where he
was kept for three days and he was discharged on 16.12.2018. The
doctor advised Hemodialysis thrice a week but the same was
intentionally not followed by respondent Kokila despite valid medical
insurance in order to usurp the property of Manik Chugh and Nidhi
Chugh. On 29.12.2018, Manik Chugh again visited Max Hospital and
the report clearly mentioned that Manik Chugh was not subjected to any
dialysis in the last week. Whenever relatives of Manik Chugh called on
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 5of 33
the phone, respondent Kokila used to answer that Manik Chugh was
sleeping. The appellant felt something fishy and she alongwith her
brother visited the house of Manik Chugh on 13.01.2019. They were
shocked to see that Manik Chugh was lying in open space without any
blanket in harsh winter of January. The father of respondent Kokila was
also present there. The brother of appellant, with help of three persons,
took Manik Chugh to hospital in his car and Manik was admitted in
National Heart Institute, where he was put on ventilator. On 17.01.2019,
Manik Chugh took his last breath and the cause of death has been
mentioned by the doctor as multiple organ dysfunction syndrome and
absence of dialysis for few weeks. The bills of the hospital were paid by
the niece of the appellant.
5. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that respondent Kokila, after
death of Manik Chugh, started filing for succession certificate for
various policies / deposits etc of Manik Chugh and Nidhi Chugh.
Respondent Kokila also illegally sold one small property of Nidhi
Chugh to a property dealer and she also sold three cars of Manik Chugh
after his death.
6. Ld. Counsel for the appellant would further argue that the
appellant is aggrieved vide order dated 28.05.2024 and 30.07.2025
passed by Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Trial Court has exceeded the jurisdiction
and has gone beyond the scope of Indian Succession Act, 1925 by not
considering the facts provided by the appellant. Ld. Trial Court failed to
appreciate that the respondent was disqualified u/s 25 of Hindu
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 6of 33
Succession Act. Ld. Trial court also failed to consider that an FIR under
section 304 IPC was registered against respondent Kokila for causing
death of her husband and sister-in-law and the charge-sheet has already
been filed. Charge under section 302 IPC has also been framed by Ld.
Sessions Court against respondent Kokila. A common Succession
Certificate was issued by the Succession Court for Nidhi Chugh as well
as Manik Chugh through only one petition. Ld. Trial Court has failed to
appreciate that respondent Kokila had married Manik Chugh with
malafide intention to usurp the property of Manik Chugh and Nidhi
Chugh as she already knew that both were diabetic patients.
7. Ld. Counsel for the appellant would further argue that the
impugned order dated 28.05.2024 and judgment dated 30.07.2025
substantively affects the appellant’s right to participate in the succession
proceedings. The appeal has been filed within limitation period from the
date of final judgment dated 30.07.2025. The pendency of serious
criminal proceeding is a material circumstance and it directly affects
entitlement of the respondent no. 1 to the succession certificate.
8. Ld. Counsel for appellant would further argue that the respondent
no. 1 had lured Manik into honey trap to grab the properties of Manik
and his sister Nidhi. Even she was in extra marital relationship with
Prince Vinayak. When Manik was on ventilator, inspite of taking care of
Manik, she was planning to sell the property. The respondent no. 1
cannot take benefit of her own wrong. Respondent no. 1 is not entitled to
inherit the property of Manik Chugh and Nidhi Chugh because she is
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 7of 33
being prosecuted for charges under section 302 IPC. The respondent no.
1 never spent any money for treatment of Manik and it was always spent
by Hema Chugh who is cousin sister of Manik. Within span of 16 days,
Nidhi Chugh and Manik Chugh died. The murder complaint was lodged
immediately with SHO PS Kotla Mubarakpur on 19.03.2029 and when
the police did not take cognizance of the complaint, application under
section 156 (3) Cr.P.C was filed before the Ld. MM and after going
through the facts and evidence, Ld. MM directed for the registration of
FIR. The FIR was lodged under section 304 IPC, whereas the order of
charge has been passed for framing of charge under section 302 IPC
against respondent Kokila. The disqualification under section 25 of
Hindu Succession Act arises from the fact of murder and not merely
conviction and civil court can independently examine evidence. The
civil proceedings operate on preponderance of probability and civil court
is competent to examine the conduct for the purpose of succession. Ld.
Trial Court has committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the
disqualification under section 25 of Hindu Succession Act.
9. Ld. Counsel for appellant would further argue that Ld. Trial Court
failed to consider that Kokila was disqualified u/s 25 of Hindu
Succession Act and charges were framed against Kokila for offence u/s
302 IPC. Ld. Trial Court did not consider the fact that the appellant and
respondent Kokila were somehow connected with eldest successor i.e.
KL Chugh and Ld. Trial Court erroneously dismissed the application u/s
I rule 10 CPC. Ld. Trial Court erred in not considering the decision of
Ram Chatarjee vs. Smt. Tapti Mukherjee wherein it was observed that
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 8of 33
Civil Court is required to adjudicate the issue on evidence to be adduced
before him even if there is a finding by criminal court. It is also argued
that the judgments passed in the matter of Anil Behari Gosh vs. Latika
Bala and GS Sada Shiva vs. MC Srinivansan were not considered.
Hence, the order dated 28.05.2024 and judgment dated 30.07.2025 be set
aside.
10. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 1 Kokila would
argue that the appeal is not maintainable in the present form. The
statutory right of appeal is confined only to the order of granting,
refusing or revoking a succession certificate. However, the applicant is
impugning order passed on application under order I rule 10 CPC
seeking her impleadment which cannot be challenged in appeal under
section 388 (2) ISA, 1925. The order passed on application under order I
rule 10 CPC is purely interlocutory and procedural in nature and it does
not determine any substantive right of the appellant. The appeal is also
barred by limitation as the impugned order was passed on 28.05.2024
whereas the appeal has been filed in August 2025 and no application for
condonation of delay has been filed and no explanation has been offered
for the delay. The appellant does not have any locus standi to file the
present appeal. She is paternal aunt and she falls in category of class -II
legal heir and respondent no. 1 Kokila is the widow and she is class-I
legal heir. Succession Certificate are summary proceedings and it does
not conclusively determine the title and the appellant can pursue
independent civil remedy before competent forum. The primary ground
taken by the appellant is pendency of the FIR and that chargesheet has
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 9of 33
been filed in that FIR and the charges has allegedly been framed against
respondent no. 1 Kokila. Mere registration of FIR or pendency of
criminal trial does not amount to prove of guilt. Further the order on
charge passed by Ld. ASJ has been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi. The appellant seeks to convert a succession certificate proceeding
into a parallel trial of criminal allegation. The disqualification under
Section 25 of HSA applies only when there is clear finding of guilt.
Mere order on charge or filing of chargesheet does not establish
culpability and only when the criminal court records a conviction,
disqualification under Section 25, HSA becomes applicable. The appeal
is not maintainable and the appeal has been filed only to delay the grant
and limitation of succession certificate in favour of the respondent no. 1.
There is no legal infirmity in the impugned order and judgment and the
appeal deserves to be dismissed. A civil suit has already been filed by
the brother of the appellant seeking declaration under Section 25, HSA
that respondent no. 1 Kokila be declared as murderer and she be
disqualified from inheriting the estate of Manik Chugh and Nidhi Chugh
and the said suit is listed for consideration on maintainability. There is
neither any conviction nor any civil declaration of disqualification
against respondent no. 1 Kokila Gupta and the issue regarding
disqualification are sub-judice before the competent forum. Mere
pendency of criminal case or declaratory civil suit does not create any
statutory bar and the Succession Court can proceed in accordance with
the law. The impugned order has been founded on proper appreciation of
the material and it does not warrant any interference. The appellant has
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 10of 33
failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the
impugned order. The appellant has falsely alleged that respondent no. 1
Kokila stands disqualified under Section 25 HSA. On the contrary, the
appellant had instituted a civil suit in 2024 seeking declaration, however,
after failing to substantiate her claim, she had withdrawn that suit. All
the submissions made by the appellant are founded primarily on the
basis of chargesheet filed by the police. Respondent no. 1 Kokila had
already filed criminal revision before the Hon’ble High Court assailing
the order on charge and she had also filed petition under section 482
Cr.P.C seeking quashing of the chargesheet and the entire criminal
proceedings and the criminal matter is presently sub-judice before the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi. As as on date, neither has a criminal trial
commenced nor has any civil court rendered a finding of disqualification
under section 25 HSA against respondent no. 1 Kokila.
11. It is further argued on behalf of respondent no. 1 Kokila that the
present appeal suffers from fundamental defect as the affidavit has been
attested on 28.05.2025, whereas the appeal has been filed on 04.08.2025,
challenging the judgment dated 30.07.2025. The affidavit was verified
and attested long before passing of the final order. It appears that the
appeal has been prepared in advance without proper application of mind.
There is no infirmity in the order and appeal deserves to be dismissed.
12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant and Ld. counsel for
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respondent no. 1 and perused the record. Written Arguments and
judgments filed by the parties are also perused. TCR is also produced.
13. The appellant is impugning order dated 28.05.2024 and judgment
dated 30.07.2025 passed by the Ld. Trial Court. Vide order dated
28.05.2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, application u/o I rule 10 CPC
and objections to the succession petition filed by the appellant were
dismissed. The said application was filed by the appellant to take her
objections on record. In the said application, it was pleaded by the
appellant before Ld. Trial Court that there is an FIR No. 234 dated
08.05.2022 PS Kotla Mubarakpur u/s 304 IPC registered against Kokila
Gupta and the investigation is in progress and that Kokila being
disqualified u/s 25 of Hindu Succession Act, there are no other legal
heirs except the applicant (appellant herein). It was also pleaded in the
application that Kokila was responsible for death of Manik which was
apparent from the FIR as Kokila completely ignored Nidhi and Manik
during their lifetime by depriving them of proper food and proper
medical treatment so that they die of starvation and multiple diseases
and therefore, Kokila was not entitled to inherit the properties of Nidhi
Chugh and Manik Chugh. It was also pleaded in the application that
even if Kokila is acquitted either on technical ground or benefit of doubt
is granted by the criminal court in the FIR, Kokila would still not inherit
the property of the deceased if the applicant is successful in proving that
Kokila is responsible for death of deceased. In the application before the
Trial Court, the applicant had prayed to declare petitioner (Kokila) as
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 12of 33
disqualified u/s 25 of Hindu Succession Act and also prayed that
applicant (appellant Indu Bala) be impleaded as respondent in the matter.
14. Vide detailed order dated 28.05.2024 passed by Ld. Trial Court,
the application as well as the objections filed by the appellant were
dismissed. The order passed by the Ld. Trial Court is reproduced as
under:-
“1. Vide this order application filed on behalf of the
proposed respondent Ms. Indu Bala seeking impleadment
under order 1 rule 10 CPC and declaration that the petitioner
is disqualified under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act
shall be adjudicated. The present succession petition has
been filed by Ms. Kokila Gupta with respect to the assets left
behind by her husband Sh. Manik Chugh and her sister in
law Ms. Nidhi Chugh.
2. The applicant is the real bua (father’s sister) of the
deceased. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the
petitioner is disqualified to obtain succession in view of the
provision under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act. It is
contended that an FIR under section 304 IPC has been
registered against the petitioner for causing death of the
deceased husband and sister in law. It is submitted that due
to the act or omissions on behalf of the petitioner the
husband and sister in law of the petitioner died. It is
submitted that a person who commits a murder or abets the
commission of murder is disqualified from inheriting the
property of the murdered under section 25 of the Hindu
succession act. It is submitted that for declaration that the
petitioner is disqualified from inheriting the property
evidence is required to be taken by the court and therefore
the applicant is a necessary party to the present succession
petition.
3. Proceedings under the section 372 of the Indian
Succession Act are summary in nature and the purpose of
obtaining succession is only to authorise valid discharge of
the debts and securities of the deceased. During succession
proceedings no right, title or interest of the parties is decided
by the court. Whether the petitioner is disqualified from
inheriting the property of the deceased under section 25 ofRCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 13of 33
the Hindu Succession Act is beyond the purview of this court
and a separate civil suit may be filed by the applicant in this
regard. Under section 373 (3) of the Indian Succession Act,
it is provided that even if an intricate question of law is
involved the court may proceed to grant a certificate to the
person having prima facie best title. In such a case, the Court
shall take sufficient security from the petition under section
375 of the Indian Succession Act. Relevant provisions are
produced for ready reference as follows.
Section 373 (3): “If the Judge cannot decide the right to the
certificate without determining questions of law or fact
which seem to be too intricate and difficult for determination
in a summary proceeding, he may nevertheless grant a
certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person
having prima facie the best title thereto.”
375. Requisition of security from grantee of certificate.–(1)
The District Judge shall in any case in which he proposes to
proceed under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of section
373, and may, in any other case, require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of a certificate, that the person to
whom he proposes to make the grant shall give to the Judge
a bond with one or more surety or sureties, or other sufficient
security, for rendering an account of debts and securities
received by him and for indemnity of persons who may be
entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and
securities.
4. In the facts of the present case the applicant is a Class II
legal heir of the deceased and the petitioner is a class I legal
heir of the deceased Sh. Manik Chugh being his wife.
Further Ms. Nidhi Chugh predeceased Sh. Manik Chugh and
therefore being wife of Sh. Manik Chugh the petitioner is
also legal air of the deceased Ms. Nidhi Chugh. Applicant
being the paternal aunt of the deceased does not come within
the ambit of the legal heirs and entitled to succession.
5. It has already been observed that whether the petitioner
is disqualified under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act
is within the purview of the civil court and in a summary
proceeding for grant of succession the same question cannot
be decided by this court. Further mere registration of FIR
does not make the petitioner a murderer or abettor to murder
as required by section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act.
Under the Indian Succession Act succession proceedings
may be continued even when there are intricate questions of
law involved by ensuring that the petitioner submits
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 14of 33
sufficient security for the claim. In view thereof there is no
ground to impleaded Ms. Indu Bala under order 1 rule 10
CPC and accordingly application under order 1 rule 10 CPC
filed on behalf of Ms. Indu Bala is dismissed.”
15. Ld. Trial Court had considered the objections taken by the
appellant Indu Bala of Section 25 HSA while passing the order dated
28.05.2024. Admittedly, the appellant did not challenge the said order
within prescribed period of limitation.
16. Ld. Counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant can
challenge the interlocutory order as well as final order by way of
common appeal. He has relied upon judgment passed in the matter of
Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. Vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi & Anr, 1964 SC 993
dated 20.04.1960.
17. I have gone through the judgment relied upon by the appellant.
The judgment is distinguishable as in that case, the parties remained
same throughout the proceedings. However, in this case, the application
of the appellant seeking impleadment as well as objections to grant of
succession certificate were dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court and the
appellant was not allowed to be a party in the matter.
18. The substantive rights of the appellant were affected when the
application of the appellant u/o I rule 10 CPC and her objections were
dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court. The appellant did not challenge the
order dated 28.05.2024 as per the law provided within prescribed period
of limitation and thus, the order dated 28.05.2024 had attained finality
and the appeal qua order dated 28.05.2024 is barred by limitation. The
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 15of 33
appeal against order dated 28.05.2024 passed on application under Order
I rule 10 CPC is also not maintainable u/s 388 (2) of ISA.
19. The appellant is impugning judgment dated 30.07.2025 passed by
Ld. Trial Court. Vide judgment dated 30.07.2025, the petition filed by
respondent no. 1 Kokila u/s 372, ISA for grant of Succession Certificate
was allowed. The relevant para of judgment is reproduced as under:-
“11. The entire record as well as the testimonies of the witnesses have been perused.
Final arguments addressed by counsel for petitioner have been heard. It had been
submitted by counsel for petitioner that the petitioner is the only surviving legal heir
of both the deceased persons.
12. Perusal of legal heir report Ex.RW1/1 shows that Smt. Kokila Gupta @ Koyal
(petitioner, wife) is the only Class I legal heir of the deceased Late Sh. Manik
Chugh. Further, there is no impediment to issuance of succession certificate in
favour of petitioner and also, no one came forward to oppose issuance of succession
certificate despite publication in newspapers.
13. It is pertinent to note that no order could be passed with respect to locker in
name of Ms. Nidhi Chugh as this court does not have jurisdiction to pass any such
order in succession petition, which is only limited to issuance of succession
certificate with respect to debts and securities in name of the deceased.
14. Therefore, in view of Ex.RW1/1 and above discussion, it is hereby ordered that
succession certificate be issued in favour of petitioner namely Smt. Kokila Gupta @
Koyal qua the debts and securities in name of Late Sh. Manik Chugh and Late Ms.
Nidhi Chugh which are as under :
S.No. Name of the Name of Policy/Account Amount
policy/account holder bank/company No. Payable
1 Nidhi Chugh LIC 117690233 Rs. 6,22,500/-
2 Nidhi Chugh LIC 124345756 Rs. 8,39,462/-
3 Nidhi Chugh LIC 124345784 Rs. 8,37,148/-
4 Nidhi Chugh Canara Bank 2417101017640 Rs.
2,85,825.89/-
5 Nidhi Chugh Life Insurance 0026417120 Rs.
Canara HSBC 34,720.96/-
6 Nidhi Chugh National Institute PRAN No. Rs. 4,81,506/-
of Kathak Dance 111006832902
Total Rs.
31,01,162.85/-
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 16of 33
15. The succession certificate shall be considered only as an entitlement of the
petitioner to receive the amount (with applicable interest till date, if any) due
towards Late Sh. Manik Chugh and Late Ms. Nidhi Chugh, as referred above. The
succession certificate shall not be considered as a direction to concerned
bank/official to transfer the aforesaid amount to petitioner. The concerned
bank/official shall be competent to seek compliance of formalities, if any, to be
fulfilled for the said purpose.
16. Upon filing of indemnity bond and requisite Court fees of Rs. 62,023.3 by
petitioner, succession certificate be issued.”
20. The appellant claims to have substantive rights in the estate of
deceased (Nidhi Chugh and Manik Chugh) and she is stated to have
been adversely affected by the judgment dated 30.07.2025 passed by the
Ld. Trial Court vide which succession certificate was granted to the
respondent no 1.
21. The relevant provisions of Indian Succession Act which are
required to be discussed for disposal of appeal against judgment dated
30.07.2025 are reproduced as under:-
‘373. Procedure on application.-(1) If the District Judge is
satisfied that there is ground for entertaining the application,
he shall fix a day for the hearing thereof and cause notice of
the application and of the day fixed for the hearing- (a) to be
served on any person to whom, in the opinion of the Judge,
special notice of the application should be given, and (b) to
be posted on some conspicuous part of the court-house and
published in such other manner, if any, as the Judge, subject
to any rules made by the High Court in this behalf, thinks fit,
and upon the day fixed, or as soon thereafter as may be
practicable, shall proceed to decide in a summary manner the
right to the certificate. (2) When the Judge decides the right
thereto to belong to the applicant, the Judge shall make an
order for the grant of the certificate to him. (3) If the Judge
cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining
questions of law or fact which seem to be too intricate and
difficult for determination in a summary proceeding, he may
nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he appearsRCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 17of 33
to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto. (4)
When there are more applicants than one for a certificate,
and it appears to the Judge that more than one of such
applicants are interested in the estate of the deceased, the
Judge may, in deciding to whom the certificate is to be
granted, have regard to the extent of interest and the fitness
in other respects of the applicants.
384. Appeal.-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part,
an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of a
District Judge granting, refusing or revoking a certificate
under this Part, and the High Court may, if it thinks fit, by its
order on the appeal, declare the person to whom the
certificate should be granted and direct the District Judge, on
application being made therefore, to grant it accordingly, in
supersession of the certificate, if any, already granted.
387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder
of certificate thereunder.-No decision under this Part upon
any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar
the trial of the same question in any suit or any other
proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this
Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person
who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or
security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to
account therefore to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
388. Investiture of inferior courts with jurisdiction of District
Court for purposes of this Act. (1) The State Government
may by notification in the Official Gazette, invest any court
inferior in grade to a District Judge with power to exercise
the functions of a District Judge under this Part. (2) Any
inferior court so invested shall, within the local limits of its
jurisdiction, have concurrent jurisdiction with the District
Judge in the exercise of all the powers conferred by this Part
upon the District Judge, and the provisions of this Part
relating to the District Judge shall apply to such an inferior
court as if it were a District Judge: PROVIDED that an
appeal from any such order of an inferior court as is
mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 384 shall lie to the
District Judge, and not to the High Court and that the District
Judge may, if he thinks fit, by his order on the appeal, make
any such declaration and directions as that sub-section
authorities the High Court to make by its order on an appeal
from an order of a District Judge.
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 18of 33
22. In this appeal, the appellant is claiming to be aggrieved by the
judgment of Ld. Trial Court and therefore, in view of provision section
388(2), ISA, this Court proceeds to decide the appeal challenging the
judgment dated 30.07.2025.
23. The appellant is seeking setting aside of judgment dated
30.07.2025 on the ground that the charge-sheet has been filed against the
respondent Kokila in FIR no. 234/22 PS Kotla Mubarakpur and that
order on charge has been passed by the Ld. Sessions Judge directing
framing of charge for offence u/s 302 IPC. The appellant has relied upon
the charge-sheet and the material collected by the police during
investigation of aforesaid FIR.
24. It is admitted by the appellant that the order on charge passed by
the Ld. ASJ has been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated
23.04.2025 passed in CRL. REV. P 157/25. The relevant portion of the
order passed by the Hon’ble High Court is reproduced as under:-
“7. A perusal of the Impugned order reveals that the Trial
Court, upheld the Petitioner’s claim that the deceased had
consistently resisted undergoing hemodialysis, and found
that the prosecution had not placed any positive evidence to
the contrary on record. However, the Trial Court accepted
this defence only up to the point when the deceased
remained mentally capable of electing to refuse medical
treatment. The Trial Court held that once the deceased
turned incapable of taking such decisions, it was the duty of
the Petitioner, being his wife, to ensure that the deceased got
proper medical attention. Relying on the material available
on record, the Trial Court proceeded to hold that the
Petitioner’s failure to act at that critical juncture reflected a
culpable intent, thereby justifying the framing of charges
under Section 302 of the IPC.
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 19of 33
8. In the backdrop of the above findings, the pivotal question
that arises is whether the subsequent deterioration in the
condition of the deceased, ultimately culminating in his
death, was the natural consequence of his own voluntary
decisions made while he was mentally capable, or whether it
was the result of an actionable omission on the part of the
Petitioner at a later stage, allegedly motivated by culpable
intent. The distinction between mere negligence and
criminal culpability, particularly one carrying the grave
consequence of a charge under Section 302 of the IPC, is a
fine but crucial one. The case, therefore, raises substantial
issues regarding causation, intention, legal responsibility of
a caregiver, and the threshold required to invoke the offence
of murder on the basis of an omission to act. In the
considered view of this Court, these aspects merit closer
examination before allowing the prosecution to proceed on
the footing of culpable homicide punishable under Section
302 of the IPC.
9. Accordingly, till the next date of hearing, the proceedings
before the Trial Court shall remain stayed.
10. Issue notice. APP for State accepts notice. Reply/status
report be filed before the next date of hearing.”
25. The charge was directed to be framed by Ld. ASJ for offence u/s
302 IPC however Hon’ble High Court had stayed the proceedings
pending before the Court of Ld. ASJ. The criminal proceedings against
respondent Kokila are stayed at present.
26. During course of arguments, respondent no. 1 Kokila has placed
on record copy of plaint for Suit for Declaration bearing CS No. 63/2024
filed by appellant Indu Bala against Kokila Gupta to declare her as
disqualified to inherit any property of Nidhi Chugh or Manik Chugh in
accordance with section 25 of HSA and to declare that plaintiff
(appellant herein) was entitled to inherit the property of Nidhi Chugh
and Manik Chugh and to restrain defendant Kokila from disposing of the
assets. The said suit was instituted in 2024. The said suit was withdrawn
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 20of 33
by appellant Indu Bala on 01.04.2025. The suit for declaration and
injunction was withdrawn in 2025 even after the appellant had
knowledge that her application u/o I rule 10 CPC and the objections
filed by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court in Succ. Court 51/19 has
been dismissed. The Civil Court is a competent court to give declaration
whether Kokila was disqualified u/s 25 of HSA to inherit the estate of
Nidhi Chugh and Manik Chugh. However, the appellant withdrew the
suit for declaration filed by her for the reasons best known to her.
27. Ld. Trial Court was dealing with petition for grant of succession
certificate u/s 372 of ISA. It is settled that proceedings u/s 372 ISA are
summary in nature and the Succession Court has limited jurisdiction. In
the case of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma vs Kunjikutty Pillai dated
27.04.2000 2000 (3) SCR 752, Division Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
“So, this certificate merely affords full indemnity to the
debtor for the payments he makes to the person holding such
certificate. Thus when the debtor pays the debts or the
securities as specified in the certificate, to the holder of such
certificate, then on such payment, he is absolved from his
obligation to pay to any one else as it conclusively concludes
his part of his obligation and such payment is construed to be
in good faith. This safeguards such debtor or person liable to
pay that he may not be later dragged into any litigation
which may arise subseqently inter se between the claimants.
The use of words “good faith” in Section 381 reinforces that
decision in these proceedings are not final. When statute
recognises such payment to be in good faith gives clear
under current message that there may in future better
claimant but that would not affect the indemnification of the
debtor. Thus we find accumulatively because of the grant of
Succession Certificate being for a limited purpose, limited in
its sphere, the declaration of title being prima facie, paymentRCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 21of 33
tendered is declared to have been made in good faith, leads
to only one conclusion that any decision made therein cannot
be treated to be final adjudication of the rights of the parties,
except such declaration being final for the purpose of these
proceedings. If that be so, the amount received by the holder
of such certificate can yet be questioned, and in subsequent
proceeding it rnay bold it to belong to other claimant,
including the contesting party.”
xxx
This leaves no room for doubt. Thus any adjudication made
under Part X of this Act which includes Section 373 does not
bar the same question being raised between the same parties
in any subsequent suit or proceeding. This provision takes
the decisions under Part X of the Act outside the perview of
Explanation VIII to Section 11. This gives proiective umbrei
l a to ward off from the rays of res judicata to the same issue
being raised in a subsequent suit or proceedinggs. No doubt
Explanation VIII to Section 11 enlarges the filed of res
judicata, by including in its field the decisions on the issue,
between the same parties even by a court of limit jurisdiction
even though such court may not have the competence of
deciding such an issue in a suit. But as we have held above
this grant of certificate would not fall within the field of
Explanation VIII of Section U. As far back as in 1937, this
principle was upheld and recognised. In Mt. Charjo and Anr.
v. Dina Nath and Ors., AIR (1937) Lahore 196(2). “The
enquiry in proceedings for grant of succession certificate is
to be summary, and the Court, without determining questions
of law or fact, which seem to it to be too intricate and
difficult for determination, should grant the certificate to the
person who appears to have prima facle the best title thereto.
In such cases the Court has not to determine definitely and
finally as to who has the best right to the estate. All that it is
required to do is to hold a summary enquiry into the right to
the certificate, with a view, on the one hand, to facilitate the
collection of debts due to the deceased and prevent their
being time-barred, owing (for instance) to dispute between
the heirs inter se as to their preferential right to succession,
and, on the other hand, to afford protection to the debtors by
appointing a representative of the deceased and authorising
him to give a valid discharge for the debt. The grant of a
certificate to a person does not give him an absolute right to
the debt nor does it bar a regular suit for adjustments of the
claims of the heirs inter se.”
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 22of 33
28. In the case of Sushila Devi Vs. State & Ors CM(M) No985/2017
dated 12.09.2017, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has also observed that
the succession certificate does not grant any title or any right in the
property of the deceased and any issue decided in the succession petition
can be raised again in subsequent proceeding or civil suit as the
proceedings under Part X of ISA are summary in nature and it is not a
decree of the court. The relevant para is reproduced as under:-
‘7. A Succession Certificate only entitles the grantee thereof
to claim and receive the debts and securities of the deceased,
giving a full discharge to the persons who may be holding
the said debts and securities, so as to relieve them from
claim by multiple persons claiming to be the heirs of the
deceased. Before granting such Succession Certificate, in a
proceeding for grant of Succession Certificate which in any
case is summary in nature, the persons holding debts and
securities are not required to be impleaded and a perusal of
the order dated 14th November, 2014 ordering issuance of
Succession Certificate in favour of the petitioner also does
not show Axis Bank, Khan Market, New Delhi and New
India Insurance Co. Ltd. claimed to be holding the said debts
and securities of the deceased to be parties thereto. Merely
because an applicant for Succession Certificate has averred
in the petition that the debts and securities mentioned in the
application are due to the deceased, is no proof of the said
debts and securities being due to the deceased and a
proceeding for grant of Succession Certificate is not meant
for adjudication of the said issues. If the persons who are
claimed to be holding the debts and securities of the
deceased dispute the claim, the entitlement in law of the
grantee of the Succession Certificate is only to make a legal
claim against them and not to execute the Succession
Certificate or an order granting Succession Certificate.
8. I have recently in judgment dated 7th September, 2017 in
CM(M) No.934/2017 titled Atul Maithel Vs. State Bank of
India dealt with the said aspect.
9. I find the Supreme Court in Banarsi Dass Vs. Teeku Dutta
(2005) 4 SCC 449 to have held (i) that the main object of a
Succession Certificate is to facilitate collection of debts onRCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 23of 33
succession and afford protection to parties paying debts to
representatives of the deceased person; (ii) all that the
Succession Certificate purports to do is to facilitate the
collection of debts, to regulate the administration of
succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged
representatives of the deceased persons; (iii) such a
Certificate does not give any general power of
administration on the estate of the deceased; (iv) the grant of
a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir
of the deceased; (v) a Succession Certificate is intended to
protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a
deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person
holding a certificate or is compelled by a decree of the Court
to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged; and, (vi)
the grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the
grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him
with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to
make payments to him without incurring any risk.
10. Earlier, in Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma Vs.
Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai (2000) 6 SCC 301 the
Supreme Court was concerned with the question, whether an
order granting Succession Certificate under Section 373 of
the Indian Succession Act would operate as res judicata to
the suit for partition filed in a Civil Court between the same
parties. It was held (i) that adjudication to grant or not to
grant Succession Certificate is in summary proceedings and
on a prima facie view of the matter; (ii) in other words, the
grant of certificate is only a determination of prima facie
title and is not a final decision between the parties; (iii) so it
cannot be construed that mere grant of such certificate or a
decision in such proceedings would constitute to be a
decision on an issue finally decided between the parties; (iv)
per Section 381 of the Indian Succession Act also, the
Succession Certificate merely affords full indemnity to the
debtor for the payments he makes to the person holding such
certificate; thus when the debtor pays the debts or the
securities as specified in the certificate to the holder of such
certificate, then on such payment, he is absolved from his
obligation to pay to anyone else as it conclusively concludes
his part of his obligation and such payment is construed to
be in good faith; this safeguards such debtor or person liable
to pay, that he may not be later dragged into a litigation
which may arise subsequently inter se between the
claimants; (v) the use of words “good faith” in Section 381RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 24of 33
reinforces that the decision in these proceedings is not final;
(vi) when statute recognises such payment to be in ‘good
faith’, it gives clear undercurrent message that there may in
future be a better claimant but that would not affect the
indemnification of the debtor; (vii) that thus any decision
made in the proceedings for grant of Succession Certificate
cannot be treated to be final adjudication of the rights of the
parties, except such declaration being final for the purposes
of those proceedings; (viii) thus the amount received by the
holder of such certificate can yet be questioned and in
subsequent proceedings it may be held to belong to other
claimant, including the contesting party; (ix) the grant of
Succession Certificate falls under Part X of the Indian
Succession Act, range whereof is between Sections 370 to
390; Section 387 declares the effect of the decisions made
under the Act and the liability of holder of such certificate; it
lays down that any decision made under Part X upon any
question of right between the parties shall not bar the trial of
the same question in any suit or other proceedings between
the same parties; and, (x) thus any adjudication made under
Part X which includes Section 373, does not bar the same
question being raised between the same parties in any
subsequent suit or proceeding.
11. Reference in this regard may also be made to the same
effect to Joginder Pal Vs. Indian Red Cross Society (2000) 8
SCC 143 wherein it was further held that merely because
issues were raised and / or evidence was led in respect of an
application for Succession Certificate, it does not mean that
the findings given thereunder are final and operate as res
judicata because even in summary proceedings, issues can
be raised and / or evidence can be led but the proceedings
remain summary; so in a subsequent suit the crucial issues
must be decided afresh untrammelled or uninfluenced by
any finding made in the proceedings for grant of Succession
Certificate.
12. I also find the High Court of Karnataka in Employment
Officer Vs. Sevarinathan ILR 1985 Karnataka 317 to have
held that the grant of Succession Certificate does not amount
to an order within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). It was reasoned that though
Section 374 empowers the grantee of the certificate to
recover interest or dividends, it does not amount to passing
an order entitling the grantee to recover the amounts. It was
further held that Section 374 makes it clear that the grant of
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 25of 33
Succession Certificate does not amount to a decree or order
within the meaning of the CPC and that Section 375 makes
it clear that the grantee of a succession certificate only gets
the power to sue on an action for the recovery of the money.
It was reasoned that Succession Certificate does not
conclusively determine the rights of the parties in the matter
of disputes between the parties and therefore grant of
Succession Certificate will not amount to a ‘decree’ within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the CPC. The High Court of
Bombay also in Pramila Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of
India 2004 (3) Mh.L.J 349 held that where Succession
Certificate has been successfully obtained by a party but the
concerned person refuses to make the payment, the
execution proceedings cannot be filed for execution of the
succession certificate granted by the Court under Part X of
the Indian Succession Act and the holder of the Succession
Certificate has to file a suit on the basis of the said
succession certificate. The same is the view of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Sandhya Banerjee
Vs. Shyama Banerjee 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1355, where
reliance was also placed on State of Chhatisgarh Vs. Dhirajo
Kumar Sengar (2009) 13 SCC 600 laying down that
Succession Certificate can be granted in favour of any
person; it may be granted to an heir or a nominee; by reason
of grant of such certificate, a person in whose favour
Succession Certificate is granted becomes a trustee, to
distribute the amount payable by the deceased to his heirs
and legal representatives – he does not derive any right
thereunder; the Succession Certificate merely enables him to
collect the dues of the deceased and no status is conferred on
the grantee thereby; grant of Succession Certificate does not
prove any relationship between the deceased and the
applicant.
13. The learned Administrative Civil Judge, in the impugned
order, has given cogent reasons to the same effect and it is
unfortunate that the counsel, without considering the law,
has filed this petition.’ (emphasis supplied)
29. It is settled through judicial pronouncement that inquiry in
proceedings for grant of succession certificate u/s 372 ISA is summary
in nature and the Court should grant certificate to the person who
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 26of 33
appears to have prima facie best title thereto without determining
intricate questions of law and fact.
30. Ld. Trial Court had granted the succession certificate to the
respondent no. 1 Kokila being class-I legal heir of Nidhi Chugh and
Manik Chugh. The appellant does not dispute that Kokila is Class-I legal
heir and appellant is Class-II legal heir of Nidhi Chugh and Manik
Chugh. The Trial Court had limited jurisdiction to decide whether the
respondent no. 1 Kokila was prima facie entitled to the succession
certificate or not. In the petition under Section 372, ISA, the question
whether the class-I legal heir is disqualified under Section 25 of HSA
cannot be gone into and only a court exercising civil jurisdiction can
give a decree of declaration u/s 25 HSA after recording of evidence of
parties. Any finding of succession court does not operate as res-judicata.
31. Presently, as per the appellant herself, there is only suspicion
against respondent no. 1 Kokila that she had murdered her husband and
her sister in law. The succession certificate only gives indemnity to the
debtor for payments, he makes to the person holding such certificate and
the succession certificate does not confer any title upon the person to
whom certificate is granted. Merely because charge-sheet is filed and
there is a criminal case pending against class-I legal heir for 302 IPC and
that a suit for declaration u/s 25 HSA is pending, the succession
certificate could not be kept in abeyance. Only when it is established on
preponderance of probability, before competent Civil Court or there is
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 27of 33
conviction by Criminal Court for charge of murder or abetment of
murder, the disqualification u/s 25 HSA would come into play.
32. In the case of Ram Chatarjee vs. Smt. Tapti Mukherjee
(2002)3CALLT208(HC), the issue before the Hon’ble High Court was
whether on the basis of the pleading made by the plaintiff, the plaint was
required to be rejected at the threshold and whether Civil Court has the
jurisdiction to determine and/or adjudicate the husband’s liability as
murderer for passing a declaration in terms of Section 25 of Hindu
Succession Act. Hon’ble High Court held that the Civil Court has the
power and jurisdiction to decide the question upon taking appropriate
evidence as would be required for passing a declaration in terms of
Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to disqualify the husband
defendant to inherit the property of the wife who was allegedly
murdered by the husband. This position of law has been affirmed by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Behari Gosh vs. Latika Bala
1955 AIR 566. In the case of GS Sada Shiva vs. MC Srinivansan ILR
2001 Kar 4574 , the plaintiff (husband) had married daughter of the
defendant. The wife of plaintiff committed suicide and in the charge-
sheet filed for offence u/s 308 and 498A IPC, the plaintiff was acquitted
and the acquittal was confirmed by Hon’ble High Court. The father in
law of plaitniff filed suit for declaration and injunction claiming
exclusive rights over the properties of his daughter but the suit was
dismissed for non-prosecution. Thereafter, the plaintiff (husband) filed
suit for declaration and injunction claiming right over the properties of
his wife, the suit was decreed and the appeal was also dismissed by the
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 28of 33
Hon’ble High Court because the defendant / applicant did not place any
material to show that the plaintiff was responsible for death of his wife.
In that case, Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has held that what is
required to be proved by the defendant that his daughter was murdered
by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff abetted commission of murder and
even if the plaintiff is acquitted by the Criminal Court, the defendant can
satisfy the Court that the plaintiff was acquitted either on technical
ground or extending benefit of doubt and can show that his daughter was
actually murdered by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff was responsible for
abetting the crime, only then the plaintiff can be disqualified from
inheriting the properties u/s 25 HSA.
33. The above position of law has been reiterated in the case of
Manjula vs. D.A. Srinivas SLP (C) No. 7924/2024 wherein Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that Section 25 HSA does not make conviction
a condition precedent and the provision imposes a civil consequence
against a wrongdoer and the issue may be examined on the standard of
preponderance of probabilities, independent of the strict standard of
proof applicable to criminal prosecution.
34. Even in the judgments relied upon by the appellant, the Court had
held that Civil Court can grant declaration on preponderance of
probability. Whether a person is murderer or he has abated a murder can
be decided either by Criminal Court or by Civil Court on preponderance
of probability however, such declaration cannot be granted in summary
inquiry u/s 372, ISA. Even if the Succession Court takes evidence
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 29of 33
regarding disqualification u/s 25, HSA, any finding on such issue would
not operate as res-judicata if same issue is raised in another proceeding
or suit.
35. The appellant had filed a civil suit for declaration that Kokila was
disqualified u/s 25 of HSA however, she chose to withdrew her suit
despite having knowledge of the fact that her objections and application
u/o I rule 10 CPC was dismissed. The proceedings of FIR No. 234/22 PS
Kotla Mubarakpur has been stayed by the order of Hon’ble High Court.
Presently, civil suit filed by brother of appellant namely Sanjeev Chugh
against Kokila for disqualification u/s 25, HSA is pending. There is no
material at this stage to show that respondent no. 1 Kokila has been
declared as murderer by Criminal Court or by a Civil Court on
preponderance of probability. In the absence of any such declaration by
Civil Court or conviction by Criminal Court, the disqualification u/s 25,
HSA will not apply at this stage.
36. In view of the discussion herein-above, this Court holds that so far
as the order of Ld. Trial Court granting the Succession Certificate to
respondent Kokila is concerned, there is no infirmity in the order. The
Trial Court has rightly granted the Succession Certificate to respondent
Kokila, as it could not have decided, in summary proceedings, the
question whether respondent Kokila murdered her husband and sister-in-
law or not. As already stated, answer to such a question can be given
only after a trial in the criminal case pending, or in a civil suit stated to
have instituted by the brother of the appellant. Hence, the order of the
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 30of 33
Trial Court granting the Succession Certificate to respondent Kokila is
found to be valid order under Section 373(3), the Indian Succession Act,
which provides that in a case where the Judge cannot decide the right to
the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which seem
to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a summary
proceeding, he may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he
appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto. In the
present case, respondent Kokila is shown to be the only class-I legal heir
of the deceased persons namely Nidhi Chugh and Manik Chugh and
therefore entitled to the Succession Certificate. There is no infirmity in
the order of the trial Court till that finding.
37. There is, however, one aspect which requires attention of this
Court. Section 375, the Indian Succession Act, provides for requisition
of security from grantee of Certificate of Succession. It reads as under:
“375. Requisition of security from grantee of certificate.-(1)
The District Judge shall in any case in which he proposes to
proceed under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of section
373, and may, in any other case, require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of a certificate, that the person to
whom he proposes to make the grant shall give to the Judge
a bond with one or more surety or sureties, or other sufficient
security, for rendering an account of debts and securities
received by him and for indemnity of persons who may be
entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and
securities.”
38. Perusal of Section 375, the Indian Succession Act would show
that in case where the Court proceeds to grant Succession Certificate
under Sub Section (3) or (4) of Section 373 of the Act, he shall require,
as a condition precedent to the granting of a certificate, that the person to
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 31of 33
whom he proposes to make the grant shall give to the Judge a bond with
one or more surety or sureties, or other sufficient security, for rendering
an account of debts and securities received by him and for indemnity of
persons who may be entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and
securities.
39. Section 375, ISA has two parts. In the cases where the Court
proceeds to grant the certificate under Sub Section (3) or (4) of Section
373, of the Act, it is mandatory for the Court to obtain, as a condition
precedent to the granting of a certificate, a bond with one or more surety
or sureties, or other sufficient security, from the person to whom the
Court decides to issue the certificate. In such cases, the Court can not
dispense with the requirement of law to obtain surety, or sureties or other
sufficient security.
40. In the present case, the impugned judgment dated 30.07.2025
passed by Ld. Trial Court shows that the certificate is directed to be
issued to respondent Kokila on filing of indemnity bond and requisite
Court fee of Rs.62023.3. The Ld. Trial Court did not seek any surety or
sureties from the petitioner (respondent Kokila herein). This Court is of
the considered opinion that in a case like the present one, the Trial Court
should have obtained a surety from the petitioner (respondent Kokila
herein), as required under Section 375 of the Act in cases where the
certificate is issued under Section 373(3) of the Act. Hence, the
judgment of the Ld. Trial Court to that effect is required to be modified.
The judgment dated 30.07.2025 is accordingly modified. It is directed
RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 32of 33
that the Ld. Trial Court shall issue the Succession Certificate to the
petitioner (Respondent Kokila herein) on filing of indemnity bond
alongwith a surety equal to the value of the debts and securities in the
case, and the requisite Court fee as directed by the Ld. Trial Court.
41. In terms of the above order, the appeal stands disposed of. The
copy of the judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court with the TCR. File
be consigned to record room after necessary compliance.
Pronounced in the open
Court today on 15th July, 2026
Digitally
(NEHA)
signed by
Neha
District Judge-06/South East
Neha Date:
2026.07.15
Saket Court/New Delhi
16:37:21
+0530RCA DJ 59/25 INDU BALA VS KOKILA GUPTA & Ors Page 33of 33
