Impcl Karamchari Sangh vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 July, 2026

July 25, 2026

Delhi High Court

Impcl Karamchari Sangh vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 July, 2026

1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks, inter
alia, setting aside of the decision of respondent nos. 1 to 3 approving
respondent no. 7 as the strategic buyer in the disinvestment of

SPONSORED

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respondent no. 9, along with all consequential steps taken pursuant
thereto, including the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement
dated 15.06.2026. The petitioner further seeks directions for an
investigation into the alleged irregularities in the disinvestment
process of respondent no. 9, including an independent investigation
by the Central Bureau of Investigation.

2. The case set out by the petitioner is that the petitioner –
IMPCL Karamchari Sangh – is a registered trade union representing
the employees of Indian Medicines Pharmaceutical Corporation
Limited [hereafter ‗IMPCL’]. It is stated that IMPCL is a Central
Public Sector Enterprise under the administrative control of the
Ministry of AYUSH (respondent no. 3), with the Government of
India holding the majority shareholding therein. According to the
petitioner, IMPCL is engaged in the manufacture and supply of
standardized Ayurvedic and Unani medicines for Government
healthcare systems and has consistently remained a profit-making
enterprise since its inception. It is further stated that its registered
office and manufacturing facility are situated at Mohan, Uttarakhand,
and that a large number of employees, contractual workers and
farmers are directly or indirectly dependent upon its functioning for
their livelihood.

3. The principal challenge in the present petition is to the decision
dated 26.05.2026 of the Alternative Mechanism of the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Affairs, constituted by the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways (respondent no. 1), the Ministry of Finance

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(respondent no. 2) and the Ministry of AYUSH (respondent no. 3),
whereby the strategic disinvestment of 100% equity shareholding of
IMPCL in favour of Skymap Pharmaceuticals Private Limited
(respondent no. 7) was approved. It is the petitioner’s case that the
disinvestment process was undertaken pursuant to the Preliminary
Information Memorandum [hereafter ‗PIM’] issued by the
Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (respondent
no. 5) through its transaction advisor, Resurgent India Limited
(respondent no. 6), culminating in the execution of the Share
Purchase Agreement dated 15.06.2026.

4. The petitioner alleges that the impugned decision approving
the strategic disinvestment suffers from various irregularities. It is
inter alia contended that IMPCL has been undervalued, respondent
no. 7 did not satisfy the prescribed financial eligibility criteria under
the bidding process, and adequate safeguards have not been provided
for protecting the interests of the employees and other stakeholders
dependent upon IMPCL. On these grounds, the petitioner seeks
setting aside of the impugned decision and the consequential actions
taken thereunder, besides directions for investigation into the alleged
irregularities in the disinvestment process.

5. At the outset, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents has opposed the maintainability of the present writ
petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is
contended that the petitioner has been litigating in relation to the
disinvestment policy since the year 2019 and has, on earlier

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occasions, approached the High Court of Uttarakhand by filing writ
petitions challenging the same.

6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly
concedes that the petitioner had earlier approached the High Court of
Uttarakhand challenging the policy decisions relating to the proposed
strategic disinvestment of IMPCL. It is, however, submitted that the
present writ petition stands on a different footing. According to the
learned senior counsel, the process contemplated under the policy has
now culminated in the approval of the strategic disinvestment in
favour of respondent no. 7 and the execution of the Share Purchase
Agreement dated 15.06.2026. It is contended that the challenge in the
present petition is not to the policy of disinvestment per se, but to the
manner in which the said policy has been implemented in the present
case, culminating in the impugned decision approving respondent no.
7 as the successful strategic buyer. On the issue of territorial
jurisdiction, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has
specifically drawn the attention of this Court to Clause 3.3.32 of the
PIM, 2023 (Annexure P-12), which provides that all disputes arising
out of the transaction shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the courts at New Delhi. It is, therefore, argued that this Court has the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
has submitted that the petitioner had initially filed a writ petition
before the High Court of Uttarakhand in the year 2019 challenging
the PIM issued in 2019 in relation to the proposed strategic

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disinvestment of 100% equity shareholding of Indian Medicines
Pharmaceutical Corporation Limited (IMPCL). It is further submitted
that a Public Interest Litigation challenging the same PIM was also
filed before the High Court of Uttarakhand, which came to be
dismissed upon the Court finding no merit in the challenge and
observing that there was no reason to interfere with the policy
decision of the Government. It is further submitted that upon issuance
of the PIM, 2023, the petitioner once again approached the High
Court of Uttarakhand by filing a fresh writ petition challenging the
said PIM, which was dismissed vide order dated 10.10.2023. The
petitioner thereafter preferred an intra-court appeal before the
Division Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand. The learned
counsel submits that both the writ petition arising out of the 2019
challenge and the aforesaid appeal were ultimately withdrawn by the
petitioner on 10.07.2026 and 14.07.2026, respectively, from the the
High Court of Uttarakhand, on the ground that subsequent
developments had taken place and that the petitioner wished to
withdraw the proceedings with liberty to initiate fresh proceedings.
The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the
petitioner’s reliance on Clause 3.3.32 of the PIM, 2023 is
misconceived, since the petitioner itself had earlier invoked the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Uttarakhand by challenging the
same PIM before that Court and had thereafter pursued the matter in
appeal before the Division Bench of High Court of Uttarakhand. It is
thus contended that the petitioner cannot now seek to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court by placing reliance upon the said clause.

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8. The learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 7 has also
argued that the liberty granted by the High Court of Uttarakhand was
to withdraw the pending proceedings and file fresh proceedings.
According to the learned counsel, such liberty to ―file fresh‖
necessarily contemplated the institution of fresh proceedings before
the same Court.

9. In response, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the withdrawal applications filed before the
High Court of Uttarakhand only stated that, in view of the subsequent
development of the impugned award having been passed in favour of
the successful bidder, the petitioner wished to withdraw the pending
proceedings while reserving its right to initiate appropriate
proceedings challenging the award. It is argued that the liberty sought
was not confined to filing fresh proceedings before the High Court of
Uttarakhand alone. It is further contended that such technical
objections relating to territorial jurisdiction ought not to defeat the
petitioner’s substantive challenge to the allegedly arbitrary manner in
which the disinvestment process has been carried out by the
respondents.

10. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
parties, and has perused the material available on record.

11. At the outset, it may be noticed that the present dispute is
intrinsically connected with the State of Uttarakhand. The petitioner,
IMPC Karamchari Sangh, is a registered trade union based at
Ramnagar, District Almora, Uttarakhand. Respondent no. 9, i.e. the

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IMPCL, whose strategic disinvestment is the subject matter of
challenge in the present petition, is also situated at Ramnagar,
Uttarakhand, where its registered office and manufacturing facility
are located.

12. This Court further notes that one of the principal grievances
raised by the petitioner itself, as specifically pleaded in the writ
petition, relates to the land on which the manufacturing facility of
IMPCL is situated. It is the petitioner’s own case that the
manufacturing unit of IMPCL is located on a forest land parcel ad-
measuring about 36 acres, leased by the respondent no. 8, i.e. State
Infrastructure and Industrial Development Corporation of
Uttarakhand Limited (SIIDCUL), having its address: Sahastradhara
Road, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, for a period of 90 years upto the year
2072. It is further pleaded in the writ petition that the lease has been
granted subject to the express condition that the land shall be used
only for the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Unani medicines and
activities ancillary thereto. According to the petitioner, respondent
no. 7 has no discernible experience in the said sector and, therefore,
the strategic disinvestment in its favour carries the grave risk of
violation of the lease conditions, resulting in reversion of the land to
SIIDCUL. Thus, one of the issues raised in the present petition itself
is directly relatable to the land situated in Uttarakhand, leased to
IMPCL by a State Corporation, and the conditions governing its use.

13. It is also material to take note of the history of litigation
between the parties. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner has, on

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earlier occasions, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court of
Uttarakhand in relation to the very same disinvestment process.
Initially, upon issuance of the PIM, 2019, the petitioner had
approached the High Court of Uttarakhand by filing a writ petition
challenging the proposed strategic disinvestment [Writ Petition (M/S)
1138/2019]. Thereafter, upon issuance of the PIM, 2023, the
petitioner once again had invoked the jurisdiction of the same High
Court by filing a fresh writ petition challenging the said PIM [Writ
Petition (M/S) 2833/2023]. This writ petition came to be dismissed
by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 10.10.2023. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner preferred Special Appeal No. 357/2024 before
the Division Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand. The said
appeal remained pending and was ultimately withdrawn on
14.07.2026, in view of the subsequent developments, with liberty as
sought by the petitioner. Copies of the aforesaid orders have, in fact,
been placed on record by the petitioner itself along with the present
writ petition.

14. The proceedings before the High Court of Uttarakhand also
demonstrate that issues which now form part of the present challenge
have already been considered by the said Court. In its order dated
09.01.2025 passed in Special Appeal No. 357 of 2024, the Division
Bench of High Court of Uttarakhand had observed as under:

―3. It is seen that a land was granted subject to condition that if
the Corporation does not use the proposed land for the said
purpose, this land will automatically be returned to the Forest
Department without paying any compensation.

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4. The grant of land having been subject to the condition, any
disinvestment will be subject to the said condition.‖

15. The aforesaid observations indicate that one of the principal
concerns now sought to be urged before this Court, i.e., the effect of
the conditions governing the land situated in Uttarakhand upon the
process of disinvestment, had already been taken note of by the High
Court of Uttarakhand.

16. Having regard to the nature of the controversy, the location of
the public sector undertaking sought to be disinvested, i.e. IMPCL,
the location of its manufacturing facility and the leased land, the
issues relating to the conditions governing such land, as well as the
fact that the petitioner itself has been litigating before the High Court
of Uttarakhand in respect of the same disinvestment process for the
last several years, this Court is of the opinion that no material or
substantial part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

17. In the above background, it would be pertinent to note that in
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India: (2004) 6 SCC 254,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court had examined the scope of territorial
jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and held
that the mere location of the seat of the Union Government or the
authority concerned does not, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction
upon a High Court. It was observed that jurisdiction under Article
226 is determined by whether any part of the cause of action has
arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court concerned.

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Further, the concept of forum conveniens was explained by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision by way of following
observations:

―Forum conveniens

30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small
part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction
of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to
be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide
the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the
doctrine of forum conveniens. [See Bhagat Singh Bugga v.

Dewan Jagbir Sawhney [1941 SCC OnLine Cal 247 : AIR
1941 Cal 670 : ILR (1941) 1 Cal 490], Madanlal Jalan v.
Madanlal [1945 SCC OnLine Cal 145 : (1944-45) 49 CWN
357 : AIR 1949 Cal 495], Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Jharia
Talkies & Cold Storage (P) Ltd. [1997 CWN 122], S.S. Jain &
Co. v. Union of India [1993 SCC OnLine Cal 306 : (1994) 1
CHN 445] and New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India [(1997) 89
Comp Cas 785 : 1993 SCC OnLine Del 564 : AIR 1994 Del
126].]

18. A similar view was also taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd.: (2023) 7
SCC 791, wherein it has been held as under:

―14. While dealing with an objection as to lack of territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition on the ground that the
cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction, a High
Court essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of
the averments made in the petition memo treating the contents
as true and correct. That is the fundamental principle. Bearing
this in mind, we have looked into the petition memo of WP (C)
No. 38 of 2017 and searched in vain to trace how at least part
of the cause of action has been pleaded by the petitioning
company, to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court.

x x x

17. Determination of the question as to whether the facts
pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to

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attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would
necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain
that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or
integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the
substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows
that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that
the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the
dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move
the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts
must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based
on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not
relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise
to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These
are the guiding tests.

x x x

21. Even otherwise, the High Court was not justified in
dismissing the interim applications. Assuming that a slender
part of the cause of action did arise within the State of
Sikkim, the concept of forum conveniens ought to have
been considered by the High Court. As held by this Court
in Kusum Ingots v. Union of India and Ambica Industries v.

CCE, even if a small part of the cause of action arises
within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court, the same
by itself could not have been a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions alive
against the appellant to decide the matter qua the
impugned notification, on merit.‖
(emphasis added)

19. Moreover, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner founded upon Clause 3.3.32 of the PIM, 2023 also does not
persuade this Court to take a different view. Though reliance has
been placed upon the said clause to contend that disputes arising out
of the transaction are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts at New Delhi, it is an admitted position that the petitioner itself
had challenged the very same PIM, 2023 before the High Court of
Uttarakhand. The said writ petition was entertained and decided on

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merits by the learned Single Judge. As noted above, the petitioner
thereafter preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High
Court of Uttarakhand, which also entertained the appeal and the same
remained pending till it was withdrawn on 14.07.2026. At no stage
were the proceedings before the High Court of Uttarakhand held to
be not maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, despite the existence of Clause 3.3.32 in the PIM, 2023, the
petitioner itself consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the High
Court of Uttarakhand in relation to the same disinvestment process,
and no objection on ground of territorial jurisdiction was raised by
the respondents before the High Court of Uttarakhand, which has in
fact been raised before this Court. In these circumstances, the
reliance now sought to be placed upon the said clause for invoking
the jurisdiction of this Court is unpersuasive.

20. Furthermore, the mere fact that certain Ministries of the Union
Government or other authorities involved in the decision-making
process are situated in New Delhi would also not, in the peculiar facts
of the present case, be sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction upon
this Court. In this regard, it would be apposite to take note of the
following observations of the Division Bench of this Court in
Manjira Devi Ayurveda Medical College & Hospital v. Uttrakhand
University of Ayurveda and Others: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6303:

―12. …The mere presence by virtue of the location of their
offices at Delhi would not, ipso facto, confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is apparent that no

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cause of action at all has arisen within the local limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

13. This Court is fortified in its aforesaid view by a catena of
judgments of this Court as also of the Supreme Court. To cite a
few, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2004) 6 SCC 254, Full Bench judgment of this Court in
Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 124
DRJ 633(FB), as also the judgment passed by the learned
Coordinate Bench in Riddhima Singh v. CBSE, 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 7168. The ratio laid down by these judgments
deals not only with the issue regarding the exercise of
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India but also succinctly laid down the law as
to under what circumstances a High Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It would not be out of place to also observe that the
aforesaid judgments also take note of the “Doctrine of Forum
Conveniens”. The Full Bench of this Court in Sterling Agro
(supra) as also the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots(supra) had
considered the scope of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and conclusively observed that though a
small part of cause of action may confer such jurisdiction, yet,
unless the said cause of action is a material fact in issue,
ordinarily the Courts having jurisdiction over material/major
facts alone would exercise their jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. The relevant para of Riddhima
Singh (supra) reiterating the ratio as laid down in Sterling Agro
(supra) is reproduced hereunder:–

―9. It is a settled position of law that where only a small
part of the cause of action arises in the territorial
jurisdiction of a Court, the same cannot automatically
clothe the Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In such cases, the Court is obligated
to follow the doctrine of forum conveniens. The doctrine of
forum conveniens was elucidated by a full bench of this
Court in Sterling Agro (supra) where it was held as
follows:

“31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally
means that it is obligatory on the part of the court to
see the convenience of all the parties before it. The
convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the
existence of more appropriate forum, expenses

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involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of
certain facts which are necessitous for just adjudication
of the controversy and such other ancillary aspects. The
balance of convenience is also to be taken note of. Be it
noted, the Apex Court has clearly stated in the cases of
Kusum Ingots (supra), Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra)
and Ambica Industries (supra) about the applicability
of the doctrine of forum conveniens while opining that
arising of a part of cause of action would entitle the
High Court to entertain the writ petition as
maintainable.

32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and
sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action
arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not
itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling
the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally
oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens…”.”

14. Keeping in view the fact that the cause of action has arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts of Uttarakhand
and the convenient forum to hear and decide the present writ
petition would be the Uttarakhand High Court, this Court finds
no merit in the instant appeal and the same is dismissed
without any order as to cost. This Court, however, reiterates the
liberty granted by the learned Single Judge to the appellant to
approach the appropriate Court of competent jurisdiction for
redressal of its grievance in accordance with law.

21. To reiterate, the challenge in the present petition substantially
concerns the strategic disinvestment of an undertaking situated in
Uttarakhand, the rights and interests of its employees, the land on
which its manufacturing facility is situated, and the implementation
of the disinvestment process in relation thereto. The petitioner has
itself, for the last several years, been pursuing its challenge before the
High Court of Uttarakhand in relation to the same disinvestment
process. In these circumstances, the High Court of Uttarakhand is

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evidently the appropriate forum to examine the grievances now
sought to be raised by the petitioner.

22. It is apposite to mention that today, when the matter was listed
for passing of orders, the learned counsel for the respondents
appeared and apprised this Court of an order dated 20.07.2026 passed
by the High Court of Uttarakhand in W.P.(MS) 2153/2026, titled
‗IMPCL Officers Association v. Union of India & Ors.’ As evident
from the said order, the IMPCL Officers Association had also
preferred a writ petition inter alia challenging the PIM, 2023 as well
as the approval of successful bidder to the extent that the same has
been undertaken without framing and implementing any policy or
scheme safeguarding the service conditions and statutory rights of
existing employees of IMPCL. The said writ petition has been
dismissed.

23. In view of the foregoing discussion, and applying the
principles governing territorial jurisdiction and the doctrine of forum
conveniens, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ
petition.

24. The same is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable for
want of territorial jurisdiction, leaving it open to the petitioner to
avail of such remedies as may be available in law before the
appropriate Court of law. Pending applications also stand disposed
of.

25. Nothing expressed hereinabove shall amount to any expression
of this Court on the merits of the case.

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26. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.

DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
JULY 22, 2026/A
T.D.

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Signing Date:23.07.2026
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Impcl Karamchari Sangh vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 July, 2026

Delhi High Court