Hasmukhbhai Arjanbhai Pandor vs State Of Gujarat on 27 March, 2026

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    Gujarat High Court

    Hasmukhbhai Arjanbhai Pandor vs State Of Gujarat on 27 March, 2026

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                               R/CR.MA/34460/2016                                          JUDGMENT DATED: 27/03/2026
    
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                                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
                                 R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
                                                FIR/ORDER) NO. 34460 of 2016
    
                           FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
    
    
                           HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
    
                           ==========================================================
    
                                        Approved for Reporting                        Yes            No
                                                                                                    
                           ==========================================================
                                                    HASMUKHBHAI ARJANBHAI PANDOR
                                                                Versus
                                                       STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
                           ==========================================================
                           Appearance:
                           MS AMRITA AJMERA FOR MR DAIFRAZ HAVEWALLA(3982) for the
                           Applicant(s) No. 1
                           MR DIPAK H SINDHI(5710) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                           MS VRUNDA SHAH, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s)
                           No. 1
                           ==========================================================
    
                              CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
    
                                                               Date : 27/03/2026
    
                                                                 JUDGMENT
    

    1 The present application is filed for quashment of the
    FIR being I-C.R. No.13 of 2016 dated 06.02.2016
    registered with Vijapur Police Station, District
    Mehsana, for the offences punishable under Sections
    406
    and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, wherein the
    period of the alleged offence is stated to be from the
    year 2012 to 23.08.2015.

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    2 As per the allegations made in the FIR, the present
    applicant is the sole accused. It is alleged that the
    complainant had supplied hybrid seeds, cotton seeds,
    and pesticides to the applicant for the purpose of
    cultivating cotton crops through various
    agriculturists. As per the understanding between the
    parties, upon providing such facilities, the
    agriculturists would supply their produce to the
    applicant, who would sell the same in the open
    market. After deducting the commission of the
    complainant, the remaining amount was to be paid to
    the concerned agriculturists, and the complainant
    had also agreed to pay 10% commission to the
    present applicant. It is further alleged that, after
    procuring the crops, the present applicant sold the
    same in the open market without routing the
    transaction through the complainant, which led to the
    lodging of the present FIR for the offences punishable
    under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code,
    which is under challenge before this Court.

    3 Heard the learned advocate Ms.Amrita Ajmera for the
    applicant, learned advocate Mr. Dipak Sindhi for
    respondent No.2 and learned APP Ms.Vrunda Shah for
    the respondent-State.

    4 Learned advocate Ms. Amrita Ajmera submits that

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    the complainant had duped as many as 71
    agriculturists from whom cotton crops were procured,
    and that the payment for the same was not made. It
    is submitted that when the present applicant, along
    with the said agriculturists, approached the
    complainant for recovery of the amount, the
    impugned FIR came to be lodged with a view to
    restrain the applicant from initiating legal
    proceedings. It is further submitted by the learned
    advocate Ms. Ajmera that the present applicant had
    also attempted to lodge a police complaint but was
    unsuccessful, and therefore a private complaint came
    to be filed. Against the said complaint, the present
    complainant had approached this Court by way of
    Criminal Misc. Application No.8115 of 2018, which
    came to be dismissed by this Court, holding that a
    full-fledged trial is required and that powers under
    Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot
    be exercised at that stage. It is also submitted by the
    learned advocate Ms. Ajmera that the complainant
    has attempted to project the case by producing
    certain receipts to show that, except for an amount
    of Rs.60,000/-, the remaining amount was borrowed
    by the present applicant however, the signatures
    appearing on the said receipts are alleged to be
    forged. It is further submitted by the learned
    advocate Ms. Ajmera that the criminal case instituted

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    by the present applicant is still pending before the
    learned trial Court. In the aforesaid circumstances, it
    is contended that the impugned FIR is nothing but an
    afterthought and a counterblast to the complaint filed
    by the present applicant and, therefore, the same
    deserves to be quashed and set aside.

    5 Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Dipak Sindhi
    appearing for respondent No.2 submits that the
    complainant had issued a notice in the month of
    August 2015 calling upon the present applicant to
    pay an amount of Rs.5,03,000/-, which was allegedly
    taken by the applicant under the guise of facilitating
    cultivation of cotton crops through various
    agriculturists, with an assurance that the produce
    would be sold to the complainant. It is submitted that
    by the learned advocate Mr. Sindhi that despite
    receipt of the said notice, the present applicant failed
    to make the payment and instead issued a counter-
    notice calling upon the complainant to pay the
    amounts due to 71 agriculturists. It is further
    submitted by the learned advocate Mr. Sindhi that
    the complaint filed by the present applicant before
    the criminal Court came to be instituted after a
    period of two years from the date of the present FIR,
    and therefore, the same cannot be said to be a
    counterblast to the present FIR. It is also submitted

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    that this Court, in the quashing petition filed by the
    present complainant against the said criminal
    complaint, has already observed that the matter
    requires a full-fledged trial. In view of the similarity of
    allegations, this Court ought not to exercise its
    inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure in the present case. It is further
    submitted by the learned advocate Mr. Sindhi that
    the list of 71 agriculturists produced by the applicant
    is itself forged, and therefore, the allegations made in
    the impugned FIR require proper investigation. In the
    aforesaid background, it is prayed that the present
    application be dismissed.

    6 Learned APP Ms.Vrunda Shah has opposed this
    application.

    7 Considering the averments made in the FIR as well as
    the submissions advanced by the learned advocates
    for the respective parties, it emerges from the record
    that the allegation in the impugned FIR against the
    present applicant is to the effect that the applicant
    had taken an amount of Rs.5,03,000/-, out of which
    Rs.60,000/- was towards hybrid seeds, under the
    assurance that the same would be supplied to
    various agriculturists and that the agriculturists
    would sell their produce through the applicant. It is

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    further alleged that, on different dates, additional
    amounts were taken by the applicant, for which
    certain vouchers are stated to have been signed. It
    appears that upon failure to repay the said amount
    as well as failure to route the sale of the crops as
    agreed, the impugned FIR came to be lodged. On
    perusal of the vouchers alleged to have been signed
    by the applicant, it is noticed that they refer to the
    amount as “advance/prepayment” (ઉપાડ). Though the
    applicant disputes the said vouchers, this Court, at
    this stage, would not enter into disputed questions of
    fact. However, even if the vouchers are assumed to
    be genuine, the allegations in the FIR prima facie
    indicate that the dispute between the parties is
    essentially of a civil nature relating to recovery of
    amount.

    7.1 It emerges that the amount allegedly borrowed
    by the present applicant has not been repaid and,
    instead of initiating appropriate recovery
    proceedings, the present FIR has been lodged. So
    far as the allegations of forgery with regard to the
    signatures in the list of 71 agriculturists are
    concerned, this Court has already directed the
    same to be examined by the learned trial Court
    and, therefore, at this stage, it would be
    inappropriate to adjudicate upon the said aspect.

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    7.2 At this stage, reference of sections 406 and 420
    of the IPC is required to be made:

    “406:Punishment for criminal breach of trust.–Whoever
    commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with
    imprisonment of either description for a term which
    may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

    420: Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
    property.–Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
    induces the person deceived to deliver any property to
    any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or
    any part of a valuable security, or anything which is
    signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
    converted into a valuable security, shall be punished
    with imprisonment of either description for a term
    which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
    liable to fine.

    8 To attract the provisions of Section 406 of the IPC,
    the ingredients of “criminal breach of trust” as
    defined under Section 405 are required to be
    satisfied. The essential ingredients of the said offence
    are: (i) entrustment of property or dominion over it to
    the accused; and (ii) dishonest misappropriation or
    conversion of such property to his own use, or
    disposal thereof in violation of any legal contract or

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    trust.

    9 Admittedly, the present petitioner was neither
    entrusted with the property nor has he dishonestly
    misappropriated or converted the same for his own
    use. To attract the provisions of Section 420, the
    offence of cheating as defined under Section 415 is
    required to be considered.

    “415
    The ingredients of the cheating as defined under section
    415
    is- (1) deception of any person
    (2) (a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person; or

    (i) to deliver any property to any person or

    (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or

    (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do
    anything which he would not do or omit, if he was not
    so deceived which act or omission causes or likely to cause
    damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation
    or property.

    10 Upon reconsideration of the allegations made
    against the present applicant, none of the ingredients
    required under Section 415, as discussed
    hereinabove, are satisfied. At this stage, reference is
    required to be made to the decision of the Apex
    Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and
    Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
    ,
    reported in 2024 (10) SCC 690, wherein it has been

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    held that offences under Sections 406 and 420
    cannot co-exist simultaneously. The relevant
    observations read as under:

    “35. This Court in its decision in S.W. Palanitkar &
    Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr.
    reported in (2002) 1
    SCC 241 expounded the difference in the ingredients
    required for constituting an of offence of criminal
    breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) viz-a-viz the
    offence of cheating (Section 420). The relevant
    observations read as under: –

    “9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal
    breach of trust are: (i) entrusting a person with
    property or with any dominion over property, (ii)
    that person entrusted (a) dishonestly
    misappropriating or converting that property to his
    own use; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of
    that property or wilfully suffering any other person
    so to do in violation (i) of any direction of law
    prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
    discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching
    the discharge of such trust.

    10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i)
    there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement
    of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so
    deceived should be induced to deliver any property
    to any person, or to consent that any person shall
    retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived
    should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do
    anything which he would not do or omit if he were
    not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b),
    the act of omission should be one which causes or
    is likely to cause damage or harm to the person
    induced in body, mind, reputation or property.”

    36. What can be discerned from the above is that

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    the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406
    IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific
    ingredients.

    In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust
    (Section 406 IPC): –

    1) There must be entrustment with person for
    property or dominion over the property, and

    2) The person entrusted: –

    a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property
    to his own use, or

    b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or
    willfully suffers any other person so to do in
    violation of:

    i. any direction of law prescribing the method in
    which the trust is discharged; or

    ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see:

    S.W.P. Palanitkar (supra).

    Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420
    IPC, the essential ingredients are: –

    1) deception of any person, either by making a false
    or misleading representation or by other action or
    by omission;

    2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person
    to deliver any property, or

    3) the consent that any persons shall retain any
    property and finally intentionally inducing that
    person to do or omit to do anything which he
    would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh
    Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab
    , (2009) 7 SCC 712 :

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    (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC))

    37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea
    i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention
    must be present, and in the case of cheating it must
    be there from the very beginning or inception.

    38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint
    fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients
    noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear
    a serious misconception of law in the mind of the
    police as well as the courts below, that if it is a
    case of the complainant that offence of criminal
    breach of trust as defined under Section 405 of IPC,
    punishable under Section 406 of IPC, is committed
    by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot
    be said that the accused has also committed the
    offence of cheating as defined and explained in
    Section 415 of the IPC, punishable under Section
    420
    of the IPC.

    39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a
    penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless
    there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent
    misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves
    a civil wrong in respect of which the person may
    seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any
    breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a
    criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in
    Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha &
    Ors.
    , reported in (1973) 2 SCC 823 as under:

    “4. We have heard Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of
    the appellant and are of the opinion that no case
    has been made out against the respondents under
    Section 420 Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of
    the present appeal, we would assume that the
    various allegations of fact which have been made in

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    the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even
    after making that allowance, we find that the
    complaint does not disclose the commission of any
    offence on the part of the respondents under Section
    420
    Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the
    complaint to show that the respondents had
    dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the
    appellant parted with Rs. 35.000/- There is also
    nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the
    appellant to pay them Rs. 35,000/- by deceiving
    him. It is further not the case of the appellant that
    a representation was made, the respondents knew
    the same to be false. The fact that the respondents
    subsequently did not abide by their commitment
    that they would show the appellant to be the
    proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and
    would also render accounts to him in the month of
    December might create civil liability on the
    respondents for the offence of cheating.”

    40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating
    and dishonest intention starts with the very
    inception of the transaction. But in the case of
    criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into
    possession of the movable property and receives it
    legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his
    own use against the terms of the contract, then the
    question is, in a case like this, whether the
    retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether
    the retention involves criminal breach of trust or
    only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of
    each case.

    41. The distinction between mere breach of contract
    and the offence of criminal breach of trust and
    cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the
    intention of the accused at the time of inducement
    should be looked into which may be judged by a

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    subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent
    conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
    cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for
    cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is
    shown right from the beginning of the transaction
    i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been
    committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is
    the gist of the offence.

    42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the
    property must have been entrusted to the accused or
    he must have dominion over it. The property in
    respect of which the offence of breach of trust has
    been committed must be either the property of some
    person other than the accused or the beneficial
    interest in or ownership’ of it must be of some
    other person. The accused must hold that property
    on trust of such other person. Although the offence,
    i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating
    involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually
    exclusive and different in basic concept.

    43. There is a distinction between criminal breach
    of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal
    intention is necessary at the time of making a false
    or misleading representation i.e., since inception. In
    criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment
    is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of
    trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the
    property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the
    same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender
    fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by
    deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a
    situation, both the offences cannot co-exist
    simultaneously.

    44. At the most, the court of the Additional Chief
    Judicial Magistrate could have issued process for the

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    offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC i.e.
    cheating but in any circumstances no case of
    criminal breach of trust is made out. The reason
    being that indisputably there is no entrustment of
    any property in the case at hand. It is not even the
    case of the complainant that any property was
    lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the
    same has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case
    of the complainant is plain and simple. He says that
    the price of the goods sold by him has not been
    paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406 of the IPC
    goes out of picture. According to the complainant,
    the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No
    case worth the name of cheating is also made out.

    45. Even if the Magistrate would have issued
    process for the offence punishable under Section 420
    of the IPC, i.e., cheating the same would have been
    liable to be quashed and set aside, as none of the
    ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating are
    disclosed from the materials on record.

    46. It has been held in State of Gujarat v.
    Jaswantlal Nathalal
    reported in (1968) 2 SCR 408,
    “The term “entrusted” found in Section 405 IPC
    governs not only the words “with the property”

    immediately following it but also the words “or
    with any dominion over the property” occurring
    thereafter–see Velji Raghvaji Patel v. State of
    Maharashtra
    [(1965) 2 SCR 429]. Before there can be
    any entrustment there must be a trust meaning
    thereby an obligation annexed to the ownership of
    property and a confidence reposed in and accepted
    by the owner or declared and accepted by him for
    the benefit of another or of another and the owner.

    But that does not mean that such an entrustment
    need conform to all the technicalities of the law of
    trust — see Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of
    Bombay
    [1956 SCR 483]. The expression

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    “entrustment” carries with it the implication that
    the person handing over any property or on whose
    behalf that property is handed over to another,
    continues to be its owner. Further the person
    handing over the property must have confidence in
    the person taking the property so as to create a
    fiduciary relationship between them. A mere
    transaction of sale cannot amount to an
    “entrustment”.

    47. Similarly, in Central Bureau of Investigation,
    SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries
    Ltd., Calcutta
    reported in (1996) 5 SCC 591 this
    Court held that the expression “entrusted with
    property” used in Section 405 of the IPC connotes
    that the property in respect of which criminal
    breach of trust can be committed must necessarily
    be the property of some person other than the
    accused or that the beneficial interest in or
    ownership thereof must be in the other person and
    the offender must hold such property in trust for
    such other person or for his benefit. The relevant
    observations read as under: –

    “27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been
    raised by the learned counsel appearing for the
    respective parties as to whether on the face of the
    allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is
    constituted or not. In our view, the expression
    “entrusted with property” or “with any dominion
    over property” has been used in a wide sense in
    Section 405 IPC. Such expression includes all cases
    in which goods are entrusted, that is, voluntarily
    handed over for a specific purpose and dishonestly
    disposed of in violation of law or in violation of
    contract. The expression ‘entrusted’ appearing in
    Section 405 IPC is not necessarily a term of law. It
    has wide and different implications in different

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    contexts. It is, however, necessary that the
    ownership or beneficial interest in the ownership of
    the property entrusted in respect of which offence is
    alleged to have been committed must be in some
    person other than the accused and the latter must
    hold it on account of some person or in some way
    for his benefit. The expression ‘trust’ in Section 405
    IPC is a comprehensive expression and has been
    used to denote various kinds of relationships like
    the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, bailor
    and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledgee.
    When some goods are hypothecated by a person to
    another person, the ownership of the goods still
    remains with the person who has hypothecated such
    goods. The property in respect of which criminal
    breach of trust can be committed must necessarily
    be the property of some person other than the
    accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of
    it must be in the other person and the offender
    must hold such property in trust for such other
    person or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the
    pledged article belongs to some other person but the
    same is kept in trust by the pledgee. […]”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    48. The aforesaid exposition of law makes it clear
    that there should be some entrustment of property
    to the accused wherein the ownership is not
    transferred to the accused. In case of sale of
    movable property, although the payment may be
    deferred yet the property in the goods passes on
    delivery as per Sections 20 and 24 respectively of
    the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

    “20. Specific goods in a deliverable state. — Where
    there is an unconditional contract for the sale of
    specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in
    the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is

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    made and it is immaterial whether the time of
    payment of the price or the time of delivery of
    goods, or both, is postponed.

    Xxx xxx xxx

    24. Goods sent on approval or “on sale or return”.

    — When goods are delivered to the buyer on
    approval or “on sale or return” or other similar
    terms, the property therein passes to the buyer–

    (a) when he signifies his approval or acceptance to
    the seller or does any other act adopting the
    transaction;

    (b) if he does not signify his approval or acceptance
    to the seller but retains the goods without giving
    notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed
    for the return of the goods on the expiration of such
    time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the
    expiration of a reasonable time.”

    49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any
    doubt whatsoever that in case of sale of goods, the
    property passes to the purchaser from the seller
    when the goods are delivered. Once the property in
    the goods passes to the purchaser, it cannot be said
    that the purchaser was entrusted with the property
    of the seller. Without entrustment of property, there
    cannot be any criminal breach of trust. Thus,
    prosecution of cases on charge of criminal breach of
    trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in
    case of sale of goods is flawed to the core. There
    can be civil remedy for the non-payment of the
    consideration amount, but no criminal case will be
    maintainable for it. [See : Lalit Chaturvedi and
    Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
    : 2024
    SCC OnLine SC 171 & Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd.
    (MESCO Steel Ltd.) and Others v. State of

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    Jharkhand and Another : 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar
    301]

    50. The case at hand falls in category No. 1 as laid
    in Smt. Nagawwa (supra) referred to in para 7 of
    this judgment.

    51. If it is the case of the complainant that a
    particular amount is due and payable to him then
    he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the
    amount against the appellants herein. But he could
    not have gone to the court of Additional Chief
    Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of cheating
    and criminal breach of trust. It appears that till this
    date, the complainant has not filed any civil suit for
    recovery of the amount which according to him is
    due and payable to him by the appellants. He seems
    to have prima facie lost the period of limitation for
    filing such a civil suit.

    52. In such circumstances referred to above, the
    continuation of the criminal proceeding would be
    nothing but abuse of the process of law.”

    11 Considering the aforesaid legal position, for an
    offence under Section 406 of the IPC, the essential
    requirement is entrustment of property and its
    subsequent dishonest misappropriation. On the other
    hand, for an offence punishable under Section 420 of
    the IPC, it is necessary to establish cheating, i.e.,
    deception by the accused and dishonest inducement
    of the person deceived to deliver property. In cases
    of criminal breach of trust, the property is initially
    acquired lawfully or with consent, but is subsequently

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    misappropriated. In contrast, in cases of cheating,
    the property is obtained by deception from the very
    inception. In the present case, the essential
    ingredients of both the provisions are absent, and in
    any case, the offences under Sections 406 and 420
    cannot co-exist simultaneously.

    12 It is also required to be noted that as per the FIR, the
    period of offence is stated to be from 2012 to
    23.08.2015 and the first informant has approached to
    the police station on 06.02.2016. It is true that the
    delay cannot be the sole ground for quashment of
    the FIR however, along with the delay the allegation
    which are made in the FIR even if taken as on their
    face value that only suggested when on 23.08.2015
    the complainant went along with his advocate to
    Parsoda village for recovery of the amount of
    Rs.5,03,000/- when the accused has denied to pay,
    the impugned FIR was lodged after the delay of
    almost six months. The applicant had also annexed
    the copy of the notice issued to the complainant
    calling to pay the amount of selling of crops of 71
    agriculturists which also suggests that with a view to
    avoid the said payment as a counterblast the FIR is
    lodged. In that background, the continuation of
    proceedings would nothing but gross abuse of
    process of law. Continuation of proceedings would

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    nothing but gross abuse of process. In that
    background, the impugned FIR is required to be set
    aside.

    13This Court has referred to the decision of the Apex
    Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported
    in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Apex Court
    has laid down the guidelines governing the exercise
    of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure which are reproduced
    hereinbelow:

    “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
    various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
    XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
    in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
    extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
    powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
    extracted and reproduced above, we have given the
    following categories of cases by way of illustration
    wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
    abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
    the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay
    down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
    channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
    and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
    wherein such power should be exercised.

    (i) Where the allegations made in the first information
    report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
    face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
    facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
    the accused.

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    (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report
    and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
    disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
    by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
    except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
    of Section 155(2) of the Code.

    (iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
    FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
    of the same do not disclose the commission of any
    offence and make out a case against the accused.

    (iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
    cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
    offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
    without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
    Section 155(2) of the Code.

    (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
    are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
    which no prudent person can ever reach a just
    conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
    against the accused.

    (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
    of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
    (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
    institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
    where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
    concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
    grievance of the aggrieved party.

    (vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
    with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
    maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
    wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
    spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

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    14This case falls under the criteria (i) and (v) from the
    case of Bhajan Lal (supra), therefore the
    application deserves to be allowed.

    15Resultantly, the present application is allowed. The
    impugned FIR being I-C.R. No.13 of 2016 dated
    06.02.2016 registered with Vijapur Police Station,
    District Mehsana, as well as all consequential
    proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed
    and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.

    (M. K. THAKKER,J)
    M.M.MIRZA

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