Punjab-Haryana High Court
Harmit Singh Sidhu vs State Of Punjab And Others on 20 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
109
CWP-16084-2026
Date of decision : 20.07.2026
Harmit Singh Sidhu ....Petitioner
V/S
State of Punjab and others ....Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. Harsh Chopra, Advocate with
Ms. Simran Kaur, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rohit Ahuja, D.A.G., Punjab.
Ms. Kavita Arora, Advocate for respondent No.3.
****
NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ of quo-
warranto for quashing/setting aside the promotion of respondent No.4
made vide order dated 03.01.2017 (Annexure P-4) to the post of Junior
Engineer (Civil).
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent
No.4 was not fulfilling the condition of 05 years experience as a Work
Munshi/Mistri, as contemplated under ‘Punjab Trust Services
(Recruitment and Condition of Services) Rules, 2015,’ when he was
given promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil). He further
submits that he was also not in the zone of consideration for promotion
as he was at Sr. No.11 against 07 vacancies. Therefore, the promotion
of respondent No.4, to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), is
totally illegal and arbitrary and is liable to be quashed.
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He further submits that promotion of similarly situated person, namely
Sh. Vijay Kumar s/o Sh. Mahesh Kumar, made to the post of Junior
Engineer (Civil), vide same impugned order, has also been challenged
by the petitioner in CWP No.7291 of 2024 titled as ‘Harmit Singh Sidhu
Vs. State of Punjab and others‘, which was admitted vide order dated
22.04.2024 (Annexure P-8) and now the same has been ordered to be
listed for hearing on 04.11.2026.
3. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel and learned counsel for respondent No.3 have put in appearance
and questioned the locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the
promotion of respondent No.4 as nothing has been stated in the petition
about the status of the petitioner and how he is aggrieved against the
promotion of respondent No.4. They further submit that the petitioner is
a Journalist which is clear from representation dated 07.11.2023
(Annexure P-7) submitted by the petitioner against the promotion of
respondent No.4. They further submit that the promotion of respondent
No.4 to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) was made vide order dated
03.07.2017 (Annexure P-4), as a stopgap arrangement due to shortage
of work-force. and the instant petition has been filed after an inordinate
delay of 09 years and 04 months. They further submits that respondent
No.4 was appointed against Group ‘C’ post on 22.12.2014, and
thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) as a
stop-gap arrangement on 03.07.2017. Since respondent No.4 has already
acquired the requisite experience of 05 years for the post of Junior
Engineer (Civil) way back in the year 2019, therefore, his promotion
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made in the year 2017 cannot be questioned at this belated stage.
4. In response to the contention raised by learned State
counsel and counsel for respondent No.3 qua locus standi of the
petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that any person can
raise grievance against an illegal appointment by way of writ of quo-
warranto and, therefore, the instant petition is maintainable. He has
placed reliance upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh
Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal : (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 501.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents with their able assistance.
6. Firstly, the petitioner, who is not a member of the service
has no locus standi to question the promotion of respondent No.4 made
to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) as a stopgap arrangement. As per
settled law, only an employee, working in the department, who is fully
eligible to hold the post, can legitimately challenge the
appointment/promotion of another employee. However, in the present
case, the petitioner who is an outsider and has nothing to do with the
service of respondent No.4 has no locus standi to question the
promotion of respondent No.4. Reference may be made to the judgment
of this Court in Satbir Singh and another Vs. State of Haryana and
others : 2026 NCPHHC 18348 and other connected cases decided on
19.01.2026, wherein it has been held as under :-
“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant
as well as petitioner(s) and after perusing the records, it
transpires that it is imperative to examine the threshold
issue of locus standi, particularly in the context of service
jurisprudence, where the contours of maintainability are
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CWP-16084-2026 4well-defined and narrowly circumscribed. The law
consistently mandates that service disputes are essentially
personal and individual in character, and therefore, only a
person directly and substantially aggrieved by the
impugned action is entitled to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Any dilution of this settled principle would
not only distort the framework of service law but also open
the floodgates to meddlesome, motivated, and speculative
litigation.
5. A Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. The Collector, District Raigad
2012 INSC 126, while speaking through Dr. Justice B.S.
Chauhan made the following observation:-
44. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, Ex-
President was the complainant, thus, at the most,
he could lead the evidence as a witness. He could
not claim the status of an adversial litigant. The
complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal
right is an averment of entitlement arising out of
law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person
by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from
legal injury can only challenge the act or omission.
There may be some harm or loss that may not be
wrongful in the eyes of law because it may not result
in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest
of the complainant but juridically harm of this
description is called damnum sine injuria. The
complainant has to establish that he has been
deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has
sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In
case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to
hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A
fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be
sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the
individual. There must be injuria or a legal
grievance which can be appreciated and not a state
propration valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of
reasons. Under the garb of being necessary party, a
person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of
general public interest. A person having a remote
interest cannot be permitted to become a party in
the lis, as the person wants to become a party in a
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CWP-16084-2026 5
case, has to establish that he has a proprietary
right which has been or is threatened to be
violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a
remedial right in the injured person. A person
cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the
description of aggrieved party. (Vide: Adi
Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate
General of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 Supreme Court
385.; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar,
Haji Bashir Ahmed and Ors., AIR 1976 Supreme
Court 578.; Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2602.;
Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors., (2002)
1 SCC 33; and Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba
Appliances Company and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC
766). The High Court failed to appreciate that it was
a case of political rivalry. The case of the appellant
has not been considered in correct perspective at all.
6. A Three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 INSC 204 while
speaking through Justice K. Ramaswamy observed as
under :-
“75. Sri Harish Chander, admittedly was the Sr. Vice
President at the relevant time. The contention of Sri
Thakur of the need to evaluate the comparative
merits of Mr. Harish Chander and Mr.
Kalyansundaram a seniormost Member for
appointment as President would not be gone into in
a public interest litigation. Only in a proceedings
initiated by an aggrieved person it may be open to
be considered. This writ petition is also not a writ of
quo-warranto. In service jurisprudence it is settled
law that it is for the aggrieved person i.e. non-
appointee to assail the legality of the offending
action. Third party has no locus standi to canvass
the legality or correctness of the action. Only public
law declaration would be made at the behest of the
petitioner, a public spirited person.”
7. A Three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar 1975 INSC
333, while speaking through Justice Sarkarai made the
following observation:-
VINOD KOTHIYAL 33. This Court has laid down in a number of
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CWP-16084-2026 6decisions that in order to have the locus standi to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has
a personal or individual right in the subject-matter
of the application, though in the case of some of the
writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is
relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general
rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice
to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is
necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter-
(See State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR 28;
Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, 1962
Supp 1 SCR 1; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member,
Board of Revenue Orissa, (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadda
Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 828; State of
Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall, AIR 1972
Supreme Court 2112; Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v.
M/s. S. Lal and Co., AIR 1973 Supreme Court
2720.)
39. To distinguish such applicants from
“strangers”, among them, some broad tests may be
deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests
are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies
according to the circumstances of the case, including
the statutory context in which the matter falls to be
considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a
person whose legal right has been infringed? Has
he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense,
that his interest, recognised by law, has been
prejudicially and directly affected by the act or
omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a
person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person
“against whom a decision has been pronounced
which has wrongfully deprived him of something or
wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully
affected his title to something?” Has he a special
and substantial grievance of his own beyond some
grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in
common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled
to object and be heard by the authority before it
took the impugned action? If so, was he
prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by
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CWP-16084-2026 7the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of
the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which
the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being
considered, a social welfare measure designed to
lay down ethical or professional standards of
conduct for the community? Or is it a statute
dealing with private rights of particular
individuals?”
8. In the case of R. v. London Country Keepers of the
Peace of Justice, (1890) 25 QBD 357, the Court has held:
“A person who cannot succeed in getting a
conviction against another may be annoyed by the
said findings. He may also feel that what he thought
to be a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a
breach of law by the Magistrate.
He thus may be said to be a person annoyed but not
a person aggrieved, entitle to prefer an appeal
against such order.”
9. A Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra
2012 INSC 512 while speaking through Dr. Justice B.S
Chauhan observed :-
“7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger
cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding,
unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls
within the category of aggrieved persons.
Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from
legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc.
in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is maintainable either for the
purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or
when there is a complaint by the appellant that there
has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the
Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially
enforceable right available for enforcement, on the
basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The
Court can of course, enforce the performance of a
statutory duty by a public body, using its writ
jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that
such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal
right to insist on such performance. The existence of
such right is a condition precedent for invoking the
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CWP-16084-2026 8writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the
exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the
relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right.
Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation
of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court.
The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily
be the right of the appellant himself, who complains
of infraction of such right and approaches the
Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide : State of
Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 Supreme
Court 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1954 Supreme Court 728; Calcutta Gas
Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal
& Ors., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1044; Rajendra
Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996(3) RCR
(Civil) 565 : AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2736; and
Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare
Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC
784).
8. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising
out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an
advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by
the rule of law. The Expression, “person aggrieved”
does not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a person
aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose
right or interest has been adversely affected or
jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v.
Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974
Supreme Court 1719 : 1974 2 SCC 387; and State
of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR
1977 Supreme Court 1361 : 1977 3 SCC 592.)
xx xx xx xx xx
22. Thus, from the above it is evident that under
ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no
concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have
any locus-standi to raise any grievance whatsoever.
However, in the exceptional circumstances as
referred to above, if the actual persons aggrieved,
because of ignorance, illiteracy, in articulation or
poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a
person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in
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relation to which, he can grind his own axe,
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CWP-16084-2026 9
approaches the court, then the court may examine
the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if
his bona fides are doubted, but the issue raised by
him, in the opinion of the court, requires
consideration, the court may proceed suo- motu, in
such respect.”
10. The existence of a legal right is the sine qua non for
invoking the writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts under
Article 226. A person cannot beheard as a party unless they
qualify as an “aggrieved person,” which requires
demonstration of a particularized legal injury or prejudice
to an interest distinct from that of the general public. The
mere desire that the law be properly administered, or a
generalized concern regarding illegality, does not confer
locus standi. The petitioner must establish that they have
been deprived of or denied a legal right, and that such
deprivation constitutes an injury to a legally protected
interest personal to them. Without this legal peg upon
which to hang a justiciable claim, the court lacks the
jurisdictional foundation to entertain the grievance.
Reliance in this regard may also be placed upon the
judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, AIR
1999 SC 943.
11. The foundational principle governing locus standi,
particularly in service jurisprudence, is that only a person
who has suffered a legal injury can maintain an action
before a court of law. A “legal right” is an entitlement or
benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law, and the
existence of such a right is a condition precedent for
invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Mere harm, annoyance, or sentimental
grievance, termed damnum sine injuria, does not confer the
status of an “aggrieved person.” To be considered
aggrieved, an individual must demonstrate that they have
been deprived of a legal right or that their legally
protected interest has been adversely affected or
jeopardized. A person having merely a remote or tenuous
interest, or who initiates litigation driven by personal
animosity, or even one who professes to act in public
interest as a self-styled vigilant, cannot claim locus standi,
as they lack the “legal peg” upon which a justiciable claim
can be hung.
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12. A stranger to the lis, one who has no proprietary or
particular interest in the subject matter of the dispute is
strictly prohibited from meddling in judicial proceedings.
In service jurisprudence, it is settled law that the legality of
an appointment, promotion, or disciplinary action can only
be assailed by the person directly aggrieved, such as the
non-appointee or the punished employee. A third party,
including a complainant or whistleblower, has no locus
standi to canvass the correctness of service actions. Such a
person may at best lead evidence as a witness, but cannot
assume the status of an adversarial litigant.
13. The whistleblower/complainant, despite having
exposed irregularities, remains a stranger to the employer-
employee lis and cannot be permitted to become a party to
the proceedings.
14. In view of the above, the present application stands
dismissed.”
7. Further the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner
after a period of 09 years and 04 months from the date of promotion of
respondent No.4 and consequently, the same cannot be entertained at
this belated stage as it is a well settled proposition of law that an
aggrieved person has to approach the Court within a reasonable time.
Entertaining such a stale claim would unsettle rights which have long
since crystallized. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai)
A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary
and others : 2009 (2) SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
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CWP-16084-2026 11
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (AIR
1970 Supreme Court 769). Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Courts, (AIR 1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service
(AIR 1969 Supreme Court 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy.”
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in
relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that what has been stated as regards that Article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N
Bose v. Union of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470)
that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without
any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under
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CWP-16084-2026 12
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though
Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow
from this that it was the intention of the Constitution
makers that this Court should disregard all principles and
grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
8. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
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CWP-16084-2026 13services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278, observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538, it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
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CWP-16084-2026 14behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios…………………
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
9. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687, while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others.
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
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CWP-16084-2026 15retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464. In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347, it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that
has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no
quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
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CWP-16084-2026 16were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ
petitions after the judgment of this court in
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik,
2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300. Whether
they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a
serious question that arises for consideration is
whether the employees who did not wake up to
challenge their retirement and accepted the same,
collected their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has been
examined by this court in a series of decisions and
laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years’ salary and
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CWP-16084-2026 17increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314. In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
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CWP-16084-2026 18petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664. Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar‘s case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar‘s case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar‘s case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502. In M.R. Gupta‘s case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
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CWP-16084-2026 19
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees.
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam‘s case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches.
13. Ordered accordingly.”
10. So far as the contention raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that respondent No.4 does not fulfill the required
condition of 05 years experience for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil)
as he joined against Group ‘C’ post (Work Munshi/Mason), vide order
dated 22.12.2014 is concerned, the said contention cannot be accepted
as firstly, the said promotion has been made as a stop-gap arrangement
and is not a regular promotion. Secondly, the said experience of 05
years has been completed by respondent No.4 in the year 2019 and his
promotion made in the year 2017 cannot be questioned at this belated
stage once he had already acquired the experience of 05 years way back
in the year 2019. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Vs. State
of Haryana and others : 1979(1) SCC 168 had the occasion to consider
a similar issue, wherein a confirmed Statistical Officer was appointed as
Chief Inspector of Shops. After he had worked for about ten months on
the said post, he was transferred to the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation
Officer because the Government had taken a decision that the posts of
Statistical Officer and Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer should be made
interchangeable. However, the Rules were not amended in conformity
with the said decision. The employee continued in his new post for
about nine years whereupon he was reverted on the ground that he was
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CWP-16084-2026 20
not qualified for the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer under
Rule 4(1) of the Punjab Labour Services (Class I & II) Rules, 1955,
which required the experience for five years in the working of labour
laws as Labour Inspector or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops or Wage
Inspector. The question which came up for consideration before Hon’ble
the Supreme Court was whether his appointment was wholly void and
ineffective or merely irregular. Their Lordships’ have held that the
appointment as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer was irregular and not
void since the employee did not possess the requisite experience but as
soon as he acquired the necessary experience mentioned in the relevant
Rules, his appointment must be regarded as having been regularised. It
was further held that the employee must be deemed to have been
appointed to that post only on the expiry of a period of five years
calculated from the date when he was appointed Chief Inspector of
Shops. The said judgment has been been followed and applied by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Buddhi Nath Chaudhary Vs.
Abahi Kumar : (2001) 3 SCC 328 and Tridip Kumar Dingal and
others Vs. State of West Bengal and others : (2009) 1 SCC 768 and by
this Court in Kulbir Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and others : 2024
NCPHHC 9363.
11. So far as the contention raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner that similar writ petition bearing No.CWP-7291-2024 filed by
the petitioner, wherein the promotion of one Vijay Kumar made to the
post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on a stopgap arrangement, vide same
impugned order, has been challenged, was admitted by this Court is
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CWP-16084-2026 21
concerned, the said contention is also liable to be rejected as admission
of one case is no bar for deciding another similar matter. Every writ
petition has to be decided independently on the basis of its own facts
and pleadings on record. Consequently, the admission of another writ
petition cannot be treated as a precedent or a ground to grant relief in
the present case.
12. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
the settled law, the instant petition, being devoid of merit is hereby
dismissed, with costs of Rs.50,000/- to be deposited with High Court
Lawyers Welfare Fund within a period of one month from today failing
which, the Deputy Commissioner, Bathinda, is directed to recover the
same as arrears of land revenue.
20.07.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
kothiyal JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether Reportable: Yes/No
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