Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurwinder Singh @ Gindi vs State Of Punjab on 17 July, 2026
124
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-36563-2026
Date of decision: July 17, 2026
Date of uploading: July 17, 2026
Gurwinder Singh @ Gindi
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab ....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:- Ms. Prarthana Duggal, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel)
for the petitioner (Through V.C.).
Mr. Adhiraj Singh, AAG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of regular bail
to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. 126 dated 29.07.2018, registered
under Sections 22 & 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, at Police Station City Sri
Muktsar Sahib, District Sri Muktsar Sahib.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question pertains to recovery of 620
intoxicant tables containing Tramadol Hydrochloride salt, allegedly recovered
from the conscious possession of the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
was initially arrested on 29.07.2018 whereinafter he was afforded the
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CRM-M-36563-2026
concession of regular bail vide order dated 21.09.2018 (Annexure P-2), which
was subsequently cancelled vide order dated 26.08.2019. Learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner has further urged that the petitioner was not aware
about the cancellation of his bail and was subsequently declared a proclaimed
offender on 23.02.2021. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has
further urged that the petitioner came to be re-arrested on 20.09.2021 and is
in continuous custody since then. He has further urged that the petitioner has
suffered incarceration for more than 4 years and 10 months and that he has
been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has further
submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
scrupulously complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from
inherent defects. Learned counsel has iterated that the trial is delayed and the
liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Thus, regular bail is
prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature
and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State
counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors
of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed.
Learned State counsel seeks to place on record the custody certificate dated
16.07.2026.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
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CRM-M-36563-2026
6. The petitioner was initially arrested on 29.07.2018 and was
afforded the concession of regular bail on 21.09.2018. Subsequently, his bail
was cancelled on 26.08.2019 and he was declared a proclaimed offender on
23.02.2021. The petitioner came to be re-arrested on 20.09.2021.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the petitioner has been in custody since the
date of his re-arrest and his plea for regular bail was cancelled by the
concerned Sessions Court on 28.03.2023 (Annexure P-3). The contraband
recovered is 258 grams of Tramadol, which is marginally above the threshold
commercial quantity of 250 grams. Total 22 prosecution witnesses have been
cited, out of which three have been partly examined till date. The rival
contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be
ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it
appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may
prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the
likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or
interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 16.07.2026 filed
by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration
for a period of 4 years, 10 months and 13 days and is stated to be involved in
other FIRs/cases. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section
37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
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6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to theNAVEEN NAGPAL
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CRM-M-36563-2026criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself.
It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are
grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to
psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous
conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be
meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental
right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be
rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge
in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature
in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to
the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not
become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an
outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
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6.3. Further, as per custody certificate filed today by learned State
counsel, the petitioner is stated to be involved in other FIRs/cases. However,
this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession
of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out
for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the
facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd. Amir
Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of
Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court
in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana,
decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR
(Criminal) 191.
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to
the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in
addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty
Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
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(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the
trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court,
to the effect that he has not been involved in commission
of any offence after being released on bail. In case the
petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his
being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of
his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move,
forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of
course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
July 17, 2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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