Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Guruguntla Lakshmidevi.B vs Bandaru Jagannath Babu on 17 June, 2026
Date of reserved for orders : 21.04.2026
Date of pronouncement : 17.06.2026
Date of uploading : 04.07.2026
APHC010628642025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3311]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
Wednesday, the 17th day of June, two thousand and twenty six
Present
The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi
Civil Revision Petition Nos.3451 & 3826 of 2025
Between:
Guruguntla Lakshmidevi.B, W/o. late B.Venkates
B.Venkateswarlu,
D. No. 27/763-1,1, Plot No.183
No.183-A, Ambedkar Nagar,
Ananthapuramu
mu city (A.P.)
....Revision Petitioner / J.Dr.
and
Bandaru Jagannath Babu, S/o. B. Venkatesulu, D.No.27-763,
763,
Plot No.183, Ambedkar Nagar, Ananthapuramu City (A.P.)
....Respondent / D.Hr.
Counsel for the petitioner:
1. J. Narayana Swamy
Counsel for the respondent:
1. P. Sravan Kumar Reddy
The Court made the following:
2
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
COMMON ORDER:
The respondent herein filed H.R.C.No.2 of 2018 before the Rent
Controller -cum- Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ananthapuramu
against the petitioner under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease,
Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction of the revision
petitioner from the petition schedule house alleging that the respondent
herein is the absolute owner of it after the death of its original owner by
name B. Venkateswarlu on 10.11.2014, who constructed the building on
the land assigned under a patta and that on 01.02.2015, the respondent
herein orally let out the property to the revision petitioner on monthly
rent of Rs.2,000/- payable on or before 5th day of every English calendar
month, but she failed to pay the rent since 01.02.2016. As the revision
petitioner remained ex parte in H.R.C. No.2 of 2018 for not filing counter
despite engaging a counsel, a decree was passed on 07.12.2018
against her. The D.Hr. filed E.P.No.363 of 2019 seeking execution of
the decree. The revision petitioner / J.Dr., having engaged a counsel,
failed to file counter. The execution Court set the JDr. ex parte on
16.02.2021.
2. The D.Hr. filed E.A.No.168 of 2022 seeking delivery of
possession of the property. Though the D.Hr. had not filed a petition
seeking police aid, the execution Court ordered police aid for the
purpose of delivery of the property to D.Hr. and issued a warrant
through police of I Town Police Station, Ananthapur for delivery of the
property. When the D.Hr. and the police came to the property for
execution of the warrant, the J.Dr. raised an objection on the ground
that she had an order of injunction, dated 14.11.2019, against the D.Hr.
granted in I.A.No.686 of 2019 in OS.No.1316 of 2019 on the file of the
3
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ananthapuramu and that the
suit was pending for cross examination of the plaintiff.
3. At that juncture, the J.Dr. filed a petition vide E.A.No.72 of 2024 in
E.P.No.363 of 2019 under Section 47 C.P.C., on 07.03.2024, to declare
the ex parte decree dated 07.11.2018 in H.R.C.No. 2 of 2018 as null
and void and not binding on the J.Dr. and not executable against the
J.Dr. The case pleaded is briefly stated as follows:
She / J.Dr. is not a tenant of the petition schedule property as
alleged by the D.Hr. On 23.04.1975, an extent of 4 ½ cents of land,
shown as plot No.183, was assigned by the Tahsildar, Anantapuramu in
favour of B.Venkateswarlu vide H.S.No.22/1984 and he was in
possession and enjoyment of the same. She is the second wife of
B. Venkateswarlu and has a son by name B. V. Durga Prasad through
B. Venkateswarlu. There are four children to B. Venkateswarlu through
his first wife. B. Venkateswarlu gave a site to an extent of 40×14 sq.
feet out of 4 ½ cents in plot No.183 to her and submitted an application
to the Tahsildar, Anantapuramu for sub-division of plot No.183 and
accordingly the Tahsildar sub-divided the plot and allotted plot No.183-A
to her by issuing a separate patta in her name. She constructed the
petition schedule house in the site given to her in plot No.183-A and
paid tax to the Municipal Corporation, Anantapuramu vide assessment
No.1001061947 in the name of her son B.V. Durga Prasad.
Suppressing the real facts, the respondent filed H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018
against her and obtained the ex parte decree. She had no knowledge
of filing H.R.C. against her. She approached her counsel
M. Guruswamy when she received notice in E.P. No. 363 of 2019. Due
to the Covid-19 pandemic upto February, 2022, the Courts had not
properly functioned and her counsel had not appeared in the execution
4
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025proceedings. She was set ex parte on 16.02.2021 in the execution
petition. Then, the D.Hr. filed E.A. No. 168 of 2022 for delivery of
possession of the E.P. schedule property. Though no petition was filed
by the D.Hr. seeking police aid, the execution Court ordered police aid
for delivery of the property. A warrant of delivery with police aid was
issued. The D.Hr., along with the police, approached her for execution
of the warrant. She narrated the above said facts to the police by
showing the assignment patta for the plot No.183-A, the house tax
receipts and the interim order of injunction dated 14.11.2019 in I.A. No.
686 of 2019 in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019 and further stated that the suit
was coming up for cross-examination of P.W.1. The police authorities
advised her to obtain clarification from Court regarding the discrepancy
in the warrant schedule property. The execution petition shown
schedule house property bearing D. No. 27-763 in plot No.183 (as
shown in H.R.C.) is different from her house property bearing D. No.
27-763-1 in plot No.183-A. Since the ex parte decree was obtained
suppressing the truth and misleading Court, the ex parte decree, so
fraudulently obtained, is null and void and not binding on her and
executable against her.
4. In the petition, the following list of documents were mentioned
and filed along with the petition:
i) D-Form patta issued by Tahsildar, Ananthapur vide H.S.
No. 22/1984, plot No.183-A on 22.05.2010.
ii) House Tax receipt dated 17.05.2023 for the house bearing
D. No. 27-763-1.
iii) Demand notice dated 03.04.2020 for the house bearing D.
No. 27-763-1. .
5
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
iv) Special notice of property tax assessment dated
14.09.2019 for the house bearing D. No.27-763-1.
v) Photos along with C.D.
5. On 26.08.2025, a counter was filed by the D.Hr. stating briefly as
follows:
All the facts stated by the petitioner / J.Dr. regarding assignment
of plot, division of the plot, construction of house by her, the relationship
pleaded by her and the inability to represent the case are denied. It is
false that this respondent / D.Hr. suppressed the facts and obtained the
decree. The petitioner is only a tenant under the respondent. Having
full knowledge of pendency of the proceedings in H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018,
she remained ex parte without filing counter after engaging
Sri M. Guruswamy as her advocate by filing vakalat on 18.06.2018.
She again engaged in E.P. No. 363 of 2019 the same counsel by filing
vakalat on 30.10.2019 and failed to file counter. She was set ex parte
on 17.02.2020. The execution Court, on 22.02.2021, ordered issuance
of a warrant for delivery of possession of the property. When Amin went
for execution of the warrant, the J.Dr. refused to deliver the property and
as such a report to that affect was filed by the Amin. On such report,
the execution Court passed an order for taking steps. Accordingly, on a
petition in E.A.No.168 of 2022 filed on 25.04.2022 by this respondent,
the execution Court granted police aid on 26.04.2022. Thus, the J.Dr. is
misleading and blaming the Court stating that the police aid was granted
by the Court without filing a petition. The allegation that the D.Hr.
obtained a collusive and fraudulent ex parte decree is false. All the
material documents filed by the D.Hr. were marked as Exs. A1 to A9 in
H.R.C. No. 02 of 2018 in support of the ownership over the schedule
6
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025property. If the E.P. schedule property stands in the name of B.V. Durga
Prasad, he has to approach the execution Court. The petitioner invented
this contention only to get unlawful gain. He is no way connected to the
E.P. schedule property. The J.Dr, is not at all the second wife of the
father of the D.Hr. nor is B. V. Durga Prasad son of the father of the
D.Hr. The father of the D.Hr. did not give any property to the petitioner.
The documents mentioned in the list filed by the J.Dr. were fabricated
and created for filing this petition and to avoid the proceedings in
execution. The J.Dr. filed E.A. No. 39 of 2024 in E.P. No. 363 of 2019
under Order XXI, Rule 106 C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte order dated
22.02.2021. It was dismissed on merits. A fresh delivery warrant was
issued. At this juncture, the J.Dr. cannot seek the present relief. The
execution Court cannot go behind the decree. The petition was filed
only to drag on the proceedings. This respondent prayed to dismiss the
petition.
6. After hearing both the parties, on 15.10.2025, the petition was
dismissed holding that the execution Court cannot travel behind the
decree, nor can it sit in appeal or pass an order jeopardizing the rights
of the parties thereunder and that, as per Section 47 of C.P.C.,
questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to
the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree can be determined
by an execution Court, but not any adjudication beyond the same. It was
further observed that the grounds raised by the petitioner / J.Dr. do not
render the decree in-executable. It is also the observation of the Court
that the petitioner contended that E.P. schedule property and the
property of the petitioner are not one and the same, and that even if the
E.P. schedule property and the property of the petitioner are one and
the same, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if the delivery
7
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
warrant is executed. It was further observed that the allegation of fraud
to secure ex parte decree is visibly self serving, speculative and
unauthentic and does not render the decree invalid and that though the
execution petition was filed in the year 2019, the D.Hr. is not able to get
the fruits of the decree.
7. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.10.2025, the petitioner / J.Dr. in
E.A. No. 72 of 2024 filed a revision petition in C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025
on 20.11.2025.
8. On 01.07.2024, the J.Dr. filed a separate petition vide I.A. No.
437 of 2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay of
2000 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree dated
07.12.2018 in H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018 reiterating the same facts as stated
in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 and further stating that she has a good case in
defence, but due to her old age and health problems, she was unable to
prosecute the proceedings in H.R.C. and that the delay is neither
intentional nor wanton.
9. The petition was resisted by the respondent by filing a counter on
26.09.2024 with the averments as in the counter filed in E.A. No. 72 of
2024 and further stating briefly, as follows:
Meanwhile, she (J.Dr.) filed a suit in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019
against this respondent (D.Hr.) through the same counsel Sri
M.Guruswamy on the file of the Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge,
Anantapuramu. The suit is pending. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner /
J.Dr. has complete knowledge of the proceedings, both in H.R.C. and
E.P. since the beginning. Therefore, as there is no sufficient cause for
delay, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
8
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
10. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court dismissed the
petition on 16.06.2025 on the ground that the petitioner (J.Dr.) failed to
make out sufficient cause, holding that she had intentionally waited till
the time of issue of warrant for delivery of possession of the property
and the petition did not contain correct and true facts.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 16.06.2025, initially she filed
revision petition in C.R.P. No. 3204 of 2025, but the same was
withdrawn, with permission of the Court, due to errors in the order
impugned in the revision petition. Subsequently, C.R.P. No. 3826 of
2025 was filed on 22.12.2025 along with a petition to condone delay of
89 days in filing the revision petition vide I.A. No. 1 of 2025 because the
delay was due to filing of the previous revision petition. The respondent
reported no counter to the petition and thus, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 was
allowed for the said reasons.
12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner / J.Dr. submitted
that fraud was played on Court by the D.Hr. in obtaining the ex parte
decree by suppressing the true material facts, stated by the J.Dr.
supported by the documents, though they are within the knowledge of
the D.Hr., as they are opposite to the case pleaded by him and fatal to
the relief sought by him in the main case (H.R.C.) and thereby the
decree so obtained is null and void and unexecutable being vitiated by
fraud and can be challenged under Section 47 C.P.C., but the execution
Court erroneously dismissed the petition.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the D.Hr. submitted
that the grounds raised by the J.Dr. do not fall within the scope of
Section 47 and the execution Court had rightly dismissed the petition.
9
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
14. He referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in in Dhurandhar
Prasad Singh Vs. Jai Prakash University and others1 wherein at
paragraphs Nos. 23 & 24, it was held as follows:
“23. Under Section 47 of the Code, all questions arising
between the parties to the suit in which the decree was
passed or their representatives relating to the execution,
discharge or satisfaction of decree have got to be
determined by the court executing the decree and not by
a separate suit. The powers of Court under Section 47
are quite different and much narrower than its powers of
appeal, revision or review….”
24. The exercise of powers under Section 47 of the
Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection
hole. Thus it is plain that executing Court can allow
objection under section 47 of the Code to the
executability of the decree if it is found that the same is
void ab initio and nullity, apart from the ground that
decree is not capable of execution under law either
because the same was passed in ignorance of such a
provision of law or the law was promulgated making a
decree inexecutable after its passing….”
15. He cited another decision of the High Court of Madras in
K. Duraisamy Vs. E. Kuppusamy2, wherein at paragraph No.16 it was
observed as follows: —
1
(2001) 6 SCC 534
2
2017 Supreme (Mad) 3918
10
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
“16. … It is well settled that the executing court cannot go
behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by
a court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, which would
make it a nullity. In the case of Ittyavira Mathai Vs.
Varkey Varkey [AIR 1964 SC 907], a Bench of four
learned Judges of this Court speaking through
Mudholkar, J. observed that when the question of
limitation was not raised for the first time before this
Court even in the hierarchy of proceedings arising from
the suit when such question of limitation raised before
the Court was not a pure question of law but was a mixed
question of law and fact. In the case of Vasudev
Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [(1970)
1 SCC 670)], J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge
Bench of this Court made the following pertinent
observation in connection with the jurisdiction of the
executing court, when called upon to execute the decree
and on the question as to under what circumstances the
executing court can go behind the decree sought to be
executed. The observation at SCR p. 68 of the Report
deserves to be extracted in extenso: (SCC pp 672-73,
paras 6-7)
“6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the
decree; between the parties or their representatives it
must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot
entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in
law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate
proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be
erroneous is still binding between the parties.
11
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance,
where it is passed without bringing the legal
representatives on the record of a person who was dead
at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince
without a certificate, is sought to be executed an
objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for
execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court
which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as
to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if
the objection appears on the face of the record; where
the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the
decree does not appear on the face of the record and
requires examination of the questions raised and decided
at the trial or which could have been but have not been
raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to
entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree
even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In
Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri Vs. Rabindra Nath
Chakravarti (AIR 1933 PC 61) the Judicial Committee
held that where a decree was passed upon an award
made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act,
1899, an objection in the course of the execution
proceeding that the decree was made without
jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1809,
there is no provision for making a decree upon an award,
was competent. That was a case in which the decree
was on the face of the record without jurisdiction.”
10. The aforesaid decision of this Court squarely
applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a
12
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
case in which the award decree on the face of it was
shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the decree was
passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an
error of law or at the highest, a wrong decision which can
be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the
executing court which was bound by such decree. It is
not the case of the respondent that the Court which
passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction to
pass such a decree. This becomes all the more so when
the respondent did not think it fit to file objection against
the award which was sought to be made the rule of the
court.”
16. He cited a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at
Hyderabad in V. Basavaiah Vs. Ch. Lakshmi and another3 wherein
the scope of authority of an execution Court was observed at paragraph
No.8 as follows: —
“8. The prayer in the application filed by the petitioner
was not the one, pertaining to adjustment, or satisfaction.
He wanted the executing Court to declare the decree as
well as the other proceedings in the E.P. as null and void.
It is well settled principle of law that an executing Court
cannot go beyond the scope of the decree. If the decree
is null and void or illegal, the judgment-debtor has to get
such a declaration by filing an appeal before an appellate
Court. Even the validity of execution proceedings cannot
be assailed before the Court, which executed the decree.
3
2013 (1) ALD 385
13
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025Here again, the remedy of appeal, or revision has to be
availed.”
17. A petition can be filed under Section 47 C.P.C. regarding (i)
execution; (ii) discharge; & (iii) satisfaction. So, insofar as execution is
concerned, inexecutability of a decree is inherent. Inexecutability can
be due to nullity, barred by law, vague etc. When a decree is a nullity it
is completely void ab initio. When fraud is played, the consequence is
nullity being vitiated by fraud, if it goes to the root of the matter. The
facts stated by the J.Dr., along with documents filed along with the
petition, are such that, if proved, would definitely establish that the Court
would not have passed the decree, but for the suppression of the truth
with complete knowledge. An ex parte decree is as good as a decree
passed on contest. But, merely because the other side has not
contested, the party seeking a relief is not allowed to obtain it by
pleading false statements and suppressing vital facts / truth which is
quite adverse to the pleaded case.
18. The execution Court erred in holding to the contrary. Moreover,
the execution court did not consider any document filed by the J.Dr.
Section 47 C.P.C mandates all the questions arising between the
parties to the suit relating to execution etc., must be determined by the
execution Court and not by a separate suit. Therefore, the execution
Court ought to have thoroughly examined the contentions of both the
parties in the light of an elaborate case pleaded by the J.Dr. and the
documents filed in support thereof. It would have been clear whether
the property claimed to be in favour of the son of J.Dr. is part of the
schedule property or a separate property and whether against the
same, this decree can be executed. Moreover, in a collateral suit, there
14
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
is an interim order in favour of the J.Dr. vide order dated 14.11.2019 in
I.A. No. 686 of 2019 in O.S. No. 1316 of 2019. Therefore, there is an
issue of executability of the decree in this case against the property in
respect of which it was granted restraining the D.Hr. from proceeding
with the decree, if that property is part of the property under execution.
19. Therefore, the order impugned in C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025 is
liable to be set aside with a direction to re-hear the petition and pass an
order afresh by considering the evidence.
20. Insofar as the order impugned in C.R.P. No. 3826 of 2025 is
concerned, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that
in view of the above case of the petitioner and the reasons stated for the
delay, irrespective of the length of the period, the execution Court ought
to have condoned the delay.
21. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the D.Hr., submitted
that C.R.P. under Section 115 C.P.C. doesn’t lie when an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed along with a petition under
Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. is filed and placed reliance on a decision of
the Supreme Court in Koushik Mutually Aided Co op. Housing
Society Vs. Ameena Begum and another4. The relevant portion of
the decision at paragraphs Nos. 5, 7 to 10, 15 and 16 reads as follows:
“5. By order dated 07.06.2018, the V-Senior Civil Judge,
City Civil Court, Hyderabad dismissed I.A. No. 30/2016
filed for seeking condonation of delay of 5767 days in
filing the application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte
decree under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure,4
2024 (1) ALD 174 (SC)
15
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 20251908 (‘CPC‘ for the sake of convenience). The said
application was considered by the Trial Court and by
order dated 07.06.2018, the application seeking
condonation of delay was dismissed. Consequently, the
petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil
Procedure seeking setting aside of the ex-parte decree
also stood dismissed.
7. By the impugned order dated 08.01.2021, the High
Court has set aside Order dated 07.06.2018 passed in
I.A. No. 30/2016 in O.S. No. 1144/1988, which also
implies that the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13
Code of Civil Procedure which had also stood dismissed
has been allowed. In the Civil Revision Petition, the High
Court condoned the delay of 5767 days in filing the
petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil
Procedure seeking setting aside the ex-parte decree
dated 15.02.1999 by directing the Trial Court to dispose
of the petition filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil
Procedure and to complete the trial of the suit
expeditiously, within a period of four months from the
date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
8. Being aggrieved by the said order passed in Civil
Revision Petition by the High Court, the
Plaintiff/Appellant has preferred this appeal.
As noted above, we have heard learned Senior Counsel
for the respective parties and perused the material on
record.
9. At the outset, this Court queried as to how a Civil
Revision Petition was maintainable against an order
16
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025passed by the Trial Court dismissing the application filed
seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition Under
Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure and
consequently rejecting or dismissing the said petition
also.
10. During the course of submissions, it was noted that,
in fact, the rejection of a petition filed Under Order IX
Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure is an appealable order
and, therefore Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil
Procedure, an appeal ought to have been filed before the
High Court rather than a Civil Revision Petition Under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
15. Against the order passed Under Order IX Rule 13
Code of Civil Procedure rejecting an application for
seeking setting aside the decree passed ex- parte, an
appeal is provided. When an application is filed seeking
condonation of delay for seeking setting aside an ex-
parte decree and the same is dismissed and
consequently, the petition is also dismissed, the appeal
Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil Procedure is
maintainable. Thus, an appeal only against the refusal to
set aside the ex-parte decree is maintainable whereas if
an order allowing such an application is passed, the
same is not appealable.
16. Thus, when an application or petition filed Under
Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure is dismissed,
the Defendant can avail a remedy by preferring an
appeal in terms of Order XLIII Rule 1 Code of Civil
Procedure. Thus, Civil Revision Petition Under Section
17
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not arise when
an application / petition Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of
Civil Procedure is dismissed. Thus, when an alternative
and effective appellate remedy is available to a
Defendant, against an ex-parte decree, it would not be
appropriate for the Defendant to resort to filing of revision
Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
challenging the order refusing to set aside the order of
setting the Defendant ex-parte. In view of the appellate
remedy Under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) Code of Civil
Procedure being available, revision Under Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure filed in the instant case was
not maintainable.”
This decision in Koushik Mutually Aided Co-operative Society
(4 supra) cannot be applied to the present case as the petition filed
under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. was not said to be dismissed along with
the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case before the
Supreme Court, there is reference of dismissal of the petition under
Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C in paragraphs Nos. 5 & 15.
22. The learned counsel for the J.Dr. relied on another decision of the
Supreme Court in C. Prabhakar Rao and another Vs. Sama Mahipal
Reddy and another5 wherein at paragraph No. 11, it was held as
follows: —
“11. To start with, facts and events relating to passing of
an ex-parte decree are distinct from the facts and events
relating to the delayed filing of the application for setting5
(2025) 9 SCC 716
18
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025aside of the ex-parte decree. Secondly, the procedure for
setting aside the ex-parte decree will again be distinct
from the procedure for condoning the delayed filing of the
application to set aside the ex-parte decree. Thirdly, the
adjudication and determination of a court with respect to
setting aside the ex-parte decree are independent of the
adjudication with respect to condoning the delay. Finally,
the remedies against these orders are independent and
one remedy would not subsume the other. They must be
adopted and pursued independently. This much of clarity
is sufficiently borne by our practice and procedure of law.
The order passed by the High Court setting aside the ex-
parte decree when no revision is filed against the said
order of the Trial Court in I.A. No. 1163 of 2021 cannot
be sustained.”
23. Nextly, the learned counsel for the J.Dr. referred to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. and
others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (L.A.)6 wherein at paragraph
No.28, the general principles for harmonious consideration of the
provisions of law of limitation are summarized as follows: —
“28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right
to remedy rather than the right itself;
6
(2024) 12 SCC 336
19
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised
or availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained,
but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided
on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
20
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
24. The learned counsel for the J.Dr. further cited a decision of the
High Court of Telangana in Ameena Begum Vs. M/s. Koushik Co-op
Housing Society and another7 wherein an ex parte decree was said
to be passed without service of summons and playing fraud on Court
and the delay in filing the petition to set aside the decree was 5767
days. But, the order in this case is the subject before the Supreme
Court referred in Koushik Mutually Aided Co-operative Society (4
supra).
25. The learned counsel for the J.Dr. cited another decision of the
Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation8,
wherein during the period of Covid pandemic limitation period between
the dates 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was saved. Paragraph No. 5 of
the order reads as follows:
“5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by
learned Counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus
on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the
prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose
of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in
continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021,
27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period
from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for
the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under7
2021 (3) ALT 82 (TS)
8
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 31, dated 10.01.2022
21
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings.
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation
remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become
available with effect from 01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have expired
during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022,
notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90
days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance
period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022
is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till
28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the
periods prescribed Under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and
any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for
instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the
court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of
proceedings.”
26. In the present case, the decree was passed on 07.12.2018 and
E.P. No. 363 of 2019 was filed in the year 2019 and she got filed vakalat
of her counsel on 30.10.2019. The petition under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, I.A. No. 437 of 2024 was filed on 01.07.2024 to condone
delay of 2000 days. The decision of the Supreme Court may help the
petitioner to count the number of days delay, but even thereafter, the
22
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025
delay is not short and moreover the delay must be justified by
reasonable cause.
27. The learned counsel for the D.Hr. submitted that when no
reasonable cause is shown, the delay cannot be condoned even by
imposing heavy costs and referred to a decision of the Supreme Court
in Lingeswaran & others Vs. Thirunagalingam9, wherein at
paragraphs Nos. 4, 5 and 5.1, it was held as follows: —
“4. Having gone through the order passed by the learned
trial Court, even the learned trial Court also specifically
observed that, in the absence of material evidence, it
cannot be said that the delay has been explained. The
trial Court has also observed that the Court feels that
there are no merits in the application. Still the trial Court
condoned the delay by observing that an opportunity of
fair trial should be given to both the parties to put-forth
their case on merits. The trial Court also observed that,
on allowing the application for condonation of delay, no
prejudice will be caused to the Plaintiff and, therefore, the
delay can be condoned by compensating the Plaintiff by
way of heavy costs. The said order has been set aside
by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order.
5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by
the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned
trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and
even there are no merits in the application for
condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest9
2022 SCC OnLine SC 2233
23
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025there and the condonation of delay application was
required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the
learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in
absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that
the delay has been explained and that there are no
merits in the application, still to condone the delay would
be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the
delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage,
the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru
Goverdhane Vs. Land Acquisition Officer reported in
[(2013) 10 SCC 765] is required to be referred to. In the
said decision, it is observed and held that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular/party but the Court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same.
5.1. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157], in
paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:
The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The
Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object
of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that
they approach the court for vindication of their rights
without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the
concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain
alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the
24
BSB, J
C.R.P.Nos.3451 of 2025 & 3826 of 2025legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered
to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is
shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within
the prescribed period of limitation.”
28. Coming to the reasonableness of the cause shown for the delay
is concerned, irrespective of the length of the period of delay, except the
case of fraud, there is no other justification. Here is a case where the
J.Dr. / respondent in H.R.C. engaged a counsel, both before the trial
Court and the execution Court, yet, failed to plead and prosecute. When
there is no reasonable cause for the delay, it cannot be condoned. The
order impugned doesn’t require interference in the revision.
29. In the result, C.R.P. No. 3451 of 2025 is allowed and the order,
dated 15.10.2025, in E.A. No. 72 of 2024 in E.P. No. 363 of 2019 in
H.R.C. No. 2 of 2018 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior
Civil Judge, Anantapuram, is set aside with a direction to rehear the
petition and pass order afresh by considering the evidence.
30. In the result, C.R.P. No. 3826 of 2025 is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
___________________
B. S. BHANUMATHI, J
Dt.17.06.2026
Speaking Yes/No / Recorded Yes/No
Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No
RAR / PNV
