Gravity Of Injury Not Enough To Convict For Attempt To Murder U/ S. 307 IPC Without Proof Of Intention To Cause Death

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    The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is

    the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the

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    actual attempt and must be established independently of the act

    itself or the actus reus. Once the requisite intention to commit

    murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes

    irrelevant, unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case

    the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of

    proof of intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be

    sustained.

    32. Intention, however, can be inferred from surrounding

    circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed, the words

    spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive behind the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the blows were delivered.

    33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid legal principles, the factual matrix of the present case may now be considered. There is no history of enmity known between the appellants and the injured. The prosecution has also failed to bring on record any material suggesting prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of Amar Singh (PW3). On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation involving the driver of the jeep. The assault, therefore, appears to have arisen in the heat of the moment and as a spontaneous reaction to such intervention, rather than pursuant to any pre-conceived intention to eliminate the complainant.

    34. The circumstances, viewed holistically, suggest that the

    object of the appellants was primarily to deter or intimidate the

    complainant from interfering in the ongoing altercation. It is also

    significant that the weapons allegedly used by the appellants were ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt depending upon the manner of use, cannot in the facts of the

    present case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There is

    nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the

    assault with such brutality or ferocity so as to unmistakably

    disclose an intention to cause death.

    35. Undoubtedly, the injuries sustained by Amar Singh (PW3) were grievous in nature, and the medical evidence demonstrates that the injury to the head subsequently led to serious complications. However, the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of the offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution is able to establish the requisite mens rea contemplated under the provision. The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, this Court is unable to hold that the appellants possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to attract Section 307 IPC in the light of Bipin Bihari (supra).

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2207 OF 2011

    ROSHAN LAL Vs THE STATE OF HARYANA & ANR 

    Author: NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

    Citation:  2026 INSC 524

    Dated: May 22, 2026.

    1. The present three appeals, Criminal Appeal Nos.2207/2011,

    2209/2011 and 2210/2011 have been preferred against the

    common judgment and order dated 16.08.2010 passed by the High

    Court of Punjab & Haryana in CRA No. 801-SB of 2002 as well as

    CRA No. 802-SB of 2002, dismissing the appeals filed by the

    appellants herein, upholding the conviction and sentence imposed

    by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, (Trial Court), vide its

    judgment dated 02.05.2002 in Sessions Case No. 13/2000 in

    relation with FIR No. 116 dated 06.06.2000, initially under Sections

    323/325/506 IPC, with Section 307 IPC added later; trial charge

    under Sections 307/506 read with Section 34 IPC.

    2. At the outset, it is apposite to recall the principles applicable

    when dealing with concurrent findings of the courts below, for

    which we may refer to the decision in Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State

    of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158, wherein it was held as below:

    “8. Thus, the principles governing interference by this Court

    in a criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised

    as follows:

    (1) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent

    finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence even

    if it were to take a different view on the evidence;

    (2) that the Court will not normally enter into a re-appraisement

    or review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the High

    Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or is based

    on error of record, misreading of evidence or is inconsistent

    with the evidence, for instance, where the ocular evidence

    is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence and so on;

    (3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the evidence

    with a view to substitute its own opinion for that of the High

    Court;

    (4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has

    arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process,

    principles of natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted in

    violation of a mandatory provision of law or procedure

    resulting in serious prejudice or injustice to the accused;

    (5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved facts

    wrong inferences of law have been drawn or where the

    conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and

    based on no evidence.”

    It is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal application,

    but the principles mentioned above and those adumbrated

    in the authorities of this Court cited supra provide sufficient

    guidelines for this Court to decide criminal appeals by

    special leave. Thus, in a criminal appeal by special leave,

    this Court at the hearing examines the evidence and the

    judgment of the High Court with the limited purpose of

    determining whether or not the High Court has followed the

    principles enunciated above. Where the Court finds that the

    High Court has committed no violation of the various

    principles laid down by this Court and has made a correct

    approach and has not ignored or overlooked striking

    features in the evidence which demolish the prosecution

    case, the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court on an

    appreciation of the evidence in the circumstances of the case

    would not be disturbed.”

    3. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, this Court shall

    proceed to examine the present set of appeals to determine whether

    any manifest error or illegality has occurred, or whether there has

    been a grave miscarriage of justice arising from a misreading of, or

    failure to consider, material evidence. Such determination

    necessarily entails a careful and comprehensive examination of the

    facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it becomes

    imperative to revisit the background facts and the evidence placed

    on record.

    4. It may be noted that since the State has not preferred any

    appeal against the acquittal of the fourth accused, Dharamvir, we

    may not burden ourselves in detail with the evidence relating to the

    acquittal of the fourth accused Dharamvir except those as may have

    ramifications for the present three appellants.

    5. The case of the Prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.06.2000,

    the injured-informant Amar Singh (PW3) was assigned night

    watchman duty in the village. In the course of his duty, he

    proceeded to ascertain the whereabouts of other persons who were

    to accompany him and was informed that they had already

    assembled near the house of one Rama Nand. Upon reaching the

    said place, the complainant noticed a gathering of persons

    assaulting and beating an individual. When he intervened and

    questioned the conduct of those persons, the accused persons,

    acting in furtherance of their common intention, turned upon him.

    Accused Sajjan Singh, armed with a lathi, inflicted a blow on the

    head of the complainant; accused Satya Parkash dealt a lathi blow

    on his right hand; accused Dharamvir assaulted him with fists and

    kicks; and accused Roshan Lal also delivered a lathi blow on his

    head. As a result of the assault, the complainant raised an alarm,

    whereupon Rama Nand (PW4) arrived at the spot and rescued him

    from the accused persons. It is further the case of the prosecution

    that the accused extended threats to kill anyone who came to the

    aid of the complainant.

    6. The matter was thereafter reported to the police, while also

    immediately providing medical aid to injured Amar Singh (PW3),

    leading to the registration of an FIR the next morning being FIR No.

    116/2000 at 8:30 AM on 06.06.2000.

    7. The injured Amar Singh (PW3) was immediately taken to the

    General Hospital, Rewari by his wife and son. Since he was a Goods

    Clerk in the Railways at the time of the incident, he was referred to

    Central Hospital, Northern Railway, New Delhi, as his condition

    worsened. He remained there from 08.06.2000 to 01.07.2000. He

    was admitted again, from 15.07.2000 to 20.07.2000.

    8. All the accused persons denied all allegations, alleged false

    implications, pleaded not guilty. Accordingly, the trial commenced.

    9. As per the Prosecution, upon being taken to the hospital,

    immediately after the incident, Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1) had examined

    the injured-informant. As per his statement, a lacerated wound

    measuring approximately 6 × 1 cm with irregular margins was

    observed on the left parietal region of the scalp. The injury was

    transversely placed, situated about 10 cm above the left pinna, and

    the underlying bone was visible. The scalp hair had not been cut,

    and the wound was found to be bleeding upon cleaning. An X-ray

    was advised, and the injury was kept under observation pending

    radiological examination. In the medical opinion, the injury had

    been caused within 24 hours by a blunt weapon. Dr. Dabas opined

    that Amar Singh had a compound fracture of scalp. At the time of

    admission to the hospital, the injured Amar Singh was experiencing

    vomiting. As per the CT scan findings, a small parietal haematoma

    was detected, accompanied by weakness on the right side of the

    body. In view of these clinical findings, the injury sustained by Amar

    Singh was opined to be dangerous to life.

    10. During the trial, Dr. C. Sharma, Medical Officer, Lok Nayak

    Hospital, New Delhi was also examined as PW9. He stated that the

    injured informant was referred from Central Hospital, Northern

    Railway, New Delhi due to a head injury. During the treatment, he

    found that Amar Singh (PW3) had small haemorrhagic contusions

    in the right temporal and left fronto parietal regions, along with

    evidence of bifrontal extra-axial collections along the convexities.

    The CT scan report from Lok Nayak Hospital dated 12.06.2000

    further revealed fractures in both parietal bones near the midline.

    11. Dr. Sanjeev Singhal (PW11), Neurosurgeon at Central

    Hospital, Northern Railway, New Delhi added another medical

    dimension that the victim was developing multi-organ failure after

    his return from the Lok Nayak Hospital, on 13.06.2000 and he

    remained in the hospital till 01.07.2000.

    12. Insofar as the accused Dharamvir was concerned, the

    evidence on record indicated that he was not armed with a lathi and

    was alleged only to have delivered fist and slap blows to the injured

    Amar Singh (PW3). The injuries attributed to him did not find

    corroboration from the medical evidence. Moreover, the testimony

    of the prosecution witnesses was insufficient to establish his guilt

    for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal

    Code. In the absence of cogent and reliable evidence against

    Dharamvir, he was acquitted.

    13. The Trial Court, vide judgment dated 02.05.2002, convicted

    accused persons Roshan Lal, Satya Prakash and Sajjan Singh

    under Sections 307 read with 34 and Section 506 of IPC, relying on

    the evidence of PW-3, the victim and the testimony of eye-witness

    Rama Nand (PW4) that, in furtherance of their common intention,

    the said accused persons caused injuries to Amar Singh (PW3) with

    such intention and knowledge, which was corroborated by the

    forensic evidence of Dr. O.P Dabas (PW1), Dr. C Sharma (PW9) as

    well as Dr. Sanjeev Singhal (PW11), which proved that the Injury

    No. 1 was dangerous to life, and in such circumstances, the Trial

    Court held that had their act resulted in his death, they would have

    been guilty of murder. Accordingly, all the essential ingredients of

    the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of

    the IPC were held duly proved against the three accused.

    Accordingly, accused Roshan Lal, Satya Prakash and Sajjan Singh

    were convicted under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and

    were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of

    seven years for the offence punishable under Sections 307 r/w 34

    IPC along with a fine of Rs. 5000/- each and to undergo rigorous

    imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence punishable

    under Section 506 IPC along with a fine of Rs. 1000/-.

    14. The High Court, in the appeals preferred by the convicted accused persons, upheld the conviction of the appellants herein.

    15. Before the High Court, the appellants contended that they

    were falsely implicated by the informant due to existing jealousy

    and rivalry. The injuries upon Amar Singh (PW3) were inflicted by

    some unidentified persons and that even though, there were a large

    number of people stated to be present at the spot of the incident,

    none of them were examined by the prosecution. The appellants

    further contended that the investigating officer of the case was never

    examined, and that the prosecution had failed to prove any

    intention to cause any injury. Lastly, it was submitted that since

    only one injury was noticed as per the medical records, a conviction

    under Section 307 IPC was unsustainable.

    16. Additionally, the Prosecution also stated that the appellants

    had been attempting to badger and threaten the key eye-witness

    Rama Nand (PW4) by lodging false FIRs against him and his family

    members. One FIR No. 263/2000 was lodged upon the statement

    of Satya Prakash against Rama Nand and his son Narender Singh

    u/s 323/324/325/506/452 IPC, which, after investigation, was

    found to be false. Further, another FIR was lodged u/s 452, 354

    and 506 IPC against Mukesh who is the other son of Rama Nand,

    on the basis of the statement of Rozy, sister of appellant Satya

    Prakash. This FIR was also later found false.

    17. The Prosecution, before the High Court, also stated that even

    after the incident and the registration of the FIR, the injured

    informant continued to face mental and physical harassment. Due

    to persistent threats from the accused-appellants directed at him

    and his witnesses, the injured complainant was compelled to

    relocate to Gurgaon.

    18. In the appeal, the High Court observed that from the

    testimonies of Dr. C. Sharma (PW9) and Dr. Ajay Aggarwal (PW15),

    it stands clearly established that the injured sustained fractures in

    both parietal bones near the midline. The evidence of Dr. Sanjeev

    Singhal (PW11) further indicates that the injured informant was

    progressing towards multi-organ failure, with investigative reports

    revealing deranged kidney and liver functions. The discharge

    summary records that the complainant suffered injuries on both the

    left and right sides of the head, along with a loss of power in the

    right wrist. Taken together, the medical evidence conclusively

    demonstrates that the accused-appellants inflicted grievous

    injuries upon the complainant.

    19. The High Court relied upon the case of Prakash Chandra

    Yadav v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2007 (4) RCR (Crl.) 860, while

    Page 11 of 25

    upholding that the nature or extent of the injury is neither essential

    nor determinative; it is merely one of the relevant considerations,

    for the purposes of Section 307 IPC. The primary inquiry is into the

    intention of the accused, which must be inferred from the

    surrounding circumstances.

    20. The High Court accepted the ocular version supported by

    medical evidence and held that the post-incident conduct of the

    accused-appellants was highly reprehensible, inasmuch as they

    subjected the injured and other witnesses to continuous mental and

    physical harassment by lodging false FIRs in an attempt to

    intimidate him. The High Court held that it was further proved that

    the appellants inflicted serious injuries upon Amar Singh, as fully

    corroborated by the medical evidence on the vital parts of the body,

    namely, both sides of the head, which led to deranged kidney and

    liver malfunctions, as well as loss of power in the right wrist.

    21. The High Court, after a detailed analysis of the evidence on

    record, repelled the contentions of the appellants and upheld the

    conviction and the order of sentence which was passed by the

    Sessions Court.

    Page 12 of 25

    22. Thus, all the three convicted accused persons Roshan Lal,

    Sajjan Singh and Satya Prakash are before us, by way of three

    separate criminal appeals, with the following pleas:

    a) Accused Roshan Lal argues that his conviction rests on

    the limited allegation that he caused an injury with a lathi on

    the right side of the head; however, no such injury finds

    mention in the testimony of Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1), who refers

    only to an injury on the left side. The evidence of PW1, Dr.

    O.P. Dabas, undermines the version of Amar Singh (PW3)

    regarding the involvement of multiple assailants, a

    discrepancy that was overlooked by both the Trial Court and

    High Court.

    b) Accused Roshan Lal has also specifically argued that

    since he was not the principal assailant, and the sentence

    imposed by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court

    being seven years’ imprisonment under Section 307 IPC and

    one year under Section 506 IPC, is excessively severe. In the

    given circumstances, particularly considering that the

    petitioner is a first-time offender, he ought to have been

    extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

    Page 13 of 25

    c) The High Court’s characterization of the said injury as

    “serious” does not satisfy the requirement under Section 307

    IPC, which mandates that the injury be of such a nature as

    is sufficient, in the ordinary course, to cause death.

    d) The High Court placed reliance on the post-incident

    conduct of the co-accused, Satya Prakash, characterising it

    as deplorable, and proceeded to affirm the conviction on that

    basis, even though such reliance was founded on FIRs lodged

    by third parties and not by the said injured/complainant

    himself.

    e) Following the alleged incident, the injured-informant

    was taken to the hospital by his wife, despite her not being

    shown as present at the scene.

    f) The ocular evidence is not corroborated by the medical

    evidence since Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1), who examined the

    complainant on 06.06.2000, has deposed in a manner

    inconsistent with the certificate issued by him on the same

    date. As per the said certificate, the injured informant was in

    a normal condition and had sustained only a single lacerated

    wound with irregular margins measuring 6 × 1 cm. However,

    Page 14 of 25

    in his deposition, PW1 stated that the injured had suffered a

    compound fracture with a haematoma and described the

    injury as dangerous to life.

    g) The jeep driver, who was allegedly beaten at the place of

    the incident was a material witness who was never examined.

    Further, the Investigating Officer, who was in charge of the

    case, was not examined as a witness and was dispensed with

    as being unnecessary.

    h) According to the FIR, a large number of persons were

    present at the scene; however, none of them were identified

    or examined as witnesses in support of the Prosecution’s

    case.

    i) The Prosecution has failed to establish on record any

    intention or premeditation to cause injury to the informant

    Amar Singh. The injuries were sustained when the informant

    intervened to rescue the driver of the vehicle, and in these

    circumstances, no intention to cause harm can, even

    remotely, be attributed to the appellants.

    j) The injured was initially discharged after receiving first

    aid; however, thereafter, by manipulation, he got himself

    Page 15 of 25

    referred to a Delhi Government Hospital but instead secured

    admission in a Railway Hospital with an oblique motive of

    obtaining a favourable medical report so as to strengthen and

    fasten the liability of the appellants. This conduct reflects a

    calculated attempt on the part of the injured to implicate the

    appellants.

    k) High Court also failed to appreciate that the Trial Court

    did not adhere to the settled legal principles laid down by this

    Hon’ble Court, which mandates that a reasonable

    opportunity be afforded to a person found guilty to prepare a

    defence on the question of sentence. In the present case, the

    appellants were held guilty at the close of proceedings on 2

    May 2002, and by 10:30 a.m. the very next day, were awarded

    the maximum sentence. This reflects a lack of due application

    of mind and, in effect, a denial of any real opportunity to the

    appellants.

    23. On the other hand, it has been contended before us on behalf

    of the prosecution that, insofar as the three appellants are

    concerned, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by

    the High Court are founded on admissible and relevant evidence. It

    Page 16 of 25

    is submitted that their conviction does not suffer from any illegality

    and, there being no perversity in the concurrent findings of the

    courts below, this Court ought not to interfere with the judgment of

    the High Court.

    ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT

    24. The principal question that arises for consideration before

    this Court is whether the accused persons can be held guilty of the

    offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code,

    and, in particular, whether the essential ingredients of the said

    provision stood satisfied on the basis of the materials brought on

    record.

    25. Section 307 IPC reads as below:

    307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with

    such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances

    that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of

    murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

    description for a term which may extend to ten years, and

    shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any

    person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to

    imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is

    hereinbefore mentioned.

    26. In order to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC two

    elements are essential to be established. First, the intention or

    knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to

    commit the murder. Thus, it must have both the necessary mens

    Page 17 of 25

    rea and actus reus. Hence, to sustain a conviction under this

    section, it is necessary to establish that had the accused succeeded

    in his attempt and had the victim met his death because of such

    act, the offence of murder punishable u/s 302 IPC would be

    established.

    27. However, an accused charged u/s 307 IPC cannot be

    acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in

    the nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or

    knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was

    discussed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @

    Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the relevant paragraph of which

    reads hereunder:

    “12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not

    essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should

    have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually

    caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to

    a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention

    may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may

    even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference

    at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction

    between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such

    an act may not be attended by any result so far as the

    person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases

    in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is

    not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim

    of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary

    circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted.

    What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of

    its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and

    under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt

    in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is

    sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with

    some overt act in execution thereof.”

    Nevertheless, the nature of injury actually caused does render

    considerable assistance to the court in ascertaining the intention of

    the accused. However, courts may also ascertain the intention from

    other circumstances, even without reference to actual wounds. The

    aforesaid principle stands reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v.

    State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799, as follows:

    “9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if

    there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in

    execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury

    capable of causing death should have been inflicted.

    Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give

    considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the

    intention of the accused, such intention may also be

    deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some

    cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual

    wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of

    the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see

    whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the

    intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned

    in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not

    be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is

    present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution

    thereof”

    28. Keeping in mind the above principles, what falls for

    determination before this Court is whether the appellants caused

    the injuries in question, and whether such act accompanied by the

    requisite intention or knowledge, was committed in circumstances

    which, if resulting in death, would render the act culpable as

    murder.

    29. The evidence of eye-witness Rama Nand (PW4) is unwavering

    and consistent. PW4 has specifically named all the accused persons

    with specific acts attributable to each appellant-accused, in his

    testimony. Further, the evidence of the informant Amar Singh (PW3)

    itself clearly describes the specific roles played by each of the

    accused-appellants herein. The appellants have also not led any

    evidence to disprove the testimonies of Amar Singh (PW3) and Rama

    Nand (PW4). Hence, it can be concluded without an iota of doubt

    that the appellants had caused the injuries to the informant, which

    could have led to his death.

    30. Having concluded as above, we now proceed to examine the

    crucial issue as to whether the injuries in question were inflicted

    with the requisite intention or knowledge, and in such

    circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would amount to

    murder.

    31. The words ‘such intention’ found in Section 307 IPC, refer to

    the intention referred to in Section 300 IPC. It means: (i) intention

    to cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the

    offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such

    bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

    cause death.

    The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is

    the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the

    actual attempt and must be established independently of the act

    itself or the actus reus. Once the requisite intention to commit

    murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes

    irrelevant, unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case

    the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of

    proof of intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be

    sustained.

    32. Intention, however, can be inferred from surrounding

    circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed, the words

    spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive behind the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the blows were delivered.

    33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid legal principles, the

    factual matrix of the present case may now be considered. There is

    no history of enmity known between the appellants and the injured. The prosecution has also failed to bring on record any material suggesting prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of Amar Singh (PW3). On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation involving the driver of the jeep. The assault, therefore, appears to have arisen in the heat of the moment and as a spontaneous reaction to such intervention, rather than pursuant to any pre-conceived intention to eliminate the complainant.

    34. The circumstances, viewed holistically, suggest that the

    object of the appellants was primarily to deter or intimidate the

    complainant from interfering in the ongoing altercation. It is also

    significant that the weapons allegedly used by the appellants were ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt depending upon the manner of use, cannot in the facts of the

    present case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There is

    nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the

    assault with such brutality or ferocity so as to unmistakably

    disclose an intention to cause death.

    35. Undoubtedly, the injuries sustained by Amar Singh (PW3)

    were grievous in nature, and the medical evidence demonstrates

    that the injury to the head subsequently led to serious complications. However, the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of the offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution is able to establish the requisite mens rea contemplated under the provision. The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, this Court is unable to hold that the appellants possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to attract Section 307 IPC in the light of Bipin Bihari (supra).

    36. At the same time, the evidence on record clearly establishes

    that the appellants voluntarily caused grievous injuries to the

    complainant, particularly on vital parts of the body, resulting in

    fractures and prolonged medical treatment. At this juncture, it is

    imperative to reproduce Section 320 IPC for our reference: –

    Grievous hurt. —The following kinds of hurt only are

    designated as “grievous”: —

    First. —Emasculation.

    Secondly. —Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

    Thirdly. —Permanent privation of the hearing of either

    ear.

    Fourthly. —Privation of any member or joint.

    Fifthly. —Destruction or permanent impairing of the

    powers of any member or joint.

    Sixthly. —Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

    Seventhly. —Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

    Eighthly. —Any hurt which endangers life or which

    causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days

    in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary

    pursuits

    37. The injuries sustained by the complainant, as borne out from

    the medical evidence on record, clearly fall within Clause Seventhly

    of Section 320 IPC, and would also attract Clause Eighthly in view

    of the finding that the injury was dangerous to life/prolonged

    treatment. The evidence of the doctors establishes that the

    complainant suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the

    midline, accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged

    hospitalization. Since fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes

    grievous hurt within the meaning of Section 320 IPC, the offence

    committed by the appellants is squarely covered by Clauses

    Seventhly and Eighthly thereof. Consequently, the ingredients

    necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied in the facts

    and circumstances of the present case.

    38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the

    considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the

    essential ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under

    Section 307 IPC, particularly the existence of the requisite intention

    or knowledge to commit murder. However, the evidence on record

    unequivocally proves that the appellants, in furtherance of their

    common intention, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the

    complainant, the injuries being squarely covered under Clauses

    Seventhly and Eighthly of Section 320 IPC. Accordingly, the

    conviction of the appellants under Section 307 read with Section 34

    IPC is altered to one under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC.

    39. Having convicted the appellants under Section 325 IPC, the

    next consideration is the quantum of punishment that may be

    imposed on them.

    40. Under Section 325 IPC, whoever, voluntarily causes grievous

    hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for

    a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to

    fine.

    As per the records, Roshan Lal, appellant in Criminal Appeal

    No. 2207/2011 has undergone sentence a sentence of 2 years, 7

    months; Sajjan Singh, appellant Criminal Appeal No. 2209/2011

    has undergone a sentence of 2 years, 8 months; Satya Prakash,

    appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 2210/2011 has undergone a

    sentence of 1 year, 1 month during the trial and pendency of the

    appeals before the High Court and this Court.

    41. This Court, vide order dated 25.11.2011 had granted bail to

    appellant Roshan Lal, and vide order dated 05.12.2011, had granted

    bail to appellants Sajjan Singh and Satya Prakash.

    42. Under the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are

    of the view that interest of justice will be served if the appellants are

    sentenced to the period already undergone by them and impose a

    fine of Rs. 50,000/- each on the appellants, which shall be paid to

    the injured-informant failing which the appellants will undergo

    additional 6 (six) months simple imprisonment. In the event of the

    appellants paying the amount, as ordered above, the bail bonds

    shall stand discharged. In the event of non-payment, the bail bonds

    shall stand discharged only after undergoing the default sentence of

    6 (six) months.

    43. For the reasons discussed above, the appeals are partly

    allowed as above and all pending applications, if any, are disposed

    of in accordance with the judgment above.

    …………………………J.

    (SANJAY KAROL)

    ………………………………………………J.

    (NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

    New Delhi;

    May 22, 2026.

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