Himachal Pradesh High Court
Gopal Chand vs Nisha Verma & Others on 24 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No.186 of 2026
Date of decision:24.07.2026
.
Gopal Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
of
Nisha Verma & others ...Respondents
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the petitioner : Mr. N.K. Bhalla, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Upasana Thakur,
Advocate, for respondent Nos.2 and 3.
Romesh Verma, Judge (oral):
The instant petition arises out of order as passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge Court No.1, Solan, dated 06.12.2025,
whereby the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for amendment
of the plaint was dismissed.
2. The facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the
plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and
mandatory injunction and in the alternative, for possession and
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
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injunction against the respondents/defendants, Smt. Nisha Verma and
Shri Rajesh Pal, on 16.11.2005.
3. It has been stated in the plaint that the plaintiff is the
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owner-in-possession of the land comprised in Khata-Khatoni Nos. 6/87
min and 90/61 min, Khasra No.616/308/14/9 and Khasra No.
616/308/14, measuring 7 biswas, as per Jamabandi for the year 2001-
2002, situated at Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan.
of
4. As per the case of the plaintiff, the suit land was
purchased by him from Shri Prem Das through a registered sale deed
rt
which was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Solan. A path leads to
the land of the plaintiff and the same has been mentioned in the sale
deed, which also finds mention in the map annexed with the sale deed.
As per the plaintiff, the disputed path has been marked as a common
path in the sanctioned map between the lands of the defendants,
comprised in Khasra No. 303/14, in the map as stated above. Further,
it has been submitted that the land shown as vacant land comprised in
Khasra No. 616/308/14/9, measuring 2 biswas in the above-stated
map, has been purchased by the plaintiff through a registered sale
deed, as the same adjoins the land earlier purchased by the plaintiff
comprised in Khasra No. 616/308/14, measuring 5 biswas, situated at
Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan. The defendants, without any
legal right, title, or interest over the suit land or over the said path, are
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threatening to raise construction over the said path and have also
started digging work at the spot.
5. It is the case of the plaintiff that there is no other path
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available at the spot and the encroachment made by the defendants
has diminished the value and use of the property of the plaintiff.
Therefore, under such circumstances, the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit
seeking decree that the defendants be restrained from raising
of
construction on the path as shown in the map duly sanctioned by the
TCP Department and shown as a common path between Khasra No.
rt
303/14 and Khasra No. 305/14, situated at Mauja Rabon, Tehsil and
District Solan.
6. The said suit came to be resisted by the defendants by
filing separate written statements.
7. Defendant No.1 in her written statement raised preliminary
objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, etc. On
merits, it was stated that there is no path over the suit land as alleged
by the plaintiff and the plaintiff be put to strict proof to establish the
contents of the same.
8. In paragraph-3 of the written statement, defendant No.1
raised objections in the following manner:
“That the contents of para 3 of totally wrong and hence
denied. It is denied that the defendant No.1 has no rights,
title or interest over path and is threatening to raise the
construction over the path and also started digging work on
the spot. It is stated that the replying defendant had::: Downloaded on – 27/07/2026 20:31:38 :::CIS
-4-purchased the land comprised in Khasra No.306/14
measuring 6 biswas situated in village Rabon, Tehsil and
District Solan H.P. from Shri Krishan Kumar son of Nek Ram
through a sale deed dated 18.3.1998 and immediately.
thereafter she has constructed her house at the sot in this
land and now no digging or other work is being carried out
by her at the post and hence the question of making anyrequest by the plaintiff as alleged does not arise at all. No
threats as alleged were ever advanced by replying
defendant to the plaintiff at any point of time and there wasof
any occasion to do so. Rather it is the defendant No.2 who
is raising the construction at the spot and is stated to have
rtencroached upon the path but in connivance with the plaintiff
false allegations of digging and construction etc. are being
levelled against the replying defendant. The replyingdefendant has no intention to encroach upon the path nor
she has ever advanced any threats to do so nor she is
indulging in any wrong and illegal acts. As stated above noconstruction activities etc. are being carried out by the
replying defendant at the spot.”
9. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed separate written statements
and also prayed for the dismissal of the suit as filed by the plaintiff.
Preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action,
being barred by equity, valuation, etc., were raised by them.
10. The learned trial Court framed the issues in the matter
and as per the learned counsel for the parties, the evidence of the
plaintiff commenced on 19.06.2014. Thereafter, both parties concluded
their evidence and the matter was fixed for final hearing. At the stage
of final arguments, the plaintiff-petitioner filed an application under
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Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of the
plaint on 25.10.2025.
11. It has been averred in the application that at the time of
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drafting the plaint, the plaintiff, due to a typographical mistake, has
written the khasra number of the land of the defendant as Khasra No.
303/14 instead of 306/14 and this fact came to the knowledge of the
counsel at the time of preparing the arguments. Therefore, it was
of
prayed that the plaintiff be permitted to carry out the necessary
amendment by incorporating and substituting Khasra No. 306/14 in
rt
place of Khasra No. 303/14 in paragraph-1 of the plaint.
12. Though in the application a prayer was also made that
during the pendency of the suit, the defendants had encroached upon
the suit land and that in order to incorporate the pleadings, the plaintiff
intended to place on record the photographs. However, as submitted
by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he does not press the second
prayer as made in the application and shall confine his submissions
only with respect to the substitution of the khasra number from 303/14
to 306/14.
13. It was stated in the application that since the khasra
number had been wrongly mentioned and it was only a clerical
mistake, therefore, by allowing the application, the plaintiff may be
permitted to carry out the necessary corrections.
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14. The non-applicants/respondents opposed the said
application by filing a comprehensive reply. All the averments and
contentions as raised in the application were denied and the
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respondent prayed for the dismissal of the application as filed by the
plaintiff. It has been stated in the reply that the application is not
maintainable as the same has been filed at a belated stage. Further, it
has been stated in the reply that in case the amendment is allowed,
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the same shall alter the foundation of the pleadings and would
effectively convert the present suit into one of a different, inconsistent
rt
character, which is impermissible under law. Further, it has been
contended in the reply that the applicant has not approached the court
with clean hands.
15. The learned trial court, vide its impugned order dated
06.12.2025, dismissed the application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner for
the amendment of the plaint.
16. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff has approached this
Court by invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of
India against the said order.
17. It is contended by Mr. N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the
petitioner, that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial court
is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that
the amendment sought by the plaintiff is for a typographical error,
which ought to have been allowed by the learned trial court. He further
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submits that no prejudice would be caused to the opposite side in case
the present application is allowed. He further submits that if the
application is allowed, it will help the learned trial court to determine
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the point in controversy effectively and properly.
18. On the other hand, Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned
Senior Counsel, duly assisted by Ms. Upasana Thakur, learned
counsel for the respondents, has defended the impugned order as
of
passed by the learned court below. He submits that the present
application has been filed just to prolong the litigation, as the suit was
rt
filed by the plaintiff way back in the year 2005. He further submits that
the plaintiff has failed to make out a case for invoking the provisions of
Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of the
plaint.
19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
gone through the case file carefully.
20. In the present case, the petitioner-plaintiff instituted the
suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants, Ms.
Nisha Verma and Shri Rajesh Pal, alleging that a path leads to the
land of the plaintiff and that the same has been mentioned in the sale
deed, which stood duly sanctioned by the TCP Department.
21. It is the case of the plaintiff that a path exists between
Khasra No. 303/14 and Khasra No.305/14, and that the defendants be
restrained from interfering or raising any construction on the said path.
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In the alternative, a decree for possession by way of demolition of the
illegal construction, if found by the court, has been sought by the
plaintiff.
.
22. On the other hand, defendant No. 1, in paragraph 3 of the
written statement, has categorically stated that she had purchased the
land comprised in Khasra No. 306/14, measuring 6 biswas, situated in
Village Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan, HP.
of
23. The fact remains that the plaintiff-petitioner approached
the learned trial court way back in November 2005, which is more than
rt
20 years ago by instituting the present suit. The learned trial court,
after completing the pleadings of the parties, framed the issues in the
matter, and thereafter both parties led their evidence.
24. When the matter was fixed for final arguments after
elapse of more than 20 years, an application came to be filed by the
present plaintiff-petitioner for amendment of the plaint. In the
application, the only ground stated is that on account of a
typographical error, he intended to replace Khasra No.303/14 with
Khasra No. 306/14.
25. The body of the entire application does not disclose or
substantiate what was the due diligence, on account of which the
plaintiff was prevented from filing the present application earlier.
26. The provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC read as
follows:
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“17. Amendment of pleadings: – The Court
may at any stage at the proceedings allow either
party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner.
and no such terms as may be just, and all such
amendments shall be made as may be necessary for
the purpose of determining the real questions incontroversy between the parties.
“Provided that no application for amendment
shall be allowed after the trial has commenced,of
unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite
of due diligence, the party could not have raised the
rt matter before the commencement of trial.”
27. As per the aforesaid provisions, the court may at any
stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend their
pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all
such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the
purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the
parties. However, it has been provided that no application for
amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the
court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party
could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the
trial.
28. In the present case, admittedly, the trial has commenced
in 2014. The basic parameter laid down under the provision of Order 6
Rule 17 of CPC is that the party has to establish that despite due
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diligence the party could not raise the said plea prior to the
commencement of the trial.
29. In the application, there is no averment with respect to the
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fact that prior to the commencement of trial, the plaintiff was prevented
on account of due diligence from raising such a plea.
30. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the
respondents that in paragraph 3 of the written statement filed by
of
defendant No. 1, it was categorically stated that she purchased the
land comprised in Khasra No. 306/14, measuring 6 biswas, situated in
rt
Village Rabon, Tehsil and District Solan, HP. He further submits that
since a specific stand was taken by the defendant in the written
statement, therefore now, after more than 20 years, it does not lie in
the mouth of the plaintiff to contend that on account of a typographical
error, this fact was not within the knowledge of the applicant.
31. The learned counsel for the parties further admit that in
2016, Local Commissioner was appointed by the court to demarcate
the suit land and in the said report also the khasra numbers of the suit
land were depicted. Similarly, in the demarcation report, which has
been carried out in 2024, the commissioner has specified the khasra
numbers qua which the parties are agitating. Though the demarcation
report was prepared by the commissioner on 07.12.2024, but the
instant application was filed after elapse of more than 10 months, i.e.,
on 25.10.2025 .
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32. The plaintiff-petitioner has failed to prove and establish
that despite due diligence, before the commencement of the trial, he
was prevented from taking the plea which is now intended to be raised
.
in the present application. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel
for the respondents, in case the application is allowed, it will amount to
a de novo trial and the decision of the trial will take another 20 years.
33. From a perusal of the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17, it is
of
evident that ordinarily, an amendment in pleadings is not to be allowed
after the trial has commenced, unless the court is satisfied that the
rt
party concerned could not apply even after the exercise of due
diligence. In other words, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have
specifically pleaded that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise
the matter now sought to be raised.
34. The Hon’ble Apex Court has interpreted the proviso to be
a mandatory requirement to prevent frivolous applications for
amendment intended only to delay the trial.
35. In Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India,
AIR 2005 SC 3353, it was held as under:-
“27. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code deals with amendment
of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision
was deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act
22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application
for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced,
unless court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due
diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before
the commencement of trial. The proviso, to some extent,::: Downloaded on – 27/07/2026 20:31:38 :::CIS
-12-curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any
stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of
trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, such
amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object.
is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay
the trial. There is no illegality in the provision.”
36. What is ‘due diligence’ has not been defined in the Code,
but it has been explained by the Apex Court in Chander Kanta
of
Bansal vs. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, in the
following terms:
rt “16. The words “due diligence” have not been defined in
the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn.2006), theword “diligence” means careful and persistent application or
effort. “Diligent” means careful and steady in application to
one’s work and duties, showing care and effort. As perBlack’s Law Dictionary (18th Edn.), “diligence” means a
continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the
attention and care required from a person in a givensituation. “Due diligence” means the diligence reasonably
expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who
seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an
obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain-
Dyspnea (Permanent Edn.13-A) “due diligence”, in law,
means doing everything reasonable, not everything
possible. “Due diligence” means reasonable diligence; it
means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in
the conduct of his own affairs.”
37. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in M. Revanna vs.
Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332, held that the burden lies upon the
person, who seeks an amendment after the commencement of the trial
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to show that he could not have sought the amendment before the
commencement of trial, and it was observed as follows:
“7. .. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC virtually
.
prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from
being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the
court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence,the party could not have raised the matter before the
commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent,
curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at anyof
stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an
amendment after the commencement of the trial to show
rtthat in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not
have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that
an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, andunder all circumstances. Though normally amendments are
allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the
court needs to take into consideration whether theapplication for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and
whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other
side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms ofmoney.”
38. The said position was reiterated in Vijay Hathising Shah
vs. Gita Devi, (2019) 5 SCC 360, wherein it was observed as follows:
“9. In our view, the trial court was right in rejecting the
application. This we say for more than one reason. First, it
was wholly belated; second, Respondent 1-plaintiff filed the
application for amendment of the plaint when the trial in the
suit was almost over and the case was fixed for final
arguments; and third, the suit could still be decided even
without there being any necessity to seek any amendment in
the plaint. In our view, an amendment in the plaint was not
really required for the determination of the issues in the suit.”
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39. In view of the exposition of law and the provisions of
Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC, the petitioner-plaintiff has failed to make
.
out a case for the amendment of the plaint. As rightly pointed out by
the learned counsel for the respondent that after elapse of 20 years,
no relief can be granted to the petitioner, and in case the application is
allowed, the parties shall be relegated to the same stage at which the
of
suit was initially filed by the plaintiff, which shall cause huge and
irreparable loss to the parties.
40.
rt
This Court is of the considered opinion that the learned
trial court has passed a well-reasoned order, and it does not suffer
from any illegality, irregularity, or jurisdictional error.
41. The power under Article 227 is limited to see that the
Courts below function within the limits of their authority or jurisdiction.
The High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by
the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 227. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, over the last 50
years, it has consistently been observed that the limited jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering
with findings of fact or by setting aside the judgments of the courts
below on merits.
42. Hon’ ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010,
titled State of Haryana & others vs. Manoj Kumar, decided on
09.03.2010 has held as follow:-
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“23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of
this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v.
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam &
Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article.
227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within
the limit of its authority or jurisdiction.
24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath‘s case in a
subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra
Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that
jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any meansof
appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of
subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of
superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds
rt
of their authority.
25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the
matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim &
Others (1983) 4 SCC 566. The court observed as under:-
“The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that
an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its
authority,” and not to correct an error apparent on the faceof the record, much less an error of law. for this case there
was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error
apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on
the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercisejurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural
justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in
consonance with the procedure established by law. In
exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High
Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will
not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be
based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”
26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in
Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing
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Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again
cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct
all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be
.
restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant
abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where
grave injustice would be done unless the High Court
interferes.
27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.)
v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again
of
abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere
with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or
rtthe tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227.
Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or
the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It
cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the
evidence and reappreciating it.
28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N.
Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the
limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for
ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits.
29. This court over 50 years has been consistently
observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the
findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts
below on merit.”
43. To the similar extent, the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.
3072 of 2022, titled as Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private
Limited, decided on 13.05.2022 has held as follows: –
“14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High
Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ
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-17-the order passed by the National Commission which has
been passed in an appeal under Section 58 (1) (a) (iii) of the
2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view
taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes.
without saying that while exercising the powers under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself
to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the HighCourt has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within
the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to
be exercised.
of
14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of
the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the
rtcase of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8
SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court
(see the recent decision of this Court in the case of GarmentCraft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29).
Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of
the Constitution, the High Court has to act within theparameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution. It goes without saying that even while
considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petitionunder Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of
superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writpetition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an
order passed by the National Commission, the same shall
always be subject to the rigor of the powers to be exercised
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”
44. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of any
merit, deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
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45. Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made
here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon
.
uninfluenced by any observation made here- in-above, which are only
for the purpose of the instant petition.
(Romesh Verma)
of
Judge
24th July, 2026.
(vt) rt
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