Delhi High Court
Getwell Healthcare Private Limited vs Dr Santosh Sahi & Ors on 22 July, 2026
$~30
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 321/2026, I.A. 18842/2026 & I.A.
18843/2026
GETWELL HEALTHCARE PRIVATE LIMITED.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. K.K. Rai, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Imitiyaz Hussain, Ms.
Medha Tandon, Mr. Shubham
Khare, Mr. Anshul Rai and Ms.
S Chatterjee, Advs.
versus
DR SANTOSH SAHI & ORS. ....Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
% 22.07.2026
1. The present petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 19961 assailing the Partial Award2 dated
20.06.2026 passed under Section 17 of the Act, whereby the learned
Arbitrator has directed the Petitioner to hand over the vacant and
peaceful possession of the property being House No. 1 and 2,
Jangpura ‘A’, Mathura Road, New Delhi-1100243 to the Respondents.
2. It is borne out from the record that the subject property is
owned by the Respondents, who leased out the same to the Petitioner
as per a Lease Deed dated 17.12.2015, initially executed for nine
years, with a monthly rent of Rs.27,00,000/- for the first three years
1 “the Act”, hereinafter
2 “impugned award” alternatively
3 “subject property”, hereinafter
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and an increment of 20% after every three years.
3. As per the terms of this Deed, the Respondents were obligated
to carry out “Basic Work” within six months and thereafter handover
the possession of the subject property to the Petitioner. Upon such
transfer, the Deed stipulated that the petitioner would undertake “Fit
Out” work pertaining to interiors and furnishing. The Deed stipulates
that the rent would become payable from the commencement date.
4. Thereafter, the parties also executed a Supplementary Lease
Deed dated 20.12.2019, whereby the Petitioner undertook to carry out
the remaining “Basic Work” and complete the “Fit Out” work within
14 months, after which the rent would commence from 01.06.2020.
5. However, due to certain delays and disputes amongst the
parties, the Respondents issued a notice of pre-litigation mediation in
February 2022 and subsequently, by notice dated 02.06.2022, the
Respondents terminated both lease deeds.
6. It is the Petitioner’s case that the actual understanding inter se
the parties was to collaborate and develop the subject property
together to run a hospital and that the parties entered into a lease deed
because it was more convenient for tax purposes.
7. The subject property was to be handed over to the Petitioner
upon completion of the basic work, but according to the Petitioner, the
same was not done by the Respondent and the Petitioner had to pay
the stipulated pre-rent period fee for the prolonged period along with
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other expenses.
8. Owing to various disputes, the Respondent invoked arbitration
in terms of the Lease Deed. Thereafter, the learned Arbitrator entered
upon reference in pursuance to an order of this Court.
9. During the arbitral proceedings, the Respondent filed an
application under Section 17 of the Act read with Order XII Rule 6 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084.
10. After hearings arguments of both parties on the Section 17
application, the learned Arbitrator passed the impugned partial award
dated 20.06.2026. By way of the impugned award, the Petitioner was
directed to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the subject
property, failing which damages of Rs.27,00,000/- were to be paid to
the Respondent.
11. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner approached this Court by way
of the present petition.
12. Mr. K.K. Rai, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, submits
that while exercising power under Section 17 of the Act, the learned
Arbitrator has granted a final relief, which is untenable and hence, the
learned Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. He carves out the
distinction between Section 17 and 31(6) of the Act.
13. It is submitted that the Petitioner is only aiming to assert its
4 “CPC” hereinafter
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rights as a lessee. It is also submitted that the Petitioner has invested in
the subject property to the tune of Rs. 65 crores and the lease is in his
favour for 24 years, which has been terminated at nascent stage by the
Respondents. It is also averred that the supplementary lease deed is
not registered.
14. Mr. Rai argues that various issues remain to be adjudicated and
therefore, possession cannot be granted prematurely. To demonstrate,
he relies on procedural orders of the learned Arbitrator dated
15.07.2024, 18.04.2025, 20.05.2025, 13.01.2026, 23.01.2026 and
24.01.2026. It is submitted that without hearing arguments on these
issues, final relief of possession cannot be granted.
15. It is further submitted that the lease actually envisages a
collaborative venture, whereby the Respondents had to perform “Basic
Work” and give possession to the Petitioner after which the Petitioner
would undertake “Fit Out” work. It is submitted that the Respondents
failed to complete their obligations and hence, the Petitioner was
delayed/unable to carry out its reciprocal obligations and incurred
huge expenses.
16. Mr. Rai places reliance on para 23 of Khurana Educational
Society (Regd.) v. Smt. Shashi Bala5 to submit that Section 17 only
endeavours preservation of the subject matter and not the grant of final
relief. Paras 2 and 12 of the decision in Evergreen Land Mark Pvt.
Ltd. v. John Tinson and Co. Pvt. Ltd.6 are also relied upon to argue
5 ARB. A.(COMM) 71.2025, Judgment dated 26.02.2026; 2026:DHC:1727
6 (2022) 7 SCC 757
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that final relief cannot be granted under Section 17 of the Act.
17. Further, reliance is placed on Indian Farmers Fertilizer
Cooperative Ltd. v. Bhadra Products7, particularly para 14, to buttress
that the terms “partial award” and “interim award” are interchangeably
used.
18. Learned Senior Counsel points to para 14 of the decision in
Paul Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Amit Chand Mitra & Anr.8 to
submit that an unregistered document, such as a lease deed, is not
admissible as evidence but it can be used for collateral purposes such
as to ascertain the purpose for which the lease deed was entered into.
19. Mr. Rai has also apprised this Court that the arbitration
proceedings are at the final stage.
20. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner and
perused the material on record. However, I do not subscribe to the
arguments advanced for the reasons to follow.
21. At the outset, it is relevant to that contours of Section 34 of the
Act are narrow. A Section 34 Court does not sit in appeal over the
decision of the Arbitrator and cannot substitute the view of the
Arbitrator merely because another view is plausible. The Arbitrator is
the final authority on questions of fact and this Court cannot go into
the re-appreciation of evidence. This Court cannot microscopically
dissect the award.
7 (2018) 2 SCC 534
8
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1216
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22. Section 19 of the Act extends wide procedural mandate and
discretion to the Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal is empowered to
“conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate” and
“determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any
evidence”.
23. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, I shall advert to the facts of the
present case.
24. The reasoning adopted by the learned Arbitrator is as follows:
“70. The Respondent in its Defence has admitted (i) The Lease Deed
dated 17th December, 2015 as well as Supplementary Lease Deed dated 20th
December, 2019 executed between the parties; (ii) The Respondent has also
admitted all the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed dated 17th
December, 2015. RW-1 admitted in his cross-examination that the Lease
Deed dated 17th December, 2015 contains all the agreed terms and
conditions and he had thoroughly read and understood the same; (iii) The
Respondent also admitted that there were no other term/condition other than
the terms and condition recorded in the Lease Deed; (iv) The Respondent
itself is relying on the Lease Deed and has pleaded that the Claimant has not
discharged its obligations under the aforesaid Lease Deed; (v) The
Respondent’s whole defence is that there was understanding between the
parties to jointly develop the property and run a hospital and a collaboration
arrangement under the heading of Lease Deed dated 17th December, 2015
was executed between the parties. According to the Respondent, the Lease
Deed be interpreted as a Collaboration Agreement; and (vi) The admitted
that there is no written document with respect to the alleged oral
understanding between the parties with respect to collaboration. In of
aforesaid Respondent’s Defence, this Tribunal has read Lease Deed dated
17th December, 2015 to ascertain whether the relationship between the
parties is of landlord-tenant or a collaboration.
73. This Tribunal is of the view that all the Clauses of the Lease Deed
dated 171h December, 2015 are clear and unambiguous that the
relationship between the parties is purely of a landlord and tenant. The
Claimants granted the Lease of property bearing No.1 and 2, Jangpura ‘A’,
Mathura Road, New Delhi-110024 to the Respondent for an initial period of
nine years at a monthly rent of Rs.27,00,000/- for the first three years to be
increased 20% every three years.
The Claimants were required to carry out the Basic Work and hand over the
premises to the Respondent who was required to carry out the Fit-Out work
and the rent was to start from the date of completion of Fit-Out work but not
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74. There is no Clause whatsoever in the Lease Deed which points out
to any joint venture/collaboration between the parties. That apart, the
Respondent’s claim that the relationship between the parties is of joint
venture/collaboration is barred by Clause 10.4 of the Lease Deed which
clearly stipulates that the relationship between the parties shall be as of
Lessor and Lessee and no partnership, joint venture or joint undertaking
shall be construed from these clauses. Clause 10.4 of the Lease Deed is
reproduced as under:
“10.4 Legal Relationship
The parties to this Agreement execute the same solely as a lessee and a
lessor. No partnership, joint venture or joint undertaking shall be construed
from these presents, and except as herein specifically provided, neither party
shall have the right to make any representations for, act on behalf of, or be
liable for the debts of the other.”
75. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Respondent urged at the time of the
hearing that Clause 7.7 provides that the Respondent shall run the hospital
in the name of “SAHI LORDS International Hospital” which reflects a joint
venture/collaboration. This Tribunal does not find any merit in this
submission. Merely because the Lease Deed gives the name of the Hospital,
it does not mean that the parties had agreed to jointly run the hospital. The
Respondent’s contention that payments made to MCD and other authorities
for approval/sanction; payments made for construction/development of the
building and efforts to get the property de-sealed amounts to joint venture/
collaboration. This Tribunal is of the view that none of these conditions
reflect any joint venture/collaboration. There is no clause in the Lease Deed
which shows that both the parties will jointly invest, develop and run the
hospital and share the profits/losses. There is no obligation whatsoever on
the Claimants with respect to the running of the hospital. No such clause has
even been alleged by the Respondent in its entire defence. This Tribunal is of
the confirmed view that the Lease Deed dated 17h December, 2015 does not
contain any clause which reflects the joint venture/collaboration between the
parties. The Lease Deed contains a pure relationship of landlord-tenant
between the parties as the Claimants have granted the Lease of the subject
property to the Respondent for running and operating a hospital on payment
of monthly rent.
76. This Tribunal is of the confirmed view that the Respondent’s
admission of the Lease Deed dated 17h December, 2015 constitutes a clear,
unequivocal and unambiguous admission with respect to the relationship of
the parties as landlord-tenant. The Respondent has further admitted having
paid the Pre-rent period fee of Rs.2,00,000/- per month to the Claimant in
terms of the Lease Deed and six months advance rent of Rs.1,62,00,000/- to
the Claimant as a security deposit in terms of the Lease Deed dated 17h
December, 2015. The Respondent has further admitted that the Basic Work
was partly carried out by the Claimant’s contractor M/s GV Constructions
and the balance Basic Work was carried out by the Respondent in terms of
the Lease Deed. The Respondent has further admitted having received the
physical possession of the subject property on 01 April, 2019 for undertaking
the Fit-Out work. The Respondent has further admitted that the Respondent
partially carried out the Fit-Out work but could not complete the Fit-Out
work for want of funds. The Claimants vide email dated 7h December, 2020,
demanded the monthly rent of Rs.27,00,000/-from 15″ December, 2020 as
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agreed between the parties in response to which. the Respondent vide email
dated 14 December, 2020, admitted having agreed to pay the rent from 15″
December, 2020 but assured the Claimants that the monthly rent shall be
paid from 15* December, 2020 or 15th March, 2021. The Respondent is
admittedly in possession of the subject property but has not paid any rent
from 15t March, 2021. The Claimants terminated the Respondent’s Lease
vide notice dated 02’d June, 2022 on the ground that the Respondent has not
paid the rent of the subject property from 15 December, 2020. The
Respondent is occupying the subject property without paying the rent to the
Claimant. The Respondent has made clear admissions in its Statement of
Defence, reply to the interrogatories; and in cross-examination which are
detailed as hereunder…
77. Admissions of the Respondent in its Statement of Defence
(i) The Respondent in reply to para 1 of the Statement of Claim has not
denied the execution of the Lease Deed and the Supplementary Lease Deed
which proves the relationship of the lessor and lessee between the parties.
Para 1 of the Statement of Claim and Respondent’s reply to para 1 are
reproduced hereunder: –
Para 1 of the SoC
“The present arbitration relates to disputes that have arisen between the
Claimants and the Respondent under and in relation to Lease Deed dated 17
December 2015 (“Lease Deed’? and Supplementary Lease Deed dated 20
December 2019 (“S11pplemelltary Lease Deed.”
Para 1 of the SoD
“That the contents and averments made in Para No.1 of the SOC under the
heading overview are matter of record. However, it is reiterated that the acts
and omissions on the part of the claimants resulted in the dispute, which
could have been easily avoided if the claimants had done their part of
obligation properly.”
(ii) The Respondent admitted the contents of para 15 to 17 of the Statement
of Claim as matter of record. Para 15 to 17 of the Statement of Claim and
para 8 of the Respondent’s Statement of Defence are reproduced hereunder:
–
Para 15 of the SoC
“The Claimants are the owners of Plots collectively admeasuring
approximately 2167 square yards and contained thereon a building for
running a hospital.”
Para 16 of the SoC
“Initially, Plot No.1 was owned exclusively by Late Mr. Dr. Bharat Bhushan
Sahi and Plot No. 2 was owned by Late Mr. Dr. Bharat Bhushan Sahi and
the Claimants in equal proportion.”
Para 17 of the SoC
“Late Mr. Dr. Bharat Bhushan Sahi died intestate on 28.08.2019. The
Claimants being his only class-I heirs, inherited his share in the Plots in
equal proportion. Therefore, the Plots are now jointly owned by the
claimants in equal proportion.”
Para 8 of the SoD
“That contents and averments made in para no. 15 to 17 of the SoC under
the heading overview are matter of record. That the contents of the para
under reply clearly establishes the fact that the initial understanding was to
build/construct a building on the plots in question and thereupon run a
hospital from the constructed building. It was with this intention Mr. Bharat
Bhushan Sahi collaborated with the respondent and thereafter agreement
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dated 17.12.2015 executed, which though was given the name of lease deed
instead of collaboration agreement”
(iii) The Respondent has not disputed the contents of paras 19 to 20 of the
Statement of Claim which are reproduced hereunder: –
Para 19 of the SoC
“The Claimants based on the representations made by the Respondent
through its Directors, believing it to be true and correct, agreed to entered
into the lease Deed with the Respondent Company.”
Para 20 of the SoC
“Accordingly, on 17 December 2015 the lease Deed was executed by and
between the Claimants abovenamed on one hand and the Respondent on the
other. The Claimants under the said lease Deed being the lessors agreed to
lease the Plots to the Respondent being the lessors, subject to the terms and
conditions contained more particularly in the said lease Deed.”
(iv) The Respondent has admitted the contents of para 23 of the SoC to be
matter of record which amounts to a clear admission of the Respondent with
respect to the relationship of Lessor and Lessee. Para 23 of the SOC and
Para 11 of the Sod are reproduced hereunder:
Para 23 of the SoC
“As per the terms and conditions set out in the Lease Deed, the Claimants,
before handing over the possession of the Plots to the Respondent, would
undertake renovation. Thereafter, after completion of the basic works and
construction completion, the plots were to be handed over to the
lessee’s/Respondents for carrying out the “Fit Out”.”
Para 11 of SoD
“That the contents and averments made in para No.23 of the SoC under the
heading Background are matter of record.”.
(v) The Respondent has admitted para 24 of the SoC to be matter of record
which amounts to the admission of the terms of the lease and relationship
between the parties. Para 24 of the SoC and para 12 of the SoD are
reproduced hereunder: –
Para 24 of the SoC
“The Clause 3.1 of the Lease Deed stipulated payment of a monthly
Rent/Lease amount of INR.27,00,000/- (Twenty-Seven Lakhs Only) for the
first 3 years starting from the commencement date as defined under the
Lease deed. In this regard, it is relevant to note that “commencement date”
as under the Lease Deed is deemed to be the date on which: (i) “Fit Out”
work has been completed; and (ii) the conversion permit for use of the
property as a hospital has been procured. Further, the Lease Deed clarified
that such commencement date, unless otherwise agreed between the Parties
shall not be later than 31 December 2017.”
Para 12 of the SoD
“That the contents and averments made in para no.24 of the SOC are the
matter of record.”
(vi) The Respondent has admitted the contents of para 25 and 26 of the SoC
to be matter of record and has thereby admitted the relationship between the
parties by execution of the Supplementary Lease Deed. Para 25 and 26 of
the SoC and Para 13 of the SoD are reproduced hereunder:-
Para 25 of the Soc
“Subsequently, after the unfortunate demise of Late Mr. Dr. Bharat Bhushan
Sahi, the Claimants became the joint owners of both the Plots and entered
into a supplementary lease deed.”
Para 26 of the SoC
“Accordingly, a supplementary lease deed dated 20.12.2019 was executed by
and between the Claimants and the Respondent (“Supplementary Lease
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Deed”), The Lease Deed and the Supplementary Lease Deed are collectively
referred to as (“Agreements”) hereinafter.”
Para 13 of the SoD
“That the contents and averments made in para 25 & 26 of the SOC are the
matter of record.”
(vii) The Respondent has admitted paras 43 and 44 of the SoC to be matter
of record which contains clear admission of the Respondent to pay the
monthly rent of Rs.27,00,000/- to the Claimants. Paras No.43 and 44 of the
Statement of Claim and para No.20 of the Statement of Defence are as
under: –
Para 43 of the SoC
“On various occasions, including on 07 December 2020, the Claimants
requested the Respondent to pay monthly Rent/Lease amount as stipulated
under the Agreement i.e., INR. 27,00,000/- (Twenty-Seven Lakhs) per
month.”
Para 44 of the SoC
“Admittedly, the Respondent vide email dated 14th December, 2020, through
its Director, Dr. Najam Ashraf, assured that entire amount due as against
the monthly Rent/Lease would be paid from 15th March, 2021 onwards. The
Petitioner’s state that this constitutes an admission of liability in so far as
payments are due from the Respondent to the Claimant’s being the monthly
Rent/Lease payable under the Agreements.”
Para 20 of the SoD
“That the contents and averments made in Para 43 & 44 of the SOC are the
matter of record. However, the said emails have to be read in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, when the same was exchanged between the
parties and could never be deemed to be an admission on the part of the
Respondent.”
78. Admissions of the Respondent in reply to the Claimant’s
interrogatories
(i) RW-1 in reply to Interrogatory No.4 admitted the execution of the
Lease Deed dated 17th December, 2015 and Supplementary Lease
Deed dated 20th December, 2019.
(ii) The Claimants questioned RW-1 with respect to the documentary
proof of the basic understanding in Interrogatory No.6. RW-1
referred to the payments made to MCD and other Authorities for
approval and sanction; payments made for construction and
development of the building and efforts made to get the property de-
sealed as the documentary proof of collaboration.
(iii) RW-1 in reply to Interrogatory No.9 admitted the payment of Pre-
rent period fee paid by the Respondent to the Claimants.
(iv) RW-1 in reply to Interrogatory No.10 admitted the monthly rent of
Rs.27,00,000/- payable by the Respondent to the Claimants.
(v) RW-1 admitted the payment of six month’s advance rent of
Rs.1,62,00,000-/ to the Claimant.
(vi) RW-1 in reply to Interrogatory No.33 admitted bringing new
investors to invest and also arranged one meeting of the Claimants
with the investor.
79. Admissions of the Respondent in cross-examination
(i) RW-1 in his cross-examination admitted that the Lease Deed dated
17th December, 2015 contains the terms and conditions which have
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been mutually agreed between the parties and RW-1 had thoroughly
read and understood the same.
(ii) RW-1 admitted that the Lease Deed dated 17th December, 2015 is
final and contains all the agreed terms and conditions.
(iii) RW-1 further admitted having executed the Supplementary Lease
Deed dated 20th December, 2019 on mutually agreed terms and
conditions.
(iv) RW-1 admitted that he neither raised any objection of pressure nor
made any complaint.
(v) RW-1 admitted that under the revised terms, the Respondent was
required to pay monthly Lease rent from 1st June, 2020.
(vi) RW-1 admitted that there is no written document of the
understanding between parties with respect to the collaboration.
80. At this stage, it is also important to note that the Lease Deed dated
17th December, 2015 is registered whereas the Supplementary Lease Deed
dated 20th December, 2019 is unregistered although both these documents
are compulsorily registrable. In that view of the matter, the Supplementary
Lease Deed dated 20th December, 2019 can be looked into only for collateral
purposes.
81. The Respondent has raised false defence before this Tribunal that
the Lease Deed reflects a relationship of joint venture/collaboration between
the parties. The Respondent is a dishonest tenant who is squatting over the
Claimant’s property and has raised a false defense to neither pay the rent
nor vacate the subject property.”
25. It emerges from the record that the Petitioner does not deny the
Lease Deed dated 17.12.2015 or its termination by the Respondents.
In fact, it is on the basis of the unambiguous and unequivocal
admission of the Lease Deed by the Petitioner that the learned
Arbitrator rendered the impugned award.
26. The main limb of the Petitioner’s argument is that its
relationship with the Respondent pertaining to the subject property
was collaborative and that the Petitioner had invested huge amounts
into the subject property, the benefits of which it cannot reap owing to
the termination of the lease.
27. In view of Clause 10.4 of the lease deed, it is explicit that the
relationship between the parties was that of a lessor and lessee, and
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nothing more. Additionally, it was also admitted by the Petitioner
before the Arbitrator that there was nothing in writing to substantiate
that the lease deed was effectively a collaborative venture. Although,
the law of evidence may not be strictly applicable in arbitral
proceedings, however, courts have held time and again that Section 19
of the Act is not prohibitry in nature, rather it encourages the arbitral
tribunal to draw sustenance from the fundamental principles
underlying the CPC or the Indian Evidence Act, 18729. In this regard,
the Supreme Court in Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. v. Tuff
Drilling (P) Ltd.10, observed as follows:
“17. Section 19 of the Act provides for determination of rules of
procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that the Arbitral
Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
or the Evidence Act, 1872. The words “Arbitral Tribunal shall not
be bound” are the words of amplitude and not of a restriction.
These words do not prohibit the Arbitral Tribunal from drawing
sustenance from the fundamental principles underlying the Civil
Procedure Code or the Evidence Act but the Tribunal is not
bound to observe the provisions of Code with all of its rigour. As
per sub-section (2) of Section 19, the parties are free to agree on
the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in
conducting its proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. The aforesaid view has also been undertaken in Pradyuman
Kumar Sharma v. Jayasagar M. Sancheti11 by the Bombay High
Court, whereby it was observed that “though the arbitrator is not
bound by CPC or the Evidence Act, the principles of CPC and
Evidence Act are applicable to even arbitration proceedings”.
Further, even this Court in Direct News Pvt. Ltd. v. DTS Travels Pvt.
9 “IEA” hereinafter
10 (2018) 11 SCC 470
11 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 453
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Ltd.12, also opined that “its trite that the fundamental principles of the
said enactment would serve as a guide for the Arbitral Tribunal to
evaluate the material and draw its conclusions.”
29. Keeping in view the applicability of the underlying principles of
IEA, the contention of Mr. Rai that the relationship between the
parties is actually collaborative, has to be excluded in view of Section
91 and 92 of IEA13 since there is no written document to demonstrate
the collaborative nature and on the contrary, there is explicit
documentary evidence of the contents of the lease deed, particularly
Clause 10.4 of the deed along with the unambiguous admission of the
Petitioner.
30. It is also of significance that the petitioner has not challenged
the validity of the termination of the lease deed.
31. Accordingly, in the absence of an explicit challenge to the
validity of the termination of the lease deed, the lease deed stands duly
revoked, rendering the petitioner an illegal occupant. Such wrong
cannot be perpetuated merely on account of pendency of proceedings.
32. It is also borne out that the learned Arbitrator, after perusing the
evidence and examining witnesses, has come to the conclusion that the
termination was legal and valid. Based on the aforesaid, coupled with
the unambiguous admission by the Petitioner, the learned Arbitrator
directed the Petitioner to hand over possession of the subject property.
12 FAO(COMM) 53/2025, decided on 03.03.2025
13 Corresponding to Sections 94 and 95 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
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33. Therefore, the threshold of interference under Section 34 is not
made out since the learned Arbitrator arrived at his decision upon
examination of the material on record furnished by both parties and
examination of witnesses. It is evident from the record that the
Petitioner was able to present its defence and there is no material
irregularity in the procedure. The Petitioner has not brought out any
patent illegality in the impugned award or highlighted any conflict
with public policy of India and such other grounds necessitating
interference of this Court under Section 34 of the Act14.
34. Section 19 of the Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to
determine the admissibility and weight of any evidence. In the present
case, the learned Arbitrator largely based his decision on the clear
admission of the Petitioner and lack of the presence of a written
document demonstrating a collaborative relationship between the
parties. Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 do not sit in
appeal over such decisions, provided that the procedure adopted by the
Arbitrator is just, fair and in accordance with principles of natural
justice.
35. Adverting to the remaining contentions, it was also argued that
the supplementary lease deed was unregistered and it records that the
basic work which was to be undertaken by the Respondent was not
completed as on 30.11.2018. These averments, in my view, do not
attract relief under Section 34. Further, the aspect of non-registration
14 OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC
417
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of the Supplementary Lease Deed is a question of fact that I cannot go
into.
36. Adverting to the precedents relied upon by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Petitioner, para 14 of the decision in Indian Farmers
Fertilizer Cooperative Ltd. (supra) reiterates that “partial award” and
“interim award” is often used interchangeably and that both partial
and interim awards are amenable to challenge under Section 34. The
finding in para 14 of the decision in Paul Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) is also well-settled and not disputed. However, the aforesaid
does not aid the case of the Petitioner since this Court does not sit in
appeal over the decision of the arbitrator and cannot substitute its view
merely because another view is plausible. This Court cannot re-
appreciate facts under Section 34 of the Act. In the present case,
pertinently, there is a categorical admission of the Petitioner with
respect to the Lease Deed and its termination.
37. The reliance placed on Khurana Educational Society (supra)
and Evergreen Land Mark Ltd. (supra) is of no avail since the
inquiry of this Court is circumscribed under Section 34 of the Act.
Additionally, decision in Evergreen Land Mark Ltd. (supra) lies on a
different factual footing than from the present case, it pertains to an
already running business and the liability to pay rent during COVID-
19 lockdown was to be adjudicated. It is trite that judgments cannot be
read like Euclid’s theorem and must be considered keeping in mind
the facts and circumstances of the matter at hand.
38. In view of the above, I find no ground to interfere with the
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arbitral award at this stage, particularly since no ground is made out
warranting interference under Section 34 of the Act and that the
arbitral proceedings are at the final stage.
39. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. Pending
application(s), if any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
40. In the interest of justice, learned Arbitrator is requested to
expedite the arbitration proceedings.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JULY 22, 2026/at/pa/gunn
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