Karnataka High Court
Geeta R vs State By on 4 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 31.01.2026
Pronounced on : 04.03.2026
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.8678 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
GEETA R.,
W/O G.S.RAVI,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
OCC. SUPERINTENDENT,
OFFICE OF DEPUTY REGISTRAR
OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES,
CHITRADURGA.
R/O NO.3388/43,
3RD MAIN, 3RD CROSS,
VINAYAKA BADAVANE VIDYANAGARA,
DAVANAGERE - 577 005.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHANKAR P.HEGDE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE BY KARNATAKA
POLICE SUB-INSPECTOR,
LOKAYUKTHA POLICE STATION,
DAVANAGERE.
2
REPRESENTED BY LD. SPL.SPP,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
AMENDMENT CARRIED OUT AS PER
ORDER DATED 07.12.2023.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI K. PRASANNA SHETTY, ADVOCATE )
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED
AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR OFFENCES P/U/S.7 AND 13(1)(d)
R/W SEC.13(2) OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988,
ON THE FILE OF PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
DAVANAGERE IN SPL.(LOK) C.C.NO.2/2020.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 31.01.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
proceedings before the Special Court in Special Case (LOK) No.2 of
2020 arising out of First Information Report in Crime No.8 of 2018
registered for offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act' for short).
3
2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
2.1. A complaint comes to be registered on 05-07-2018 which
becomes a crime in Crime No.8 of 2018 for the afore-quoted
offences. The Police Sub-Inspector, Lokayukta is the complainant. It
is the allegation of the first informant/one Rudresh that the
petitioner working as Superintendent in the office of the Assistant
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Davangere Sub-Division was
approached for registration of Raithabandhu Sahakara Sangha
Niyamitha, Kathalagere, Channagiri Taluk. For the said
registration, it is the case of the prosecution that the petitioner had
demanded ₹15,000/- for completion of work of registration. The
then Anti-Corruption Bureau ('ACB' for short) sleuths prepared
entrustment mahazar and proceeded to the office of the petitioner.
A trap was laid and the petitioner was caught receiving tainted
money. The entrustment mahazar and the trap mahazar are
indicative of the fact that the petitioner herself has received the
money. It is on the basis of the said trap so laid, the aforesaid
crime comes to be registered. The Lokayukta Police conduct
investigation and file a final report - charge sheet before the
4
concerned Court. The concerned Court registers Special LOK
C.C.No.2 of 2020 and proceed to frame charges for the afore-
quoted offences against the petitioner on 01-07-2022.
2.2. On the same incident, another analogous or
contemporaneous proceeding was taken up on departmental side. A
departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the
basis of trap so laid. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies
was appointed as Inquiry officer. The charge sheet was issued and
the Inquiry Officer after conduct of inquiry exonerates the petitioner
in entirety. Since exoneration of the petitioner was during
subsistence of trial before the concerned Court, the petitioner
knocks at the doors of this Court contending that the petitioner is
entitled to the relief at the hands of this Court, on the ground that
the departmental enquiry and the criminal trial are based on a
solitary set of facts. The solitary set of facts is trap that was laid
against the petitioner on 05-07-2018. The continuance of trial is
what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.
5
3. Heard Sri Shankar P.Hegde, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner and Sri K. Prasanna Shetty, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
SUBMISSIONS:
PETITIONER'S:
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
vehemently contend that witnesses and documents that are
produced before the Inquiry Officer in the departmental enquiry and
the criminal trial are one and the same. In the departmental
enquiry, the Inquiry Officer has completely exonerated the
petitioner on the basis of evidence. This exoneration has been
accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and proceedings are closed.
In the light of closure of proceedings, the learned counsel would
contend that criminal trial must also be obliterated as, if the
prosecution could not prove the case against the petitioner on
preponderance of probability, it can hardly prove in a criminal trial
where it is required to be proved, beyond all reasonable doubt. He
would seek quashment of proceedings.
6
THE ACB - LOKAYUKTHA:
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the then ACB,
now the Lokayukta, would vehemently contend that the petitioner
herself is caught receiving bribe. Therefore, the fact that she is
exonerated in a departmental inquiry, where unlike in a criminal
trial, the evidence would not be complete, cannot mean that
criminal trial should be obliterated. He would submit that the
judgment rendered by the Apex Court in 2026 would steer clear the
doubt as to whether an employee against whom a departmental
inquiry is initiated and has been exonerated, the criminal trial will
have to be obliterated or otherwise. He has relied upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KARNATAKA
LOKAYUKTHA BAGALKOTE DISTRICT v. CHANDRASHEKAR1.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would join
issue in contending that the Apex Court in the case of
CHANDRASHEKAR supra has not followed the judgment of the
Apex Court in ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI v. CBI2, which
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 13
2
(2020) 9 SCC 636
7
is a judgment rendered by three Judges and, therefore, the
judgment in CHANDRASHEKAR is per incuriam. He would further
contend that the departmental inquiry against the petitioner is
conducted under the Karnataka Departmental Inquiries
(Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses, production of Documents
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981. It is his submission that if
witnesses and documents are produced under this Act, it would be
on oath. If it is on oath, it becomes a judicial proceeding and not a
quasi-judicial proceeding and if it is a judicial proceeding, the
exoneration in departmental inquiry would take away the effect of
criminal trial. He would, therefore, contend that this Court should
interfere in the case at hand. The charges are framed and criminal
case is at its fag end. On the sole score that in the departmental
inquiry the petitioner is exonerated, he would submit that the
judgment in CHANDRASHEKAR is not applicable to the facts
obtaining in the case at hand and would seek to place reliance on
the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of (i) P.S.RAJYA v.
STATE OF BIHAR3; (ii) RADHESHYAM KEJRIWAL v. STATE OF
3
(1996) 9 SCC 1
8
WEST BENGAL4; (iii) STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AJAY KUMAR
TYAGI5; (iv) ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI supra; and
(v)NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)6.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent/Lokayukta places
reliance upon two judgments of the Apex Court in the case of T.
MANJUNATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA7 and A. KARUNANITHI
v. STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE8.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
CONSIDERATION:
9. In furtherance of the said submissions, the issue that falls
for consideration is:
4
(2011) 3 SCC 581
5
(2012) 9 SCC 685
6
(2023) 4 SCC 731
7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2597
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1677
9
"Whether, in every case where two parallel
proceedings spring from an identical substratum of facts -
one being a departmental enquiry and the other, a criminal
prosecution, the exoneration of a delinquent employee in the
former - departmental enquiry, can result in the obliteration
of the later - criminal trial?"
10. The factual narrative and a sequence of events are
matters of record and admit of no serious dispute. On 05-07-2018,
a complaint comes to be registered, acting upon the said complaint
the then Anti-Corruption Bureau laid a trap against the petitioner.
In the course of the trap, the petitioner was apprehended red-
handed - caught in the act of receiving tainted currency. The
phenolphthalein test yielded the characteristic pink discoloration
lending corroboration to the prosecution's case. The trap mahazar
records recovery of the entire sum of ₹15,000/- and documents the
procedural formalities attended upon such recovery. The trap
mahazar, insofar as it is relevant, reads as follows.
" ಾ ಪಂಚ ಾ
10
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2) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 1GM220166
3) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 9HM267396
4) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 3BH245582
5) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 3MC727609
6) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 4AA271506
7) ರೂ. 2000 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 7AT848016
8) ರೂ. 500 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 3FE250354
9) ರೂ. 500 \ೌಲ%ದ ಒಂದು ೋಟು ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: 7DL008113
ಸದ) ೕಲ=ಂಡ ೋಟುಗಳ ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ% & \ೌಲ%ವನುc ೆರಳq`ಾl I ೕಮ[ \ಾPಾ ಆದ
ಾನು ೇeದಂiೆ, ಇ ೊcಬo ಪಂಚ`ಾl I ೕ ಮಹಬೂL MಾNಾ ರವರು ಒಂದು .e ಾjೆಯ*+
ಬ ೆದು ೊಂಡರು ನಂತರ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳ ಸೂಚ ೆಯಂiೆ ಾವ} Fಾ gೕhಕ ಪಂಚ ಾ ಾಲ ೆ=
7AಾS ಾಜEಪ6- ಾ>ಗ, ಒಂದು .e ಾjೆಯ*+ ಗುರು[- ೊಂ6ದ> ೋಟುಗಳ ಸಂ4ೆ% ಮತುa
\ೌಲ%ವ}, ಆFಾ ತರು ಾಜರುಪ6-ದ ೋಟುಗಳ \ೌಲ% ಮತುa ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%ಗe ೆ ೊಂ ಾ† ೆ
ಆhರುತa ೆ. ಸದ) ಾjೆ ೆ ಪಂಚ ಾದ ಾವ}ಗಳq, ಆFಾ iೆ I ೕಮ[ hೕiಾ, wAಾS ಸr \ಾ6ದ
ನಂತರ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳq ಅ\ಾನತುaಪ6- ೊಂಡರು. ನಂತರ ೕಲ=ಂಡ ಎPಾ+ ೋಟುಗಳನುc
Fಾ+-:9 ಕವEನ*+ ಾ•, ಅದನುc 4ಾ• ಬಣ‰ದ ಾಗದದ ಒಂದು 4ಾ* ಕವEನ*+ ಇಟು:, Fಾ gೕhಕ
ಪಂಚ ಾ ಾಲದ*+ 'ಎ#' ಅGರದ -ೕ€ನುc ೆರಳq `ಾl- I ೕಮ[ \ಾPಾರವರ ಕZೆ ೕ6ದ>ನುc
ಪZೆದು ಕವE ೆ ಅರh ಂದ "ಎ#" ಎಂಬ ಇಂh+ೕ• ಅGರದ -ೕ€ \ಾ6 ಾಗದದ ಕವEನುc ಆxSಕ€
ನಂ:04 ಎಂದೂ ಮತುa ಪಂಚರು Fಾ gೕhಕ ಪಂಚ ಾ ಾಲದ*+ & ಾ ಆದ ನಂತರ ೋಟುಗಳ
ಸಂ4ೆ% ಾಗೂ \ೌಲ%ವನುc ಬ ೆದು ೊಂಡ ಎರಡು .e ಾjೆಗಳನುc ಒಂದು ಾಗದದ ಕವEನ*+ ಾ•
ಆxSಕ€ ನಂ:05 ಅಂತ ನಮೂ ಸPಾsತು.
13
ನಂತರ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳ ಸೂಚ ೆಯ ೕ ೆ ೆ ಪಂಚರ ಸಮGಮ ಎ-. 1ಾ2ೆಯ /*ೕ0
ಇO‚Fೆಕ:E I ೕ . ಾಗಪn & -ಬoಂ I ೕ #ೕ ೇಶಪnರವರು ಶುದ'Yಾದ ೕರು ಮತುa `ೋ6ಯಂ
ಾMೋS ೇ‹ ಪ}6 ಉಪgೕh- ಒಂದು Fಾ+-:9 ಬಟ:*ನ*+ `ೋ6ಯಂ ಾMೋS ೇ‹ ಾ ವಣ
ತAಾ)-ದರು ಅದು ಬಣ‰ ರrತYಾhದು>, ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳ ಸೂಚ ೆಯಂiೆ Fಾ+-:9 ಬಟ:*ನ*+ದ>
`ೋ6ಯಂ ಾMೋS ೇ‹ ಾ ವಣ ಂದ ಸDಲn ಾ ವಣವನುc \ಾದ)Aಾh iೆ ೆದು ಅದನುc ಒಂದು
Mಾಟ*ಯ*+ ಾ• ಮುಚು'ಳ ಮುˆ' ಅದ ೆ= .e ಬ ೆ: ಸು[a ಅದರ Mಾs ೆ ಾರ ಂದ ಕx: ಅರh ಂದ
-ೕ€ \ಾ6 ಅದರ ೕPೆ "ಎ.#" ಎಂಬ ಇಂh+ೕ• ಅGರದ <ಹರು \ಾ6 ಆxSಕ€ ನಂ.06 ಅಂತ
ನಮೂ ಸPಾsತು.
ನಂತರ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳ ಸೂಚ ೆಯ ೕ ೆ ೆ ಆFಾ ತರ ಬಲ & ಎಡ ೈMೆರಳqಗಳನುc
ಎರಡು ಪ iೆ%ೕಕ Fಾ+-:9 ಬಟ:*ನ*+ದ> `ೋ6ಯಂ ಾMೋS ೇ‹ ಾ ವಣದ*+ ಪ iೆ%ೕಕYಾh ಅ >
iೊjೆ ಾಗ ಅದು [eಗುPಾ. ಬಣ‰ ೆ= ಬದPಾವ2ೆ ಆsತು, ನಂತರ ಅದನುc ಎರಡು ಪ iೆ%ೕಕ Fಾ+-:9
4ಾ* Mಾಟ*ಗಳ*+ ಾ• ಮುಚು'ಳ ಮುˆ' ಅವ}ಗe ೆ .e ಬ ೆ: ಸು[a ಅವ}ಗಳ Mಾs ೆ ಾರ ಂದ ಕx:
ಅವ}ಗಳ ೕPೆ ಅರh ಂದ -ೕ€ \ಾ6 ಅದರ ೕPೆ "ಎ#" ಎಂಬ ಇಂh+ೕ• ಅGರದ <ಹರು \ಾ6,
ಬಲ ೈ Mೆರಳqಗಳನುc iೊjೆದ ಾ ವಣದ Mಾಟ*ಯನುc ಆxSಕ€ ನಂ.07 ಅಂತ ಾಗೂ ಎಡ ೈ
Mೆರಳqಗಳನುc iೊjೆದ ಾ ವಣದ Mಾಟ*ಯನುc ಆxSಕ€ ನಂ.08 ಅಂತ ನಮೂ ಸPಾsತು.
ನಂತರ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳq ಆFಾ iೆ I ೕಮ[ hೕiಾರವ) ೆ wAಾS ಯು ೈತಬಂಧು
ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘ ಯQತ ಕತaಲ ೆ ೆ ಸಂಘದ ೊಂದ† ಾh ಸ*+-ದ ಅVS ೆ ಸಂಬ@-ದ ಕಡತವನುc
ಾಜರುಪ6ಸಲು ೇeದು> ಅವರು ಅ*+{ೕ ೇಬ€ ೕPೆ ಇದ> vೈಲನುc ಾಜರುಪ6-ದರು. ಪಂಚರ
ಸಮGಮ ತ 4ಾ@ ಾ)ಗಳq ಪ)Iೕ*- ಾಗ ಒಟು: 76 ಾjೆಗಳq ಇದು> ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡಂiೆ ಇರುತaYೆ.
1) ೈತ ಬಂದು ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘ ಯQತ ಅಂತ ಇರುವ ಮುಖಪ}ಟ
2) wAಾS ಯು ಸಂಘದ ೊಂಧ† ಾh ೕ6ದ ಅVS
3) ಸಂಘದ ಪ]ವS $ಾ# ಸೂಚ ಾ ಪ ಕಟ2ೆ
4) : 08/04/2018ರಂದು ನZೆದ ಸಂಘದ `ಾವSಜ ಕ ಸ$ೆಯ ನಡವeಗಳq.
5) ಸದ) ಸಂಘದ ಪ ವತSಕರ ೆಸರು ಮತುa #jಾಸದ \ಾr[ ಮತುa ಸಂಘದ ಮುಖ% ಪ ವತSಕರ
ಮತುa ಪ ವತSಕರು `ೇ) ಒಟು: 13 ಜನರ Yೈಯ•aಕ \ಾr[ ಮತುa "ೂೕಷ2ೆ ಪತ ಗಳq.
( Dಪ [ಯ*+)
6) ಸಂಘದ ಮುಖ% ಕ'ೇ)ಯ iೆ ೆಯುವ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಕಟ:ಡದ Mಾ6 ೆ ಕ ಾರು ಪತ
7) ಸಹ ಾರ ಅbವೃ ' ಅ@ ಾ) ಚನch)ರವ) ೆ ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘಗಳ ಸ ಾಯಕ ನಬಂಧಕರು,
14
ಾವಣ ೆ ೆ ಉಪ #$ಾಗರವರು : 26/4/2018ರಂದು ತಮU ಕ'ೇ) ಪತ ಸಂ4ೆ%: ಎಆE-31/ಆE
VಎO/ಊ ೈಸಸಂ/`ಾ"ಪ ೆ/2018-19 ರ*+ ಸದ) ಸಂಘದ `ಾ"ಪ ೆ ಬ ೆf `ಾಧ%iಾ ವರ ಯನುc
ಸ*+ಸುವ ಬ ೆf ಬ ೆದ ಪತ .
8) ಸಹ ಾರ ಅbವೃ ' ಅ@ ಾ) ಚನch)ರವರು ಸ ಾಯಕ ಬಂಧಕರು ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘರವ) ೆ ಸದ)
ಸಂಘದ ೊಂದ† ೆ ಸ*+-ರುವ `ಾದ%iಾ ವರ
ೕಲ=ಂಡ ಾಖPಾ[ಗಳ ಬ ೆf 7AಾS ೆ #Wಾ)ಸPಾh ಈ ಾಖPಾ[ಗಳq ಾನು ಮತುa
ನಮU ಾ ಮದ `ಾವSಜ ಕರು `ೇ) ೊಂಡು `ಾ"7ಸಲnx:ರುವ ಉ ೆ>ೕIತ ೈತ ಬಂದು ಸಹ ಾರ
ಸಂಘದ ಪ ವತSಕರುಗಳ Yೈಯ•aಕ \ಾr[ ಮತುa ಇiಾ% ಾಖPೆಗಳನುc ಸ*+-ದವ}ಗjಾhರುತaYೆ.
ಅಂತ [e-ದರು."
Subsequent investigation culminated in filing of the charge sheet by
the Lokayuktha police before the competent Court. The learned
Special Court registered Spl.C.C. 2 of 2020 and upon consideration
of the material, framed charges against the petitioner on
01-07-2022 for the offences alleged. The trial presently stands in
progress.
11. Simultaneously, a departmental proceeding was
instituted on the very same factual foundation, i.e., the trap
conducted on 05-07-2018. The Enquiry Officer, upon appreciation
of the oral and documentary evidence, adduced in the said
departmental proceeding, rendered a report exonerating the
15
petitioner. The report exonerating the petitioner, insofar it is
germane, reads as follows:
".... .... ....
REASONS
7. I have gone through the oral and the documentary
evidence placed before me. PW-1 from whom the DGO was
said to have received the bribe amount of ₹15000/-, has
stated in his evidence that about 4 years back one day he
had gone to the office of ARCS, Davanagere and he met
one Sri Rangappa, who is the retired Executive Engineer,
pertaining to registration of his Sangha as he was told to
meet him in order to get the works done in a proper way.
8. The evidence of PW-1 further unveils the fact that
Rangappa informed him that certain documents are
required and he asked him to pay ₹20,000/- and he
requested Rangappa to make it ₹15,000/- and he
presented the documents before the DGO and the DGO
informed him that 15 documents are required in respect of
13 Directors. He further speaks that thereafter he met
Rangappa outside the Office for registration of his Sangha
and Rangappa asked him to pay the amount and he paid
₹15,000/- to him, who was standing near the entrance
gate of the office and thereafter the ACB sleuths came and
went inside the office and he does not know what
happened inside the office.
9. PW-1 further speaks that while receiving the documents
from him, Rangappa had also taken his signatures on some
blank papers stating that those documents may be required
for attending the work. He further speaks that the ACB
sleuths have not drawn any mahazars in his presence and
his signatures were taken by ACB sleuths on blank white
sheets. He has identified his signature on the complaint,
which is marked Ex.P1. He further identifies his signatures
on mahazars, which are marked as Ex.P2 and Ex.P3. Ex.P2
is the entrustment mahazar and Ex.P3 is the trap mahazar.
16
He identifies the documents submitted for registration of
Sangha and the said documents are together marked as
Ex.P4.
10. Since PW-1 did not support the case, the Presenting Officer
has treated him as hostile. Nothing has been got elicited in
the cross-examination of PW-1 made by the Presenting
Officer. PW-1 has stated in his cross-examination made by
the Defence Assistant that he does not know the contents
of Ex.P1 to P3. He further speaks that he has not written
the contents of Ex.P1. He further speaks that he has never
talked anything with the DGO at any point of time. He
further speaks that when ACB sleuths entered the chamber
of DGO, there was exchange of words in between
Rangappa and DGO and the DGO was telling that what
Rangappa had given to DGO was a loan taken by him from
DGO.
11. PW-2 speaks that on 05-07-2018 when he was in the
office, the ACB sleuths came to their office and the ACB
sleuths asked him to identify the voice of DGO recorded in
the cell phone and he said that the said voice may be the
voice of DGO. He further speaks that the ACB sleuths
seized some documents under mahazar and asked him to
certify the said documents and he accordingly certified the
same, when are marked as Ex.P4. He speaks in the cross-
examination that he is not an expert in the voice
identification. He further speaks that he cannot say as to,
to whom the cell phone belongs. He further speaks that he
cannot say as to whether anybody had made mimicry of
the said voice and he cannot say as to whether the voice
identified by him is genuine one or tampered. He further
speaks that prior to playing the voice, the ACB sleuths had
told him that it is of the DGO voice.
12. PW-3, who is the shadow witness, has stated in
examination-in-chief that in the month of July, 2018, the
ACB sleuths had requested her Secretary to send a lady
typist to their office in connection with a case and she was
accordingly sent on duty. She further speaks that another
official witness had come there and the ACB sleuths
informed her about the complaint and explained about the
procedure of trapping and entrustment mahazar and they
17
prepared Ex.P2 and she signed on it. PW-3 further speaks
that herself and another witness and the ACB sleuths went
near the office of DGO and the ACB sleuths sent herself and
PW-1 along with a lady constable to the office of DGO. She
further speaks that the officials had gone for lunch and
they waited there and thereafter the DGO came to her
chamber.
13. PW-3 further speaks that she had been seated near DGO in
her chamber and PW-1 was along with her and there were
talks in between the DGO and PW-1. She further speaks
that she is oblivious of their talks and PW-1 paid ₹18,000/-
to DGO, who kept it in the drawer of her table and
thereafter, she came out of the chamber and informed to
the lady police and in turn, the lady police communicated
to the other sleuths and herself and the lady police came
inside the chamber and each of them caught hold of the
hands of DGO till arriving of riding sleuths. She also speaks
that the ACB sleuths got the hands of DGO washed and
they performed the procedure of trap and seized the
amount from the drawer of the table. She further speaks
that the ACB sleuths have drawn the mahazar as per Ex.P3.
14. PW-3 has admitted in his cross-examination that she was
not knowing as to the quantum of the amount to be given.
She has further stated that both Ex.P-2 and Petition-3 were
written in the office of ARCS, Davangere, which unfolds the
fact that Ex.P3 was not prepared in the office of DGO. She
further speaks that the DGO removed the amount of
₹18,000/- from the drawer of her table as per the
instructions of ACB sleuths. She also speaks that she does
not know as to how much amount was handed over by the
DGO to ACB sleuths from the drawer and as to how much
amount has been retained in the drawer. PW-3 further
speaks in the cross-examination that she does not know
the contents of the mahazars.
15. The DGO has stated in her evidence that one Rangappa,
who is her relative, had taken the hand loan of ₹15,000/-
from her and she had asked him repeatedly to return the
said amount and he had not returned. Further she speaks
that on 05-07-2018 when she was in the office, the said
Rangappa came to her chamber and repaid the said loan
18
and when she was arguing with him as to the delay in
repaying the loan, some persons entered into her chamber
and caught hold of her hands and she came to know that
they are ACB sleuths. She has stated in her evidence that
the work of PW-1 was not pending with her as on 05-07-
2018 and she has never asked him to pay any amount and
he had not paid any amount to her. She has also stated in
her evidence that she has not received any bribe amount
from PW-1.
16. Upon the assiduous unravelling the evidence of PW-1, it
clearly spells out the fact that he has not paid the bribe
amount of ₹15,000/- to DGO. The evidence of PW-1 clears
the cloud to hold that pragmatically there is no demand
and acceptance of any bribe amount by the DGO. Whatever
PW-1 has stated is only against one Rangappa to whom he
has paid ₹15,000/- to get his work done. If the evidence of
PW-1 is read along with the evidence of DGO, it lays a clear
path to hold that what PW-1 had paid the amount to
Rangappa was the very amount, which was paid by
Rangappa to the DGO and the said amount came to be
seized by the ACB sleuths during raid.
17. Upon peering into the whole evidence of PW-1, it is my
considered opinion that without there being even an
infinitesimal skeptical his evidence does not implicate the
DGO in any way for the reason that he has not spoken
anything against the DGO as to whether he had
approached her to get his work done or as to whether the
DGO has placed any demand for the bribe or as to whether
he has paid any bribe to DGO on her demand.
18. The circumspect look over the evidence of PW-3, it unrolls
the fact that according to her, PW-1 has paid ₹18,000/- to
DGO, which is not the case of the Disciplinary Authority.
Further the evidence of PW-3 beckons the fact that she
does not know as to how much amount was handed over
by the DGO to ACB sleuths from the drawer and as to how
much amount was retained in the drawer. In all
perspective, the evidence of PW-3 places the inconsistent
and different story than what has been alleged against the
DGO.
19
19. It is indispensable to state that the evidence of PW-1 and
PW-3 does not corroborate with each other and father, the
number of material contradictions and material omissions
amounting to contradictions are arising in their evidence
and their evidence does not run parallel to each other.
Above all, even the evidence of PW-3 does not divulge as
to whether there was a demand and acceptance on the part
of DGO.
20. It is very much cardinal to state that even if the entire
evidence of PW-1 and 3 is filtered in the way known to law,
there does not find even a tiny cogent and satisfactory
evidence to come to the conclusion as to whether there is a
demand and acceptance of the bribe amount of ₹15,000/-
by the DGO from PW-1. Albeit the evidence of PW-3
unveils that PW-1 paid ₹18,000/- to the DGO, the evidence
of PW-1 falsifies her evidence, whose evidence uncovers
the fact that he has not paid any amount to DGO. As I
have earlier stated, PW-3 has placed a complete different
evidence all together by deposing that PW-1 has paid
₹18,000/- to DGO.
21. In order to recapitulate, I have no hesitation to hold that it
is very arduous to accept the evidence of PW-3, whose
evidence contradicts the evidence of PW-1. Upon peeping
into the whole evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, I do not find a
petite material in their evidence even to postulate as to
whether there was a demand and acceptance on the part of
the DGO.
22. Hence, in the light of my findings given supra, I arrive at
an irresistible conclusion that there is no even a miniature
evidence on record to buttress the charges levelled against
the DGO and thus, in all perspective it is not proved that
DGO has committed any breach in her duty and there is no
iota of evidence to hold that DGO has committed the
breach in her duty under the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957 as
alleged. Hence, for the reasons stated supra, I have no
hesitation to hold that DGO is entitled for exoneration of
the charges levelled against her.
20
23. In the result, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
That the charges levelled against he Delinquent
Government Official viz., Smt. Geetha R. W/o Ravi G.S.,
alleging the violation of KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957 are not
proved.
Sd/-
(BASAVARAJ S.SAPPANNAVAR)
ENQUIRY OFFICER
ANNEXURES:
Witnesses examined for the Disciplinary Authority:
1. PW-1 – Sri S.E.Rudresh,
2. PW-2 – Sri Dakshinamurthy
3. PW-3 – Smt. Mala
Witnesses examined for the Defence:
1. DW-1- Smt. Geetha R.
Documents marked for Disciplinary Authority:
1. Ex.P1 – Complaint
2. Ex.P1(a) – Signature of PW-1.
3. Ex.P2 – Entrustment Mahazar
4. Ex.P2(a)- Signature of PW-1
5. Ex.P2(b)- Signature of PW-3
6. Ex.P3 – Trap mahazar
7. Ex.P3(a)- Signature of PW-1
8. Ex.P3(b) Signature of PW-3
9. Ex.P4 – Documents pertaining to registration of
Sangha.
10. Ex.P4(a) – Signature of PW-2
Documents marked for Defence: Nil.
Sd/-
(BASAVARAJ S.SAPPANNAVAR)
ENQUIRY OFFICER”
21
In essence, the Enquiry Officer found that PW1, the complainant
resiled from the prosecution narrative, turning hostile and
attributed the monetary transaction to one Rangappa, disclaiming
any demand or acceptance on the part of the petitioner. PW2’s
testimony concerning voice identification was hedged with
uncertainty and lacked expert corroboration. PW3, the shadow
witness, while deposing about the alleged payment, introduced
inconsistencies, particularly as to the quantum of money and
circumstances of recovery. The Enquiry Officer noted material
contradictions and omissions between the testimonies of PW1 and
PW3 and observed that their versions did not match each other. He
further found that in the absence of cogent evidence establishing
the essential ingredients of demand and acceptance, the defence
version – that the amount represented repayment of a hand loan by
a relative was considered as correct, with the complainant’s
deposition.
12. On an overall assessment, the Enquiry Officer concluded
that there was not even a semblance of reliable evidence to
substantiate the charge of misconduct under the KCS (CCA) Rules,
221957. Consequently, the petitioner was exonerated. The
Disciplinary Authority, by an order dated 27-01-2023, accepted the
report and closed to the proceedings. The order of the Disciplinary
Authority reads as follows:
“ಪ `ಾaವ ೆ:
ೕPೆ ಓದPಾದ ಕ ಮ ಸಂ4ೆ%: (1) ರ \ಾನ% ಉಪPೋ ಾಯುಕaರ ವರ ಯ*+ I ೕಮ[
ಆE.hೕiಾ ೋಂ V.ಎ0.ರ#, ಕ’ೇ) ಅ@ೕGಕರು, ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘಗಳ ಸ ಾಯಕ ಬಂಧಕರ
ಕ’ೇ), ಾವಣ ೆ ೆ ಉಪ#$ಾಗ, ಾವಣ ೆ ೆ ಇವರು ” ೈತ ಬಂಧು” ಸಹ ಾ) ಸಂಘ ಎಂಬ ೆಸ)ನ
ಸಹ ಾರ ಸಂಘವನುc ೋಂದ† \ಾಡುವ ಸಂಬಂಧ I ೕ ಎ0.ಇ.ರು ೆ ೕŒ .O ಎ0.V.ಈಶDರಪn
ಇವ) ೆ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ೆ=, Mೇ6 ೆ ಇಟು: ಾಂಕ:05.07.2018 ರಂದು ರೂ.15,000/- ಗಳ ಲಂಚದ
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ಾಂಕ:06.06.2022 ರ ಆ ೇಶದ*+ ಕ ಾSಟಕ ಾಗ)ಕ `ೇYಾ (ವhೕSಕರಣ, ಯಂತ ಣ ಮತುa
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ಾಂಕ:26.09.2022 ರಂದು ಮು ಾaಯ ೊe- ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡಂiೆ ಆ ೇI-ರುiಾa ೆ.
“4. The Inquiry Officer ( Additional Registrar of
Enquiries-3) has reported that, after recording of
23First Oral Statement the DGO submitted that on
the same charges, departmental enquiry has been
conducted against her by the Disciplinary Authority
and she has been exonerated from the charges and
hence requested to close the Present enquiry.
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ಮು ಾaಯ ೊeಸಲು [ೕ\ಾS -ದ ಸ ಾSರವ} ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡಂiೆ ಆ ೇI- ೆ.
ಸ ಾS) ಆ ೇಶ ಸಂ4ೆ%:
ಸಂ4ೆ% ಸಇ 16 ಎಸ`ೇ 2022
Mೆಂಗಳkರು,
Mೆಂಗಳkರು ಾಂಕ:27.01.2023
ಾಂಕ
ಕ ಾSಟಕ ಾಗ)ಕ `ೇYಾ (ವhೕSಕರಣ, ಯಂತ ಣ ಮತುa ೕಲUನ#) ಯಮಗಳq,
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#ರುದ’ದ ಇPಾ4ಾ #Wಾರ2ೆಯನುc ಮು ಾaಯ ೊeಸPಾh ೆ.
ಈ #Wಾರ2ೆ ನZೆಯ ದ>*+ ೌಕರರು Aಾವ `ೌಲಭ%ಗಳನುc ಪZೆಯು[aದ>ರೂ, ಆ ಎPಾ+
`ೌಲಭ%ಗಳನುc ಪZೆಯಲು ಅಹS)ರುiಾa ೆ.
ಕ ಾSಟಕ ಾಜ%Fಾಲರ ಆ ೇtಾನು`ಾರ
ಮತುa ಅವರ ೆಸ)ನ*+
ಸr/- 27/1/23
( ೆ. ಮಂಜು ಾಥ)
ಸ ಾSರದ ಅ@ೕನ ಾಯSದIS-2
ಸಹ ಾರ ಇPಾ4ೆ”
In the wake of such exoneration, the present petition comes
to be filed on 11-07-2023, contending that the continuation
of criminal trial would be unwarranted in the light of the
departmental findings, thereby contending that the criminal
24
trial must be closed, on account of the petitioner’s
exoneration in the departmental enquiry.
13. In order to resolve the controversy, it becomes necessary
to survey the judicial landscape shaped by the elucidation of the
Apex Court.
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:
13.1. The Apex Court in P.S. RAJYA supra has held as
follows:
“…. …. ….
17. At the outset we may point out that the learned
Counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position
that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a
criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to
establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also
accepted that in the present case, the charge in the
departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one
and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the
departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it. On these
premises, if we proceed further then there is no difficulty in
accepting the case of the appellant. For if the charge which is
identical could not be established in a departmental proceedings
and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports
submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to
proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings. In this
context, we can usefully extract certain relevant portions from
the report of the Central Vigilance Commission on this aspect:
25
“Neither the prosecution nor the defence has
produced the author of various reports to confirm the
valuation. The documents cited in the list of documents
is a report signed by two engineers namely S/Shri S.N.
Jha and D.N. Mukherjee whereas the document brought
on record (Ex. S. 20) has been signed by three
engineers. There is also difference in the estimated
value of the property in the statement of imputation and
the report. The document at Ex. S. 20 has been signed
by three engineers and the property has been valued at
Rs. 4, 85, 000 for the ground floor and Rs. 2, 55, 600
for the second floor. A total of this comes to Rs. 7, 40,
900 which is totally different from the figure of Rs. 7,
69, 800 indicated in the statement of imputation. None
of the engineers who prepared the valuation report
though cited as prosecution witnesses appeared during
the course of enquiry. This supports the defence
argument that the authenticity of this document is in
serious doubts. It is a fact that the income tax
authorities got this property evaluated by S/Shri S.N.
Jha and Vasudev and as per this report at. pp., 50 to_63
they estimated the property at Rs. 4, 57, 600 including
the cost of land Rs. 1, 82, 000 for ground and – -.
mezzanine floor plus Rs. 2, 55, 600 for first floor and Rs.
20, 000 for cost of land. Thus both the engineers who
prepared the valuation report for income tax purposes
also prepared the report for the CBI and there is no
indication in the subsequent report as to why there is a
difference in the value of the property. A perusal of
these two reports reveals that there is difference in the
specification of the work. The valuation report prepared
by Sri S.N. Jha for ground floor for income tax purposes
clearly states that the structure was having “RCC pillars
at places, brickwork in cement mortar, RCC lintel, 60 cm
walls, 9 inch floor height, 17. 6, 8. 00, 8. 00 inch” but in
the report for CBI which was also prepared by him the
description is “RCC framed structure open verandah on
three sides in the ground floor”. Similarly, for the first
floor it is written in the report as “partly framed
structure and partly load being walls, floor heights 3. 20
mm. Further Shri S.N. Jha on p. 54 of Ex. D. 1 had
adopted a rate of Rs. 290 per sq. mtr. for ground floor
and adding for extra height he had estimated ground
floor including mezzanine floor at Rs. 2, 02, 600. But for
the report at Ex. S. 20 the rate has been raised to 365
per sq. mtr. There is no explanation for this increase of
rate by Rs. 75 per mtr. It is also observed that for the
26updating of the cost of index 5% was added to the rate
of Rs. 290 as per p. 55 of Ex. D. 1 by Sri S.N. Jha but
this has been raised to 97% as an escalation to the cost
of index in Ex. S. 20 without explaining or giving the
reasons therefor. It is surprising that same set of
engineers have adopted different standard for evaluating
the same property at different occasions. Obviously,
either of the report is false and it was for the
prosecution to suitably explain it. In the absence of it
the only inference to be drawn is that report at Ex. S. 20
is not authentic. Since the same set of engineers have
done the evaluation earlier and if subsequently they felt
that there was some error in the earlier report, they
should have explained detailed reasons either in the
report itself or during the course of enquiry. Therefore,
Ex. S. 20 is not reliable.”
…………
20. Moreover a perusal of Ex. S. 20 reveals that
Shri Vasudev, Executive Engineer has recorded a note as
follows:
“Hence the valuation of Sri S.N. Jha was
never superseded by any other estimates. As is
confirmed from the records, his estimated figures
were only accounted for by the ITO Bokaro.”
Thus according to Shri Vasudev, who was the
seniormost among the three CPWD engineers who
prepared Ex. S. 20, the valuation of ground floor remains
at Rs. 1, 82, 600 plus Rs. 20, 000 for the cost of land.
The first floor as per Ex. S. 20 was estimated at Rs. 2, 55,
600 and a total of all this comes to Rs. 4, 57, 600 which
is very near to the declaration of actuals to the income
tax authority and also the estimated cost by the Bokaro
Steel Township Engineer and the Government approved
valuer.
21. It is clear from the above discussions that
though the document cited in Annexure III is a joint
report of two engineers what has been brought on record
is a document signed by three engineers, the same set of
engineers who evaluated the property for income tax
purposes, and there is a vast difference in the
specifications and the rates adopted for calculating the
27
cost in Ex. S. 20 have been increased without any
explanation and none of these engineers were produced
during the course of enquiry to clarify the position. Hence
the authenticity of Ex. S. 20 is doubtful as claimed by the
defence.
22. It needs to be mentioned that the report at Ex.
S. 20 has evaluated the ground floor at Rs. 4, 85, 300
and a note to the effect that 10% should be allowed for
self-supervision and procurement of material has also
been recorded at the end. On this basis the net value of
ground floor comes to Rs. 4, 36, 810 (Rs. 4, 85, 344-Rs.
48, 534). The first floor has been evaluated at Rs. 2, 55,
600 after allowing the allowance for self-supervision and
a total of both items would come to Rs. 6, 62, 410. Thus,
even the report at Ex. S. 20 does not support the
prosecution case that as per the report of CPWD
Engineers the property is valued at Rs. 7, 69, 800. As the
property assessed by the income tax authority for Rs. 4.
67 lakhs and even the valuation given by the Bokaro
Steel Township Engineer and the Government approved
valuer are very near to this figure, the reasonable value
of this property could only be taken as Rs. 4. 75 lakhs
assessed by the Bokaro Township Engineer on detailed
estimate basis.
…. …. ….
20. At the risk of repetition, we may state that
the charge had not been proved and on that basis
the appellant was cleared of departmental enquiry.
In this connection, we may also usefully cite a
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426. This Court after considering almost all earlier
decisions has given guidelines relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code for quashing an FIR or a complaint.
This Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79,
paras 102-3)
28
“In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down
any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non –
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
29
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.”
13.2. Later, in RADHESHYAM KEJRIWAL supra the Apex
Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a
criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication
proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been
able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and
the appellant has been exonerated on the same
allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal
case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts
in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be
irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [AIR 1945
Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding
of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be
30
evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (AIR
p. 27)
“… I must, however, say that in answering the
question, I have only referred to civil cases where the
actions are in personam and not those where the
proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact
arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant
in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this
case. When that question arises for determination, the
provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be
carefully examined.”
…. …. ….
29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting
the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an
adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for
criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in
adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held
guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a
little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire
burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the
prosecution.
…. …. ….
31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in
criminal proceedings is higher than that required before
the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is
exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his
prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or
not is the precise question which falls for determination
in this case.
…. …. ….
38. The ratio which can be culled out from these
decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution
can be launched simultaneously;
31
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not
necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings
are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in
the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding
for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to
attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or
Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in
favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will
depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in
adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not
on merit, prosecution may continue;and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits
where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all
and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the
same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to
continue, the underlying principle being the higher
standard of proof in criminal cases.
39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would
be to judge as to whether the allegation in the
adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for
prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person
concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits.
In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention
of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication
proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an
abuse of the process of the court.”
32
13.3. In AJAY KUMAR TYAGI supra, the Apex Court has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and we find substance in the submission of Mr Attri.
True it is that the inquiry officer has submitted its report and
found the allegation to have not been proved but, that is not the
end of the matter. It is well settled that the disciplinary
authority is not bound by the conclusion of the inquiry
officer and, after giving a tentative reason for
disagreement and providing the delinquent employee an
opportunity of hearing, can differ with the conclusion and
record a finding of guilt and punish the delinquent
employee. In the present case, before the said stage was
reached, the accused filed an application under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure for terminating the criminal
proceedings and the High Court fell into error in quashing the
said proceedings on the premise that the accused has been
exonerated in the departmental proceeding. As the order of the
High Court is founded on an erroneous premise, the same
cannot be allowed to stand.
13. It is worthwhile to mention here that in the writ
petition filed by the accused himself, seeking conclusion of the
departmental proceeding, the High Court had observed that
keeping the departmental proceeding in abeyance till the
pendency of the criminal case is not unjustified, and that order
has attained finality. Further, the order dated 25-3-2009 passed
by the disciplinary authority exonerating the accused from the
charges, is founded on the ground of quashing of the criminal
proceedings by the High Court and in that, it has clearly been
observed that if an order contrary to the High Court order is
received, the matter will be reopened.
14. As we have taken the view that the impugned order
[Ajay Kumar Tyagi v. State, (2008) 3 DLT (Cri) 788] of the High
Court suffers from an apparent illegality, the same deserves to
be set aside so also the order of the disciplinary authority
founded on that and, in the light of the direction of the High
33
Court, the departmental proceeding has to be reopened and
kept in abeyance till the conclusion of the criminal case.
15. Now we proceed to consider the question of law
referred to us i.e. whether the prosecution against an
accused, notwithstanding his exoneration on the identical
charge in the departmental proceeding could continue or
not?
16. Mr Sharma, with vehemence, points out that this
question has been settled and set at rest by this Court in P.S.
Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , which has held
the field since 1996, hence at such a distance of time, it is
inexpedient to reconsider its ratio and upset the same. Mr Attri,
however, submits that this Court in the aforesaid case has
nowhere held that exoneration in the departmental proceeding
would ipso facto terminate the criminal proceeding.
17. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions advanced and in order to decipher the true ratio of
the case, we have read the judgment relied on very closely.
In P.S. Rajya case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] ,
the allegations against the delinquent employee in the
departmental proceeding and criminal case were one and
the same, that is, possessing assets disproportionate to
the known sources of income. The Central Bureau of
Investigation, the prosecutor to assess the value of the
assets relied on the valuation report given later on. This
Court on fact found that “the value given as basis for the
charge-sheet is not the value given in the report
subsequently given by the valuers”. This would be evident
from the following passage from para 15 of the judgment: (SCC
p. 5)
“15. … According to the learned counsel the
Central Vigilance Commission has dealt with this
aspect in its report elaborately and ultimately came to
a conclusion that the subsequent valuation reports on
which CBI placed reliance are of doubtful nature. The
same view was taken by the Union Public Service
Commission. Even otherwise the value given as basis
for the charge-sheet is not the value given in the
report subsequently given by the valuers.”
34
18. Thereafter, this Court in P.S. Rajya case [(1996) 9
SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] referred to its earlier decision
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , and reproduced the illustrations laid down
for exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the criminal
prosecution. The categories of cases by way of illustrations,
wherein power could be exercised either to prevent the abuse of
the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice read as follows: (Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
35
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
The aforesaid illustrations do not contemplate that
on exoneration in the departmental proceeding, the
criminal prosecution on the same charge or evidence is to
be quashed. However, this Court in P.S. Rajya
case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] quashed the
prosecution on the peculiar facts of that case, finding that
the said case can be brought under more than one head
enumerated in the guidelines. This would be evident from
paras 21 and 22 of the judgment, which read as follows: (P.S.
Rajya case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 9)
“21. The present case can be brought under more than
one head given above in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] without any difficulty.
22. The above discussion is sufficient to allow this
appeal on the facts of this case.”
19. Even at the cost of repetition, we hasten to add
that none of the heads in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 897] is in relation to the effect of
exoneration in the departmental proceedings on criminal
prosecution on identical charge. The decision in P.S.
Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , therefore,
does not lay down any proposition that on exoneration of
an employee in the departmental proceeding, the criminal
prosecution on the identical charge or the evidence has to
be quashed.
20. It is well settled that the decision is an authority for
what it actually decides and not what flows from it. The mere
fact that in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
897] , this Court quashed the prosecution when the
36
accused was exonerated in the departmental proceeding
would not mean that it was quashed on that ground. This
would be evident from para 23 of the judgment, which reads as
follows: (SCC p. 9)
“23. Even though all these facts including the report of
the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the
notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took
a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final
proceedings and the report of the Central Vigilance
Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge
in departmental proceedings would not conclude the
criminal case against the appellant. We have already held
that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case,
the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant
cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the
view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are
the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 [P.S.
Rajya v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 434 of 1996,
order dated 27-3-1996 (SC)] for allowing the appeal and
quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving
consequential reliefs.”
(emphasis supplied)
From the reading of the aforesaid passage of the
judgment it is evident that the prosecution was not
terminated on the ground of exoneration in the
departmental proceeding but, on its peculiar facts.
21. It is worth mentioning that the decision in P.S.
Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] came up for
consideration before a two-Judge Bench of this Court earlier,
in State v. M. Krishna Mohan [(2007) 14 SCC 667 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 922] . While answering an identical question i.e.
whether a person exonerated in the departmental enquiry
would be entitled to acquittal in the criminal proceeding
on that ground alone, this Court came to the conclusion
that exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto
would not lead to the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal trial. This Court observed emphatically that the
decision in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
897] was rendered on peculiar facts obtaining therein. It
is apt to reproduce paras 32 and 33 of the said judgment in this
37
connection: (M. Krishna Mohan case [(2007) 14 SCC 667 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 922] , SCC p. 676)
“32. Mr Nageswara Rao relied upon a decision of this
Court in P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 897] . The fact situation obtaining therein was
absolutely different. In that case, in the vigilance report, the
delinquent officer was shown to be innocent. It was at that
juncture, an application for quashing of the proceedings was
filed before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which was allowed relying on State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] holding: (P.S. Rajya case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 9, para 23)’23. Even though all these facts including the report
of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the
notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court
took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in
the final proceedings and the report of the Central
Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the
same charge in departmental proceedings would not
conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have
already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar
facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated
against the appellant cannot be pursued.'”
(emphasis in original)
Ultimately this Court concluded as follows: (M.
Krishna Mohan case [(2007) 14 SCC 667 : (2009) 1 SCC
(Cri) 922] , SCC p. 676, para 33)“33. The said decision was, therefore, rendered
on the facts obtaining therein and cannot be said to
be an authority for the proposition that exoneration in
departmental proceeding ipso facto would lead to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial.”
22. This point also fell for consideration before this
Court in Supt. of Police (CBI) v. Deepak
Chowdhary [(1995) 6 SCC 225 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1095] ,
where quashing was sought for on two grounds and one
of the grounds urged was that the accused having been
exonerated of the charge in the departmental proceeding,
the prosecution is fit to be quashed. The said submission
38
did not find favour with this Court and it rejected the
same in the following words: (SCC p. 227, para 6)
“6. The second ground of departmental
exoneration by the disciplinary authority is also not
relevant. What is necessary and material is whether
the facts collected during investigation would
constitute the offence for which the sanction has
been sought for.”
23. The decision of this Court in CBI v. V.K.
Bhutiani [(2009) 10 SCC 674 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 407] ,
also throws light on the question involved. In the said
case, the accused against whom the criminal proceeding
and the departmental proceeding were going on, was
exonerated in the departmental proceeding by the
Central Vigilance Commission. The accused challenged his
prosecution before the High Court relying on the decision
of this Court in P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 897] and the High Court quashed the prosecution.
On a challenge by the Central Bureau of Investigation,
the decision was reversed and after relying on the
decision in M. Krishna Mohan [(2007) 14 SCC 667 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 922] , this Court came to the
conclusion that the quashing of the prosecution was
illegal and while doing so observed as follows: (V.K. Bhutiani
case [(2009) 10 SCC 674 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 407] , SCC p.
678, para 6)
“6. … In our opinion, the reliance of the High Court on
the ruling of P.S. Rajya [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
897] was totally uncalled for as the factual situation in that
case was entirely different than the one prevalent here in
this case.”
24. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court
quashed the prosecution on total misreading of the
judgment in P.S. Rajya case [(1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 897] . In fact, there are precedents, to which we
have referred to above, that speak eloquently a contrary
view i.e. exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso
facto would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a
criminal case. On principle also, this view commends us.
It is well settled that the standard of proof in a
39
department proceeding is lower than that of criminal
prosecution. It is equally well settled that the
departmental proceeding or for that matter criminal
cases have to be decided only on the basis of evidence
adduced therein. Truthfulness of the evidence in the
criminal case can be judged only after the evidence is
adduced therein and the criminal case can not be rejected
on the basis of the evidence in the departmental
proceeding or the report of the inquiry officer based on
those evidence.
25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto
would not result in the quashing of the criminal
prosecution. We hasten to add, however, that if the
prosecution against an accused is solely based on a
finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside by
the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very
foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed.But
that principle will not apply in the case of the
departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the
departmental proceeding are held by two different
entities. Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”
13.4. The Apex Court in ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI
supra has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
8. A number of judgments have held that the
standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being
based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower
than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where
the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [P.S. Rajya v. State of
Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1: 1996 SCC (Cri) 897], the question
before the Court was posed as follows: (SCC pp. 2-3, para
3)
40
“3. The short question that arises for our
consideration in this appeal is whether the
respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution
against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with
Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical
charge the appellant was exonerated in the
departmental proceedings in the light of a report
submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and
concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.”
9. This Court then went on to state: (P.S. Rajya
case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 5, para 17)
“17. At the outset we may point out that the
learned counsel for the respondent could not but
accept the position that the standard of proof
required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far
higher than the standard of proof required to
establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings.
He also accepted that in the present case, the charge
in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal
proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute
the findings rendered in the departmental
proceedings and the ultimate result of it.”
10. This being the case, the Court then held: (P.S.
Rajya case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 9, para 23)
“23. Even though all these facts including the report
of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to
the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High
Court took a view [Prabhu Saran Rajya v. State of
Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 5212 of 1992, order
dated 3-8-1993 (Pat)] that the issues raised had to
be gone into in the final proceedings and the report of
the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the
appellant of the same charge in departmental
proceedings would not conclude the criminal case
against the appellant. We have already held that for
the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case,
the criminal proceedings initiated against the
appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not
41agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated
above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-
1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned
criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”
11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of
W.B. [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3
SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , this Court held as
follows: (SCC pp. 594-96, paras 26, 29 & 31)
“26. We may observe that the standard of proof
in a criminal case is much higher than that of the
adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement
Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the
adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been
exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is
facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our
opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication
proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the
criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [B.N. Kashyap v. Crown,
1944 SCC OnLineLah46 : AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench
had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil
case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from
the following passage of the said judgment: (SCC
OnLineLah: AIR p. 27)
‘… I must, however, say that in answering the
question, I have only referred to civil cases where the
actions are in personam and not those where the
proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of
fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be
relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to
decide in this case. When that question arises for
determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence
Act, will have to be carefully examined.’
***
29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in
accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that
the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not
binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A
person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication
proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a
criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided
on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little
higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire
42
burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on
the prosecution.
***
31. It is trite that the standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings is higher than that
required before the adjudicating authority and in case
the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating
authority whether his prosecution on the same set of
facts can be allowed or not is the precise question
which falls for determination in this case.”
12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then
culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follows:
(Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of
W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p.
598)
“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these
decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal
prosecution can be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not
necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal
proceedings are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing
prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding
on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law
to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution
or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication
proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for
identical violation will depend upon the nature of
finding. If the exoneration in adjudication
proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit,
prosecution may continue; and
43
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on
merits where the allegation is found to be not
sustainable at all and the person held innocent,
criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and
circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the
underlying principle being the higher standard of
proof in criminal cases.”
13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal
case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581
: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598, para 39)
“39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick
would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the
adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding
for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the
person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is
on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no
contravention of the provisions of the Act in the
adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person
concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the
court.”
13.5. In its latest judgment, in CHANDRASHEKAR supra,
the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
3. The appellant is the Lokayukta of the State of
Karnataka, an independent body tasked also to conduct
enquiries on complaints of corruption and initiate and continue
prosecution; such powers having been statutorily conferred
under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984. On facts, suffice it to
notice that the respondent, an Executive Engineer (Electrical)
with the Works and Maintenance Division, HESCOM, Bagalkot
regulated by the Karnataka Electricity Transmission Corporation
Limited Regulations, was alleged to have demanded a bribe
from an electrical contractor to clear five bills, at the rate of
Rupees two thousand each. The contractor complained to the
Anti-Corruption Bureau who prepared a trap, with identifiable,
powdered notes kept in a packet entrusted with the
complainant, to be handed over to the Executive Engineer. The
44
trap was successful, and the notes were recovered from the
pocket of the Executive Engineer whose hands turned pink on
dipping in the prepared solution, which proved the taint of
corruption.
4. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated and so was
criminal prosecution launched, the former by the department
itself and the latter by the Lokayukta who is the appellant
herein. On the claim that the departmental proceedings ended
in exoneration, the delinquent employee approached the High
Court, for quashing the criminal proceedings. The High Court by
the impugned judgment relied on Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State
of W.B., a three-Judge Bench decision to hold that if there is an
exoneration on merits where the allegation is found to be not
sustainable at all and the person held innocent, then criminal
proceedings on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot
be allowed to continue especially based on the principle of
higher standard of proof in criminal cases. The learned Single
Judge also refused to follow a later judgment of this Court
in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi; finding the later
judgment to be per incuriam, having been passed in ignorance
of the earlier one.
5. There can be no doubt regarding the principle that if
the later Bench holds contrary to the earlier Bench decision of
coequal strength, on the same point, the contrary dictum
expressed by the later Bench would be per incuriam as held by
a Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company
Limited v. Pranay Sethi. But the question arising herein is as to
whether there was a conflict with the earlier and later
judgments.
6. In Radheshyam Kejriwal, the raid on the
premises of the appellant therein, by the Enforcement
Directorate gave rise to proceedings under the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Initially, a show-cause
notice was issued by the Director of the Enforcement
Directorate proposing adjudication proceedings under
Section 51 of the FERA, which, after explanation received
was concluded with a decision taken by the Adjudicating
Officer that the contravention of the provisions alleged
cannot be sustained since the transaction itself is not
proved. The said order became final for reason of the
Enforcement Directorate having not challenged it. Later,
45
on the same set of facts, as enabled under Section 56 of
the FERA criminal proceedings were initiated, which even
as per the enactment could be continued without any
prejudice to any award of penalty by the Adjudicating
Officer under Section 51 of the FERA. It is in this context
that the three-Judge Bench, by a majority, held inter
alia that though the adjudication and criminal
proceedings are independent of each other, if in the
former the offender is exonerated on merits then the
criminal prosecution also comes to an inevitable end. It
was also categorically found that if the exoneration in the
adjudication proceeding is on a technical ground and not
on merits, the prosecution could continue.
7. In Radheshyam Kejriwal the adjudication
proceedings and the criminal proceedings were under the
FERA, one for penalty; to recoup the economic loss
caused by the transaction contravening the provisions of
the statute and the other, prosecution; to provide penal
consequences as a deterrent measure. The subject matter
of the offence alleged in both proceedings was the
contravention of the provisions of the statute through the
transaction detected. When the adjudication proceedings
found the transaction alleged to have not taken place,
then it cuts at the root of the prosecution too. Other
decisions under the FERA, where the two proceedings of
adjudication and prosecution were found to be independent; the
decision in one having no bearing on the other, were noticed. So
were the decisions under the Income Tax Act, 19616 noticed,
wherein, when the penalty imposed on a presumed violation of
the provisions of the I.T. Act was set aside by the Tribunal; the
last fact-finding authority under the scheme of the I.T. Act, for
that reason alone the prosecution was found redundant and
quashed. Radheshyam Kejriwal2 culled out the principles in the
following manner:
38. The ratio which can be culled out from these
decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution
can be launched simultaneously;
46
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary
before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings
are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing
prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is
not binding on the proceeding for criminal
prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
Directorate is not prosecution by a competent
court of law to attract the provisions of
Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300
of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in
favour of the person facing trial for identical
violation will depend upon the nature of
finding. If the exoneration in adjudication
proceedings is on technical ground and not on
merit, prosecution may continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits
where the allegation is found to be not
sustainable at all and the person held innocent,
criminal prosecution on the same set of facts
and circumstances cannot be allowed to
continue, the underlying principle being the
higher standard of proof in criminal cases.
39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick
would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the
adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding
for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the
person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is
on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no
contravention of the provisions of the Act in the
adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person
concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the
court.
[underlining by us for emphasis]
8. In Radheshyam Kejriwal the very substratum of
the allegation of violation of the provisions of FERA was
47
found to be non-existent, an adjudication on merits that
the transaction alleged had not occurred. In the instant
case the Enquiry Report found that for reason of the
Officer in charge of the trap having not been examined,
the department was unable to establish the charge, not
at all an exoneration on merits, but more a discharge for
lack of diligence. The ratio decidendi of that case cannot
be extended to every situation where a statute provides
for a civil liability and a criminal liability, in which event
Courts would be presuming what logically follows from
the finding, without any application on the facts.
9. In a disciplinary enquiry the employer satisfies
itself as to whether the misconduct alleged is proved and
if proved, decides on the proportionate punishment that
should be imposed; both of which are in the exclusive
domain of the employer, to be determined on the
standard of preponderance of probabilities. In a criminal
prosecution launched what assumes significance is the
criminality of the act complained of or detected which has
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Both are
independent of each other not only for reason of the
nature of the proceedings and the standard of proof, but
also for reason of the adjudication being carried on by
two different entities, regulated by a different set of rules
and more importantly decided on the basis of the
evidence led in the independent proceedings. If evidence
is not led properly in one case, it cannot govern the
decision in the other case where evidence is led
separately and independently.
10. No doubt, the principles in Radheshyam Kejriwal are
applicable in a disciplinary inquiry, which was the specific
question considered in Ajay Kumar Tyagi; interestingly by the
very same Hon’ble Judge who authored the majority judgment
in Radheshyam Kejriwal. True, the earlier decision was not
noticed in the latter decision; according to us with just cause
since there were distinctions on facts.
11. Ajay Kumar Tyagi was a case in which a
successful trap was laid and there was exoneration in the
enquiry conducted without a final order by the
Disciplinary Authority. Therein the Disciplinary Authority
48
had not passed an order, in deference to the pending
criminal prosecution, which action of deferment was
unsuccessfully challenged in a writ petition by the
delinquent. Then a further writ petition was filed
challenging the continuance of the criminal prosecution
on the ground of exoneration in the Enquiry Report,
which stood allowed. The Disciplinary Authority then
passed an order exonerating the delinquent, subject to a
challenge to the quashing of the criminal proceedings. In
the SLP filed against the order of quashing there was a
reference to a larger Bench noting the divergence of
opinion with regard to the quashing of a prosecution
based on exoneration in a disciplinary proceeding. Even
before answering the reference the larger Bench found
the quashing to be wrong insofar as the Disciplinary
Authority having power to differ from the findings in the
report of enquiry and the High Court, in that case having
upheld the action of the Disciplinary Authority, keeping in
abeyance the final order. We pause here to notice that
herein the Disciplinary Authority passed an order
concurring with the findings in the Enquiry Report on
08.07.2024, produced as Annexure R-1, with a rider that
the order is subject to the proceedings in the criminal
case, the consequences of which would necessarily
follow.
12. The reference too was answered in Ajay Kumar
Tyagi. A two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in P.S.
Rajya v. State of Bihar was referred to wherein the
criminal prosecution was quashed when the departmental
proceedings concluded in exoneration. In P.S. Rajya, the
allegation was of possession of assets disproportionate to
the source of income. The Central Vigilance Commission
dealt with the charge and in its elaborate report
concluded that the valuation report on which CBI placed
reliance is of doubtful nature. The Court on facts found
that the value given as a base for the chargesheet was
not the value given in the reports subsequently given by
the valuers. The decision in P.S. Rajya relying on State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; the water shed decision in
invocation of the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing criminal
prosecution, held that the prosecution in that case should
49
be quashed for more than one reason as laid down
in Bhajan Lal. Ajay Kumar Tyagi categorically held that
the quashing of criminal proceedings in P.S. Rajya was
not merely on account of the exoneration in the
disciplinary proceedings. Referring to a number of
decisions, it was held so in paragraphs 24 & 25 which are
extracted hereunder:
“24. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court
quashed the prosecution on total misreading of the
judgment in P.S. Rajya case (1996) 9 SCC 1. In fact,
there are precedents, to which we have referred to
above, that speak eloquently a contrary view i.e.
exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto
would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a
criminal case. On principle also, this view commends
us. It is well settled that the standard of proof in a
department proceeding is lower than that of criminal
prosecution. It is equally well settled that the
departmental proceeding or for that matter criminal
cases have to be decided only on the basis of
evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness of the
evidence in the criminal case can be judged only after
the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal case
cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence in the
departmental proceeding or the report of the inquiry
officer based on those evidence.
25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso
facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal
prosecution. We hasten to add, however, that if the
prosecution against an accused is solely based on a
finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside by
the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very
foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed.
But that principle will not apply in the case of the
departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the
departmental proceeding are held by two different
entities. Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”
13. We are of the opinion that in the present case
the distinction as brought out in Ajay Kumar
Tyagi squarely applies and the ratio decidendi therein is
not regulated by the ratio of the earlier judgment
in Radheshyam Kejriwal. In Radheshyam Kejriwal, the
50
adjudication proceedings and the prosecution were both
by the very same entity, the Enforcement Directorate
under the FERA. In Ajay Kumar Tyagi, the allegation was
of a demand and acceptance of bribe in which a trap was
laid, and the prosecution was commenced and continued
by the ACB while the departmental proceedings were by
the Delhi Jal Board under which the delinquent employee
worked. Identical is the fact in this case where the ACB
laid the trap, commenced and continued the criminal
proceedings, at the behest of the appellant, while the
department carried on with the enquiry. The findings in
the enquiry report also do not persuade us to quash the
criminal proceedings as we would presently notice.
14. At the outset, we cannot but reiterate that the
enquiry report in disciplinary proceedings is not
conclusive of the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent
employee, which finding is in the exclusive domain of the
disciplinary authority. The enquiry officer is appointed
only as a convenient measure to bring on record the
allegations against the delinquent employee and the
proof thereof and to ensure an opportunity to the
delinquent employee to contest and defend the same by
cross-examination of the witnesses proffered by the
department and even production of further evidence, in
defense. The enquiry officer, strictly speaking, merely
records the evidence and the finding entered on the basis
of the evidence led at the enquiry does not have any
bearing on the final decision of the disciplinary authority.
The disciplinary authority takes the ultimate call as to
whether to concur with the findings of the enquiry
authority or to differ therefrom. On a decision being
taken to differ from the findings in the enquiry report as
to the guilt of the delinquent employee, if it is in favour of
the delinquent employee nothing more needs to be done
since the enquiry stands closed exonerating the
employee of the charges levelled. If the decision is to
concur with the finding of guilt by the Enquiry Officer,
then a show-cause is issued with the copy of the Enquiry
Report. However, while differing from the finding of
exoneration in the enquiry report, necessarily the
disciplinary authority will not only have to issue a show-
cause against the delinquent employee, with a copy of
51
the Enquiry Report, but the show-cause notice also has to
specifically bring to attention of the delinquent, the
aspects on which the disciplinary authority proposes to
differ, based on the facts discovered in the enquiry so as
to afford the delinquent employee an opportunity to
proffer his defense to the same.
15. Having thus stated the law regulating the final
decision in a departmental enquiry, we cannot but notice that in
the present case, there is a final order produced as passed by
the Disciplinary Authority. The learned Counsel for the
respondent vehemently argued that a retired District Judge was
the Enquiry Officer, which according to us gives the enquiry no
higher sanctity than that would be conferred on any enquiry
report in any disciplinary proceeding carried out by a person not
trained in law. The Enquiry Officer often is appointed as an
independent person who would have no connection with the
management to ensure against any allegation of bias. A retired
judicial officer being appointed as an enquiry officer does not
confer the enquiry report any higher value or greater sanctity
than that is normally available to such reports. We cannot but
observe that in this case the Enquiry Officer fell into an error by
requiring proof at a higher level than that necessary under
preponderance of probabilities and so did the Disciplinary
Authority, in concurring with the same.
16. We also notice the specific findings in the enquiry
report. The exoneration was on the basis of two aspects, one,
the Inspector of the ACB who carried out the trap having not
been examined and the other, two independent witnesses
accompanying the trap team having stated that they were
standing outside the office room wherein the handing over of
the bribe took place. The first ground of the Inspector not
having been examined, according to us, based on the
preponderance of probabilities, is not imperative, especially
when the two independent witnesses were examined. More so,
insofar as the department not being at fault since three
summons were taken out and a further request was made again
for summoning the witness, which was declined by the Enquiry
Officer. We cannot but notice that there would be no
consequence in not responding to a summons in departmental
proceedings, while a like failure in criminal proceedings would
be more drastic. The criminal court has ample powers to ensure
52
the presence of a witness in a criminal proceeding, which the
Enquiry Officer does not possess. In this context, the fact that
the prosecuting agency and the one carrying on the
departmental enquiry being two entities assumes significance.
Further, here the trap was laid by the ACB, and the prosecution
was conducted at the behest of the Lokayukta, and we cannot
presume or anticipate any laxity on the prosecuting agency of
not bringing the Inspector to the box, before the criminal court.
More pertinently we cannot, on such anticipated laxity put an
end to the prosecution.
17. We looked at the evidence laid at the enquiry, not to
regulate the order in the departmental proceedings which is not
challenged before us, but to satisfy ourselves and to understand
whether there is total exoneration on merits, which we find to
be absent. In the present case, the witnesses proffered by the
department where, (i) the complainant; the contractor who
complained of the demand of bribe and (ii) two independent
witnesses, government officers in two different departments
who accompanied the trap team. PW-1, the complainant
categorically stated that a bribe was demanded from him of
Rupees ten thousand to clear five bills at the rate of Rupees two
thousand each. He complained to the ACB whose Inspector
marked the notes, powdered them and put them in a packet,
after noting down the numbers to later identify them. The trap
team along with the complainant and two witnesses went to the
office of the delinquent employee. The complainant went inside
the office room wherein he handed over the packet containing
the money to the delinquent employee, who counted and put it
in his pant’s pocket, clearly spoken of by the complainant at the
enquiry. The complainant gave the signal as agreed upon, a
missed call on the mobile, when the trap team went in, checked
the pockets of the delinquent employee, recovered the packet
with the money and when the hands of the delinquent employee
were dipped in the solution earlier prepared, the colour changed
bringing forth the taint.
18. PW-2 and PW-3 were the independent witnesses who
were standing outside the office room when the complainant
went in. They deposed that on the signal being given, the
officers went inside the room and the witnesses followed. They
witnessed the money being taken out from the pocket of the
delinquent and the delinquent’s hands being dipped in a solution
53
which displayed the tainted colour. Even without the
examination of the Inspector who laid the trap we are of the
opinion that there was sufficient proof on the standard of
preponderance of probabilities to find the delinquent guilty of
the charge of demand and acceptance of bribe. The complainant
and the independent witnesses have spoken about the incident
of the successful trap laid.
19. On the principles of law as stated hereinabove
and also on the peculiar facts coming out from the above
case, we are not convinced that this is a fit case where
the criminal proceedings can be quashed on the
exoneration of the delinquent employee in a
departmental enquiry. We find the decision in Ajay Kumar
Tyagi to be squarely applicable. The appeal stands
allowed permitting the continuation of criminal
proceedings. We make it clear that since the disciplinary
authority has accepted the enquiry report, there cannot
be reopening of the same based on the findings
hereinabove; but a conviction in the criminal case would
bring in consequences as mandated by rules regulating
the service, specifically reserved in the order of the
disciplinary authority, Annexure R-1.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court in CHANDRASEKHAR supra makes it
abundantly clear that the impact of exoneration in a
departmental inquiry, upon the criminal prosecution, must
be assessed in the factual matrix of each case. It does not
efface earlier precedents but circumscribes their application
to appropriate circumstances. It therefore becomes necessary to
notice, whether the demand and acceptance is prima facie proved
54
against the petitioner, for it to become the ingredients of the
offences alleged.
14. The trap mahazar is noted hereinabove. The conversation
between the informant and the petitioner is also necessary to be
noticed. It reads as follows:
“… … …
ಒಟು: 14 Qಷ 29 `ೆ ೆಂƒ ೇ ಾƒS ಸಂ$ಾಷ2ೆ ಇರುತa ೆ.
02-43ರವ ೆ ೆ ಸಂಬಂ@ಸದ ಮತುa ಅಸnಷ: ಸಂ$ಾಷ2ೆ ಇರುತa ೆ.
2-44 ಬ c
ಅಸಅ
7AಾS ಆh ೆAಾ ೕಡಂ ನಮು>
ಅಸಅ ಆh ೆ, ೆcೕ ೆ \ಾƒ ಇx: ೆ>.
3-14 Mೇಗ tೇE ಕPೆGO \ಾZೊ=ಂƒ ತಂ ೆ ೋ6 .
ಅಸಅ
7AಾS tೇE ಅ\ೌಂ‹ ಎ•: \ಾ6 ೕ) ೕಡಂ.
ಅಸಅ ಒಂ™ [ Pಾ9‚ \ಾ6 ೕ .
7AಾS ೇ• ಅNೊ: ೊ=ಂ™ \ಾZೆoೕ6 ೕಡಂ.
ಅಸಅ ೇ ಅNೆ:ೕ šಾ-a ಏನPಾ+..
7AಾS ೇ• ಒಂ™ ಲG \ಾ6 ೕಡಂ.
ಅಸಅ ೇ, ಒಂ™ ಲG ಆ ೋ ಲ+, ಹಂ ೆ..
7AಾS ಮೂE ಲG \ಾZೆ+Mೇ ಾ?
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ಒಂ™ ಸEಕೂ%ಲE ಪ ಾರ ಅ•: \ಾZೆ+Mೇಕು.
7AಾS ಇವ} ರಂಗ ಾœ ೇeದcPಾ+ ಒಂ™ ಲG \ಾƒಬಹುದು ಅಂiಾ ೇಳc ಅಂದ
ಅಸಅ ೇ ಅವ ೊಬo ಆwೕ- ೆ \ಾ%ಟE ಸಂಬಂಧ ಇPೊ>ೕನು Aಾಕಪn \ಾiಾ6aೕAಾ ಅಂiಾ ಾ ೇea .
7AಾS ನಗುiಾa ೆ.
ಅಸಅ ಅವ} ಆwೕ- ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಪZೋ ಲ+, ಅವ} ಏ ಾದೂ ೊ[a ೆ \ಾiಾZೆoೕಕು. ೊ[aಲ>YೆPಾ+
55
\ಾiಾZೊaೕ ೆ ಇಲ+ ಸುQcEMೇಕು. ೌದು iಾ ೇ_
7AಾS ೇeೕ ೆ ಾನು, ಎಷು: \ಾ6- ೕ) ಅಂತಂ ೇ NೇE ಕPೆGO ಅದ ೆ= ೇeೕಲ+ ೕಡಂ ಅ# ೆ
ೇjೆoೕಕು ಅಂ ೆ, ಅ ೆ= ಒಂ™ ಲG.
ಅಸಅ ಎPಾ+ ಓ™ ದMಾ• ಾ ೆ, Zಾಕು ಂ‹ನ ಸಕೂ%SಲEನ, ಸುiೊaೕPೆನ ಏ ೇO \ಾƒMೇಕು ಅಂiಾ
\ಾiಾZಾa ೆ, ಾ›. ಹಂ ಾh.
7AಾS ಇನೂc `ಾ ೇಬ ಉ `ೈO ಾ ೆoೕಕು ೕಡಂ.
ಅಸಅ ಇPಾ+ ಆh ೆ.
7AಾS ಆh ಾ%, ೋ Zೊoೕದು, `ೈO ಾ•.
7AಾS ಹೂ› .. ೋ Zೊoೕ ಾ ೕಡಂ ಇದ ಾc..
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ೋ Zೊoೕದು. `ೈO ಾ•.
7AಾS ಇPೊ+ಂ™ `ೈO ಾ ೆoೕ ಾ.. FೆO ೋ6 ೕಡಂ ಇ*+, ಇPಾ+, ಇ*+ ೆಳಗZೆ ಾ.. )-ವE
ಅಂತ ಾ, )-#ಂŸ ಅಂiಾ ಅPಾD,
ಅಸಅ `ೈO \ಾ6 f, ೋ6a ಾw ತ ೋe ,
7AಾS ೌ ಾ.. ನ f ಅPಾD ಇದು `ೈO \ಾ6 ೋದು f.
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ಅPಾ+ ಇ ೆ= `ೈO \ಾ6 ಾ ,
7AಾS ಹೂ› .. `ೈO \ಾ Zೆ>ೕ, tಾ‹S `ೈO tಾ‹S `ೈO.
ಅಸಅ Zೇ‹ ಾ• ೆಳ ೆ
7AಾS Zೇ‹ ಎಷು: ೕಡಂ ಇವತುa.
ಅಸಅ ಾ›... ಐದು.
7AಾS ಐದು, ಏಳq ಹ ೆಂಟು ಓ ೆ. Fಾ`ಾ:h \ಾ6 ೕ).
ಅಸಅ ಾನು ಇ ೆ \ಾZೊ=ೕ‹ .6a šಾಗ™ ಮು% ೇಷO ಆ ೋ ತನಕ rಂ ೆ. ಇದು ಾ7
7AಾS vೈ€ ನ ೆ ೕಡಂ, ಇದು ಇ ೊಂ ೆ ಾ7 ಾ f
ಅಸಅ ಅ ೊಂ ೆ ಾ7 ನ f ಹೂ› .tಾ4ೆWೆಂp ಆh ೆ. ಇ ೊಂ™ ಸ) \ಾZೊ=‹ .6aೕ . ಇ*+ ಾವಣ ೆ ೆ.
tಾ4ೆ. ಐ™ Qಷ.
7AಾS Pೇ‹ ಆಗುiಾa ೕಡಂ. ಇ*+
ಅಸಅ ಇಲ+.. ಇಲ+..
56
7AಾS tಾ4ೆ 6vೆ ೆO‚ ಆh ೆ ಅPಾD
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ›
7AಾS `ಾ ೇಬು ದು ಮX `ೈO ಆ ೆoೕಕPಾ+ ಈಗ, ಇದ ಾ `ಾ ೇಬು ಇದ ಾ..
ಅಸಅ ಇ ಾ ೆ..
7AಾS ಇ ೆ ಸ)..
06-06 )ಂದ 10-25 ರವ ೆ ೆ Aಾವ} ೇ ಸಂ$ಾಷ2ೆ ಇರುವ} ಲ+.
10-26 NೇE ಕ6 \ಾಡ ಾ=ಗಲ+ ೕಡಂ ಇದು.
7AಾS
ಅಸಅ ಇPಾ+, ಆPÀÄÑ*ೕ ಸEಕೂ%ಲE ಪ ಾರ
7AಾS ಮೂರು ಕಂಪ€`ಾE \ಾZೆ+Mೆ ಾ.
ಅಸಅ ೌದು.. ೌದು.. Aಾಕಂ ೆ ಾ¡ ಸಕೂ%SಲE .‹ ೋ ೋ ೆ ಆಗಲ+. rೕŸ ಏ ಾಗುತa ೊiಾ ,
NೇE ೆಲGO ಕ6 \ಾZೆ¢ ಅಂzÉÆÌýæà ಎPೆGO ೆ Mಾ6 ೆ ೆ ಅಂiೆ, ಅ¯Éèà U ದುƒ ಉe™
.ಡುiೆa. ಎNೊ:ೕಂ™
7AಾS ಹೂ› .. ಹೂ› ..
ಅಸಅ ಆ ಉ ೆ>ೕಶ ೆ=.
7AಾS šಾ-a \ಾZೋದು.
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ಅ‹* •: ೋದೂ ನೂ ಉeMೇಕು.
7AಾS ಅ\ೌಂ‹ ಇ ೆ ಸDಲn ನ ೆ
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ಸDಲn ಅನುಕೂಲ ಆಗುiೆa. ಇದು Mಾ%ಂ• ೆ ಒಂ™ ೊ ೆ ೕ.
7AಾS Mಾ%ಂ9 ೆ ಒಂ™ ೊZೆoೕ ಾ.
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ೊ6> ೆ ಅ ೌಂ‹ ಓಪO \ಾ60 ೊಳ£ಲ+.
7AಾS ಇ™ ಇ™, ಈ ಾ7 ೋZೆoೕಕPಾ+.
ಅಸಅ ಈ ಾ7.
7AಾS ಈ ಾ7 ೋZೆoೕಕು, ಈ ಾ7 rƒ ೊಳMೇಕPಾ+.
ಅಸಅ ಈ \ಾ9S \ಾ6ೕ , ಅವ vಾರಂ ೊZಾa ೆ.
7AಾS ಓ ೆ ಓ ೆ.. ೆ9:¤ ೆ9:¤ ನಮು> ಏ ಾರೂ ಇ ೆ ಅನುಕೂಲ \ಾƒ ೊ ೆ .
ಅಸಅ ಹೂ› .. ಆಯaFಾn, ಅ*+ಂದ ಬಂ™ ೕPೆ `ೈO ಆ™ ೕPೆ ಅ ೌಂ‹ ಎ0...ಐ ನ*+
7AಾS f ಎPಾ+ ತಂ™ ೊZೋ ಾಗುiೆa ಅPಾ Zಾಕು% ಂ‹‚ನ ಎPಾ+ನೂ
ಅಸಅ ಅ ೕPೆ ಾ ೇe ನPಾ+ ಇ : Zಾಕು% ಂ‹ ತMೇSಕು, ಇ*+ಂದ ಇಷು:...
57
7AಾS ಓೆ ೕಡಂ ಓ ೆ
ಅಸಅ ಇ*+ಂದ ಇ*+ ತನಕ ಎPಾ+ Zಾಕು% ಂ‹‚ ತ ೊಂƒ ಬMೇSಕು. ಆ ೕPೆ )V`ೆ¥ೕಷO \ಾZೊ=ಂƒ
ೊ6aೕ ,EµïÖ ೆಲಸಗe ಾYೆ,
7AಾS )V`ೆ¥ೕಷO ಆhPಾ+ ಅಲD ೕಡಂ ಇದು,
ಅಸಅ ಇನೂc ಇPಾ+
7AಾS ಮiೆa ಏ ಾh ೆ
ಅಸಅ ಕPೆGO ಪQSಶO ೊx: >ೕ#,
7AಾS ಅNೆ:ೕ, ಪQSಶO ಅNೆ:ೕ ಇದು,
ಅಸಅ \ಾ6`ೊ=ಂƒ ಬಂ™ ೕPೆ Q•ದು>, ಆ ೕPೆ )V`ೆ¥ೕಷO
7AಾS ಓೆ
12.20 ತ ೋ½æÃ, ಎ†`ೊ=ೕ½æ
7AಾS
ಅಸಅ ಸ) ಇ ೆ
7AಾS ಎ†`ೊ=ೕ .6 ೕಡಂ
ಅಸಅ ಹತುa, ಹ ೆcರಡು, ಹ ಾಲು=, ಹ ೈದು ತ ೊಂƒ ಬಂ >ೕ ಾ
7AಾS ಹೂಂ
ಅಸಅ Q•=ದು>, MೈPಾ ಎPಾ+ ಆ™ ೕPೆ ೇeaೕ
7AಾS ಹೂಂ ೕಡಂ
ಅಸಅ ಆದಷು: Mೇಗ ೕವ} NೇE ಕPೆGO \ಾ6 ೕವ} ತುಂ..ಟು:, ಮೂE ಲG
7AಾS ಆ tೇE ಅ\ೌಂ‹ ಬಹಳ ೇ# ಆVâÃಡುa ಈಗ
ಅಸಅ ಅPಾ+ šಾ-a ಅ\ೌಂ‹ ಆ ೆ ಅದು ಎಲೂ+ ೋಗPಾ+, ಅPೆ+ೕ ಇರುತaYೆ, ಏO ೊiಾa ಒಂ™ `ಾ)
ಾ•™ ೕPೆ Aಾ¡ ಾರಣಕೂ= iೆ ೆgೕ ೆ ಬರPಾ+
7AಾS ಅPಾ+ ೕಡಂ )V`ೆ¥ೕಷO vೈನ€ ಆhPಾ+ ಇದು
ಅಸಅ ಹೂಂ,
7AಾS ಈಗ ಏ ದು ಸzÀå
ಅಸಅ tೇE ಅ\ೌಂ‹ ಕPೆGO ೆ ಪQSಶO ೊx: ೋದು
7AಾS )V`ೆ¥ೕಷO ಎಷು: ನ ಆಗುiೆa.
ಅಸಅ -QÖ÷ì Zೇ0, ಆರವತುa ನಗjೆk ಳ ೆ ಎPಾ+ ಮುVì ೊಂಡು ಬ c
7AಾS ೌ ಾ , ಮೂE ಲG ಆಗPೇMೇ ಾ? ಆŸ ದ> ೆ,
ಅಸಅ ಆದಷು: Mೇಗ \ಾZೊ=ಂಡು ಬ c ಆAಾa
7AಾS ಹೂಂ ಹೂಂ
58
ಅಸಅ ಉಪ #@ಗಳq ಾO \ಾƒ ೊ6aೕ ªÉÄÎ
7AಾS ಹೂಂ.. ಹೂಂ, MೈPಾ ೕವ} \ಾZೊ=[aೕ ಾ
ಅಸಅ ಹೂಂ ಾO \ಾZೊ=‹ .6aೕ
7AಾS ೇ, ಮiೆ ರಂಗ ಾœ \ಾZೋ[ೕ ಅಂiಾ ೇezÀßPಾ+
ಅಸಅ ದಯ#ಟು: ಅ«ß ೆ ದುಡು¢ ೊZೊ9 ೋUÉâÃ6 , ಏO ೊZೋ9 ೋUÉâÃ6 , ಅಥS ಆAಾa,
7AಾS ಹೂಂ.. ಹೂಂ..
.... .... ....
ಸಂ$ಾಷ2ೆಯ*+ನ ಆಯ> $ಾಗದ Pೇ‡ ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡಂiೆ ಇರುತa ೆ.
05-33 ಈಗ ಒಂ™ ಅಧS ೋƒMೇಕು. ಆ ೕPೆ ಒಂ™ ಅಧS.. ಹು› ಒಂ™ ಇಪnX `ಾYಾ
ಅಸಅ
ಆŸಬಹುದು.
ಅಸಅ ಎPಾ+ `ೇ) ಒಂ™ 25 ಆಗುiೆa.
7AಾS 25, ಅNೊ:ಂ™ ಇಲ+ ೕಡಂ.. ಬಹಳ ಆಯುa..
ಅಸಅ ಮiೆa ಇಲ+ ಅಂ ೆ , ಒಂ™ ಇಪnXa(20) ೊ6a ಾ..Mೈಲದು ಎPಾ+ `ೇ).
7AಾS ಅªïß ಮ ಾ ಸುZಾ.. ಅ*+ ಸಂಘ-ಸಂ`ೆ" ೆ ೇjಾa ೆ. ಅ ೆ= ೇeದು> ಾನು ಮ ೆ.
ಅಸಅ ಹು›.. ಸಂಘ-ಸಂ`ೆ" ೆ ೋ ಾa ೆ, ಅ*+ Aಾ¡ ತ ಾ ಅಂ ೆ , ಈಗ ಅ ೆ= ಅಮU \ಾX ೇ©Mೇ6
ಅಂiಾ ಮ ೆ ೇjೆk ೕದು ಇ ೆ ಉ ೆ>ೕಶ ೆ=.
ಅಸಅ Mೈಲ ಾ• ೋದು ಎPಾ+ `ೇ), ಇಪnXa (20) ತಂ ೆ ೊ ೆ \ಾZೊ=6a .."
The voice sample of the petitioner was sent for forensic
examination. The forensic analysis report of the voice sample is
appended to the charge sheet and it shows that conversation
between the informant and the petitioner was recorded by the
informant on his mobile phone. The opinion of Forensic Science
Laboratory (‘FSL’) is as follows:
“OPINION
The comparison of respective speeches based on auditory and
feature extraction methods has revealed that, the respective
59speeches said to be of female speaker suspect Smt.Geetha
found recorded in the CDs marked as article numbers 01 and 09
the sample speeches found recorded CD marked as article
number 10 are similar and are of the same person.
Sd/-
(Chandrika.G)
Senior Scientific Officer
OOD at Physical Section
State Forensic Science Laboratory
Bengaluru -68Despatch No: FSL/615/PS/276/2018 Date:10-3-2020
Forwarded: – Receipt of the same may please be acknowledged.
Sd/-
Director
Director
State Forensic Science Laboratory
Bengaluru -68″
In the case at hand, the material placed before the criminal Court
discloses prima facie evidence of demand and acceptance. The trap
mahazar records recovery of tainted currency. The recorded
conversation between the informant and the petitioner was
subjected to forensic examination and the Forensic Science
Laboratory opines that the voice sample matched with that of the
petitioner. These circumstances taken together, furnish prima facie
material supporting the prosecution’s case. In such a scenario,
where the accused is allegedly caught red-handed, where recovery
is documented and where forensic opinion lend support to the
60
allegation of demand, the exoneration in a departmental
proceedings, cannot by itself eclipse the criminal prosecution or
obliterate it. A caveat, this principle would not become applicable
to all cases.
15. The principle that once a delinquent employee gets
exonerated in a departmental enquiry, would lead to obliteration of
the criminal proceedings would not become or the principle is not of
universal application. In cases where the trap has failed or where
there is absence of direct evidence of demand and acceptance, a
departmental exoneration of the kind may indeed bear upon the
sustainability on the criminal proceedings. But where prima facie
evidence of demand and acceptance exists, and where the amount
is recovered from the hands of the said delinquent
employee/accused, when caught red-handed receiving the tainted
currency and the trap mahazar draws or documents all that is
necessary to be done to prove demand and acceptance albeit,
prima facie, it would become prima facie evidence of demand and
acceptance. Such matters must be tested in the crucible of full-
fledged trial. Therefore, there exists no straight-jacketed formula
61
that mandates obliteration of criminal proceedings, merely because
both actions arise from the same factual foundation.
16. The contention of the learned counsel that
examination of witnesses on oath in departmental
proceedings elevates such enquiry to the status of a judicial
proceeding is noted only to be rejected. A departmental
enquiry, by settled principle of law, remains a quasi-judicial
proceeding. The mere administration of oath to witness does
not metamorphose its character into a criminal trial
governed by the rigours of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the Indian Evidence Act.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
• Where both departmental inquiry and criminal prosecution
arise from the same set of facts, the effect of exoneration in
the former – departmental inquiry, upon the latter the
criminal trial would depend upon the evidentiary complexion
of each case.
62
• If the departmental exoneration rests upon a finding that the
core ingredients of the offence – demand and acceptance in
corruption cases, are wholly absent, the criminal case
founded upon identical material, continuation of prosecution
may, in appropriate cases, amount to abuse of the process.
• However, where prima facie material exists in the criminal
case such as, recovery of tainted money, recorded
conversation, evidencing demand or forensic corroboration,
the departmental exoneration cannot eclipse the criminal
trial. The matter must be tested in the crucible of full-fledged
trial under the stricter standard of proof. This would be
particularly in cases where the delinquent Government
servant is caught red-handed receiving bribe.
• In essence, departmental exoneration may influence, but
does not automatically extinguish, criminal prosecution. Each
case turns on its own factual and evidentiary matrix.
63
17. In that view of the matter, the submissions advanced on
behalf of the petitioner, do not persuade this Court to interdict the
criminal process at this stage. It is for the petitioner to come out
clean in a full-blown trial, which stands in progress as on today.
18. Finding no merit in this petition, the petition stands
rejected. Since the trial was interjected by the interim order, the
trial shall now progress further.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ
