Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Gaurav Mishra S/O Late Shri Om Prakash … vs State Of Rajasthan on 23 July, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:28865]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3087/2021
CNR: RJHC020177442021 | URN: CW / 7170U / 2021
Gaurav Mishra S/o Late Shri Om Prakash Mishra, aged about 42
years, Resident of Chandra Prabhu Nagar, Behind UCO Bank
Makadwadi Road Ajmer, District Ajmer, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, U.D.H.
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Government Sec-
retariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2. Land Acquisition Officer, Ajmer Development Authority,
Ajmer, Rajasthan.
3. Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, through its Secre-
tary, Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan.
4. Authorized Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority,
Ajmer, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
Connected With
(2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10986/2022
CNR: RJHC020520722022 | URN: CW / 21374U / 2022
Gaurav Mishra S/o Late Shri Om Prakash Mishra, aged about 43
years, Resident of Chandra Prabhu Nagar, Behind UCO Bank
Makadwadi Road Ajmer, District Ajmer, Rajasthan.
—-Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary, U.D.H.
Department, Government of Rajasthan, Government Sec-
retariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2. Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, through its Secre-
tary, Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer, Rajasthan.
3. Authorized Officer (North), Ajmer Development Authority,
Ajmer, Rajasthan.
—-Respondents
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For Petitioners : Mr. Manoj Kumar Bhardwaj Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Ajay Singh Advocate
Mr. Vishal Kumar Advocate with
Mr. Divyansh Mathur Advocate on be-
half of Mr. Manoj Sharma Additional
Advocate General.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
23/07/2026
1. The petitioner has preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
3087/2021 laying challenge to the notice dated 05.02.2021 issued
by Respondent No.4, Authorised Officer (North), Ajmer
Development Authority, Ajmer under Section 67 (3) of the Ajmer
Development Authority Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as
‘the ADA Act’), whereby treating the land comprised in Khasra
Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and 752), situated at
Village Nausar, Tehsil and District Ajmer, as Government land
acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the
encroachment made thereupon should not be removed. The
petitioner has further prayed for declaration that the acquisition
proceedings culminating in award dated 31.12.1998 stand lapsed
by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 2013’).
2. As regards S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10986/2022 is
concerned, the petitioner has assailed legality and validity of order
dated 15.07.2021 by the Ajmer Development Authority, pursuant
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to above notice dated 05.02.2021 under Section 67(3) of the ADA
Act for holding the petitioner as encroacher and to direct him to
remove the encroachment made by him upon the Government
land.
3. As facts, cause of action and grievances raised in both
the above writ petitions are interlinked and connected, therefore,
with the consent of both the parties, at the stage of application for
early listing filed by the petitioner, arguments on both the above
writ petitions were heard together and the same are being decided
by this common judgment.
4. The case set up by the petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition no. 3087/2021, in brief, is that the petitioner’s father Late
Shri Om Prakash and mother Late Smt. Sushma Rani purchased
lands bearing Khasra Nos.724 and 725 situated at Village Nausar,
Tehsil and District Ajmer through a registered sale deed dated
21.09.1978. Consequent upon execution of the sale deed,
mutation was also sanctioned in favour of the purchasers by the
competent authority. However, due to inadvertence, corresponding
entries were not incorporated in the revenue records and the
names of the erstwhile khatedars continued to be reflected in the
Jamabandi. Subsequently, owing to settlement operations, old
Khasra Nos.724 and 725 were renumbered as Khasra Nos.751 and
752.
5. It is pleaded that while the petitioner’s parents had
already become khatedar tenants by virtue of the registered sale
deed and mutation order, the respondents initiated acquisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to
be referred as ‘the Act of 1894’) for development of “Hari Bhau
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Vistaar Yojana”. Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894
was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 13.01.1995 followed by
declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 published on
22.04.1996 and in the Official Gazette on 11.06.1996. Ultimately,
the Land Acquisition Officer passed an Award on 31.12.1998
determining compensation of Rs. 4,46,753/- in respect of the
petitioner’s land.
6. According to the petitioner, notwithstanding passing of
the Award, neither compensation was ever paid to his parents or
thereafter to the petitioner, nor was physical possession of the
acquired land ever taken by the respondents. It is specifically
pleaded that the petitioner and his family have continuously
remained in occupation of the property since its purchase in the
year 1978. A residential house and poultry farm were established
by the petitioner’s father and the petitioner continues to reside
therein.
7. In order to substantiate continuous possession, the
petitioner has placed on record electricity bills commencing from
the year 1998 onwards, electricity bills issued in the years 2001
and 2003, telephone bills issued in the name of the petitioner’s
brother, receipts relating to payment of house tax and
photographs depicting the residential construction existing upon
the land. According to the petitioner, these documents are enough
to establish that the respondents never took possession of the
acquired property.
8. The petitioner has further relied upon the proceedings
of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority dated
13.12.2017 (Annexure-10), wherein while considering the
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proposal relating to de-acquisition, it was recorded that as per the
available record, compensation had neither been paid, nor
deposited before the Court and no surrender deed had been
executed by the khatedar for allotment of developed land in lieu of
compensation. The petitioner contends that the said Minutes of
Meeting dated 13.12.2017 also acknowledge existence of
construction over the land and clearly negates the respondents’
stand that possession had been taken.
9. The petitioner has further pleaded that since neither
compensation had been paid nor possession had been taken
despite expiry of more than fifteen years from the date of award,
the acquisition proceedings automatically lapsed on 01.01.2014 by
operation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
10. It has further been averred that after lapse of
acquisition proceedings, Respondent No.4 issued notice dated
05.02.2021 under Section 67 of the ADA Act treating the land as
Government land and proposing eviction. The petitioner
immediately submitted a detailed reply on 26.02.2021 asserting
that the acquisition itself had lapsed and, therefore, the
respondents had absolutely no authority to invoke proceedings
under Section 67 of the ADA Act. According to the petitioner,
despite receipt of the reply filed by the petitioners justifying his
legitimate title and possession, the respondents have treated the
petitioner as encroacher vide order dated 15.07.2021 and directed
him to remove the alleged encroachment, which compelled the
petitioner to file another S.B. Civil Writ Petition 10986/2022
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
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11. The petitioner has accordingly prayed for declaration
that the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of Khasra
Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and 752) culminating in
award dated 31.12.1998 have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013 and consequently, the impugned notice dated
05.02.2021 as well as order dated 15.07.2021 deserve to be
quashed.
12. Respondents opposed the writ petitions by way of filing
reply. It is averred that the land stood validly acquired long back
and the petitioner is merely an unauthorised occupant over
Government land. While not disputing issuance of notifications
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 or passing of award
dated 31.12.1998, the respondents have pleaded that though
mutation had been sanctioned in favour of the petitioner’s
parents, corresponding entries were never incorporated in the
revenue record and, therefore, notices under Section 12(2) were
issued to the persons whose names continued to be recorded as
khatedars.
13. The respondents have further alleged that the
petitioner’s parents had already sold the residential house and
poultry farm to other persons, yet the petitioner has suppressed
material facts. The respondents have also contended that
electricity bills, telephone bills, municipal receipts and
photographs do not establish lawful possession and are wholly
irrelevant once the land stood acquired. It has further been
pleaded that out of total acquisition measuring about 115 bighas,
possession of approximately 105 bighas was taken and
compensation was paid to several khatedars either in cash or by
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allotment of developed land. It has been asserted that notices
under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 had been issued to the
recorded khatedars and compensation had been tendered to
them. The respondents have also pleaded that cash compensation
relating to the petitioner’s land was deposited before the
competent Court under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 on
29.10.2021.
14. The respondents have further relied upon the
Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal & Others,
(2020) 8 SCC 129, to contend that acquisition proceedings do
not lapse merely because compensation has not been actually
received by a claimant and that where compensation has been
tendered or where majority of landholders have received
compensation, acquisition remains unaffected. It is further
pleaded that the petitioner’s claim is highly belated and stale and,
therefore, deserves rejection.
15. The respondents have also stated that the land in
question forms an integral part of Hari Bhau Vistaar Yojana and
constitutes facility area under the sanctioned layout plan and,
therefore, cannot be released from acquisition. According to them,
the petitioner illegally obtained building permission from the
Municipal Corporation and attempted to raise construction over
acquired land, necessitating issuance of notice dated 05.02.2021
under Section 67 of the ADA Act.
16. Mr. Manoj Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner vehemently argued that the respondents’ own official
record completely demolishes their defence. Inviting attention to
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the minutes of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority
dated 13.12.2017, it was contended that the respondent-authority
itself admitted that compensation had neither been paid nor
deposited before any Court and that no surrender deed had been
executed. It was further argued that paragraph 12 of the reply
contains a categorical admission that compensation was deposited
under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 only on 29.10.2021. Since
such deposit admittedly took place nearly eight years after
enforcement of the Act of 2013, it was submitted that the
statutory consequence under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 had
already taken effect on 01.01.2014 and could not thereafter be
nullified.
17. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner
has produced overwhelming documentary evidence in the form of
electricity bills, house tax receipts, telephone bills and
photographs demonstrating uninterrupted possession, whereas
the respondents have failed to produce even a single possession
memo, Panchnama or any other record showing taking over of
physical possession. It was argued that mere assertions in the
reply cannot substitute proof of actual possession contemplated by
law.
18. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Singh and Mr. Divyansh Mathur,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents reiterated the
stand taken in the reply and contended that the acquisition
proceedings stood concluded long back. It was argued that notices
under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 had been issued to the
recorded khatedars, compensation had been tendered and
subsequently deposited before the Court. Reliance was placed
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upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development
Authority (supra) to contend that acquisition cannot lapse
merely because compensation was not actually received by a
claimant.
19. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and
carefully scrutinised the pleadings, documentary evidence placed
on record, at the outset, it deserves to be noticed that
foundational facts are not in dispute. Notification under Section 4
of the Act of 1894 came to be issued on 13.01.1995, declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 followed on 22.04.1996 and
the award was ultimately passed on 31.12.1998. Consequently, on
the date when Act of 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014, nearly
fifteen years had expired from the date of passing the award.
Therefore, the first statutory requirement to attract provisions of
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 regarding completion of more
than 5 years from the date of award, on the date of enforcement
of new Act indisputably stands satisfied.
20. The controversy, therefore, narrows down to the
fulfillment of the remaining two statutory requirements, namely,
whether compensation had been paid or deposited in accordance
with law before 01.01.2014 and whether physical possession of
the acquired land had actually been taken by the acquiring
authority.
21. Before examining the factual controversy, it would be
appropriate to refer that the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra),
authoritatively settled the scope and ambit of Section 24(2) of the
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Act of 2013. The Constitution Bench held that the word “or”
occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to be read as
“nor” and, therefore, acquisition proceedings lapse only where
both the conditions coexist, namely, (i) physical possession has
not been taken; and (ii) compensation has not been paid in
accordance with law. The Constitution Bench further explained
that mere non-deposit of compensation in Court would not by
itself result in lapse if compensation had been duly tendered to the
landowner. Likewise, where possession has been taken in
accordance with law, acquisition would not lapse merely because
compensation remained unpaid. At the same time, the
Constitution Bench unequivocally held that where both the
essential conditions coexist on the date of commencement of the
Act of 2013, the acquisition would lapse by operation of law.
22. Thus, the present case has to be examined strictly in
the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid Constitution
Bench judgment. This court finds that the respondents have
attempted to justify continuation of the acquisition by contending
that notices under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 were issued to
the recorded khatedars and compensation was tendered to them.
However, upon careful examination of the material available on
record, this Court finds no documentary evidence supporting such
assertion.
23. On this aspect, it would be relevant to refer the
proceedings of the meeting of the Ajmer Development Authority
held on 13.12.2017, placed on record of Writ Petition No.
3087/2021 by the petitioner as Annexure-10, which assumes
considerable significance. The said proceedings were prepared
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much prior to institution of the present litigation. The minutes
specifically record that as per the file available with the Authority,
compensation had neither been paid nor deposited with the
competent Court. The proceedings further record that no
surrender deed had been executed by the khatedar for obtaining
developed land in lieu of compensation. These observations
contained in the official proceedings amount to a clear admission
by the acquiring body itself regarding the factual position
prevailing as on 13.12.2017.
24. Furthermore, In paragraph 12 of the reply, the
respondents have categorically pleaded that cash compensation
was deposited before the competent Court under Section 31 of the
Act of 1894 on 29.10.2021. This pleading, in fact, clearly
establishes that till 29.10.2021, no amount had been deposited
before the competent Court.
25. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 came into operation on
01.01.2014. Consequently, the factual position existing on that
date alone becomes relevant for determining whether the
acquisition stood saved or lapsed. If compensation admittedly had
not been deposited before the Court till 29.10.2021, it necessarily
follows that no such deposit existed on 01.01.2014. Thus, even
according to the respondents themselves, compensation had
neither been deposited before the competent Court nor paid to the
petitioner prior to commencement of the Act of 2013.
26. The respondents have attempted to rely upon notices
issued under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894. However, issuance
of notice calling upon a person to receive compensation cannot be
equated with actual payment of compensation. Significantly, one
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such notice dated 20.01.1999 has been placed on record by the
respondents themselves. A careful reading of the said notice
reveals that the recipient was merely called upon to receive
compensation, failing which possession would be taken under
Section 16 of the Act of 1894. The notice does not establish that
compensation was ever actually disbursed.
27. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the
respondents themselves admit that compensation came to be
deposited under Section 31 of the Act of 1894 only on
29.10.2021, such subsequent deposit cannot satisfy the statutory
requirement to show such deposition as on 01.01.2014.
28. The second requirement under Section 24(2) of the Act
of 2013 relates to taking of physical possession. The petitioner has
consistently maintained that neither he, nor his predecessors were
ever dispossessed from the acquired land. In support thereof, the
petitioner has produced electricity bills extending over several
years commencing immediately after passing of the award,
telephone bills, municipal house tax receipts and photographs
depicting existence of the residential house standing over the
property. These documents constitute consistent evidence to show
possession of the petitioner over the property in dispute.
Admittedly, even the proceedings of the Ajmer Development
Authority dated 13.12.2017 acknowledge existence of construction
over the land.
29. The only document relied upon by the respondents is
the notice dated 20.01.1999. Ironically, the said notice advances
the petitioner’s case rather than the respondents’. The notice itself
records that if compensation is not received, possession shall
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thereafter be taken. Thus, on the date of issuance of the notice
itself, possession admittedly had not been taken. Thereafter, no
material whatsoever has been produced showing that possession
was in fact assumed.
30. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of Banda
Development Authority, Banda vs Moti Lal Agrawal &
Others, (2011) 5 SCC 394, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid
down following legitimate mode to take possession in the
acquisition proceedings:
“37. The principles which can be culled out from the
abovenoted judgments are:
(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act
would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land.
(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State
authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a
panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to
constitute taking of possession.
(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or
building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the
authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking
possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority
concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the
building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land
and take possession in the presence of independent
witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of
course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure
may not lead to an inference that the possession of the
acquired land has not been taken.
(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be
possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take
physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and
it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by
preparing appropriate document in the presence of
independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such
document.
(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an
agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total
compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and
substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in
furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court
may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired
land has been taken.”
31. While examining the factum of possession in the light of
above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court finds
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that despite asserting that possession had already been taken, the
respondents have failed to produce the most material piece of
evidence, namely, the possession memo, or any panchnama in
respect of constructed structure. If possession had genuinely been
taken, production of the possession proceedings or panchnama
would have been the simplest course available to the respondents.
The absence of such primary evidence, despite respondents being
the custodian of the acquisition record, compels this Court to draw
an adverse inference against the respondents under Section 114
illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act. Possession under the
Land Acquisition Act is a question of fact and must be proved by
cogent documentary evidence. The burden squarely rested upon
the respondents, however, they have failed to discharge the same.
32. Therefore, the present case squarely satisfies the
requirements laid down by the Constitution Bench judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority
(supra). Consequently, this Court is left with no manner of doubt
that both the statutory conditions contemplated under Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013 stood fulfilled and the acquisition
proceedings stood lapsed by operation of law.
33. The right to property, though no longer a fundamental
right, continues to enjoy constitutional protection under Article
300A of the Constitution of India. No person can be deprived of
his property except by authority of law. Where acquisition
proceedings themselves stand lapsed by operation of Section 24
(2) of the Act of 2013, the acquiring authority cannot continue to
treat the land as Government land.
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34. Once the very foundation of vesting disappears, all
consequential actions founded thereupon necessarily collapse.
Therefore, issuance of notice dated 05.02.2021 followed by order
dated 15.07.2021 under Section 67 of the ADA Act treating the
petitioner’s property as Government land becomes wholly without
jurisdiction. The impugned notice proceeds entirely on the
assumption that the land vested in the State Government and that
the petitioner was an unauthorised occupant over Government
land.
35. Once the acquisition itself ceased to exist, the
respondents could not have proceeded to treat the land as
Government land, nor could they have invoked the provisions of
Section 67 of the ADA Act for dispossessing the petitioner. The
respondents ceased to have any legal authority to invoke powers
under Section 67 of the ADA Act. The impugned action, therefore,
is wholly arbitrary, contrary to law and violative of Article 300A of
the Constitution of India.
36. Much emphasis has been laid by the respondents on
the allegation that the petitioner’s parents had sold part of the
property in favour of third parties. In the opinion of this Court, the
said controversy is wholly irrelevant for deciding the present writ
petition. However, looking to the fact that notice under Section 67
of the ADA Act was given to the petitioner, as well as examining
proceedings of the Ajmer Development Authority dated
13.12.2017 which were also drawn in respect of the petitioner,
this Court finds that whether title ultimately vested in the
petitioner or in some subsequent purchaser may have relevance
for inter-se dispute, if any, between the private parties, however,
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such dispute has absolutely no bearing upon the limited question
arising under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
37. Accordingly, both the above writ petitions succeed and
are hereby allowed. It is declared that the land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in
respect of Khasra Nos.724 and 725 (new Khasra Nos.751 and
752), situated at Village Nausar, Tehsil and District Ajmer,
culminating in award dated 31.12.1998, stood lapsed by operation
of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014. Consequently, the
impugned notice dated 05.02.2021 and consequential order dated
15.07.2021 issued by Respondent-Authorised Officer (North),
Ajmer Development Authority, Ajmer treating the aforesaid land
as Government land and initiating proceedings under Section 67 of
the Ajmer Development Authority Act, 2013 are declared illegal,
without jurisdiction, arbitrary and unsustainable in law, and the
same are accordingly quashed and set aside.
38. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
39. Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on
record of connected writ petition.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/101-102
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