Bombay High Court
Ganesh Nivrutti Varade vs National Highways Authority Of India … on 1 April, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:13753
IN THE JUDICATURE OF HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 103 OF 2025
National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon
Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar ...Appellant
VERSUS
1. Bhaskar Ninu Zambare,
2. Nalini Madhukar Zambare,
3. Hari @ Bhushan Madhukar Zambare,
4. Chhaya Dnyandev Bhangale,
5. Pushpa Yogesh Warke,
6. Ramchandra Bhaskar Zambare. ...Original Claimants/
Respondents
7. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition
And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. ...Respondent
...
Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh
Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w
Shubham Zalte
Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. R. Bangar
...
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8404 OF 2025
IN ARBA/103/2025
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13976 OF 2025
IN ARBA/103/2025
...
AND
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 104 OF 2025
National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon
Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar ...Appellant
VERSUS
1. Manohar Hari Patil (died) Thr Lrs
1.1 Laxmibai Manohar Patil,
1.2 Pramod Manohar Patil,
1.3 Purushottam Manohar Patil,
1.4 Shrikrishna Manohar Patil,
1.5 Dinkar Hari Patil, ...Original Claimants/
Respondents
2. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition
And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. ...Respondent
Page 1 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
...
Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh
Advocate for Respondents No.1.1 to 1.5 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M.
More a/w Shubham Zalte
Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. S. Sarvadnya
...
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8406 OF 2025
IN ARBA/104/2025
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13977 OF 2025
IN ARBA/104/2025
...
AND
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 106 OF 2025
National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon
Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar ...Appellant
VERSUS
1. Sangita Sunil Patil,
2. Nilima Damodhar Warade, ...Original Claimants/
Respondents
3. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition
And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. ...Respondent
...
Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh
Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w
Shubham Zalte
Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. R. Bangar
...
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13979 OF 2025
IN ARBA/106/2025
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8410 OF 2025
IN ARBA/106/2025
...
AND
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 108 OF 2025
Page 2 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
National Highways Authority Of India PIU Jalgaon
Through Its Project Director Shivaji V Pawar ...Appellant
VERSUS
1. Ganesh Nivrutti Varade, ...Original Claimant/
Respondent
2. The Competent Authority Land Acquisition
And Sub-Divisional Officer at Bhusawal. ...Respondent
...
Advocate for Appellant : Mr. Manorkar Deepak Suresh
Advocate for Respondents No.1 : Mr. A. P. Bhandari h/f Mr. K. M. More a/w
Shubham Zalte
Advocate for Respondents- Competent Authority : Mr. R. D. Sanap
...
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8414 OF 2025
IN ARBA/108/2025
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12518 OF 2025
IN ARBA/108/2025
...
CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.
Dated : April 01, 2026
JUDGMENT :
1. By the present Arbitration Appeals, the appellant – National Highway
Authority of India has challenged the order passed by the learned Principal
District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of
the said Act came to be rejected and the arbitral award passed by the
learned Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956
Page 3 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
came to be confirmed.
2. Since all the Arbitration Appeals involve common questions of fact
and law, they are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of
by this common judgment.
3. For the sake of convenience, the facts in Arbitration Appeal No.103
of 2025 alone are referred to. The brief facts of the appeal are as under :
The National Highways Authority initiated acquisition proceedings for
the purpose of widening National Highway No.6 from Jalgaon, Maharashtra
to the Gujarat boundary. A notification under Section 3A of the National
Highways Act, 1956 was issued on 11/11/2011. The said notification was
published in the newspapers pursuant to communication dated 30/12/2011
and the public notice was published on 23/01/2012. Subsequently, a
declaration under Section 3D of the said Act was issued on 10/10/2012.
4. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) thereafter
passed an award determining compensation at the rate of Rs.340/- per
square meter. In addition thereto, compensation to the extent of 10% of
the amount was granted towards easementary rights. The lands were
classified into two groups, wherein the lands situated at village Kothali and
village Muktainagar were treated as belonging to the same group.
Page 4 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
5. Being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the
Competent Authority, the claimants preferred arbitration proceedings
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act seeking enhanced
compensation as well as statutory benefits under Section 3G(7)(a) to (d) of
the Act.
6. Before the Arbitrator, the claimants relied upon several sale
instances and led evidence in support of their claim. The relevant sale
deeds relied upon are as under:
(I) Sale Deed No.1674 of 2005 dated 22/11/2005 showing
consideration at the rate of Rs.3022/- per square meter in respect of
Plot No.7 from land Gut No.562 situated at village Muktainagar.
(ii) Sale Deed No.217 of 2010 dated 25/01/2010 showing
consideration at the rate of Rs.3375/- per square meter in respect of
land Gut No.1075 situated at village Muktainagar.
(iii) Sale Deed No.331 of 2012 dated 13/02/2012 showing
consideration at the rate of Rs.4000/- per square meter in respect of
land Gut No.542/1 and 543, Plot No.40 situated at village
Muktainagar.
Apart from the above sale deeds, other sale instances pertaining to
nearby villages were also placed on record.
7. Upon appreciation of the material on record, the learned Arbitrator
Page 5 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
held that the registered sale deed dated 13/02/2012 was the most
proximate in point of time and therefore could be relied upon for
determination of market value. The Arbitrator further held that the
claimants were entitled to compensation for severance and loss of property
in terms of Section 3G(7)(b) and Section 3G(7)(c) of the National Highways
Act. Accordingly, by award dated 26/07/2021 the Arbitrator granted
enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 2800/- per square meter.
8. Being aggrieved by the said arbitral award, the appellants preferred
an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
before the learned District Judge challenging the award. The said
application came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeals under
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act have been filed.
9. The learned counsel Mr. D. S. Manorkar for the appellants has
challenged the arbitral award as well as the order passed under Section 34
on the following grounds:
(I) Illegal reliance on post-notification sale deed
It is contended that the Arbitrator committed patent illegality by
relying upon the post-notification sale deed bearing No.331 of 2012 dated
13/02/2012. According to the appellants, under Section 3G(7)(a) of the
National Highways Act, the market value of the land is required to be
determined as on the date of notification under Section 3A of the Act,
Page 6 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, othwhich in the present case was issued on 11/11/2011. Since the sale deed
relied upon by the Arbitrator is subsequent to the said notification, the
same ought not to have been considered for determination of
compensation.
(II) Comparison of dissimilar properties
It is further contended that the Arbitrator erroneously compared
dissimilar properties. The lands of the claimants are agricultural lands
situated at village Kothali, which is about one kilometer away from
Muktainagar. However, the Arbitrator relied upon transactions relating to
commercial plots situated within the municipal limits of Muktainagar. It is
also submitted that the Arbitrator failed to consider the “size factor”, as
the sale instance relied upon pertains to a very small plot.
(III) Illegality in awarding interest
It is further submitted that the Arbitrator awarded interest at the rate
of 9% per annum from 10/10/2012, though the possession of the acquired
land was taken only after the award passed by the Competent Authority on
09/05/2013. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.
L. Jain vs. Delhi Development Authority & others reported in
(2004) 4 SCC 79 it is contended that interest is payable only from the
date of taking physical possession and not from the date of notification.
Page 7 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
(IV) Award of compensation without evidence
It is further contended that the Arbitrator awarded compensation at
the rate of Rs.280/- per square meter towards severance and Rs.246/- per
square meter towards loss of easementary rights without there being any
documentary evidence such as panchanama or other material to establish
such loss. According to the appellants, the claimants failed to lead any
evidence to show that they suffered any injury to other immovable
property or loss of earnings due to the acquisition.
10. The learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the
District Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act to set aside the arbitral award.
11. Per contra, the learned Counsel Mr. A. P. Bhandari holding for Mr.
K. M. More appearing for the respondent/claimants relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 1988 SC 1652,
particularly para 4, clause (9) of the judgment, and submitted that even
post-notification sale deeds can be relied upon unless it is specifically
pleaded that the prices mentioned therein are inflated or the transaction
itself is challenged as not genuine. He further submitted that the sale deed
relied upon by the Arbitrator is executed only about three weeks after the
notification and there is no evidence to suggest that the price mentioned
Page 8 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
therein is inflated. The sale deed is bona fide and has not been challenged
by the NH Authority on the grounds of fraud or inflation.
12. As regards the compensation towards easementary rights is
concerned, it is submitted that the Competent Authority for Land
Acquisition (CALA) itself granted compensation to the extent of 10%
towards easementary rights in accordance with the statutory mandate, and
the Arbitrator has granted consequential relief in consonance with the
enhanced compensation.
13. As regards compensation for loss of profit and severance in terms of
Section 3 G (7) (b) and (c) of the National Highways Act, 1956, it is
submitted that the claimants have specifically stated in their affidavit that
they have suffered losses on account of the acquisition, and the said
statement has not been controverted by the National Highways Authority.
14. Apart from the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the
respondent further submits that there were several other acquisition
proceedings pertaining to the same notification dated 11/11/2011. In one
such case, land bearing Gut No.453 of village Muktainagar came to be
acquired and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs.3200/- per
square meter on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 13/02/2012. In
Page 9 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
the said proceedings also, compensation was awarded towards
easementary rights as well as for loss of business. The said awards were
challenged by the Authority, however, the challenge failed and the same
was also not accepted by this Court. It is submitted that in respect of about
36 such cases, the awards have already been satisfied by the appellant.
15. The learned Counsel for the respondent, therefore, submits that once
the Arbitrator has passed the award on the basis of relevant considerations
and material placed on record, and the same has been confirmed by the
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,
this Court, in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act,
would be slow in interfering with the same.
16. In support of the above submissions, reliance is placed upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders v. Delhi
Development Authority reported in AIR 2015 SC 620 and PSA Sical
Terminals Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambaranar Port
Trust, Tuticorin reported in (2023) 15 SCC 781.
17. Having considered the rival submissions, the first question that
arises for consideration before this Court is whether the Arbitrator could
have relied upon the sale deed dated 13/02/2012 or whether there is any
legal bar in relying upon the said sale deed.
Page 10 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chimanlal Hargovinddas (Supra)
has laid down the parameters to be considered while determining
compensation. It has been observed that while determining market value,
various factors are required to be taken into consideration and one of such
factors is that even post-notification sale instances can be taken into
account if (i) they are very proximate in point of time, (ii) they are genuine
transactions, and (iii) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser
to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in
development prospects.
19. The said principle has also been followed by this Court in Goa
Industrial Development Corporation v. Maria Tereza N. Quadros
reported in 2016(3) All MR 810 and in Pandurang Ramrao
Somvanshi v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2025 BHC (AUG)
14723.
20. Considering the aforesaid judgments, there is no absolute bar in
taking into consideration a post-notification sale deed; however, the
market value is required to be determined with reference to the date of the
notification. Applying the principles laid down in Chimanlal
Hargovinddas (supra), it can be seen that the sale deed relied upon by
the Arbitrator is executed merely about three weeks after the notification.
Page 11 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
There is no evidence on record to indicate that the sale price mentioned
therein is inflated and the transaction itself has not been challenged as not
being genuine. There is also no contest as regards the bona fide nature of
the said sale deed.
21. Even if the other sale deeds placed on record (noted at para 6
above) are considered and the prices therein are suitably adjusted for
yearly escalation, the resultant price would broadly correspond with the
price reflected in the sale deed dated 13/02/2012.
22. In such circumstances, when the Arbitrator has relied upon the said
sale deed dated 13/02/2012 for determination of compensation and the
District Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, has not interfered with the same, this Court, while
exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act,
would be slow to interfere with the determination of compensation based
on the sale deed dated 13/02/2012.
23. As regards the compensation towards easementary rights is
concerned, the same was initially granted by the Competent Authority for
Land Acquisition (CALA) and the said grant was not specifically challenged
by the National Highways Authority while contesting the enhancement of
the market value of the land. Consequently, upon enhancement of the
Page 12 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
compensation for the acquired land, there would naturally be a
corresponding increase in the total amount payable towards loss of
easementary rights. Similarly under Section 3 G (7)(c) compensation is
also granted by CALA.
24. As regards the grant of compensation under Section 3G(7)(b) and (c)
of the National Highways Act, 1956, it is to be noted that the claimants
have made specific statements in their affidavits regarding the losses
suffered by them on account of the acquisition. In the case of Krishna
Balchandra Hadfadkar and Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
and The Managing Director, reported in MANU/MH/0159/2013, this
Court has held that even if the issue of severance is not raised or framed,
the same has to be considered if the facts justify severance. This Court in
Krishna (supra) has observed as under :
“22. it is true that in the reference application, the applicants
had not claimed compensation towards severance charges. It
is also true that no issue was framed int hat regard. However,
the fact remains that due evidence was led by the applicants
on this aspect. In the case of “Caetano Jose Filomeno (Dr.)”
(supra), this Court has held that the question of severance of
land was liable to be considered even if no such issue was
framed and even if no such plea was taken by the applicant in
his application for reference.”
25. Similarly in the case of Dr. Caetano Jose Filomeno Jacinto de
Page 13 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
Loiola Pereira vs. Deputy Collector, South, Sub-Division and Ors.,
reported in 2005 (1) All MR 797, this Court at paragraph No.22 held as
under :
“22. The next grievance made on behalf of the applicant is
that by the present acquisition their remaining property of
survey No.363/1 was severed as a result of which it has now
remained landlocked without there being any access. The
applicant in his evidence before the Court had stated that in
view of the acquisition the property under survey No.363/1
remained blocked without any access. There is no doubt that
no issue on this aspect was framed by the Court nor such a
plea was taken by the applicant in his application for
reference. Nevertheless if the Court is required to determine
the market value of the acquired land by sitting, on the
armchair of a willing purchaser and in our view it is right so,
this factor certainly ought to have been considered by the
learned Trial Court. Shri Noronha has placed reliance on
several decisions regarding this aspect of the case. In
Government v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.
Ltd. MANU/MH/0092/1941 : A.I.R.1942 Bom 105 wherein this
Court observed that when large proportion of frontage is
acquired and a relatively small amount of frontage is left with
the owner of the remaining land, he is entitled to some
compensation in respect of severance. Reliance has also been
placed on the case of Radhey Shyam v. Haryana State
MANU/PH/0155/1981 wherein it is observed that the claimants
were entitled to compensation for severance. In the case of
Smt. Kasturi Devi an Ors. vs. The Collector, Nainital
MANU/UP/0607/1982: A.I.R. 1983 All 338 after the acquisitionPage 14 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, othof 20,000 Sq. ft. of land the remaining area was deprived of
frontage on the road and a Division bench of that Court
observed that this would certainly diminish the value of the
land to some extent. However, no evidence was produced to
show as to what extent the value of the remaining land had
diminished, but still the Court held, that it was difficult to hold
that severance of the disputed land had diminished the value
of the remaining land and in the absence of positive evidence,
the Court considered to award Rs.2000/- as damages
sustained by the applicants on account of severance of land.
Int he case of Amirbibi and Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition
officer, MANU/GJ/0146/1984: AIR1981 Guj 219 a division bench
of that court stated that it could not be laid down as a rule of
law that where expert assistance is not available and where a
reasonable guess can be made form whatever evidence there
is on record, the Court would be precluded form doing so only
because the expert evidence is not led in a particular case.
The Court further felt that damage suffered by the claimants
could not go uncompensated altogether and that they should
make their best endeavour to meet out justice to them,
although they must be on guard while doing so, as their
conclusion must be based on a broad basis and commonsense
inference. The Court therefore proceeded after considering
pros and cons of the questions to award compensation for
injurious affection to Rs.2/- per sq. metre as it would serve the
purpose.”
26. The Arbitrator has considered the uncontroverted affidavits and the
evidence while determining the compensation. It is evident that the lands
Page 15 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
of the claimants were not acquired in their entirety, but only partially for
the purpose of widening or expansion of the National Highway. This
position is also reflected in their claim applications filed before the CALA.
Each of the claimants specifically raised the issue of severance
before the CALA, and the same is duly recorded in the CALA awards. For
ready reference, one such objection and the corresponding finding are set
out in the table below –
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Page 16 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
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fdaerhoj 10% ofgokV ewY;kadu gksmqu
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27. The acquisition for widening of road takes place of a large strip of
land, generally narrow in width, affecting only a portion of larger land
Page 17 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
holdings belonging to several land owners. As a result, such acquisition
may cause severance and may also adversely affect the usability and
economic utility of the remaining land. The Arbitrator, taking into
consideration the affidavits and statements of the claimants as well as the
nature of the acquisition, has granted compensation towards severance.
28. The power of the ‘Court’ to interfere with arbitral award under
Section 34 and of this Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act needs
to be noted before considering the above submissions on merits of arbitral
award. The Supreme Court in the case of PSA Sical Terminals Private
Limited Vs. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambaranar Port Trust
Tuticorn and Anr. reported in (2023) 15 SCC 781 has observed that it
is a settled legal position, that in an application under Section 34, the court
is not expected to act as an appellate court and reappreciate the evidence.
The scope of interference would be limited to grounds provided under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The interference would be so warranted
when the award is in violation of “public policy of India”, which has been
held to mean “the fundamental policy of Indian law”. A judicial intervention
on account of interfering on the merits of the award would not be
permissible. However, the principles of natural justice as contained in
Section 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Arbitration Act would continue to be the
grounds of challenge of an award. The ground for interference on the basis
that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is now to be understood
Page 18 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
as a conflict with the “most basic notions of morality or justice”. It is only
such arbitral awards that shock the conscience of the court, that can be set
aside on the said ground. An award would be set aside on the ground of
patent illegality appearing on the face of the award and as such, which
goes to the roots of the matter. However, an illegality with regard to a mere
erroneous application of law would not be a ground for interference.
Equally, reappreciation of evidence would not be permissible on the ground
of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in PSA Sical Terminals Private
Limited (supra) has further observed that a decision which is perverse,
though would not be a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”,
would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award. However, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which
ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
30. To appreciate the test of perversity, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
PSA Sical Terminals Private Limited (supra) in para 42 has further held
as under :-
“42. To understand the test of perversity, it will also be appropriate
to refer to paragraph 31 and 32 from the judgment of this Court in
Associate Builders (supra), which read thus:
Page 19 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or
so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the
same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is
settled law that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
thedecision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments.
In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &
Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], it was held:
“7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by
ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the
blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in
law.”
In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, it was held:
“10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between
the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a
decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is
thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon
it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on
record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon,
howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not bePage 20 of 23
Arb Appeal 103-2025, othtreated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered
with.”
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 14 in the case of MMTC Limited
Vs. Vendanta Limited reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163 has further
observed that as far as interference with an order made under Section 34,
as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such
interference under Section 37, cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid
down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only
ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not
exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an
arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by
the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely
cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.
32. As observed in above noted Judgment of Supreme Court i.e. PSA
and M.M.T.C., (Supra) the power of this Court to interfere with an arbitral
award is extremely limited. Unless the award suffers from patent illegality
or falls within the limited grounds contemplated under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, interference would not be
warranted. The scope of interference becomes even narrower while
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Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the said Act.
33. This Court has also taken into consideration that in respect of the
same acquisition proceedings, several other awards have attained finality
on account of delay in filing application under Section 34 of the Act.
34. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the
opinion that no case is made out for interference with the award passed by
the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has assessed the value of the land
considering the relevant material before him and has granted
compensation for severance, loss of business, and loss of easementary
rights. The same is based on the material on record and is in accordance
with the law as noted in the above-referred judgments of this Court.
Consequently, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court finds no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment under Section 34 and the award,
passed by the Arbitrator.
35. In view of the orders passed in all the arbitration appeals today, all
civil applications seeking withdrawal of amounts are allowed. However,
since the National Highway Authority intends to challenge this order, the
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Arb Appeal 103-2025, oth
applicants shall furnish an undertaking to this Court stating that, in the
event any favourable order is passed in favour of the National Highway
Authority, they will redeposit the amount withdrawn within a period of four
weeks.
36. All other pending applications for interim relief/ stay stand disposed
of.
( ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J. )
vj gawade/-.
Page 23 of 23
