Telangana High Court
G. Srinivasa Rao vs Union Of India And 3 Others on 28 July, 2026
Author: P. Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA:
HYDERABAD
***
WRIT PETITION No.31340 of 2010
Between:
G. Srinivasa Rao, S/o. G.Rama Rao.
...Petitioner
AND
Union of India, rep. by Secretary,
Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers,
New Delhi and 3 others.
...Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 28.07.2026
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_______________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Page 2 of 14
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
+ WRIT PETITION No.31340 of 2010
% 28.07.2026
# Between:
G. Srinivasa Rao, S/o. G.Rama Rao.
...Petitioner
AND
Union of India, rep. by Secretary,
Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers,
New Delhi and 3 others.
...Respondents
! Counsel for petitioner(s) : Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha.
^Counsel for respondent(s) : Mr. G. Jayaprakash Babu, learned
counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) 1994 SCC OnLine P&H 166
2) (2005) 5 SCC 569
3) (2004) 11 SCC 743
4) 2023 INSC 798
Page 3 of 14
THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.31340 of 2010
Date : 28.07.2026
Between:
G. Srinivasa Rao, S/o. G.Rama Rao.
...Petitioner
AND
Union of India, rep. by Secretary,
Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers,
New Delhi and 3 others
...Respondents
ORDER:
(per Hon’ble Sri Justice P. Sam Koshy)
Heard Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned counsel for the
petitioner; and Mr. G. Jayaprakash Babu, learned counsel for
respondent Nos.2 and 3.
2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for issuance of a Writ,
Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of
Page 4 of 14
Mandamus praying the Court to call for the records and to set aside
the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad
Bench, Hyderabad (for short the ‘Tribunal’) dated 06.10.2010 in
O.A.No.789 of 2009 as well as the proceedings
No.CROP/PERT/DOP/TERM/2009-2010, dated 13.08.2009, passed by
respondent No.3 (for short, ‘the impugned order’); to set aside the
same as illegal, arbitrary and unjust and violative of principles of
natural justice; and to consequently direct the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential service and
monetary benefits.
3. Vide the impugned order, the Tribunal had dismissed
O.A.No.789 of 2009, dated 06.10.2010, on the ground that there are
no justified grounds for intervention of the Tribunal in respect of the
impugned proceedings dated 13.08.2009 either on the ground that
the same is punitive in nature or on the ground that no inquiry had
been conducted against him by giving opportunity and also violation of
constitutional mandate.
4. Initially, the petitioner had approached the Tribunal assailing
the proceedings No.Corp/Per/DDPAF/Term/2009-10, dated
13.08.2009, passed by respondent No.3 and to direct the respondents
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to continue the petitioner as Manager in respondent No.2 organization
and to release all consequential benefits on the ground that the
impugned order is stigmatic in nature and such an order has to be
passed only by following the constitutional mandate as contemplated
under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and also the
procedure contemplated under CCS (CCA) Rules; and the
consequential order of relieving the petitioner from service by which
the probationary services of petitioner was ordered to be terminated
after one (01) month of notice w.e.f. 14.09.2009 onwards.
5. The facts in nutshell are that the petitioner was initially
appointed for the post of Manager (Technical) vide order of
appointment dated 25.07.2008 pursuant to which the petitioner
entered into an agreement insofar as the terms and conditions of offer
of appointment is concerned and joined the services w.e.f.
08.09.2008. While the petitioner was on probation, the impugned
notice dated 13.08.2009 was issued intimating the petitioner that the
organization did not found his performance to be satisfactory; and in
spite of oral counseling being done on many occasions, the
organization had decided not to continue with the probation period
and accordingly ordered that the services of petitioner would stand
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terminated after one (01) month; and accordingly, the impugned
notice dated 18.08.2009 came to be issued to the petitioner
intimating him that his services would stand terminated w.e.f.
14.09.2009.
6. The challenge to the impugned order dated 13.08.2009, by the
petitioner, before the Tribunal was on the ground that:-
a) The impugned order is punitive in nature; hence enquiry ought
to had been conducted.
b) The impugned order on the plain reading of it is a stigmatic
order and for which reason also enquiry becomes necessary, as
the organization as also the petitioner would had got a chance
of establishing their case.
c) The action on the part of the respondents is contrary to the
judicial precedents rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
d) The Tribunal has not considered the contentions put forth by the
petitioner in the course of his arguments, and the finding
arrived at by the Tribunal is also without proper appreciation of
the rule position as it stands.
e) Since the impugned order passed is, firstly, without enquiry and
secondly, being stigmatic, it amounts to an act which is violative
Page 7 of 14of the very basic principles of natural justice and also in
contravention to the constitutional provision under Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India.
7. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the impugned order is one which was passed after the
one year period of probation, for which reason the impugned order is
liable to be interdicted.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3
contended that a plain reading of the order of appointment, conditions
attached thereto, as also the plain reading of the impugned order of
termination from services are all by itself self-explanatory. According
to the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 it is a clear case of
termination simpliciter where a person’s services during his probation
period on account of non-performance and also on account of non-
satisfactory performance, stood disengaged. According to the learned
counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 since the petitioner was on
probation period, the services of the petitioner were discontinued on
giving 30 days’ notice time, or else the respondents could also have
discontinued the services of the petitioner forthwith after paying him
the salary for the notice period in lieu of notice.
Page 8 of 14
9. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of clause 4 of
the appointment order dated 25.07.2008, which for ready reference is
reproduced hereunder:
“Clause 4 : It stipulates that period of probation is one year. During
the period of probation, if the performance is found unsatisfactory
services may be terminated………………….”
10. After reading the clause 4 of the appointment order, it would be
also relevant at this juncture to refer to the termination order, which
again for ready reference is reproduced hereunder:
ORDER
Sub: Termination of Probation Period
G.Srinivasa Rao is hereby informed that his performance is found not
satisfactory. He has been orally counseled on many occasions by the
Centre Head and also he has been issued Advisory Note on 6.4.2009
to improve his performance in the areas of taking initiative,
resourcefulness, willingness to assume responsibility. Further he has
been directed to be present at CIPET Corporate on 12-May 2009 at
11.00 hrs to discuss about his performance at CIPET Centre,
Hyderabad. He was also present at CIPET Corporate on 12.05.2009 at
11.00 am. The Director General, CIPET has advised him to improve
his performance failing which appropriate action will be taken on him.
He has also assured to improve his performance.
We regret to inform that he has not taken keen interest to improve
his performance even after the above cited counseling and advisory
note. Under these circumstances we have left with no alternative
other than to dispense with his services at CIPET. Therefore in
accordance with the Clause 4 of the Appointment Order dtd. July 25,
Page 9 of 14
2008 and also Clause (d) of the Agreement Bond dt.8.9.2008, he is
hereby served this one month notice of termination of his probation
period from the services of CIPET. Accordingly his probationary period
will stand terminated on 14.09.2009 (AN). He is entitled to draw all
his terminal benefits as per rules.
This issues with the concurrence of the Competent Authority.”
From a plain reading of the afore-referred order, it would clearly
reflect that the reasons for discontinuing the services of the petitioner
was the non-performance or poor performance on the part of the
petitioner. A plain reading of the impugned order would also show that
the petitioner has been warned on earlier occasions and was also
advised to improve his working.
11. Upon reading the contents of the aforesaid order of termination,
what needs to be looked into at this juncture is, was it required for the
respondents to have conducted an enquiry before disengaging the
services of the petitioner while on probation.
12. It is by now a well settled proposition of law that only on mere
completion of probation tenure by itself would not give a confirmation
to the probation period unless there is a specific order passed in this
regard confirming the services of the employee and that too after
being satisfied of his / her performance during the probation period.
Page 10 of 14
This in other words means that if an employee’s services have been
placed on probation, until and unless there an order is passed
confirming the services, the concerned employee for all practical
purposes remains as a probationer. Further, when we look into the
impugned order, what is also reflected is that the impugned order as
such does not speak of any alleged misconduct committed by the
petitioner, but only speaks of the performance not being satisfactory.
Moreover, it also reflects that the petitioner was indicated in this
regard to improve his performance. In spite of opportunities being
granted to him, if the organization still did not find his performance up
to the mark, in terms of clause 4 of the appointment order, the
organization has all the rights to discontinue the services on the
ground of non-performance.
13. The reference of non-performance or under performance in the
order of termination simpliciter by itself cannot be construed to be
stigmatic order or an element of misconduct being reflected in the
said order. In the case of Sher Singh, Ex-Constable vs. State of
Haryana & Ors. 1 the full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
had an occasion of dealing with the termination of a police personnel
1
1994 SCC OnLine P&H 166
Page 11 of 14
during probation period. The Full Bench through the said judgment
held that a probationer has no right to the post and the services are
terminable at any time during the said period. A probationer can
expect a secure position in service only if he satisfies the superiors in
the Department, who in turn, would be convinced of the said
probationer being likely to be proved as an efficient probationer. The
Full Bench went on to hold that if the employer or the concerned
disciplinary authority finds somebody to be not active, not disciplined,
not self-reliant, not punctual, not sober, and also being not courteous
and straightforward, the authority has the right to reasonably form an
opinion that the employee is not likely to be proved to be an efficient
officer and under the said circumstances the disciplinary authority can
discharge a person from service. The said observations made by the
Full Bench was in fact followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Punjab and Others vs. Sukhwinder Singh 2.
14. Again In the case of State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir
Singh 3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held at paragraph Nos.7 and 11
as under:
2
(2005) 5 SCC 569
3
(2004) 11 SCC 743
Page 12 of 14“7. Thus the principle that in order to determine whether the
misconduct is motive or foundation of order of termination, the test
to be applied is to ask the question as to what was the “object of the
enquiry”. If an enquiry or an assessment is done with the object of
finding out any misconduct on the part of the employee and for that
reason his services are terminated, then it would be punitive in
nature. On the other hand, if such an enquiry or an assessment is
aimed at determining the suitability of an employee for a particular
job, such termination would be termination simpliciter and not
punitive in nature. This principle was laid down by Shah, J. (as he
then was) as early as 1961 in the case of State of Orissa v. Ram
Narayan Das [State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, (1961) 1 SCR 606
: AIR 1961 SC 177 : (1961) 1 LLJ 552] . It was held that one should
look into “object or purpose of the enquiry” and not merely hold the
termination to be punitive merely because of an antecedent enquiry.
Whether it (order of termination) amounts to an order of dismissal
depends upon the nature of the enquiry, if any, the proceedings
taken therein and the substance of the final order passed on such
enquiry. On the facts of that case, the termination of a probationer
was upheld inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry was held to be to
find out if the employee could be confirmed. The purpose of the
enquiry was not to find out if he was guilty of any misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification.
xxx xxx xxx
11. In the light of the above legal position, we will now determine
whether, in substance, the order of discharge in the present case is
punitive in nature. For this purpose it would be necessary to
ascertain, firstly, the “nature of enquiry” i.e. whether the termination
is preceded by a full-scale formal enquiry into allegations involving
misconduct on the part of the respondent, which culminated in the
finding of guilt, and, secondly, the “purpose of the enquiry” i.e.
whether the purpose of the enquiry is to find out any misconduct on
Page 13 of 14
the part of the employee or it is aimed at finding out as to the
respondent being unlikely to prove as an efficient police officer.”
The aforesaid legal position was also subsequently reiterated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of Punjab and
Others vs. Jaswant Singh 4.
15. In the instant case also admittedly the services of the petitioner
got relieved vide order dated 13.08.2009. Likewise, there is also no
dispute so far as the impugned order having been issued without
conducting a departmental enquiry, and the impugned order also does
not spell out any specific misconduct on the part of the petitioner,
rather it only refers to the underperformance or poor performance,
which cannot be said to be either stigmatic or an order which reflects
misconduct to have been committed.
16. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any strong case
made out by the petitioner calling for an interference to the impugned
order passed by the Tribunal. The writ petition thus fails and is
accordingly dismissed confirming the order passed by the Tribunal.
4
2023 INSC 798
Page 14 of 14
17. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any in this Writ
Petition, shall stand closed.
_____________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
_________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 28.07.2026
Note: L.R. copy to be marked.
(B/o) Ndr / GSD
