Telangana High Court
G. Srikanth vs Dr. Priyanka Ala, Ias on 29 June, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
CONTEMPT CASE No. 1589 OF 2025
29.06.2026
Between:
G. Srikanth
..... Petitioner
And
Smt. Dr. Priyanka Ala, IAS,
Secretary,
Telangana State Public Service Commission (TGPSC)
..... Respondent
O R D E R:
The image of justice in the popular imagination is
that of a woman who is blind-folded with a weighing scale in her
hand. The blindfold represents the idea of impartiality i.e. the
belief that the judge has to be completely neutral and decide the
matter before her without being influenced by any consideration
other than the merits of the case.
By Saurabh Kirpal (Chapter 11 – The Telecom
Counter-Revolution from FIFTEEN JUDGMENTS CASES THAT
SHAPED INDIA’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE)
Respondent authorities appear to be on the
erroneous assumption that symbolism of the blindfold denotes
inability of the justice delivery system to perceive or take
cognizance of manifest illegality. The contemporary conception
2
of Justice, as reflected in the recently unveiled Nyay Devatha by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, depicts Lady Justice with open
eyes, signifying that the law is neither oblivious nor indifferent,
but remains vigilant and sees every citizen equally while
administering justice without fear or favour. Further significant
is the replacement of the traditional sword with the Constitution
of India, symbolizing that the constitutional values, the rule of
law, and the protection of fundamental rights constitute the
true foundation of the justice delivery system, and not the
punitive legacy of colonial jurisprudence.
*****
The present Contempt Case alleging wilful
disobedience on the part of Respondent – Dr. Priyanka Ala, IAS,
Secretary, Telangana Public Service Commission (hereinafter
referred to as ‘TGPSC’) of the order dated 21.03.2025 passed by
this Court in Writ Petition No. 8198 of 2020.
2. Petitioner had applied for the post of School
Librarian in the Residential Education Institution Societies
under Notification No. 20/2017, dated 14.04.2017, issued by
the TGPSC; he appeared in the written examination conducted
pursuant to the said notification and successfully went through
the process of certificate verification as well, thereby qualifying
himself to be considered for appointment against the vacancies
3
notified under the said Notification. Despite having successfully
participated in the selection process and being found fit for
appointment, the Petitioner was not selected primarily on
account of the failure of the TGPSC to follow Rule 6-A of the
Telangana Public Service Commission Rules, which mandates
that where a selected candidate declines to accept the offer of
appointment, the same shall be offered to the next meritorious
candidate in the order of merit. Having been aggrieved by the
denial of appointment, the Petitioner approached this Court by
way of this Writ Petition and upon success in the said Writ
Petition, is now before this Court alleging that the Respondent
has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order passed by this
Court on 21.03.2025.
2.1. This Court allowed the Writ Petition by the order
under contempt directing the 3rd respondent therein to consider
the case of petitioners for selection and appointment to the post
of Librarians (Schools) as per his merit in the selection process
in the non-joining vacancies, if any by operating the next merit.’
The said order has since become final and binding upon the
Respondent. By virtue of the aforesaid direction, Petitioner is
entitled to be considered and appointed in the non-joining
vacancies, and TGPSC is bound to implement the order of this
Court. In view of the same, Petitioner made a representation
4
dated 05.05.2025 to the Secretary, TGPSC, requesting
implementation of the Court’s order, as he had been waiting for
the last eight years for appointment, having successfully gone
through the selection process. In response to the said
representation, Respondent issued Memo No. 515, dated
28.05.2025, addressed to the Petitioner, stating that the non-
joining vacancies pertaining to the Notification of 2017 have
been notified in the next recruitment which took place under
Notification No. 04/2023, dated 05.04.2023, and hence there
are no unfilled or non-joining vacancies for implementing the
Court order.
2.2. The contents of the aforesaid Memo No. 515 dated
28.05.2025, to the effect that the unfilled and non-joining
vacancies of the 2017 Notification have been notified in the
subsequent Notification No. 04/2023, and hence there are no
unfilled or non-joining vacancies, is incorrect and contrary to
the facts on record. The Petitioner submits that it is relevant to
note that the TGPSC has itself recruited applicants of the 2017
Notification, including the candidate bearing Hall Ticket No.
1720001688 in Zone-VI under Selection Notification dated
30.05.2023, and two other applicants bearing Hall Ticket Nos.
1720001325 and 1720003839 in Zone-VI under a Notification
dated 07.10.2023, all of whom belong to the 2017 Notification.
5
These facts clearly demonstrate that the unfilled and non-
joining vacancies of the 2017 Notification were, in fact, not
notified in the 2023 Notification and were, even after 2023,
being filled on the basis of the Court orders by operating the
2017 Notification itself.
2.3. It is also pertinent to note that in the counter
affidavit filed by the TGPSC in W.P. No. 29473 of 2023, at Para
No. 25, it is stated that 17 petitioners therein did not join even
though they received favourable orders in W.P. No. 29737 of
2018. Out of those 17 non-joining vacancies, one vacancy was
filled up with the petitioner in W.P. No. 836 of 2019 basing on
his merit. The said counter was filed in March 2024. This
further proves that the non-joining vacancies of the 2017
Notification were not notified in the 2023 Notification, and that
candidates of the 2017 Notification were recruited even after
2023, on the basis of Court orders. In the light of the above, the
Memo No. 515 dated 28.05.2025 has been issued only to
mislead Petitioner and also to bypass the order of this Court.
TGPSC is deliberately and willfully not implementing the order
of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8198 of 2020. Such deliberate
non-compliance constitutes wilful disobedience of the order of
this Court and amounts to contempt of court, rendering the
6
Respondent liable for punishment under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
2.4. Petitioner has been waiting for his recruitment,
having successfully gone through the selection process under
the notification of 2017, and though this Court has issued a
direction to consider and appoint him in the non-joining
vacancies basing on his merit, the Respondent is wilfully not
implementing the same.
3. Respondent filed the counter affidavit contending
that the Commission sought relinquishments for the said
Notification No. 20/2017 from 26.07.2019 to 30.07.2019, and a
total of 30 candidates submitted their relinquishments.
Following the same, 29 next meritorious candidates were
selected in place of the relinquished candidates, and the
remaining one post was not filled due to want of eligible
candidates for the PH Vacancy. The final selection lists after the
relinquishment option was published on 27.08.2019, and the
unit list for the post of Librarian (Schools) was sent to the
Societies concerned on 14.09.2019. After sending the Unit List
to the appointing authorities, if any vacancy is left from the Unit
List for any reason, G.O. Ms. No. 81 will come into force and
those vacancies will be treated as non-joining vacancies, which
shall be filled up in the subsequent recruitment as per G.O. Ms.
7
No. 81, G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dt. 22/02/1997, and G.O. Ms. No.
544, G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dt. 04/12/1998. There is no provision
to call for relinquishments again and again from those
candidates who have expressed their willingness to join the post
by way of impleading in W.P. No. 29737 of 2018. It is up to the
candidate whether to join the post or not, and the Commission
will not compel them to submit relinquishment. G.O. Ms. No.
81, G.O. Ms. No. 544 and Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure come
into force once final selection is completed and unit list is sent
to the unit officer to issue appointment orders. Filling up
resultant vacancies caused due to non-joining of selected
candidates is outlaw and is not acceptable according to Rule
6(A) also.
3.1. Petitioner, who did not secure selection to the post
of Librarian, filed the present Writ Petition declaring the action
of Respondents in not considering his case for appointment to
the post of Librarian (Schools) against the unfilled and left-over
vacancies of incumbents in W.P. No. 29737 of 2018 as arbitrary
and contrary to Rule 6-A of the Public Service Commission
Rules, in pursuance of Notification No. 20/2017. The said Writ
Petition was allowed by this Court by the final order dated
21.03.2025. The operative part of the order directed the 3rd
respondent to consider the case of the petitioners for selection
8
and appointment to the post of Librarians (Schools) as per their
merit in the selection process in the non-joining vacancies, if
any, by operating the next merit.
3.2. In compliance with the orders of this Court dated
21.03.2025, the Commission wrote a letter to the indenting
Officer of TSWREIS and MJPTBCWREIS to furnish the
vacancies, if any, in Notification No. 20/2017, as the duty of
taking up the subsequent recruitment has been shifted from
TGPSC to TREI-RB Board. The TGPSC addressed a letter to
TSWREIS vide letter No. 515/Librarian School, REIS/2016,
dated 12.05.2025, asking about the unfilled vacancies. The
TSWREIS replied vide Lr.Rc.No.G/TS/2233/2022, dated
24.05.2025, clarifying that all the unfilled and non-joining
vacancies of Notification No. 20/2017 have been included in the
next notification No. 04/2023, dated 05/04/2023, issued by
TREI-RB. Similarly, another letter was addressed to
MJPTBCWREIS vide letter No. 515/Librarian School,
REIS/2016, dated 12.05.2025, asking about the unfilled
vacancies, and in reply, the MJPTBCWREIS vide Lr. No.
2789/A1/Lib (sch)/2017-19, dated 14.05.2025, clarified that all
the Unfilled and Non-Joining vacancies of Notification No.
20/2017 have been included in the next notification No.
04/2023, dated 05.04.2023, issued by TREI-RB.
9
3.3. The Government has dispensed with filling up non-
joining vacancies from a waiting list through G.O. Ms. No. 81,
G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dated 22/02/1997, and G.O. Ms. No. 544,
G.A. (Ser-A) Dept., dated 04.12.1998. TGPSC, after receiving the
information regarding the unfilled and non-joining vacancies
under Notification 20/2017, dated 14.04.2017, from both the
TSWREIS and MJPTBCWREIS, and in compliance of the order
dated 21.03.2025 in W.P. No. 8198 of 2020, considered the case
of the Petitioner and issued orders vide Memo No. 515/Librarian
(Schools), REIS/2016, dated 28.05.2025, rejecting the request
of the Petitioner to consider their case and to appoint them to
the post of Librarian, as there were no unfilled and non-joining
vacancies left under Notification No. 20/2017, dated
14.04.2017. All the Petitioners were informed of the above facts
vide Memo No. 515/Librarians (Schools) REIS/2016, dated
28/05/2025.
3.4. This Respondent has the highest regard towards the
orders of this Court and has no intention whatsoever to disobey
the orders of this Court. It is stated, they have scrupulously
complied with the order dated 21.03.2025, addressing Letter No.
515/Librarian School, REIS/2016, dated 12.05.2025, to the
indent officer of TSWREIS, and Letter No. 515/Librarian School,
REIS/2016, dated 12.05.2025, to the indent officer of
10
MJPTBCWREIS, and thereafter considering the case of the
Petitioner. The Respondent prays that the Contempt Case be
closed as there is no disobedience of the order of this Court.
However, if this Court still feels that the orders dated
21.03.2025 have been disobeyed, this Respondent tenders
unconditional apology.
3.5. It is pertinent to state that TGPSC is only a
recruiting agency and ultimately the respective Societies are the
appointing authorities. As of now, there is a separate
recruitment board, i.e., Telangana Residential Educational
Institutions Recruitment Board (TREI-RB), which is constituted
to conduct recruitment in Telangana Residential Educational
Institutions. As per the information given by the TSWREIS and
MJPTBCWREIS, the TREI-RB has already notified the vacancies
left under Notification No. 20/2017 and they are filled up with
eligible candidates.
4. Petitioner filed a reply reiterating that despite
successfully participating in the selection process under
Notification No. 20/2017, dated 14.04.2017, and having
complied with all the requirements thereunder including written
examination and certificate verification, the benefit of the order
of this Court dated 21.03.2025 has been denied to him on
wholly untenable grounds. The claim of Respondent that all
11
unfilled and non-joining vacancies of Notification No. 20/2017
have been included in Notification No. 04/2023 issued by TREI-
RB, is factually incorrect and contrary to the material on record.
It is the specific case of the Petitioner that the TGPSC has itself
recruited the applicant of the 2017 Notification bearing Hall
Ticket No. 1720001688 in Zone-VI under Selection Notification
dated 30.05.2023, i.e., even after the issuance of Notification
No. 04/2023 of 2023. Similarly, two other applicants bearing
Hall Ticket Nos. 1720001325 and 1720003839 were also
recruited in Zone-VI under a Notification dated 07.10.2023. The
fact that all these candidates belonged to the 2017 Notification
and were recruited in the year 2023 even subsequent to the
issuance of Notification No. 04/2023 clearly demonstrates that
the unfilled and non-joining vacancies of the 2017 Notification
were, in fact, not carried forward to the 2023 Notification and
that such vacancies continued to exist under the 2017
Notification itself.
4.1. The contents of the counter affidavit filed by TGPSC
in W.P. No. 29473/2023, at Para No. 25 thereof, clearly state
that 17 petitioners therein did not join even though they
received favourable orders in W.P. No. 29737 of 2018. Out of
those 17 non-joining vacancies, one vacancy was filled with the
petitioner in W.P. No. 836 of 2019 basing on his merit. The said
12
counter was filed in March 2024. This statement in its own
counter affidavit by the TGPSC directly contradicts the stand
taken by the Respondent in the present Contempt Case that all
non-joining vacancies were subsumed in the 2023 Notification.
4.2. Memo No. 515, dated 28.05.2025, issued by the
Respondent, which seeks to reject the Petitioner’s request by
claiming that all unfilled and non- joining vacancies have been
notified in the 2023 Notification, has been issued solely to
mislead the Petitioner and to circumvent and bypass the order
of this Court. The said Memo is an instrument of deliberate
non-compliance. The TGPSC is deliberately and wilfully not
implementing the order dated 21.03.2025 in W.P. No. 8198 of
2020, and the same amounts to wilful disobedience of the order
of this Court, rendering the Respondent liable for punishment
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
5. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel
assisted by Sri Vedula Chitralekha, learned counsel for
petitioner and Sri P.S. Rajasekhar, learned Standing Counsel on
behalf of Respondent.
6. The background to the present proceedings may be
briefly stated thus. The TGPSC issued Notification No. 20/2017,
dated 14.04.2017, for the recruitment of 256 posts of Librarian
(Schools) in Residential Educational Institutions in Telangana.
13
The Petitioner, G. Srikanth, belonging to the BC-A community,
participated in the selection process conducted pursuant to the
said notification, appearing in the written examination and
going through the certificate verification stage. He secured 213
marks in the written examination. However, the TGPSC failed to
follow Rule 6-A of the Telangana Public Service Commission
Rules, resulting in a large number of notified posts remaining
vacant. Rule 6-A, which is a mandatory provision, requires that
where a selected candidate relinquishes his claim for
appointment in writing, the Commission shall remove such
candidate’s name from the selection list and select the next
candidate according to the rules. The failure to adhere to this
rule meant that meritorious candidates like the Petitioner were
deprived of the benefit of appointment against the vacancies
that arose as a result of relinquishments and non-joining.
7. Petitioner filed this Writ Petition to declare the
action of the Respondents in not considering his case for
appointment to the post of Librarian (Schools) against the
unfilled and left-over vacancies of incumbents in W.P. No.
29737/2018, contrary to Rule 6-A of the Public Service
Commission Rules, in pursuance of Notification No. 20/2017,
as arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory, and directing the
Respondents to consider and appoint the Petitioner to the post
14
of Librarian (Schools) based on merit read with eligibility against
the existing, left-over, and unfilled vacancies, taking into
account the orders of this Court dated 27.08.2019.
8. This Court vide order dated 21.03.2025 allowed the
Writ Petition after taking note of the judgment of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Telangana State Level Police
Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi [Civil Appeal No.
4735 of 2022, dated 23.11.2022], as well as the judgment in
Ashok alias Somanna Gowda v. State of Karnataka [(1992)
1 SCC 28], and placing reliance on the ratio in Writ Petition No.
4495 of 2019, dated 11.06.2019, and Writ Appeal No. 551 of
2019, dated 03.07.2019. This Court observed that the principle
enunciated in Narimetla Vamshi case is that public
employment is an important source of employability for young
people in the country, and that an interpretation that leaves a
large number of vacancies unfilled would go against the very
ethos of providing public employment to persons who are
eligible and meritorious. Accordingly, this Court directed the 3rd
respondent, i.e., the TGPSC, to consider the case of the
Petitioner for selection and appointment to the post of
Librarians (Schools) as per his merit in the selection process in
the non-joining vacancies, if any, by operating the next merit.
The aforesaid order has attained finality.
15
9. After the pronouncement of the order dated
21.03.2025, Petitioner made a representation dated 05.05.2025
to the Secretary, TGPSC, requesting the implementation of the
Court’s order. In response, the TGPSC, after writing to TSWREIS
and MJPTBCWREIS and receiving replies from both the
societies, issued Memo No. 515/Librarian (Schools), REIS/2016,
dated 28.05.2025, rejecting the Petitioner’s request on the
ground that there are no unfilled and non-joining vacancies
under Notification No. 20/2017 as all such vacancies have been
included in the subsequent notification, i.e., Notification No.
04/2023, dated 05.04.2023, issued by TREI-RB. Being
aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection and asserting that the same
is contrary to the facts on record, the Petitioner has filed the
present Contempt Case alleging deliberate and wilful non-
compliance with the order of this Court dated 21.03.2025.
10. The core question for determination by this Court in
the present Contempt Case is whether the conduct of the
Respondent, TGPSC, in issuing Memo No. 515, dated
28.05.2025, rejecting the Petitioner’s request on the ground that
there are no non-joining or unfilled vacancies under Notification
No. 20/2017, amounts to a wilful and deliberate disobedience of
the order of this Court dated 21.03.2025, or whether the
16
Respondent has genuinely and faithfully complied with the
aforesaid direction.
11. To adjudicate the aforesaid question, it is
necessary to examine in some detail the conduct of the
Respondent after the passing of the order dated 21.03.2025.
The Respondent claims compliance by pointing to the letters
addressed to TSWREIS and MJPTBCWREIS and the replies
received from them. The TSWREIS, by its reply letter
Lr.Rc.No.G/TS/2233/2022, dated 24.05.2025, stated that all
the unfilled and non-joining vacancies of Notification No.
20/2017 have been included in the next notification No.
04/2023, dated 05.04.2023, issued by TREI-RB. Similarly, the
MJPTBCWREIS, by its reply letter Lr. No. 2789/A1/Lib (sch)/
2017-19, dated 14.05.2025, stated that all the unfilled and non-
joining vacancies under Notification No. 20/2017 were included
in the next notification No. 04/2023, dated 05.04.2023, issued
by TREI-RB. Based on the aforesaid replies, the Respondent
rejected the Petitioner’s request.
12. Petitioner, however, has placed on record material
that directly contradicts the position taken by the Respondent
and the Societies. It is brought to the notice of this Court that
the TGPSC itself recruited applicants belonging to the 2017
Notification, namely the candidate bearing Hall Ticket No.
17
1720001688 in Zone-VI under Selection Notification dated
30.05.2023, and two other candidates bearing Hall Ticket Nos.
1720001325 and 1720003839 in Zone-VI under Notification
dated 07.10.2023. All of these candidates belonged to the 2017
Notification, and they were recruited in the year 2023, i.e., even
after the issuance of Notification No. 04/2023 by TREI-RB. If
indeed all the unfilled and non-joining vacancies of the 2017
Notification had been subsumed in the 2023 Notification as
claimed by the Respondent and the Societies, there would have
been no occasion to recruit candidates belonging to the 2017
Notification under separate notifications in the year 2023.
13. Further and more significantly, the Respondent
TGPSC itself, in its counter affidavit filed in W.P. No.
29473/2023 at Para No. 25, specifically stated that 17
petitioners therein did not join even though they received
favourable orders in W.P. No. 29737/2018, and that out of
those 17 non-joining vacancies, one vacancy was filled up with
the petitioner in W.P. No. 836/2019 on the basis of his merit.
The said counter was filed in March 2024. This admission on
the part of the Respondent itself is irreconcilable with the stand
adopted in the present proceedings that all non-joining
vacancies had been folded into the 2023 Notification. If, as
stated in March 2024, there were non-joining vacancies being
18
filled up under the 2017 Notification itself, the claim that all
such vacancies had already been included in the 2023
Notification of 2023 cannot but be false and untenable.
14. The conduct of the Respondent thus reveals a
pattern that this Court finds difficult to countenance. On one
hand, it is the Respondent’s own case in other proceedings that
vacancies under the 2017 Notification continued to exist and
were being filled up on the basis of Court orders as late as 2023
and 2024. On the other hand, in the present proceedings,
immediately upon the passing of the order of this Court on
21.03.2025, the Respondent has taken a diametrically opposite
stand, claiming that all vacancies have been subsumed in the
2023 Notification. The timing of this volte-face, coming as it
does immediately after this Court’s order, is deeply suspect and
lends credence to the Petitioner’s contention that Memo No.
515, dated 28.05.2025, was issued not with a genuine intention
to implement the Court’s order, but to give an appearance of
compliance while in substance defeating the very purpose of the
direction.
15. The law relating to contempt of court is well settled.
A wilful disobedience of a Court order does not necessarily
require proof of a deliberate intent to flout the authority of the
Court; it suffices if the party bound by the order fails to comply
19
with it and the non-compliance is not occasioned by any
genuine inability or circumstance beyond the party’s control.
Where a party seeks to comply with the letter of the order while
defeating its spirit, or where the purported compliance is built
upon a factual premise that is demonstrably incorrect, the
Court will not hesitate to treat such conduct as constituting
non-compliance. In the present case, the order dated
21.03.2025 is clear, explicit, and unambiguous. It directs the
TGPSC to consider the Petitioner’s case for appointment in non-
joining vacancies, if any, by operating the next merit. The order
does not contemplate rejection of the Petitioner’s case on the
basis of a disputed and demonstrably incorrect factual assertion
that no vacancies exist. If the Respondent genuinely believes
that no vacancies exist, the appropriate course was to place the
material before this Court and seek clarification, not to issue a
peremptory rejection and present the matter as a fait accompli.
16. This Court also notes that the principle enunciated
in Narimetla Vamshi case, which formed the bedrock of the
order dated 21.03.2025, emphasizes that public employment is
an important source of employability for young people and that
an interpretation that leaves vacancies unfilled goes against the
very ethos of providing employment to eligible and meritorious
candidates. The order of this Court was passed with the intent
20
of ensuring that the Petitioner, who had cleared the selection
process and was found fit for appointment, is not deprived of
the fruits of his litigation on account of the inaction and non-
compliance of the Respondent. The present conduct of the
Respondent, if allowed to stand, would render the order of this
Court entirely nugatory and would effectively deprive the
Petitioner of the benefit he secured after prolonged litigation.
This Court cannot be a mute spectator to such a course of
events.
17. Respondent has also tendered an unconditional
apology in the counter affidavit filed before this Court, stating
that if this Court feels that the orders dated 21.03.2025 have
been disobeyed, this Respondent tenders unconditional apology.
While this Court takes note of the said apology, it is well settled
that an apology by itself cannot be a substitute for compliance
with the order of the Court, nor can it be allowed to shield the
contemnor from the consequences of deliberate disobedience.
An apology offered in the course of contempt proceedings,
particularly when it is not accompanied by actual compliance,
cannot efface the contempt that has already been committed.
The purpose of the law of contempt is not merely punitive, but
also coercive, to compel compliance with the Court’s orders.
Accordingly, the unconditional apology tendered by the
21
Respondent is noted but cannot, by itself, result in closure of
the present Contempt Case without ensuring compliance.
18. Having carefully examined the totality of the
material on record, this Court is of the considered view that the
Respondent has failed to genuinely and faithfully comply with
the order under contempt. Rejection of Petitioner’s case by
Memo No. 515, dated 28.05.2025, on the factually incorrect
basis that there are no unfilled or non-joining vacancies under
Notification No. 20/2017, when in fact the Respondent’s own
admissions in other proceedings demonstrate the contrary,
cannot be accepted as valid compliance. The issuing of Memo
No. 515, dated 28.05.2025, which seeks to close the matter by
asserting a factually unsustainable position, amounts to a
willful and deliberate disobedience of the direction of this Court.
The Petitioner, who has been waiting for over eight years for his
rightful appointment and who succeeded in the Writ Petition
before this Court, deserves that the fruits of his litigation be not
frustrated by such conduct.
19. This Court is also placing reliance upon the law
laid down in Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumathi Prasad Bafna 1,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that once a court passes
an order, the said order is required to be complied with in letter
1
2024 INSC 978
22
and spirit, and that a party cannot be permitted to sit in
judgment over the order of the court and decide for itself
whether to comply with it or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further held that when a court passes a clear and unequivocal
direction, the authority or party bound by such direction is
under an absolute obligation to comply with the same, and that
any attempt to wriggle out of the said obligation by raising
technical pleas or by advancing justifications that were either
already considered or ought to have been raised before the court
that passed the order, would amount to willful disobedience
constituting contempt. The Hon’ble Apex Court also made it
clear that where a party has chosen not to challenge the order
by preferring an appeal and has allowed the same to attain
finality, such a party cannot be heard to raise objections to
compliance at the stage of contempt proceedings, as the
correctness of the order is no longer open for examination at
that stage. The operative portion of the judgment is extracted
hereunder:
” 182.In order to decide whether the appellants are guilty of
civil contempt, it would be apposite to refer to Section 2(b) of the Act,
1971, which reads as under:
“2. Definitions.-
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
xxx xxx xxx
23
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
of an undertaking given to a court;”
183. The Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 1599,
defines “willful” as hereunder: –
“Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly;
deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional;
purposeful; not accidental or involuntary. Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or
with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful;
without legal justification. An act or omission is “willfully” done, if done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific
intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its
construction often influenced by its context. In civil actions, the word (willfully) often denotes
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal context it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.”
184. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and
Ors. reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression ‘wilful disobedience’ in
the context of Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 was read to mean an act or
omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do
something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to
do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies
deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It
should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either
wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance.
185. Hence, the expression or word “wilful” means act or
omission which is done voluntarily or intentionally and with the specific
intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specific intent
to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with
bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a
deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose.
186. Article 129 of the Constitution declares this Court as a “a
court of record” and states that it shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The
provisions of the Act, 1971 and the Rules framed thereunder form a part
of a special statutory jurisdiction that is vested in courts to punish an
offending party for its contemptuous conduct. It needs no emphasis that
the power of contempt ought to be exercised sparingly with great care
24
and caution. The contemptuous act complained of must be such that
would result in obstruction of justice, adversely affect the majesty of law
and impact the dignity of the courts of law.
187. It must also be understood that contempt proceedings are
sui generis inasmuch as the Law of Evidence and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 are not to be strictly applied. At the same time, the
procedure adopted during the contempt proceedings must be fair and
just that is to say the principles governing the Rule of law must be
extended to the party against whom contempt proceedings have been
initiated. The party must have every opportunity to place its position
before the Court. Such a party must not be left unheard under any
circumstances.
188. In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. reported in (2014)
16 SCC 204 it was held that the contempt jurisdiction conferred on to
the law courts power to punish an offender not only for his wilful
disobedience but also for contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law. It further observed that such power has been conferred
for the simple reason that the respect and authority commanded by the
courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his
rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society
will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. The
relevant observations read as under: –
“11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish
an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty
of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the
greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire
democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is
undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of
the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus,
otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the
law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all
reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
189. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr. reported in
(2000) 2 SCC 367 this Court held that the purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law
since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
25
led to be distorted, as any indulgence which can even remotely be
termed to affect the majesty of law would result in the society losing its
confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts forfeiting the
trust and confidence of the people in general. The relevant observations
read as under: –
“9 […] The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest
guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble
down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged
by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even
remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and
faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the
people in general.”
(Emphasis supplied)
190. In Pushpaben & Anr. v. Narandas Badiani & Anr.
reported in (1979) 2 SCC 394, it was held that contempt of court is a
special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever
an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to
impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial
institutions. It further held that this jurisdiction is to be exercised not
for the protection of the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the
administration of justice from being maligned and ensure that the
authority of the courts is neither imperilled nor is the administration of
justice by it interfered with in any manner. The relevant observations
read as under: –
” 42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly
and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which
tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions.
This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the
majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the
jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any
claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an
individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the
general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be
imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It
is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is
exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law
and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to
shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.
26
(Emphasis supplied)
191. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian
Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1988) 4
SCC 592 it was observed that the process of due course of
administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and
the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or
circumvented. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 35. The question of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The
process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the
judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or
publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the
developing countries are passing, contempt of court means interference with the due
administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
192. In Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora reported in
(1996) 6 SCC 14, it was observed that even if parties have not filed an
undertaking before the court but if the court was induced to sanction a
particular course of action or inaction on the representation made by a
party and the court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act
on the said representation or such representation was false, the party
would be guilty of committing contempt. The relevant observations read
as under: –
” 12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the court to
vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the court and
there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the
present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this
Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our
considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation
may be held liable for such contempt if the court is induced to sanction a particular course of
action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the court ultimately
finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was
false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was
persuaded to pass the order dated 5-10-1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit
premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of court, notwithstanding non-furnishing of the
undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never
intended to act upon it. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
27
193. The Borrower and the Subsequent Transferee / the alleged
contemnors herein placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Patel
Rajnikant (supra) have contended that in the absence of any
disobedience or wilful breach of a prohibitory order no contempt could
be said to have been committed. It has been further canvased that this
Court in the Main Appeals never issued any specific direction either to
the Borrower or the Subsequent Transferee, & therefore no contempt
could be said to have been committed.
194. In Patel Rajnikant (supra), this Court upon examining
Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 held that to hold a person guilty of having
committed contempt, there must be a judgment, order, direction etc. by
a court, there must be disobedience of such judgment, order, direction
etc and that such disobedience must be willful.
” 58. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have also
been invoked. Section 2 of the Act is a definition clause. Clause (a) enacts that contempt of
court means “civil contempt or criminal contempt”. Clause (b) defines “civil contempt”
thus:
” 2. (b) ‘civil contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
a court;”
Reading of the above clause makes it clear that the following conditions
must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed a civil contempt:
(i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court (or an undertaking given to a court);
(ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court (or breach of undertaking given to a court); and
(iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court (or breach of undertaking) must be wilful.”
195. However, the subsequent observations made by this Court
in Patel Rajnikant (supra) are significant. It observed that the court
should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt, it is for
the proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with
the orders passed by it in order to uphold and maintain the dignity of
courts and majesty of law. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 70. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt
of court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same
time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the
dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper
administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a court, it
is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent
weapon of contempt.
28
(Emphasis supplied)
196. What can be discerned from the above exposition of law is
that any act of disobedience, defiance, or any attempt to malign the
authority of the court would amount to contempt because they
undermine the respect and trust that the public reposes in judicial
institutions. The judicial process relies on the confidence of society, and
any act that disrupts or disrespects this process threatens to erode the
foundation of justice and order.
197. Contempt jurisdiction exists to preserve the majesty and
sanctity of the law. Courts are the guardians of justice, and their
decisions must command respect and compliance to ensure the proper
functioning of society. When individuals or entities challenge the
authority of courts through wilful disobedience or obstructive behaviour,
they undermine the rule of law and create the risk of anarchy. Contempt
serves as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the courts, ensuring
that they remain a symbol of fairness, impartiality, and accountability.
198. When judicial orders are openly flouted or court proceedings
are disrespected, it sends a signal that the rule of law is ineffective,
leading to a loss of trust in the system. Judicial decisions must remain
unimpaired, free from external pressures, manipulation, or
circumvention. Acts that attempt to mislead the court, obstruct its
functioning or frustrate its decisions distort the process of justice and
would amount to contempt.
199. The contempt jurisdiction of this court cannot be construed
by any formulaic or rigid approach. Merely because there is no
prohibitory order or no specific direction issued the same would not
mean that the parties cannot be held guilty of contempt. The Contempt
jurisdiction of the court extends beyond the mere direct disobedience of
explicit orders or prohibitory directions issued by the court. Even in the
absence of such specific mandates, the deliberate conduct of parties
aimed at frustrating court proceedings or circumventing its eventual
decision may amount to contempt. This is because such actions strike
at the heart of the judicial process, undermining its authority and
obstructing its ability to deliver justice effectively. The authority of
courts must be respected not only in the letter of their orders but also in
the broader spirit of the proceedings before them.
29
200. Any contumacious conduct of the parties to bypass or
nullify the decision of the court or render it ineffective, or to frustrate
the proceedings of the court, or to ensure any undue advantage
therefrom would amount to contempt. Attempts to sidestep the court’s
jurisdiction or manipulate the course of litigation through dishonest or
obstructive conduct or malign or distort the decision of the courts would
inevitably tantamount to contempt sans any prohibitory order or
direction to such effect.
201. Thus, the mere conduct of parties aimed at frustrating the
court proceedings or circumventing its decisions, even without an
explicit prohibitory order, constitutes contempt. Such actions interfere
with the administration of justice, undermine the respect and authority
of the judiciary, and threaten the rule of law.
202. However, at the same time, the power of contempt ought to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and care. It operates with a
string of caution and unless otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would
neither be fair nor reasonable for the courts to resort to such powers.
The standard of proof required before a person is held guilty of
committing contempt of court must be beyond all reasonable doubt.
203. The courts while exercising its contempt jurisdiction must
remain circumspect, more particularly, where there exists a possibility
of the order being amenable to more than one interpretation. In
Jhareshwar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly reported in (2002) 5
SCC 352 it was held that if an order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions
issued therein then it would be appropriate to direct the parties to
approach the court which disposed of the matter for necessary
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising its contempt
jurisdiction thereby taking upon itself the power to decide the original
proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order. The relevant observations read as under:
“The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been
any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is
alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided
in the judgment or order… The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or
order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt
30jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party,
which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding
a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the
order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment
or order.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
20. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
mentioned supra in Celir LLP, is squarely applicable to the
present case. In view of the foregoing discussion, findings, and
reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered view
that the present Contempt Case deserves to be allowed.
Respondent is held to be guilty of wilful disobedience of the
order of this Court dated 21.03.2025 in W.P. No. 8198 of 2020,
by failing to genuinely comply with the direction issued therein,
and by issuing Memo No. 515/Librarian (Schools), REIS/2016,
dated 28.05.2025, on a factually incorrect and unsustainable
basis.
21. Interestingly, an argument was sought to be put
forth contending that the direction in the Writ Petition was to
the TGPSC, therefore, there cannot be any contempt against the
State. In this connection, it is to be noted that Writ Petition was
filed against the State of Telangana (represented through
Principal Secretary, Roads & Buildings Department), and
Telangana State Public Service Commission, which is the
31agency of the State. TGPSC being a recruiting agency of the
State Public Services, and acting for and on behalf of the State;
its role is to scrupulously follow the guidelines applicable for
conducting examinations, selection of candidates and
forwarding the select list to the State Government for issuance
of necessary appointment orders. Therefore, a direction to
TGPSC is invariably a direction to the State. Merely because the
direction specified the TGPSC, that does not absolve the State of
its responsibility to act and implement the order. Therefore,
both the TGPSC as well as the State are duty-bound to take
action to implement the order under contempt.
22. Therefore, the grounds sought to be urged by
TGPSC that State has filled up / appointed the candidates
subsequently and that there are no vacancies, or the grounds
sought to be urged by the State that the direction is for TGPSC
are apparently a blame-game.
23. In that view of the matter, the Contempt Case is
allowed. The State of Telangana and TGPSC (respondents in the
Writ Petition) are directed to forthwith comply with the direction
issued in the order dated 21.03.2025 in Writ Petition No. 8198
of 2020, if necessary by creating supernumerary posts, within
eight weeks from today.
32
23.1. Respondent shall also be liable for punishment
under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
the quantum of which shall be determined upon Respondent’s
compliance or non-compliance with this direction being brought
to the notice of this Court.
24. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, if any,
shall stand closed.
——– —————————–
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
29th June 2026
Ksld
