Madras High Court
G.Rengammal vs The State Of Tamilnadu on 30 April, 2026
Crl.OP(MD)No.1169 of 2026
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 27.02.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 30.04.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE L.VICTORIA GOWRI
Crl.O.P.(MD).No.1169 of 2026
G.Rengammal
... Petitioner/Accused No.
Vs.
1. The State of Tamilnadu,
Rep. by the Superintendent of Police,
Pudukottai District.
2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
District Crime Branch,
Pudukottai District.
3. The Inspector of Police,
District Crime Branch,
Pudukottai District.
.... Respondent / Complainant
4. K.Lakshmi
5. Krishnan .... Respondent /
Defacto Complainant
Prayer: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of
BNSS, 2023, to set aside the docket order passed by the learned
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Judicial Magistrate -II, Pudukottai, in Crl.M.P.No.13 of 2024 dated
13.05.2025.
For Petitioner : Mr.G.Karuppasamypandiyan
For R-1 to R-3 : Mr.M.Sakthi Kumar,
Government Advocate (Crl. side)
ORDER
Preface:
The present petition raises an issue of some significance
touching the scope of the supervisory jurisdiction of a Magistrate
while dealing with an application seeking a direction for
investigation. The question is not merely whether the complaint of
the petitioner deserves investigation, but whether the learned
Magistrate, after entertaining a petition invoking the statutory
mechanism for investigation, could direct the police to conduct an
enquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether a cognizable offence
is made out.
2. The controversy lies at the intersection of two equally
important concerns. On the one hand, the criminal process cannot
be lightly invoked to transform every failed financial arrangement
into a penal prosecution. On the other hand, where allegations
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disclose deception, inducement, misappropriation and a pattern of
similar conduct affecting multiple victims, the criminal law cannot
remain inert under the guise of civil overtones. The Court is therefore
called upon to determine whether the impugned order reflects a
lawful exercise of judicial discretion or whether it amounts to a
deferral of the very adjudicatory duty cast upon the Magistrate.
3. The petitioner, who asserts herself to be a victim of cheating
and breach of trust, seeks to assail the order of the learned Judicial
Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, dated 13.05.2025 in Cr.M.P. No.13 of
2024, by which the learned Magistrate directed the Inspector of
Police, District Crime Branch, Pudukkottai, to conduct an enquiry
and, if cognizable offence is found, to register a case, investigate and
file a report. The grievance of the petitioner is that such an order is
legally unsustainable once the complaint had already been placed
before the judicial forum for an order of investigation.
Gist of the prosecution case:
4. The petitioner is the victim of an alleged financial fraud said
to have been perpetrated by respondents 4 and 5. According to the
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petitioner, respondents 4 and 5 approached her and other members
of the public with representations that, if money and jewels were
entrusted to them for investment, the same would be doubled within
a short period and returned with high profits.
5. Believing the assurances thus held out, and more
particularly because the parties were known to one another and
belonged to the same village, the petitioner is stated to have parted,
during the first week of September 2023, with a sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- and approximately 3½ sovereigns of gold jewellery in
favour of respondents 4 and 5.
6. The petitioner would further allege that the jewels so
entrusted by her were pledged by the accused in their own names
with Fincare Small Finance Bank, Karumandapam, Trichy. Though
respondents 4 and 5 had allegedly assured that the investment
amount would be doubled and returned, they failed to honour the
promise and thereby cheated the petitioner.
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7. The petitioner would also assert that she is not the only
victim. According to her affidavit, several other persons from the
same village were induced in a similar fashion, and in all,
respondents 4 and 5 are said to have collected approximately Rs.
50,00,000/- in cash and about 35 sovereigns of gold from multiple
victims. It is further alleged that jewels so obtained were pledged in
Fincare Small Finance Bank and Radiance Fincorp under various
loan accounts, and that the victims were subsequently threatened
with auction of the pledged jewels unless the dues were discharged.
8. In the first instance, the petitioner lodged a complaint on
09.10.2023 before the District Crime Branch / Economic Offences
authorities, Pudukkottai. Since no action was taken, she sent a
further complaint on 15.11.2023 to the Superintendent of Police and
other police authorities by registered post. According to her, despite
receipt of the complaints and supporting documents, no effective
action was taken and the matter was either closed or allowed to drift.
Left with no other efficacious remedy, the petitioner approached the
learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, by filing a petition
seeking a direction for registration of FIR and investigation. The
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learned Magistrate, by order dated 13.05.2025, directed the
Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Pudukkottai, to conduct
an enquiry and, if a cognizable offence is disclosed, to register a case,
investigate and file a report on or before 13.06.2025. Aggrieved by
the said course adopted by the learned Magistrate, the present
petition has been filed.
Gist of the impugned order:
9. Since the impugned order lies at the heart of the
controversy, it would be useful to notice its substance. The learned
Magistrate heard the petitioner, perused the documents, recorded
that the accused were known to the petitioner, that they had induced
her to invest by promising doubled returns, that the petitioner had
parted with Rs.1,00,000/- and 3½ sovereigns of gold jewellery, and
that the jewels were allegedly pledged in Fincare Small Finance Bank
at Karumandapam, Trichy, in the accused’s names.
10. The learned Magistrate also noticed that the petitioner had
earlier lodged complaints before the police authorities and that no
action had been taken thereon. Upon considering the petition, the
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Magistrate directed the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch,
Pudukkottai, to conduct an enquiry and, if it was found that a
cognizable offence had been committed, to register a case, investigate
and file a report. The order further required strict compliance with
the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others1.
Grounds for setting aside the impugned order:
11. The petitioner assails the impugned order substantially on
the following grounds:
11.1. Firstly, it is contended that the learned Magistrate,
having adverted to the complaint and materials and having prima
facie found the existence of allegations disclosing cognizable
offences, ought to have directed registration of FIR and investigation.
The course of directing only an enquiry is stated to be contrary to the
settled legal position.
11.2. Secondly, it is urged that while exercising power under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. / the corresponding provision, the Magistrate
1 (2014) 2 SCC 1.
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has only two lawful options, namely, either to direct investigation if
the complaint discloses a cognizable offence or to decline the request
if no such offence is made out. The intermediate course of directing
the police to enquire whether cognizable offence is made out is stated
to be unknown to criminal law.
11.3. Thirdly, the petitioner asserts that the impugned order
amounts to improper delegation of judicial function. According to the
petitioner, the judicial satisfaction regarding disclosure of cognizable
offence must be recorded by the Magistrate himself and cannot be
relegated to the police, particularly when the petitioner approached
the Court only because the police had already failed to act.
11.4. Fourthly, it is contended that even assuming the order to
be valid, the third respondent had failed to act meaningfully upon
the direction issued on 13.05.2025, thereby causing grave prejudice
to the petitioner and rendering the order ineffective in practice.
11.5. Fifthly, the petitioner submits that the impugned order
defeats the very object of the statutory remedy designed to secure
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prompt registration and investigation in matters involving cognizable
offences, especially where allegations of cheating and breach of trust
have been raised by a victim who has already exhausted the police
channel.
Arguments on either side:
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the
impugned order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., 1973, as being legally unsustainable.
According to the petitioner, the learned Magistrate had, on the one
hand, adverted to the materials placed before the Court and
proceeded on the premise that the complaint disclosed a prima facie
case involving cognizable offences, but, on the other hand, instead of
directing registration of an FIR and investigation, relegated the
matter to the police for conducting an enquiry. This, according to the
petitioner, reveals an inherent contradiction in the order itself.
13. It was contended that the jurisdiction under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., 1973, casts a judicial duty upon the Magistrate to apply his
mind to the complaint and determine whether the allegations
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disclose a cognizable offence. Once the Magistrate reaches such
satisfaction, the only course open in law is to direct the police to
register an FIR and conduct investigation. Conversely, if no
cognizable offence is made out, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
The intermediate course adopted in the impugned order, namely
directing the police to enquire into whether a cognizable offence is
made out, was attacked as a procedure unknown to criminal law.
14. The petitioner further submitted that the learned
Magistrate could not delegate his judicial function to the police.
Placing reliance on the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari,
it was argued that the power to assess whether the complaint
discloses a cognizable offence is vested exclusively in the Magistrate
once the matter is brought before him under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.,
1973. The police, having earlier failed to act upon the complaint,
cannot once again be entrusted with the very task that the
Magistrate himself is bound to perform.
15. To reinforce the submission, the learned counsel relied
upon the order of this Court in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.18477 of 2025 dated
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31.10.2025, particularly paragraphs 4 and 5, to contend that the
Magistrate, upon an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.,1973 /
Section 175(3) BNSS, 2023, must first satisfy himself as to whether a
cognizable offence is made out, and that only upon such satisfaction
can investigation be ordered, which necessarily postulates
registration of FIR. It was therefore argued that the impugned order,
inasmuch as it leaves the question of cognizable offence to be
determined by the police, amounts to an abdication of judicial duty.
16. The petitioner also submitted that the defacto complainant
had already approached the police authorities, but no FIR had been
registered, which compelled her to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate. In such circumstances, sending the matter back to the
police for enquiry was both illogical and legally impermissible. The
grievance of the petitioner was thus that the Magistrate failed to
render the adjudicatory satisfaction required in law and instead
passed an order that effectively prolonged the inaction already
displayed by the police.
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17. The petitioner additionally disputed the applicability of
Section 175(3) of the BNSS, 2023, to the present case by contending
that the occurrence had taken place in the year 2023 and the
petition had been instituted in 2024, and therefore the matter ought
to be governed by Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., 1973. Though the
petitioner had complied with the requirement of filing an affidavit, it
was argued that such compliance flowed from the dictum in
Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, and not because
the proceedings would automatically stand governed by the BNSS.
18. Expanding his oral submissions, learned counsel would
submit that once the matter reached the Magistrate, the learned
Magistrate was expected to take a clear legal position. According to
him, the Magistrate cannot say in one breath that the allegations
and documents have been considered and then, in another breath,
direct the police to ascertain whether cognizable offence is made out.
Such a course, it was argued, creates uncertainty in the operative
part of the order and dilutes the judicial scrutiny contemplated by
law.
2 (2015) 6 SCC 287
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19. The learned counsel would also contend that the petitioner
had approached the Magistrate precisely because the police had not
discharged their statutory duty upon receipt of the earlier
complaints. Therefore, to remand the petitioner to the same police
machinery for an enquiry as to whether a cognizable offence exists
would amount, in substance, to denying her the statutory protection
embodied in the remedy itself.
20. The learned counsel placed considerable emphasis on the
proposition that the Court cannot outsource its satisfaction.
According to him, while the police may conduct investigation once
lawfully directed, the threshold determination whether the complaint
discloses cognizable offence is one that the Magistrate must make
himself. This duty, according to the petitioner, is not merely
administrative but judicial, and therefore incapable of delegation.
21. It was further argued that the impugned order lacks a
definite finding and is therefore vulnerable on the ground of non-
application of mind. The learned counsel submitted that if the
Magistrate was of the view that the matter was purely civil, the
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petition ought to have been rejected. If, however, the Magistrate
found that the allegations warranted criminal investigation, then the
logical and legal consequence should have been a direction to
register FIR and investigate. The hybrid course adopted, it was
urged, is the very infirmity.
22. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. side)
submitted that the petitioner had misconstrued the tenor and
purport of the impugned order. According to the prosecution, the
learned Magistrate had not recorded any final finding that cognizable
offences were made out. On the contrary, the order merely directed
the police to conduct an enquiry and, only if such enquiry disclosed
commission of a cognizable offence, to register a case and proceed
with investigation. Therefore, the order did not suffer from any
contradiction, but rather reflected judicial caution.
23. The learned Government Advocate (Crl. side) pointed out
that the complaint pertained essentially to a money transaction
between parties known to each other, and in such cases the
ingredients of the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC cannot
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be presumed merely because money was not repaid. It was
submitted that, to constitute cheating, deception from the very
inception of the transaction is a necessary ingredient, and the
complaint did not clearly establish such initial dishonest intention. It
was precisely on account of this ambiguity that the learned
Magistrate refrained from straightaway directing registration of FIR
and instead ordered a preliminary enquiry.
24. The prosecution also relied upon paragraph 6 of the order
passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.18477 of 2025 dated
31.10.2025, wherein it was observed that in cases where enquiry is
required prior to registration of FIR, as contemplated by the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v.
Government of Uttar Pradesh3, the learned Magistrate can direct
such enquiry. Relying upon this observation, the learned
Government Advocate submitted that the course adopted by the
Magistrate in the present case was fully supported by precedent and
cannot be termed as delegation of judicial power.
3 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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25. It was further argued that the learned Magistrate had
discussed the factual background in the impugned order and, in
view of the doubtful nature of the allegations, especially in relation to
the criminality of the transaction, directed the police to ascertain
whether cognizable offences were made out. According to the
prosecution, this was neither an abdication of judicial duty nor an
order unknown to law, but rather a course expressly countenanced
where preliminary enquiry is permissible.
26. The learned Government Advocate also pointed out that,
pursuant to the order, the police had initiated enquiry and summons
had been issued to the petitioner on three occasions. However, the
petitioner had appeared only once and thereafter failed to cooperate
by producing the necessary documents, due to which the enquiry
remained pending for several months. Hence, the petitioner cannot
now complain of delay or inaction when she herself did not cooperate
with the enquiry process.
27. On the question of the governing procedural law, the
prosecution contended that, as on the date of the impugned judicial
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order, namely 13.05.2025, the BNSS had already come into force,
and therefore the petition had to be dealt with under Section 175(3)
BNSS and not under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., 1973. The learned
Government Advocate emphasised that Section 175(3) BNSS
materially differs from Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., 1973, inasmuch as it
contemplates consideration of the application along with the
submission made by the police officer in terms of Section 173 BNSS,
2023. This statutory scheme, according to the prosecution, itself
recognises a more elaborate process before ordering investigation.
Therefore, the impugned order was wholly in consonance with the
contemporary statutory framework.
28. The learned Government Advocate would additionally
submit that in matters involving money dealings between private
individuals, prudence sometimes demands a careful preliminary
scrutiny so that the criminal process is not triggered in a mechanical
manner. It was thus argued that the learned Magistrate’s insistence
upon an enquiry before registration of FIR was a cautious judicial
measure rather than an impermissible surrender of jurisdiction.
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29. According to the prosecution, the impugned order cannot
be tested by isolating one sentence from another. If the order is read
as a whole, the learned Magistrate had only intended that the police
should verify the complaint in the light of the materials and the law
laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh4 and
proceed in accordance with law. Such an order, according to the
respondents, warrants no interference.
Point for consideration:
30. In the light of the rival submissions, the following point
arises for consideration in this Criminal Original Petition whether the
docket order dated 13.05.2025 passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, in Cr.M.P. No.13 of 2024, directing
the police to conduct an enquiry and, if cognizable offence is found,
to register a case and investigate, is legally sustainable; or whether
the said order is liable to be set aside on the ground that the learned
Magistrate failed to record the threshold judicial satisfaction required
in law and impermissibly relegated that determination to the police?
4 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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Governing legal principles:
31. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is necessary to
remind oneself of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a
Magistrate when a complainant approaches the Court after alleging
police inaction. The power to direct investigation is undoubtedly
wide, but it is not mechanical. It presupposes judicial application of
mind to the complaint, the materials accompanying it, and the legal
nature of the allegations disclosed therein.
32. It is equally well settled that a complaint disclosing a
cognizable offence ordinarily attracts the statutory obligation of the
police to register a case. The decision in Lalita Kumari v.
Government of Uttar Pradesh5, while affirming the mandatory
nature of registration in cognizable cases, recognised that in certain
categories of cases a limited preliminary enquiry may precede
registration, not for weighing the truth of the allegations in the
manner of a trial, but for ascertaining whether the information
reveals a cognizable offence.
5 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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33. The decision in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar
Pradesh6, underscored the need for responsibility and sincerity in
invoking the jurisdiction for a direction to investigate, and insisted
upon an affidavit so that the process of law is not casually abused.
At the same time, the requirement of affidavit cannot be read as
diluting the Magistrate’s obligation to pass a reasoned order
reflecting application of mind.
34. The order cited at the Bar in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.18477 of
2025 dated 31.10.2025 appears to have recognised two facets of the
matter. First, that the Magistrate must ascertain whether cognizable
offence is made out. Second, that in a case where preliminary
enquiry before registration is legally warranted under Lalita Kumari
v. Government of Uttar Pradesh7, the Magistrate can direct such
enquiry. The true question, therefore, is not whether enquiry can
ever be directed, but whether the impugned order reflects the
necessary judicial discernment as to why such a course was required
in the facts of the case.
6 (2015) 6 SCC 287
7 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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35. The law thus appears to insist upon a balanced approach.
A Magistrate cannot mechanically order FIR in every case merely
because allegations are made. Equally, the Magistrate cannot avoid
the threshold judicial exercise by passing a vague order that leaves
the essential satisfaction entirely to the police. The order must,
therefore, disclose whether the Court found the matter fit for direct
investigation or fit for preliminary enquiry in terms of the categories
recognised by law, and the reasons for such choice.
Analysis:
36. This Court has carefully considered the complaint, the
translated tenor of the impugned order, the affidavit of the petitioner,
and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side.
37. At the outset, the complaint cannot be dismissed as one
involving a bare money claim. The allegations are that respondents 4
and 5, who were known to the petitioner and belonged to the same
village, induced her and other villagers to part with money and jewels
on the representation that the same would be invested and doubled
within a short span. The allegation further proceeds that the
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entrusted jewels were pledged in financial institutions in the
accused’s own names, that similar transactions were undertaken
with several others, and that a larger fraudulent pattern involving
approximately Rs.50 lakhs and 35 sovereigns of gold exists. These
allegations, if taken at face value, travel beyond a mere debtor-
creditor dispute.
38. Equally, it cannot be ignored that the complaint as framed
raises questions that may require careful verification at the
threshold. In cases of cheating, the dishonest intention at the
inception of the transaction assumes significance. If the matter were
one of a simple failure to return money advanced in the course of a
private arrangement, the criminal colour may indeed become
doubtful. On the other hand, if the inducement was dishonest from
the very beginning and formed part of a repeated scheme targeting
multiple persons, the criminal law would stand squarely attracted.
39. It is precisely for that reason that the quality of the
Magistrate’s order becomes decisive. If the learned Magistrate had,
upon consideration of the nature of the transaction, the allegations
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of multiple victims, the pledging of jewels in the accused’s own
names, and the need to ascertain whether the ingredients of cheating
were revealed at the threshold, recorded a reasoned conclusion that
this was a category of case requiring preliminary enquiry before
registration in terms of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar
Pradesh8, the matter would stand on one footing.
40. However, the impugned order does not proceed on such a
carefully articulated basis. The learned Magistrate records the
factual assertions of the petitioner, notices the earlier complaints to
the police, refers to the documents and then directs the police to
conduct enquiry and, if cognizable offence is found, to register a case
and investigate. What is absent is a definite judicial articulation as to
why the Court considered this to be a fit case for preliminary enquiry
rather than a direct direction to register FIR.
41. This Court is conscious that judicial orders of Magistrates
in miscellaneous criminal petitions are often brief. Brevity by itself is
not a vice. But brevity cannot degenerate into ambiguity. When the
complaint reaches the Court after alleged police inaction, the
8 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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complainant is entitled to know whether the Court, upon application
of mind, found the case fit for investigation, unfit for investigation, or
fit for a preliminary enquiry for reasons recognised in law. The
impugned order, in its operative structure, leaves this aspect
insufficiently articulated.
42. The submission of the petitioner that the Magistrate had
already found cognizable offence to be made out cannot be accepted
in its full amplitude. The order, fairly read, does not record such a
conclusive finding. In that sense, the respondents are right in
contending that the learned Magistrate did not straightaway hold
that cognizable offence stood established. The order only says that
the police shall enquire and, if cognizable offence is found, register a
case and investigate.
43. Yet, the respondents’ contention cannot conclude the
matter in their favour. The defect in the order is not that the
Magistrate positively found cognizable offence and still ordered
enquiry. The defect lies in the Magistrate not clearly recording the
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legal basis upon which such enquiry was warranted after the Court
itself had already been approached for a direction to investigate.
44. The petitioner’s complaint was not one where no materials
were placed. She had filed the complaint, postal receipts and other
supporting documents. The Magistrate noticed the specific
allegations of inducement, entrustment of jewels, pledging of jewels
and prior police inaction. In such a situation, the Court had to take a
clear legal route. If the learned Magistrate considered the matter to
be predominantly civil in character or insufficient to reveal criminal
ingredients even prima facie, the petition ought to have been
dismissed with reasons. If, on the other hand, the Court was
satisfied that investigation was warranted, then the order ought to
have reflected that conclusion with sufficient clarity.
45. The reliance placed by the prosecution on paragraph 6 of
the order in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.18477 of 2025 is not misplaced in
principle. There can indeed be cases where enquiry before
registration is legally permissible. But such permissibility is not a
charter for undefined or routine relegation to the police. The order
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directing enquiry must itself reveal why the case falls within a
category deserving such preliminary scrutiny. It is only then that the
judicial act remains judicial.
46. This Court is also unable to accept, in the peculiar facts of
this case, the sweeping argument of the petitioner that under no
circumstance can a Magistrate direct enquiry. That proposition,
stated in absolute terms, would not be consistent with the latitude
recognised in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh9 and
the subsequent exposition placed before this Court by the learned
Government Advocate. Therefore, the petitioner’s broader proposition
is rejected to that extent.
47. Nevertheless, the narrower and more substantial grievance
of the petitioner deserves acceptance. The impugned order, as
presently worded, does not demonstrate a clear threshold
determination by the Magistrate as to why a preliminary enquiry was
required in this case after the judicial forum had already been
invoked. The order therefore suffers from lack of adequate reasoning
and from an operative ambiguity that cannot be sustained.
9 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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48. The question then is as to the appropriate relief. This Court
is not inclined, on the materials presently available, to straightaway
direct registration of FIR in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, because
the learned Magistrate is the primary forum that considered the
original petition and because the prosecution has specifically
contended that the matter required preliminary scrutiny owing to the
nature of the money transaction and the question of deception at
inception.
49. At the same time, permitting the impugned order to stand
in its present form would amount to affirming an order that does not
clearly disclose the judicial route adopted. The appropriate course,
therefore, would be to set aside the impugned order and remit the
matter to the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, for
fresh consideration.
50. Upon such reconsideration, the learned Magistrate shall
apply his independent judicial mind to the complaint, affidavit and
supporting documents, hear the petitioner, hear the police if the
statutory framework so requires, and thereafter pass a fresh
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reasoned order in accordance with law. If the learned Magistrate
concludes that the complaint discloses cognizable offence warranting
investigation, appropriate direction shall be issued in accordance
with law. If the learned Magistrate concludes that the case falls
within a category where preliminary enquiry before registration is
warranted under the law declared in Lalita Kumari v. Government
of Uttar Pradesh10, the reasons for adopting such course shall be
specifically recorded. If no such ground is made out, the petition may
be dealt with accordingly. What is essential is that the order must
reflect a clear and reasoned judicial determination.
51. The controversy raised before this Court regarding the
applicability of Cr.P.C., 1973, vis-Ã -vis BNSS need not be
pronounced upon in any final or abstract manner in this petition, for
the limited relief now being granted is only one of setting aside and
remand for fresh consideration. The learned Magistrate shall
consider the matter under the procedural regime applicable in law
and pass fresh orders in accordance therewith, uninfluenced by any
tentative observations made by either side before this Court.
10 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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52. The submission of the learned Government Advocate that
the petitioner had not cooperated in the enquiry also cannot, by
itself, salvage the impugned order. Cooperation or non-cooperation
may have relevance in the factual course of an enquiry already
ordered, but when the very legal sustainability of the order directing
such enquiry is under challenge, the Court must first test the legality
of the order itself.
53. For all the above reasons, this Court holds that the
impugned order is liable to be set aside, not because a Magistrate
can never direct a preliminary enquiry, but because the impugned
order, in the facts of the present case, does not adequately disclose
the judicial reasoning necessary to justify such a course.
Epilogue:
54. The criminal Court, when approached by a citizen
complaining of police inaction, occupies a position of solemn
responsibility. It must protect the criminal process from frivolous
invocation; equally, it must ensure that serious allegations are not
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lost in a procedural haze. Judicial discretion is not vindicated by
ambiguity. It is vindicated by clarity, reason and lawful choice.
55. In the case on hand, the petitioner has placed allegations
that are too serious to be brushed aside as a mere private monetary
disagreement, yet the order under challenge does not clearly reveal
why the learned Magistrate chose the path of enquiry in preference
to a direct investigational command or rejection. Such an order
cannot be allowed to remain as it stands.
56. A remand, in the considered view of this Court, would best
subserve the ends of justice. It would preserve the Magistrate’s
primary jurisdiction, permit a fresh and reasoned determination, and
ensure that the petitioner’s grievance receives a judicially coherent
response in accordance with law.
57. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed on
the following terms:
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(i) the docket order dated 13.05.2025 passed in Cr.M.P. No.13
of 2024 by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Pudukkottai, is set
aside;
(ii) the matter is remitted to the learned Judicial Magistrate
No.II, Pudukkottai, for fresh consideration;
(iii) the learned Judicial Magistrate shall reconsider the
petition, the affidavit and the supporting documents, afford
opportunity to the petitioner and to the police, if required in law, and
pass a fresh reasoned order in accordance with law, uninfluenced by
the observations made in the impugned order;
(iv) such exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as
possible, preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order;
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Crl.OP(MD)No.1169 of 2026
(v) it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any final
opinion on the merits of the allegations against respondents 4 and 5.
30.04.2026
NCC : Yes / No
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes/ No
Sml
To
1.The Judicial Magistrate -II,
Pudukottai.
2.The Superintendent of Police,
Pudukottai District.
3. The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
District Crime Branch,
Pudukottai District.
4. The State of Tamilnadu,
Rep by the Inspector of Police,
DCB,
Pudukottai District.
5. The Additional Public Prosecutor,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,
Madurai.
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L.VICTORIA GOWRI, J.
Sml
CRL OP(MD)No.1169 of 2026
30.04.2026
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