Punjab-Haryana High Court
Firm Radha Krishan Sri Niwas vs Mani Raj And Ors. on 24 June, 2026
(Pronouncement)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M)
Firm Radha Krishan Sri Niwas through
Shri Mahabir Parshad Mukhtiar-e-aam of the
firm M/s. Radha Krishan Sri Niwas
.......... Petitioner
Versus
Mani Raj and others
.......... Respondents
1 The date when the judgment was reserved 24.03.2026
2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 24.06.2026
3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 07.07.2026
4 Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced
5 The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJA
Argued By:- Mr. Siddharth Batra, Advocate; with
Mr. Abhinav Sood, Advocate; and
Mr. Rythm Katyal, Advocate;
for the petitioner-lessee.
Mr. Akshay Kumar Jindal, Sr. Advocate, assisted by
Mr. Bhavya Vats, Advocate
for respondent Nos. 1 to 3-landlords.
****
HARKESH MANUJA, J.
By way of present revision petition, challenge has been laid
to the judgments dated 08.12.2005 and 21.11.2006 passed by the learned
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Rent Controller, Hansi and the learned Appellate Authority, Hisar
respectively, whereby an eviction petition preferred at the instance of
respondent Nos. 1 to 3-landowners stands allowed.
FACTS
[2] Briefly, the facts which are necessary for adjudication of the
matter in hand are that the subject property measuring 6 bighas 2 biswas of
land forming part of Khasra Nos. 5887-8526-8527, Khewat No. 73/1308
situated at Hansi alongwith constructed portion measuring 41½’ x 35′
thereupon, was owned and possessed by late Lala Ugar Sain. Vide lease
deed dated 28.07.1927 (registered on 01.08.1927), the subject land was
leased out by Lala Ugar Sain in favour of firm-M/s. Bhagat Ram Ram
Narain through its proprietor-Lala Ram Narain against annual lease amount
of Rs. 275/-. Later, the rights under the lease deed dated 28.07.1927 were
transferred by Lala Ram Narain in favour of the firm-M/s. Radha Krishan
Siri Niwas vide transfer document dated 24.07.1931. Subsequently, the lease
money was enhanced to Rs.285/- per annum on account of some more
portion of around 4 biswas been occupied and possessed by the lessee-
transferee. The increase of lease amount was an offshoot of civil proceedings
initiated at the instance Lala Ugar Sain. In the year 1953-54, consolidation
took place in Hansi and as a result thereof, the aforementioned 6 bighas 6
biswas of land (6 bighas 2 biswas originally leased out and 4 biswas later
occupied by the lessee) got converted into 10 kanal 01 marla (6285.25
square yards) of land forming part of new khasra Nos. 1227, 1229 & 1228
situated within the municipal limits of the Municipal Council, Hansi.
DINESH KUMAR
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[2.1] Later in 1973, the petitioner demolished the boundary wall
towards North of the subject property and constructed eight shops thereupon
which were rented out to respondent Nos. 4 to 11. Thereafter, upon demise
of Lala Ugar Sain on 31.01.1975, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 succeeded to the
subject property as his legal heirs and consequently became the landlords
thereof. On 14.08.1989, the legal heirs of deceased-Lala Ugar Sain
(respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein) filed an eviction petition against the
petitioner as well as respondent Nos. 4 to 11 (alleged sub-tenants) on the
grounds that the lessee was in arrears of rent since 28.07.1989; further, after
having demolished the boundary wall towards North and having converted
old existing barracks into eight shops, the same were rented out to
respondent Nos. 4 to 11 by parting with exclusive possession thereof against
payment of rent and that too without the written consent of the landlords
(respondent Nos. 1 to 3) which thus amounted to sub-letting; having
impaired the value and utility of the rented land by demolishing the
platforms of existing walls; on account of change of use as the subject
property was leased out for Ginning Factory, however, shops were raised
thereupon and were rented out. It was thus prayed that the order of eviction
be passed against the petitioner herein as well as respondent Nos. 4 to 11
(sub-tenants).
[3] In response, written statement was filed only on behalf of the
petitioner herein while submitting that as per the terms of lease documents
dated 28.07.1927, there was no right vested with the owner to seek re-entry
of possession in the subject property and as such, no eviction order could be
passed against the petitioner, who had entered the subject property pursuant
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to the transfer of the lessee’s rights under the aforesaid lease by virtue of a
registered transfer deed dated 24.07.1931. It was further stated that the
original lease deed dated 28.07.1927 was never for any specific purpose,
however, the factum of conversion of the already raised construction–
barracks into eight shops which were thereafter leased out to respondent
Nos. 4 to 11 herein was very well within the knowledge of respondent Nos.
1 to 3-landowners. It was further contended that, having continuously
accepted and realized the lease rent despite being aware of the said state of
affairs, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had acquiesced in the petitioner’s act of
parting with possession and were, therefore, estopped from seeking his
eviction on the ground of sub-letting. It was also pleaded that the
construction of shops was merely over a small portion of land and that too
upon investing of huge money, thus never amounted to violation or breach
of terms or conditions of the lease deed dated 28.07.1927. In the written
statement, specific objection was raised to the effect that the lease deed dated
28.07.1927 was in perpetuity and as such, the provisions of The Haryana
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity “1973 Act”)
were not to be made applicable. It was further denied that by demolishing of
Pucca wells alongwith Chabutra etc., the value and utility of the rented land
and building was materially impaired. It was thus prayed that the eviction
petition preferred at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 be dismissed.
[4] Having taken into consideration the evidence led by the
parties, the learned Rent Controller, Hansi, vide its decision dated
08.12.2005 ordered for eviction of the petitioner as well as respondent Nos.
4 to 11 having recorded the following findings in sum and substance:-
DINESH KUMAR
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(a) the lease deed dated 28.07.1927 (registered on
01.08.1927) was proved on record as Exhibit R-2 from
Lala Ugar Sain to Lala Ram Narain being owner of firm-
M/s. Bhagat Ram Ram Narain;
(b) transfer of rights under the above mentioned lease
qua the subject property in favour of the petitioner-firm,
i.e. firm-M/s. Radha Krishan Shri Niwas by Lala Ram
Narain owner of firm-M/s. Bhagat Ram Ram Narain
effected vide document dated 24.07.1931;
(c) the lease deed dated 28.07.1927 (registered on
01.08.1927) was in perpetuity, however, eviction could be
prayed for on any of the statutory grounds available under
the 1973 Act;
(d) the arrears of rent already been tendered by the
petitioner before the learned Rent Controller;
(e) the rented land and building was leased out for
setting up of a Cotton Ginning Factory and for its allied
purposes, however, the same without the written consent of
the landowners was used for other purposes; having been
leased out by constructing shops thereupon, therefore,
sub-letting was proved;
(f) the eight (08) shops being constructed by the
petitioner over the subject land followed by the same been
leased out to respondent Nos. 4 to 11 (sub-tenants)
alongwith delivery of possession amounted to subletting
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and thus, the provisions of the 1973 Act were applicable to
the case in hand;
(g) further, the construction of eight shops been
converted into a shopping complex on the subject property
by demolishing the boundary wall established the material
impairment towards its value and utility;
(h) the demised premises was leased out for setting up
of a Cotton Ginning Factory and converting the same into
a shopping complex and parting with the possession of part
portion thereof to different tenants amounted to change of
user of the premises in dispute;
(i) previous litigation between the parties could not
amount to statutory bar under Section 11 or Order 2 Rule 2
CPC, as at that point in time, no cause of action accrued to
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 about seeking of eviction against
the petitioner and respondent Nos. 4 to 11.
[5] Aggrieved of the aforesaid findings, the petitioner herein filed an
appeal before the learned First Appellate Authority, Hisar, however, the
same was dismissed vide decision dated 21.11.2006, thereby affirming the
aforesaid findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller. Hence, the
present revision petition.
CONTENTION(S):-
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER-LESSEE:
[6] Impugning the aforesaid judgments dated 08.12.2005 & 21.11.2006
passed by both the Authorities below, learned counsel for the petitioner
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -7-submitted that from the terms of the registered lease dated 28.07.1927 and
also from the transfer deed dated 24.07.1931, it was established on record
that rights in perpetuity were created in favour of the lessee and also the
transferee. He thus submitted that once, the lease deed as well as the transfer
deed created rights in perpetuity in favour of the petitioner herein being the
transferee, the provisions of the 1973 Act were not applicable, especially
when in the original pleadings in the form of ejectment petition preferred at
the instance of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the factum of transfer of lessee rights
in favour of the petitioner herein by virtue of the transfer deed dated
24.07.1931 followed by delivery of possession of the subject property were
admitted. In support, learned counsel also referred to the terms of the lease
deed dated 28.07.1927; relevant clause-4 & 6 as relied upon, are extracted
hereunder:-
“(4) I and my successor and heirs will not have the right to
expel (from the possession of the land) the lease holder and his
successors and heirs, any time;
(6) Lease holder and his successor and heirs will have the
possession over the said land endlessly generation after
generation and this document will be valid/applicable on me, the
executants, and my heirs and successor.”
Learned counsel further submitted that the finding about the
original lease deed dated 28.07.1927 creating rights in perpetuity in favour
of the lessee followed by the transfer of such rights in favour of the
petitioner herein was duly recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the
said finding was never assailed by the respondents herein. Further, the same
was even affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority.
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[6.1] Further, placing reliance upon Clause-3 to the registered lease
deed dated 28.07.1927, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
lessee was not only permitted to build any kind of factory upon the subject
property but was also conferred upon rights to use the land for any other
purpose including the right to build pucca or kachha building, well and diggi
etc. He thus submitted that merely by demolishing the outer wall of the
rented land, and having constructed eight shops thereupon, the case set up by
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 with respect to the change of user of the demised
premises was not proved. In support of his submission, clause-3 from the
lease dated 28.07.1927 as relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, is extracted hereafter:-
” (3) Lease holder will have the right to build any kind of
factory in the said land or make use of the land for any other
purpose including the right to build pucca or kachha building,
well and diggi etc. or plant the fruit bearing or fruitless trees
and make bagicha (garden) etc., I and my heir will not have
objection to it.”
[6.2] Learned counsel for the petitioner, while referring to Clause-
5 of the lease deed dated 28.07.1927, submitted that the petitioner being the
transferee from the original lessee had the right to give the subject land to
any other person as per the conditions of the lease document. He further
submitted that a conjoint reading of Clause-3 and Clause 5 of the said lease
deed clearly demonstrates that the construction of eight shops on the
demised land and the subsequent letting out of the said shops to respondent
Nos. 4 to 11 could not be construed as sub-letting as the same carried
deemed consent of the lessor and his successors. Clause-5 from the lease
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dated 28.07.1927 as relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is
extracted hereafter:-
” (5) The lease holder will have the right to give the said
land to another person as per the conditions of this lease, at the
time of need and take any amount as contract money. I and my
successors will not have any objection to it. But I and my
successors will have the right to take the contract amount from
the person to whom lease holder and his successor will give
this land on contract. ”
[6.3] Learned counsel also pointed out that the law laid down in
case of Ram Ricchpal Versus Sher Singh, reported as 1985 1 RCR (Rent)
625 was not applicable to the given facts and circumstances. He contended
that in case of Ram Ricchpal (supra), the lease was only for a specific
purpose i.e. for raising of construction of a Ginning Factory and the factum
of any right been conferred upon the lessee to construct a part thereof or
lease out the same to any Third Party was not recorded. He further pointed
that in case of Ram Richhpal (supra), the part of the demised premises after
been re-constructed was rented out to Third Party without the consent of the
lessor-successors whereas in the given facts, there was a deemed consent
conferred upon by the original lessor to lease out the property to any other
party first under the terms of the lease deed dated 28.07.1927 and further
having accepted the lease money post letting out of the shops. Relevant
paras-4 to 6 from the decision of Ram Richhpal (supra) as relied upon by
the petitioner, are extracted hereunder:-
” 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that
since the lease deed. Exhibit A.W.6/A, was of a
permanent/perpetual nature, the petitioner could not beDINESH KUMAR
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -10-ejected from the demised premises unless there was any
violation of the terms of the lease deed itself. According to the
learned counsel, so long as the lease deed subsisted, they
could only be ejected if there was any violation of the terms
thereof and not otherwise. According to learned counsel,
since there was no violation of the terms of the lease deed, no
eviction order could be passed by the authorities below
against them under the Haryana Urban (Control of Land and
Eviction) Act, 1973, (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). In other
words, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners
was that the Act was not applicable to the demised premises
as long as the lease was not determined as contemplated
under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. In support
of the contention, the learned counsel relied upon Associated
Hotels of India v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 933.
It was also contended by the learned counsel that only a
negligible portion measuring about 625 square yards out of
the demised premises measuring about 12,000 square yards
had been sublet by constructing 38 shops thereon. It did not
provide a ground of ejectment of the tenants from the
premises. In any case, argued the learned counsel, since the
land was leased out and now the shops have been constructed
thereon which have been let out, the question of sub-letting
thereof did not arise. Reliance in support of this contention
was placed on H.P. Gupta v. Jatinder Kumar, 1982(1) RCR
138 (FB) : 1982(1) Rent Law Reporter 337.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the lease deed, Exhibit A.W.6/A,
carefully. From a perusal of the lease deed, it is quite evident
that the premises in question were leased out for setting up a
cotton ginning factory on the terms set out therein. It is also
one of the terms of the lease that the tenants were allowed to
sublet the karkhana but on the same terms and conditions on
which the lease of the land was given to them. There is
nothing in the lease deed whereby the tenants were authorised
to raise any other type of construction or to sublet theDINESH KUMAR
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -11-premises to any body else. According to the terms of the lease
deed, the tenancy was to continue as a long as the karkhana
existed. It is the common case of the parties that the tenants
have constructed about 38 shops on a part of the demised
premises covering about 600 square yards which have been
sublet by them. The question to be decided in this revision is :
whether the Act is applicable to the demised premises or not ?
6. The Act was enacted with a view to control the increase
of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within
limits of urban areas, and the eviction of the tenants
therefrom. Under Section 3 of the Act, the State Government
may direct that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall not
apply to any particular or rented land or to any class of
buildings or rented lands. Section 13 thereof provides that a
tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be
evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of
this section. Reading the said provisions together, it is quite
clear that after the enforcement of the Act, a tenant could be
ejected from the demised premises only in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. Even if there was any violation of
any term of the lease deed, even then the tenant could not be
evicted from the premises unless the same was a ground for
his eviction under the Act. In that situation, it becomes
immaterial as to whether the tenancy was a statutory one or
was a subsisting one under a lease deed. The Act will not
apply to certain buildings or rented lands which may be
exempted by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act.
Otherwise, it applies to all the buildings or rented lands
within the limits of the urban areas concerned. It is not
disputed and is the common case of the parties that the
demised premises are situated within the limits of the urban
area of Hansi and that the same has not been exempted by the
State Government under Section 3 of the Act. The observation
made in paragraph 3 of the judgment in Ranjit Singh‘s case
(supra) by the Supreme Court, inter alia are, ——
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“A tenant holding premises under a subsisting
lease is protected by the lease and needs no
protection under the Rent Act. It was open to the
appellant to contend that it was protected by the
terms of the lease deed dated August 18, 1939, that
the breaches, if any, of the conditions of the lease
had been waived by the respondents and that the
lease had not determined. But the appellant
deliberately elected to seek protection under
Section 13 of the Act only. The appellant’s counsel
made a formal statement in the trial Court that the
appellant would not seek any protection under the
terms of the lease deed as regards the period of the
lease fixed therein.”
The said observation made by the Supreme Court in the
said case do not help the case of the petitioners for the
proposition that a tenant under a subsisting lease is not liable
to be rejected under the Rent Act, nor any such proposition
was canvassed before the Supreme Court therein. It may be
that in a given case if some protection is available under the
terms of the leased deed which is still subsisting, the tenant
may not be liable to be ejected, but it does not mean that a
tenant is not liable to be rejected under the Rent Act if the
grounds of eviction provided thereunder are proved by the
landlord, though there may not be anything in the lease deed
as regards the said grounds of ejectment available under the
Rent Act. It is so because even if there is any violation of the
terms of the lease deed, a tenant is not liable to be ejected
from the demised premises as under Section 13 of the Act, a
tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be
evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of
that section. After the enforcement of the Act, a tenant is liable
to be ejected from the demised premises only on the grounds
provided under the Act, and not otherwise even if there was
any violation of the terms of the lease deed as such. As
regards the ground of ejectment under the Act, it has been
DINESH KUMAR
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -13-
concurrently held by both the authorities below that the
tenant, after constructing certain shops on portion of the
premises, had sublet the same. The finding has not been
challenged by the petitioners; rather it is the case of the
petitioner themselves that they had constructed the shops on a
portion of the premises and had rented out the same to
different persons and according to them, it did not amount to
subletting because, to them, it was only the land which was
leased out and not the shops which they had constructed
themselves. Once it is proved that a part of the rented land
has been sublet without the written consent of the landlord,
then, under Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act, a tenant is liable to
be rejected therefrom. Reference in this behalf may also be
made to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Madan
Lal v. Smt. Vidya Wati, 1981(1) R.C.R. 57 (D.B.) : 1981
Punjab Law Reporter 18, wherein the landlord had let out
vacant site as rented land to a tenant and the latter had
constructed khokha thereon and had let out the same to the
sub-tenant and the landlord had sought ejectment of the
tenant on the ground that the latter had sublet the demised
premises without the written consent of the landlord. It was
held therein that the position of the tenant of a rented land
would not undergo any change with the construction that may
be made by him thereon. In the event of the building
constructed on the rented land being let out, it cannot be said
that the subletting of the land therein is not involved.”
[6.4] Learned counsel further placed reliance upon the decision
rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of “Sitaram Narayan
Shinde and others Versus Ibrahim Ismail Rais and others”, reported as
2005 (1) RCR (Rent) 85 to contend that even if it was presumed that the
transferee of the lease deed i.e. the petitioner herein constructed certain
shops over the subject land and rented out those in favour of respondent Nos.
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4 to 11, the same was never to be treated as sub-letting. Relevant para-8
from the decision passed in case of Sitaram Narayan Shinde (supra) is
extracted hereunder:-
8. Courts below have held that the petitioners had
constructed the house on the suit open land and had let out
such construction to respondent Nos. 3 to 7. This was held to
be illegal subletting. In India, the concept of dual ownership
is well recognized. The land may belong to one person and
super-structure standing thereon may belong to another.
Where the land belongs to one person and the super-structure
belongs to another and the owner of a super-structure lets out
the super-structure, in the absence of any other evidence, it
cannot be held that the owner of super-structure has sublet
the land. I am fortified in this view by a decision of a
Supreme Court in Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy vs.
Khemchand Gorumal and ors. Reported in AIR 1966 SC 1939.
No finding has been recorded by the Courts below that the
suit property which is an open land was sublet out in addition
to the letting out of the super-structure by the petitioners.
Hence, the finding of a sub-letting of the open land cannot be
sustained. “
[6.5] No other point was raised. In the light of aforesaid
submission(s), learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the eviction
petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 was liable to be dismissed.
ON BEHALF OF CONTESTING RESPONDENT NOS. 1 to 3-
LANDLORDS:
[7] On the other hand, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent nos. 1 to 3 submitted that as per the registered lease deed dated
28th of July 1927, though, the same conferred rights in perpetuity in favour
of the lease, however, the lease being for a specific purpose of establishing a
factory over the subject property; the purpose could not have been changed
DINESH KUMAR
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -15-by raising construction of shops thereupon and letting out those to
respondent nos. 4 to 11 by parting with the exclusive possession thereof
against payment of rent. He thus submitted that in such facts and
circumstances, the respondent nos. 1 to 3 being the successors of original
lessor were entitled to seek eviction of the petitioner as well as respondent
nos. 4 to 11 from the subject property, based on the statutory grounds of
change of user as well as subletting been available under the provisions of
Haryana (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973. Learned Senior Counsel,
accordingly submitted that the judgements passed by the authorities below
being based on proper appreciation of pleadings, the evidence as well as the
law applicable there to thus called for no interference and therefore the
present revision petition was liable to be dismissed.
DISCUSSION AND REASONING
[8] I have heard ld. counsel for the parties and have gone through the
paper book as well as the records. I am unable to find any merit in the
present petition.
[9] Before proceeding any further, this Court deems it apposite to
reiterate the well-established rule of interpretation that the intention
underlying an instrument cannot be gathered from a single expression in
isolation. Instead, the document must be construed in its entirety so as to
discern the true intent reflected from all its provisions read together. In this
regard reference may be made to the following authoritative
pronouncements:
[9.1] A Division Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Provash
Chandra Dalui v. Bishawanath Banerjee reported as 1990 (1) RCR(Rent)
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -16-191 held that every clause of a contractual instrument must be interpreted in
the context of the document as a whole and not in isolation, so as to discern
the true intention of the parties and to ensure that all its provisions operate
harmoniously. Relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:
“9. ‘Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretation’.
The best interpretation is made from the context. Every contract is to
be construed with reference to its object and the whole of its terms.
The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of
the parties. It is an accepted principal of construction that the sense
and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may
be collected ‘ex antecedentibus et consequentibus;’ every part of it
may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one
uniform and consistent sense, if that is possible. As Lord Davey said
in N. E. Railway v. Hastings, (1900) AC 260 (267), “The deed must
be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its
several clauses, and the words of each clause should be so
interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions
of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of
which they are naturally susceptible”. In construing a contract the
Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are
such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention
correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the Court can do
about it. In the construction of a written instrument it is legitimate in
order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be
doubtful it is legitimate to have regard to the circumstances
surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was
designed and intended they should apply”
[9.2] Another Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., M/s. v. Collector of Central Excise,
Baroda reported as 1990 (3) SCC 447 elaborately explained the principle of
noscitur a sociis. The Court held that where words of wider import occur
alongside words of specific meaning, the former ordinarily derive their
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -17-colour from the latter, unless the instrument clearly manifests a contrary
intention. Relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:
“12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a generic
word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well
established. In the context with which we are concerned, we can
legitimately draw upon the “noscitur a sociis” principle. This,
expression simply means that “the meaning of a word is to be judged
by the company it keeps.” Gajendragadkar, J. explained the scope of
the rule in State v. Hospital Mazdoor’ Sabha, (1960) 2 SCR 866
(SC) in the following words:
“This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when two or
more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are
coupled together they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each
other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense
analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted
in “Words and Phrases” (Vol. XIV, p. 207) : “Associated
words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine
of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the
meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference
to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is
broader than the maxim Ejusdem Gencris.” In fact the latter
maxim “is only an illustration or specific application of the
broader maxim noseltur a soclis”. The argument is that
certain essential features or attributes are invaribly
associated with the words “business and trade” as understood
in the popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of
these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the
definition though their normal import may be much wider. We
are not impressed by this argument. It must be borne in mind
that noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it
cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words
have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the
defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -18-words of narrower significance is doubtful or otherwise not
clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully
applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the
words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the
Legislature in using wider words is clear and free of
ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be
pressed into service.”
[9.3] Likewise, a 3-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
another case of Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim reported as
1959 AIR Supreme Court 24, explained the rule governing reconciliation of
different clauses of the same instrument by holding that every endeavour
must first be made to harmoniously construe all the clauses and, only where
such reconciliation is impossible, would the earlier clause prevail over a later
inconsistent clause. Relevant extract is reproduced hereunder for reference:
“13. ………….. If, in fact, there is a conflict between the earlier clause and
the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the
rule of construction is well-established that it is the earlier clause that must
override the later clauses and not ‘vice versa’. In Forbes v. ‘Git, (1922) 1
AC 256 at p. 259. Lord Wrenbury stated the rule in the following terms :
“If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which
destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the
later clause is to be rejected as repugnant and the earlier clause
prevails. In this case the two clauses cannot he reconciled and the
earlier provision in the deed prevails over the later.”
[9.4] The aforesaid principles were reiterated in the context of
interpretation of lease deeds by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Govind
Impex (P) Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department reported
as 2011(1)SCC529 wherein it was observed that the terms of a lease cannot
be construed by isolating one clause from the remaining provisions, but the
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lease deed has to be read in its entirety to ascertain the true intention of the
parties. The relevant extract reads as under:-
“12. In our opinion, what we are required to consider is the terms and
conditions of lease. The terms of lease are not to be interpreted
following strict rules of construction. One term of the lease cannot
be taken into consideration in isolation. Entire document in totality
has to be seen to decipher the terms and conditions of lease. Here
in the present case, Clause 1 in no uncertain term provides for
extension of period of lease for a further period of nine years and
clause 12 thereof provides for renewal on fulfillment of certain
terms and conditions. Therefore, when the document is constructed
as a whole, it is apparent that it provides for the extension of the
term. If that is taken into account the lease is for a period of not
less than twelve years. Once it is held so the explanation to
Section 269UA(f)(i) is clearly attracted.”
[10] Adverting to the facts of the present case, admittedly land
measuring 6 Bighas 2 Biswas having construction of building over an area of
41½’ x 35′ with 2 pucca wells, besides the vacant portion, situated at Hansi
was leased out in favour of firm M/s. Bhagat Ram Ram Narayan by the
original owner, Lala Ugar Sain vide registered lease deed dated 28th July
1927 (registered on 1st August 1927) against payment of rent of Rs.275/- per
annum. Later, vide transfer deed dated 24.07.1931, the lessee rights were
transferred by the firm M/s. Bhagat Ram Ram Narayan in favour of firm
M/s. Radha Krishnan Sri Niwas-petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner had
occupied an additional area of 4 Biswas belonging to the original owner-
lessor and as such, the lease money was enhanced by Rs.10/- per annum in
terms of a previous litigation between the lessor and the transferee. For the
purposes of adjudication of the case in hand, relevant portion of the lease
deed dated 28.07.1927 is being reproduced here under:-
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“1. Ugar Sen, adopted son of Babu Kishori Lal, caste Aggarwal
Vesh, owner in possession, am a resident of Kasba Hansi, District
Hisar.
I, being Malik Kabza of the land, am sole owner in possession of
lend measuring 6-2 Bigha kham detailed as under:
Nehri 3 Biswah
Ghair Mumkin Karkhana (Factory): 5-19
bearing Khasra No. /8526 Min (3 Biswah), 18527 (5-19), entered in
Khewat No…(illegible)…/1308…….(unintelligible). District Hisar, at
patti awwal. …situated at Kasba Hansi,
And, in the above said land one pucca Kothi and two pucca wells
are constructed. Now, while enjoying right senses & good intellect,
I, with my own sweet will, have leased out the above said land
measuring 6-2 Bigha kham bearing Khasra Nos. 18526 Min (3
Biswah), 18527 (5-19), together with Kothi & Chahat (wells)……
(illegible)……. @ fixed contract amount i.e. 275 rupees per annum,
for perpetuity, to Lala Rain Narayan s/o Lala Bhagat Ram caste
Aggarwal Vesh. r/o Kasba Ramgarh, state of Bikaner, owner of
Firm Bhagat Ram Ram Narayan situated at Kasba Hansi, District
Hisar, with effect from 28th July, 1927 for the purpose of
establishing factory etc. including all type of purposes.
I shall remain bound to the following terms and conditions.
……………………….
(3) Lease holder will have the right to build any kind of factory
in the said land or make use of the land for any other purpose
including the right to build pucca or kachha building, well and
diggi etc. or plant the fruit bearing or fruitless trees and make
bagicha (garden) etc., I and my heir will not have objection to it.”
[10.1] A perusal of the aforesaid lease deed would reveal that while
specifying the particulars of the parties thereto as well as the details of the
demised land, it was categorically stipulated that the subject property had
been leased for the purpose of establishing a factory. Further, a plain reading
of Clause 3 of the lease deed, particularly the words “Lease holder will
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have the right to build any kind of factory in the said land”, leaves no
room for ambiguity that the dominant and specific purpose of the lease was
the establishment of a factory. In view of the legal position discussed above,
the subsequent expression “or make use of the land for any other
purpose” cannot be construed in isolation but is required to be read
harmoniously with the preceding part of the clause. So construed, the said
expression merely authorizes the lessee, in addition to constructing a factory
over the demised land, to utilize the remaining land for such ancillary,
incidental or allied purposes as may be reasonably necessary to achieve the
principal object of establishing and operating the factory.
[10.2] Therefore, the aforesaid expression cannot, by any interpretation,
be construed as conferring an unfettered right upon the lessee to alter the
very nature and use of the demised premises by raising construction of shops
or by parting with possession thereof in favour of third parties for
commercial gain against way of rent. In view of the law laid down in Rohit
Pulp’s case(supra) and Radha Sundar‘s case(supra) and also in the
considered opinion of this Court, once the lease deed itself expressly
stipulated that the demised land was being leased for the specific purpose of
establishing a factory, the subsequent words “or make use of the land for
any other purpose” could only be understood to permit such use of the land
as was ancillary or incidental to the attainment of the principal object of the
lease. Else, there was no need for the parties to have mentioned about the
specific and categoric purpose for which the lessee was to utilize the subject
property. Infact, any other interpretation would not only defeat the manifest
intention of the parties but would also render the specific recital regarding
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the purpose of the lease wholly redundant.
[11] Further, as per the records, the subject property formed part of
the municipal limits of Hansi. Consequently, by virtue of Section 1(2) of the
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, the respondent
Nos. 1 to 3, being the successors-in-interest of the original lessor, were fully
entitled to seek eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the demised premises
on any of the statutory grounds available to a landlord under the 1973 Act
even though the lease deed dated 28.07.1927, created rights in perpetuity in
favour of lessor. In support reliance can be placed upon the judgement
passed in Ram Richhpal’s case (supra). Relevant paragraph number six of
the above judgment is extracted hereunder:
” 6. The Act was enacted with a view to control the increase of rent
of certain buildings and rented land situated within limits of urban
areas, and the eviction of the tenants therefrom. Under Section 3 of
the Act, the State Government may direct that all or any of the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to any particular or rented land
or to any class of buildings or rented lands. Section 13 thereof
provides that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land
shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the
provisions of this section. Reading the said provisions together, it is
quite clear that after the enforcement of the Act, a tenant could be
ejected from the demised premises only in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. Even if there was any violation of any term of
the lease deed, even then the tenant could not be evicted from the
premises unless the same was a ground for his eviction under the
Act. In that situation, it becomes immaterial as to whether the
tenancy was a statutory one or was a subsisting one under a lease
deed. The Act will not apply to certain buildings or rented lands
which may be exempted by the State Government under Section 3 of
the Act. Otherwise, it applies to all the buildings or rented lands
within the limits of the urban areas concerned. It is not disputed andDINESH KUMAR
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -23-is the common case of the parties that the demised premises are
situated within the limits of the urban area of Hansi and that the
same has not been exempted by the State Government under Section
3 of the Act. The observation made in paragraph 3 of the judgment in
Ranjit Singh‘s case (supra) by the Supreme Court, inter alia are, —–
“A tenant holding premises under a subsisting lease is
protected by the lease and needs no protection under
the Rent Act. It was open to the appellant to contend
that it was protected by the terms of the lease deed
dated August 18, 1939, that the breaches, if any, of the
conditions of the lease had been waived by the
respondents and that the lease had not determined. But
the appellant deliberately elected to seek protection
under Section 13 of the Act only. The appellant’s
counsel made a formal statement in the trial Court that
the appellant would not seek any protection under the
terms of the lease deed as regards the period of the
lease fixed therein.”
The said observation made by the Supreme Court in the said case
do not help the case of the petitioners for the proposition that a tenant
under a subsisting lease is not liable to be rejected under the Rent Act,
nor any such proposition was canvassed before the Supreme Court
therein. It may be that in a given case if some protection is available
under the terms of the leased deed which is still subsisting, the tenant
may not be liable to be ejected, but it does not mean that a tenant is not
liable to be rejected under the Rent Act if the grounds of eviction
provided thereunder are proved by the landlord, though there may not
be anything in the lease deed as regards the said grounds of ejectment
available under the Rent Act. It is so because even if there is any
violation of the terms of the lease deed, a tenant is not liable to be
ejected from the demised premises as under Section 13 of the Act, a
tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted
therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of that section.
After the enforcement of the Act, a tenant is liable to be ejected from
the demised premises only on the grounds provided under the Act, and
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not otherwise even if there was any violation of the terms of the lease
deed as such. As regards the ground of ejectment under the Act, it has
been concurrently held by both the authorities below that the tenant,
after constructing certain shops on portion of the premises, had sublet
the same. The finding has not been challenged by the petitioners;
rather it is the case of the petitioner themselves that they had
constructed the shops on a portion of the premises and had rented out
the same to different persons and according to them, it did not amount
to subletting because, to them, it was only the land which was leased
out and not the shops which they had constructed themselves. Once it is
proved that a part of the rented land has been sublet without the written
consent of the landlord, then, under Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act, a
tenant is liable to be rejected therefrom. Reference in this behalf may
also be made to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Madan
Lal v. Smt. Vidya Wati, 1981(1) R.C.R. 57 (D.B.) : 1981 Punjab Law
Reporter 18, wherein the landlord had let out vacant site as rented land
to a tenant and the latter had constructed khokha thereon and had let
out the same to the sub-tenant and the landlord had sought ejectment of
the tenant on the ground that the latter had sublet the demised premises
without the written consent of the landlord. It was held therein that the
position of the tenant of a rented land would not undergo any change
with the construction that may be made by him thereon. In the event of
the building constructed on the rented land being let out, it cannot be
said that the subletting of the land therein is not involved.”
[12] Further, even the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that
the original lease deed dated 28.07.1927 created perpetual rights in favour of
the original lessee, which rights subsequently stood transferred to the
petitioner, and that such finding having been recorded by the learned Rent
Controller, never having been assailed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3, and having
also been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, precludes the
respondents from disputing the same, does not merit acceptance. Equally
devoid of merit is the submission that a conjoint reading of Clauses (3) and
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(5) of the lease deed demonstrates that the construction of eight shops over
the demised land and the subsequent letting thereof to respondent Nos. 4 to
11 cannot be construed as sub-letting, as the same was allegedly carried out
with the deemed consent of the original lessor and his successors, thereby
operating as an estoppel against them.
In this regard, Clauses (5) and (6) of the lease deed assume significance and
are reproduced hereunder:
“(5) The lease holder will have the right to give the said land to
another person as per the conditions of this lease at the time of need
and take any amount as lease contract money. I and my successors
will not have any objection to it. But I lease and my successors will
have the right to take the contract amount from the person to whom
lease holder and his successors will give this land on contract.
(6) Lease holder and his successors and heirs will have the
possession over the said land endlessly generation after generation
and this document will be valid/applicable on me, the executant, and
my heirs and successors.”
[12.1] A conjoint reading of the aforesaid clauses leaves no manner of
doubt that the original lessor, namely Lala Ujagar Sain expressly created
leasehold rights in perpetuity in favour of the original lessee and further
conferred upon the lessee the right to transfer or give the demised land to
another person, subject to the conditions stipulated in the lease deed. It is
also not in dispute that the finding recorded by the learned Rent Controller
with respect to the perpetual nature of the lease and its transferability was
never challenged by respondent Nos. 1 to 3, namely the legal heirs of the
original lessor, and consequently attained finality.
[12.2] However, the mere existence of perpetual and transferable
leasehold rights cannot be construed as conferring an unfettered authority
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upon the lessee to alter the very nature and purpose of the lease. The lease
deed, when read as a whole, unequivocally reveals that the demised land was
leased for the specific purpose of establishing a factory. At no place does the
lease deed either expressly or by necessary implication authorise the lessee
to raise commercial shops over the demised land or to induct independent
tenants therein. Therefore, the construction of eight shops and the
subsequent letting thereof to respondent Nos. 4 to 11 cannot be regarded as
an act falling within the scope of the rights conferred under the lease deed.
Consequently, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be held estopped from
challenging the construction of the shops and their subsequent letting, as the
dispute is not with regard to the existence or transferability of the leasehold
rights, but with regard to their exercise beyond the terms and purpose of the
lease deed.
[12.3] Moreover, the mere acceptance of rent by the original owner-
lessor from the lessee-transferee/petitioner, after the construction of shops
and the letting out thereof to third parties, cannot be treated as an act of
estoppel against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, there being no written consent
accorded by them permitting the petitioner to part with possession of the
shops in favour of third parties, as contemplated under Section 13(2)(ii) of
the 1973 Act. The said provision specifically stipulates that a tenant shall be
liable to eviction if he has, without the written consent of the landlord,
transferred his rights under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented
land or any portion thereof. The relevant provision of the Act is reproduced
hereunder:-
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"13. Eviction of tenants.
..................
(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the
Controller, for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller,
after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the application, is satisfied, –
………………
(ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of the 1949
Act without the written consent of the landlord,
(a)transferred his right under the lease or sublet the
entire building or rented land or any portion thereof;
or
b)used the building or rented land for a purpose other
than that for which it was leased;
………………..
the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put
the land-lord in possession of the building or rented land and
if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order
rejecting the application:”
[12.3.1] Further, in this regard, reliance is also placed upon the judgment
of this Hon’ble Court passed in the case of Ram Kishan v. Moti Ram
reported as 2006 (1) RCR (Rent) 395 wherein it was held that where the
statute mandates the landlord’s written consent for subletting or transfer of
possession, the tenant cannot invoke the principles of waiver, acquiescence
or estoppel merely on account of the landlord’s knowledge of the subletting
or acceptance of rent. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are
reproduced hereunder:
“9. I have considered the arguments raised by the counsel for the
parties on this issue and I do not find any substance in the arguments
raised by the counsel for the petitioner. In this case, it has been
established by the respondent-landlord that initially the demised
premises was let out to respondent – Mangal Singh on rent @ Rs.
35/- per month somewhere in the year 1971. Subsequently, in the
year 1985, the premises was let out by the said tenant to the
petitioner without written consent of the respondent-landlord. In my
opinion, when the sub-letting has been established, then, the sub-
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tenant cannot take the plea of waiver and estoppel on the ground that
inspite of the knowledge about the subtenancy, the landlord has not
filed the ejectment application for a reasonably long time. In the Act,
it has been provided that a landlord can seek the ejectment of the
tenant if the tenant has sub-let the premises without the written
consent of the landlord. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Waman
Shriniwas Kini’s case (supra) has held that when the Rent Act
prohibits sub-letting and makes it unlawful for a tenant to assign or
to transfer his interest in the premises let to him and when the tenant
makes himself liable to eviction under the Rent Act on the said
ground, then, the tenant cannot be permitted to assert in a Court of
justice to say that the landlord has waived his right. It was held that
the plea of waiver is not available against the Statute. In Ram
Saran‘s case (supra), in which the decision of A.S. Sulochana v. C.
Dharmalingam, 1987(1) RCR (Rent) 213 : 1987(1) RCC 213 was
also considered, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the mere
knowledge of the landlord about the creation of sub-tenancy which
was never authorised by the landlord, cannot estop him from seeking
eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. The Hon’ble Apex
Court has held as under :
“35. The Rent Act is a special statute governing and
regulating tenancy and sub-tenancy. Such provisions in the
special statute supersede the general law of tenancy if the
provisions of the special statute are incompatible with the
general law of tenancy. Under Section 14 of the Rent Act,
mere knowledge of the landlord about occupation of the
tenanted premises by the said registered society and
acceptance of rent for the tenanted premises tendered by the
tenant in the name of the registered society, will not create a
sub-tenancy unless induction of a sub-tenant is made with the
written consent of the landlord. It is nobody’s case that the
landlord has given any written consent for induction for sub-
tenant. There is no estoppel against statute. Hence, even if the
landlord has accepted payment of rent for the disputed
premises from the said society, such acceptance of rent will
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CR No. 2180 of 2007 (O&M) -29-registered society. Consequently, landlord will not be
estopped from claiming eviction of unauthorised sub-tenant
along with the tenant indulging in inducting sub-tenant
without lawful authority.”
Thus, in view of the aforesaid statutory mandate and the legal
position enunciated in the above judgment, the reliance placed by the
petitioner on Sitaram Narayan Shinde (supra) is wholly misplaced and does
not advance its case.
[13] In view of the foregoing discussion and the settled legal position,
this Court finds no merit in the present petition. Accordingly, the petition is
dismissed, and the judgments dated 08.12.2005 and 21.11.2006 passed by
the learned Rent Controller, Hansi and the learned Appellate Authority,
Hisar, respectively, are hereby affirmed.
[14] Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed off.
June 24, 2026 ( HARKESH MANUJA )
'dk karma / sanjay' JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether Reportable Yes
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