Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Falil Ur Rehman vs Ut Of J&K on 30 June, 2026
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
LADAKH AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 21.05.2026
Pronounced on: 30.06.2026
Uploaded on: 01.07.2026
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is
pronounced: Full
CrlA(S) No.01/2020
FALIL UR REHMAN ... APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. M. Y. Bhat, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. Sajid, Advocate.
Vs.
UT OF J&K ...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Haaris Khan, Assisting Counsel, vice
Mr. Mohsin S. Qadiri, Sr. AAG.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1) The present appeal is directed against judgment dated
12.02.2020 passed by the learned Special Judge
Anticorruption, Kashmir, Srinagar (hereinafter referred to as
the trial court) whereby the appellant has been convicted of
offences under Section 5(1)(d) read Section 5(2) of J&K
Prevention of Corruption Act [ for short “the PC Act“] and
Section 161 of RPC. Vide the impugned judgment, the
appellant has been sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of
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Rs.10,000/ in proof of offence under Section 5(1)(d) read
with Section 5(2) of the PC Act. In proof of offence under
Section 161 of RPC, the appellant has been sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and
to pay a fine of Rs.2000/. In default of payment of fine, the
appellant has been sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a further period of six months. Both the
sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
2) As per the prosecution case, on 03.03.2008,
complainant-PW Ab. Rashid Wani, lodged a written
complaint before the Vigilance Organization, Kashmir,
alleging therein that he had submitted an application to
State Forest Corporation, Srinagar, for sanction of 50 CFT
timber about five months back and on 12.11.2007, the
sanction order was issued in his favour. It was alleged in the
complaint that when the complainant approached Range
Officer SFC, Rajbagh, Srinagar, he was told that as soon as
the stock of timber will become available at PC Depot,
Parimpora, Srinagar, the allotted timber will be issued in his
favour. The complainant further alleged that when he
approached In-charge PC Depot, Parimpora, the appellant
herein, he demanded Rs.7500 as bribe for issuance of
sanctioned timber. It was further alleged in the complaint
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that after great persuasion, the deal relating to payment of
bribe was settled at Rs.4000, which was to be paid to the
appellant on 03.03.2008. According to the complainant, he
was reluctant to pay bribe, as such, he approached Vigilance
Organization, Kashmir, along with an amount of Rs.4000
and prayed for legal action against the appellant.
3) On the basis of aforesaid complaint, FIR No.8/2008 for
offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the
PC Act and Section 161 of RPC came to be registered with
Police Station Vigilance Organization, Kashmir (VOK) and
investigation was commenced. A trap team comprising
officers/officials of VOK was constituted for laying trap
against the appellant/ accused. Services of one independent
witness, PW-Prince Ahmad Khan, Senior Assistant,
Commercial Tax Department, Srinagar, were also
requisitioned and he was associated in the trap proceedings.
The complainant is stated to have produced Rs.4000/
comprising three currency notes, each of Rs.1000/
denomination and ten currency notes of Rs.100/
denomination before the members of the trap team.
4) After conducting pre-trap demonstration, the
complainant along with other members of the trap team
proceeded to PC Depot, Parimpora. On reaching there, the
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complainant and the independent witness approached the
appellant in his office and after some time, the appellant and
the complainant came out of the office and they went to a
tea stall outside the office premises and the independent
witness followed them. It is further alleged that the
appellant/accused demanded and accepted Rs.4000/ as
bribe from the complainant and kept the same in the left
back pocket of his trouser, whereafter he came out of the tea
stall. The whole transaction was watched by the independent
witness. Thereafter a pre-fixed signal was given by the
complainant to other members of the trap team who rushed
to the spot and apprehended the appellant/accused. Upon
search of left back pocket of his trouser, the tainted money
was recovered from his possession which was seized on spot.
Thereafter the appellant/accused was made to wash his
hands in the solution of Sodium Carbonate which turned
pink. Similarly, left back pocket of trouser of the
appellant/accused was also washed in Sodium Carbonate
solution and the same also turned pink. These solutions
were put in bottles and the same were sealed on spot.
Thereafter the appellant/accused was arrested and during
his personal search, his identity card, a mobile phone and
an amount of Rs.2400/ were recovered and seized. The
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investigating agency also seized the sanction order bearing
No.833063 dated 12.11.2007 and GR No.1277 dated
08.11.2007 produced by the complainant. The statement of
the complainant PW-Ab. Rashid Wani under Section 164A
Cr.P.C was recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st
Class, and the statements of other witnesses conversant
with the facts of the case were recorded under Section 161
of the Cr.P.C. After investigation of the case, offences under
Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of PC Act and Section
161 of RPC were found established against the
appellant/accused and the challan was laid before the trial
court.
5) Vide order dated 25.04.2011, the learned trial court
framed charges for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with
Section 5(2) of the PC Act and Section 161 of RPC against
the appellant/accused, who denied the charges and claimed
to be tried. Accordingly, the prosecution was directed to lead
evidence in support of the charges. In order to prove the
charges, the prosecution besides examining complainant PW
Ab. Rashid Wani, and shadow witness PW Prince Ahmad
Khan, also examined members of the trap team, namely,
Inspector Mohammad Rafi, Inspector Bashir Ahmad Mir and
Constable Abdul Rashid Khan as witnesses in support of
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their case. PW Abdul Majid Khan was examined to prove
investigation whereas PW Ghulam Hassan Bhat was
examined to prove registration of FIR. Besides this, Scientific
Officer, PW Shabir Ahmad Yesvi, PW Zahoor Ahmad Mir,
Field Worker, SFC, Parimpora, and PW Abdul Rashid,
Divisional Manager, JKSFC, were also examined by the
prosecution.
6) After completion of the prosecution evidence, the
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution
evidence were put to the appellant/accused for seeking his
explanation and, accordingly, his statement under Section
342 of J&K Cr. P. C. was recorded on 22.11.2018. In his
statement the appellant/accused put up a defence that the
complainant is an interested witness and that there was no
occasion for him to make any demand of bribe as there was
no release order in favour of the complainant nor any
document was marked to him. The appellant expressed his
ignorance about the trap proceedings. He termed the
evidence with regard to recovery of tainted money from his
possession as biased, inconsistent and contradictory.
7) Though the appellant sought time to lead evidence yet
no witness was produced by him in defence and he made a
statement before the trial court that he does not want to
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produce any witness in defence. The case was, accordingly,
set down for final arguments.
8) The learned trial court vide the impugned judgment
dated 12.02.2020 framed the following four points for
determination:
a) Whether complainant approached State Forest
Corporation for sanction of 50 Cft of timber and
sanction order was accordingly issued in his
favour;
b) Whether complainant approached PC Depot
Parimpora Srinagar for allotment of sanctioned
timber where accused Falil-ul-Rehman met him
who demanded Rs.7500/- as bribe for issuance of
sanction timber and bribe money was settled to
an amount of Rs.4000/-;
c) Whether complainant paid the bribe money of
Rs.4000/- to the accused on the day of trap who
accepted the same and was subsequently
recovered from the pocket of the pent that the
accused was wearing by trap team;
d) Whether positive hand wash and pocket wash
confirmed that accused handled the bribe money;
9) After analysing the evidence on record, the learned trial
court vide the impugned judgment came to the conclusion
that the complainant had approached State Forest
Corporation for sanction of 50 CFT of timber and the same
was sanctioned in his favour. The learned trial court further
recorded a finding that the prosecution has succeeded in
proving the initial demand of illegal gratification made by the
appellant/accused from the complainant. The learned trial
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succeeded in proving the demand and payment of illegal
gratification to the appellant/accused during the trap
proceedings, pursuant whereto, an amount of Rs.4000/ was
paid by the complainant to the appellant/accused who
accepted it and put the same in left back pocket of his
trouser, wherefrom the same was recovered. It was also
concluded that chemical tests carried out on spot confirmed
that the appellant/accused had handled the tainted
currency notes. On the basis of these findings, the learned
trial court recorded the impugned judgment of conviction
and sentence against the appellant/accused which is under
challenge in the present appeal.
10) The appellant has challenged the impugned judgement
on the grounds that the sanction for prosecution against him
has not been proved in the present case as only Xerox copy
of the sanction order has been placed on record of the
challan. It has been contended that the appellant/accused
was not competent to issue timber in favour of the
complainant because the order relating to sanction of timber
was not endorsed to him and, therefore, there was no
occasion for the appellant/accused to demand bribe from
the complainant. It has been contended by the appellant that
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position. It has been further contended that the shadow
witness has clearly stated that there was no conversation
about bribe between the complainant and the accused and
that the bribe money was not tendered by the complainant
to the accused. It has been contended that PW Zahoor
Ahmad Mir, who was present on spot, has clearly stated that
the complainant forcibly tried to tender bribe money to the
accused but he returned the same twice. According to the
appellant, there are grave contradictions in the statements
of prosecution witnesses. It has been contended that the
impugned judgment has been passed without appreciating
the evidence and the material on record and that the findings
recorded by the learned trial court are perverse. It has been
also contended that without proof of demand and acceptance
of illegal gratification, mere recovery of the tainted money
from the possession of the appellant/accused would not be
enough to record judgment of conviction against him.
11) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the impugned judgment, the grounds of appeal,
evidence on record and record of the trial court.
12) As already stated, the charge against the
appellant/accused, which was subject matter of trial before
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PC Depot, SFC, Parimpora, had demanded illegal
gratification from the complainant, PW Ab. Rashid Wani, for
release of timber that was sanctioned in his favour in terms
of sanction order dated 12.11.2007, regarding which he had
also deposited the requisite amount vide GR dated
08.11.2007. It is the case of the prosecution that when the
trap was laid by the sleuths of VOK on 03.03.2008, the
appellant/accused had demanded and accepted tainted
currency notes amounting to Rs.4000/ which were later on
recovered from the left side back pocket of his trouser.
13) The first contention that has been raised by learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant is that in the
present case sanction for prosecuting the appellant/accused
has not been proved, inasmuch as the original order
according sanction for prosecution against the
appellant/accused was not placed on record of the challan.
On this ground it is being contended that the very
cognizance of the offences against the appellant/accused is
vitiated and, as such, he deserves to be acquitted of the
charges.
14) In the above context, if we have a look at the trial court
record, it does appear that a copy of the original sanction
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order bearing SFC order No.848 of 2010 dated 27.12.2010,
endorsed to the Vigilance Organization, is available on the
record. The learned trial court, while dealing with this aspect
of the matter, has observed that since copy of the original
sanction order is on record, as such, contention of the
accused is not tenable. However, the accused/appellant did
not raise the issue with regard to validity of the sanction
order until final hearing before the trial court. The
authenticity of the sanction order has not been disputed by
the appellant either during cross-examination of the
prosecution witnesses including the investigating officer or
while making statement under Section 342 of J&K Cr. P. C.
The question arises as to whether it is legally permissible for
the appellant/accused to raise this issue before the
Appellate Court.
15) In the above context, it would be apt to notice the
provisions contained in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of
Section 6 of the PC Act. It reads as under:
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, Samvat 1989 –
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall
be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or
revision on the ground of any error, omission or irregularities in,
the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion
of that court, a failure of justice has in fact occasioned thereby.
From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it becomes
clear that a finding, sentence or order passed by a Special
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Judge cannot be reversed or altered by a court in an appeal
etc. on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in
the sanction for prosecution of the accused mandated in
terms of sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the PC Act unless it
is shown that it has resulted in failure of justice.
16) Thus, unless it is shown by the appellant/accused that
because of omission on the part of the prosecution to place
on record the original sanction order before the trial court
failure of justice has occasioned, such omissions will not
lead to reversal of finding of guilt recorded by the learned
trial court against the appellant/accused.
17) In my aforesaid view, I am supported by the judgment
of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of Central
Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal and another,
(1999) 8 SCC 501. While dealing with a similar issue, the
Supreme Court has, in the said case, after noticing the
provisions contained in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Central), which are somewhat similar to the
provisions contained in sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the
J&K PC Act, observed as under:
11. In a case where the accused failed to raise the question of
valid sanction the trial would normally proceed to its logical
end by making a judicial scrutiny of the entire materials. If that
case ends in conviction there is no question of failure of
justice on the mere premise that no valid sanction was
accorded for prosecuting the public servant because the veryCrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 12 of 40
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public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive
prosecution on the allegation that they have committed
offence in the discharge of their official duties. But once the
judicial filtering process is over on completion of the trial the
purpose of providing for the initial sanction would bog down to
a surplusage. This could be the reason for providing a bridle
upon the appellate and revisional forums as envisaged in
Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
18) The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, after
noticing the provisions contained in Section 19(3) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act), which is in
pari-materia with the provisions contained in Section 6(3) of
the J&K PC Act, held that no conviction and sentence can be
altered or reversed merely on the ground of absence of
sanction, much less on the ground of want of competency of
the authority who granted the sanction.
19) Turning to the facts of the present case, as already
stated, the appellant/accused did not raise the objection
with regard to admissibility in evidence of the order of
sanction during the trial of the case. Thus, no question of
failure of justice in the present case would arise. Once the
allegations against the appellant/accused have been
subjected to full dressed trial by the trial court, the purpose
of initial sanction for prosecution gets fulfilled. It has been
observed by the Supreme Court in V. K. Sehgal‘s case
(supra), that the purpose of precondition of sanction for
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launching a prosecution against a public servant is to filter
frivolous complaints against the public servant and to
safeguard him from vindictive prosecution, but once he has
waived his right to raise an objection relating to
absence/irregularity of sanction and the allegations levelled
against him have been subjected to full-dressed trial, the
insistence upon the sanction for prosecution would be
unnecessary. In this view of the matter, the contention
raised by the appellant/accused does not have any force.
20) The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant
has laid much emphasis on the contention that in the
present case, demand of illegal gratification by the
appellant/accused from the complainant at the time of trap
proceedings is not established. It has been contended that
shadow witness PW Prince Ahmad Khan has categorically
stated that while he was watching the accused and the
complainant, there was no conversation between them with
regard to demand of bribe nor there was any transaction of
bribe money. He has also referred to the statement of PW
Zahoor Ahmad Ahamd Mir, who, as per the prosecution
case, was also present on spot at the time of alleged
transaction of bribe money between complainant and the
accused. It has been submitted that the said witness has
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categorically stated that the complainant tried to tender
bribe money to the accused twice but he refused to take the
same.
21) According to the learned Senior Counsel, in the
absence of corroboration to the statement of the complainant
as regards the demand and acceptance of tainted money by
the accused during trap proceedings, the same cannot be
relied upon. It has been contended that the complainant in
a trap case has to be treated as an accomplice and his
uncorroborated testimony cannot be relied upon. According
to the learned Senior Counsel, the essential ingredients of
demand and acceptance of tainted money by the
appellant/accused during the trap proceedings have not
been established and, therefore, mere recovery of tainted
money from the possession of the appellant/accused would
not be enough to record conviction against him.
22) There is no dispute to the legal position that in order to
prove an offence under Section 5(2) of the J&K PC Act read
with Section 161 of RPC, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove with cogent and convincing evidence
that the accused made the demand of illegal gratification,
that pursuant to the said demand the illegal gratification
was paid to the accused and the same was recovered from
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him. Unless all the aforesaid three aspects of the case are
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the legal presumption
arising out of Section 4 of the J&K PC Act does not get
attracted. The question that is required to be determined in
the instant case is whether in the absence of corroboration
to the statement of the complainant, PW Ab. Rashid Wani,
to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
appellant/accused during the trap proceedings by the
shadow witness, PW Prince Ahmad Khan, it can be stated
that the said essential ingredient of offence under Section
5(2) of PC Act read with Section 161 of RPC is established.
23) In order to find an answer to the aforesaid question, it
would be apt to survey legal position regarding the reliability
of uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness that has
emanated from various precedents handed down by the
Supreme Court from time to time.
24) The Supreme Court has, in the case of Prakash Chand
vs. State Delhi Administration, (1979) 3 SCC 90, while
dealing with the issue as to whether conviction can be based
on uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, held that a
trap witness may perhaps be considered as a person
interested in the success of trap and that may entitle a Court
to view his evidence as that of an interested witness. The
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Court further held that where the circumstances justify it, a
Court may refuse to act upon the uncorroborated testimony
of a trap witness but on the other hand, a court may well be
justified in acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of a
trap witness if the court is satisfied from the facts and
circumstances of the case that the witness is a witness of
truth.
25) In M. O. Shamsudhin vs. State of Kerala, (1995) 3
SCC 351, the Supreme Court has, while dealing with the
argument that statement of a bribe giver being in the nature
of an accomplice cannot be relied upon without
corroboration, explained the legal position on the issue in
the following manner:
11. Since this is an argument which is frequently
put forward in all cases of bribery, we would like
to examine the scope, nature and extent of
corroboration that is necessary in such cases.
The word ‘accomplice’ is not defined in the
Evidence Act. However, it is accepted that the
word is used in its ordinary sense which means
and signifies a guilty partner or associate in a
crime. Illustration (b) to Section 114 in a way
cautions the court to bear in mind the
presumption that an accomplice is not worthy of
credit unless he is corroborated in material
particulars. Section 133 of the Act, however,
declares that an accomplice shall be a
competent witness against an accused person
and a conviction is not illegal merely because it
proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. The relation between Section 133
which is a rule of law and Illustration (b) to Section
114 which is a rule of prudence has been the
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subject of comment in a large number of
decisions. However, it has emerged that a
conviction based on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice is not illegal though
an accomplice may be unworthy of credit for
several reasons. Reading Section 133 and
Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act
together, the courts in India have held that while it
is not illegal to act upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the accomplice the rule of prudence
so universally followed has to amount to rule of
law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of an
accomplice unless it is corroborated in material
aspects so as to implicate the accused. The
reasons for requiring corroboration of the
testimony of an accomplice are that an
accomplice is likely to swear falsely in order to
shift the guilt from himself and that he is an
immoral person being a participator in the crime
who may not have any regard to any sanction of
the oath and in the case of an approver, on his
own admission, he is a criminal who gives
evidence under a promise of pardon and supports
the prosecution with the hope of getting his own
freedom.
12. Now confining ourselves to the case of bribery
it is generally accepted that the person offering a
bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an
accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal
gratification but the nature of corroboration
required in such a case should not be subjected
to the same rigorous tests which are generally
applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe-
givers are generally treated to be in the nature of
accomplices but among them there are various
types and gradations. In cases under the
Prevention of Corruption Act the complainant is
the person who gives the bribe in a technical and
legal sense because in every trap case wherever
the complaint is filed there must be a person who
has to give money to the accused which in fact is
the bribe money which is demanded and without
such a giving the trap cannot succeed. When
there is such a demand by the public servant from
a person who is unwilling, and if to do public good
approaches the authorities and lodges a
complaint, then in order that the trap succeeds he
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has to give the money. There could be another
type of bribe-giver who is always willing to give
money in order to get his work done and having got
the work done he may send a complaint. Here he
is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime
committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus,
there are grades and grades of accomplices and
therefore a distinction could as well be drawn
between cases where a person offers a bribe to
achieve his own purpose and where one is forced
to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is
to say under coercion. A person who falls in this
category and who becomes a party for laying a
trap stands on a different footing because he is
only a victim of threat or coercion to which he was
subjected to. Where such witnesses fall under the
category of ‘accomplices’ by reason of their being
bribe-givers, in the first instance, the court has to
consider the degree of complicity and then look
for corroboration if necessary as a rule of
prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration
that may be needed in a case may vary having
regard to the facts and circumstances.
13. The word ‘corroboration’ means not mere
evidence tending to confirm other evidence.
In DPP v. Hester , Lord Morris said:
“The purpose of corroboration is not to give
validity or credence to evidence which is
deficient or suspect or incredible but only
to confirm and support that which as
evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and
credible; and corroborative evidence will
only fill its role if it itself is completely
credible….”
In DPP v. Kilbourne , it was observed thus:
“There is nothing technical in the idea of
corroboration. When in the ordinary affairs
of life one is doubtful whether or not to
believe a particular statement one
naturally looks to see whether it fits in with
other statements or circumstances
relating to the particular matter; the better
it fits in the more one is inclined to believe
it. The doubted statement is corroborated
to a greater or lesser extent by the otherCrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 19 of 40
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207statements or circumstances with which it
fits in.”
14. In R. v. Baskerville , which is a leading case on
this aspect, Lord Reading said:
“There is no doubt that the uncorroborated
evidence of an accomplice is admissible in
law…. But it has long been a rule of practice
at common law for the judge to warn the
jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner
on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice or accomplices, and, in the
discretion of the judge, to advise them not
to convict upon such evidence; but the
judge should point out to the jury that it is
within their legal province to convict upon
such unconfirmed evidence…. This rule of
practice has become virtually equivalent to
a rule of law, and since the Court of
Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, came into
operation this Court has held that, in the
absence of such a warning by the judge, the
conviction must be quashed…. If after the
proper caution by the judge the jury
nevertheless convicts the prisoner, this
Court will not quash the conviction merely
upon the ground that the testimony of the
accomplice was uncorroborated.”
15. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, Bose, J.,
after referring to the rule laid down in Baskerville
case with regard to the admissibility of the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, held
thus:
“That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in
India so far as accomplices are concerned
and it is certainly not any higher in the case
of sexual offences. The only clarification
necessary for purposes of this country is
where this class of offence is sometimes
tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In
these cases it is necessary that the judge
should give some indication in his
judgment that he has had this rule of
caution in mind and should proceed to give
reasons for considering it unnecessary to
require corroboration on the facts of the
particular case before him and show whyCrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 20 of 40
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207he considers it safe to convict without
corroboration in that particular case.”
Justice Bose in the same judgment further
observed thus:
“I turn next to the nature and extent of the
corroboration required when it is not
considered safe to dispense with it. Here,
again, the rules are lucidly expounded by
Lord Reading in Baskerville case at pages
664 to 669. It would be impossible, indeed
it would be dangerous, to formulate the
kind of evidence which should, or would,
be regarded as corroboration. Its nature
and extent must necessarily vary with
circumstances of each case and also
according to the particular circumstances
of the offence charged. But to this extent
the rules are clear.
First, it is not necessary that there should
be independent confirmation of every material
circumstance in the sense that the independent
evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of
the complainant or the accomplice, should in
itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. As Lord
Reading says —
‘Indeed, if it were required that the
accomplice should be confirmed in
every detail of the crime, his
evidence would not be essential to
the case, it would be merely
confirmatory of other and
independent testimony.’
All that is required is that there must be
‘some additional evidence rendering it probable
that the story of the accomplice (or complainant)
is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it’.
Secondly, the independent evidence must
not only make it safe to believe that the crime was
committed but must in some way reasonably
connect or tend to connect the accused with it by
confirming in some material particular the
testimony of the accomplice or complainant that
the accused committed the crime. This does not
mean that the corroboration as to identity must
extend to all the circumstances necessary to
identify the accused with the offence. Again, all
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independent evidence which will make it
reasonably safe to believe the witness’s story that
the accused was the one, or among those, who
committed the offence. The reason for this part of
the rule is that —
‘a man who has been guilty of a
crime himself will always be able to relate
the facts of the case, and if the
confirmation be only on the truth of that
history, without identifying the persons,
that is really no corroboration at all…. It
would not at all tend to show that the party
accused participated in it.’
Thirdly, the corroboration must come from
independent sources and thus ordinarily the
testimony of one accomplice would not be
sufficient to corroborate that of another. But of
course the circumstances may be such as to
make it safe to dispense with the necessity of
corroboration and in those special
circumstances a conviction so based would not
be illegal. I say this because it was contended that
the mother in this case was not an independent
source.
Fourthly, the corroboration need not be
direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial
evidence of his connection with the crime. Were it
otherwise, ‘many crimes which are usually
committed between accomplices in secret, such
as incest, offences with females’ (or unnatural
offences) ‘could never be brought to justice’. ”
16. We shall now refer to some of the judgments
wherein the rule of corroboration has been
considered in respect of the bribery cases. In Rao
Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh there are observations to the effect that
the evidence of the trap witnesses cannot be
taken on its face value thereby indicating that
their evidence cannot be relied upon without
independent corroboration. In State of
Bihar v. Basawan Singh a Bench of five Judges
considered this “corroboration requirement” and
after referring to the observations made in Rao
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Shiv Bahadur Singh case explained them in the
following manner:
“If the witnesses are not
accomplices, what then is their position?
In Shiv Bahadur Singh case (A) it was
observed, with regard to Nagindas and
Pannalal, that they were partisan
witnesses who were out to entrap the
appellant in that case, and it was further
observed: ‘A perusal of the evidence …
leaves in the mind the impression that they
were not witnesses whose evidence could
be taken as its face value.’ We have taken
the observations quoted above from a full
report of the decision, as the authorised
report does not contain the discussion with
regard to evidence. It is thus clear that the
decision did not lay down any universal or
inflexible rule of rejection even with regard
to the evidence of witnesses who may be
called partisan or interested witnesses. It is
plain and obvious that no such rule can be
laid down; for the value of the testimony of
a witness depends on diverse factors, such
as, the character of the witness, to what
extent and in what manner he is interested,
how he has fared in cross-examination etc.
There is no doubt that the testimony of
partisan or interested witnesses must be
scrutinised with care and there may be
cases, as in Shiv Bahadur Singh case (A),
where the Court will as a matter of
prudence look for independent
corroboration. It is wrong, however, to
deduce from that decision any universal or
inflexible rule that the evidence of the
witnesses of the raiding party must be
discarded, unless independent
corroboration is available.”
This Court in the above case concluded thus:
“The correct rule is this: if any of the
witnesses are accomplices who
are particeps criminis in respect of the
actual crime charged, their evidence must
be treated as the evidence of accomplices
is treated; if they are not accomplices but
are partisan or interested witnesses, who
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their evidence must be tested in the same
way as other interested evidence is tested
by the application of diverse
considerations which must vary from case
to case, and in proper case, the Court may
even look for independent corroboration
before convicting the accused person.”
It was further concluded thus:
“As was observed by Lord Reading
in Baskerville (C) even in respect of the
evidence of an accomplice, all that is
required is that there must be ‘some
additional evidence rendering it probable
that the story of the accomplice is true and
that it is reasonably safe to act upon it’.
In Rameshwar at p. 385 (B), to which we
have referred in an earlier paragraph, the
nature and extent of corroboration
required, when it is not considered safe to
dispense with it, have been clearly
explained and it is merely necessary to
reiterate that corroboration need not be
direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime; it is sufficient even
though it is merely circumstantial evidence
of his connection with the crime.”
17. In a later case namely Major E.G.
Barsay v. State of Bombay it was held by this
Court that though a trap witness is not an
approver he is certainly an interested witness in
that he is interested to see that the trap laid by him
succeeds and he could at the most be equated
with the partisan witnesses which needs
corroboration. Relying on the ratio laid down
in Basawan Singh case a Bench of three Judges
in Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of
Gujarat held thus:
“Now coming back to the contention
that the appellants could not have been
convicted solely on the basis of the
evidence of Ramanlal and the police
witnesses, we are of opinion that it is an
untenable contention. The utmost that can
be said against Ramanlal, the Dy SP,
Erulker and Santramji is that they areCrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 24 of 40
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207partisan witnesses as they were interested
in the success of the trap laid by them. It
cannot be said — and it was not said — that
they were accomplices. Therefore, the law
does not require that their evidence should
be corroborated before being accepted as
sufficient to found a conviction. This
position is placed beyond controversy by
the decision of this Court in State of
Bihar v. Basawan Singh wherein this Court
laid down, overruling the decision in Rao
Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh that where the witnesses are not
accomplices but are merely partisan or
interested witnesses who are concerned in
the success of the trap, their evidence
must be tested in the same way as any
other interested evidence is tested and in a
proper case, the court may look for
independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person. We are
unable to agree that any different rule was
laid down in E.G. Barsay v. State of
Bombay. It must be remembered that the
decision in Basawan Singh case was given
by a Bench of five Judges and that decision
was binding on the Bench that
decided Barsay case . Some of the
observations in Barsay case no doubt
support the contention of the appellants.
But those observations must be confined
to the peculiar facts of that case. It is now
well settled by a series of decisions of this
Court that while in the case of evidence of
an accomplice, no conviction can be
based on his evidence unless it is
corroborated in material particulars but as
regards the evidence of a partisan witness
it is open to a court to convict an accused
person solely on the basis of that evidence,
if it is satisfied that that evidence is reliable.
But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration. In the instant case, the trial
court and the High Court have fully
accepted the evidence of Ramanlal, the Dy
SP, Erulker and Santramji. That being so, it
was open to them to convict the appellants
solely on the basis of their evidence. That
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2026:JKLHC-SGR:207apart, their evidence is substantially
corroborated by the evidence of
Dahyabhai, Sanghvi and Sendhalal. In the
case of partisan witnesses, the
corroboration that may be looked for is
corroboration in a general way and not
material corroboration as in the case of the
evidence of accomplices.”
18. In Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan , this
Court after referring to Basawan Singh
case observed thus:
“We are unable to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and
other prosecution witnesses to whose
evidence we shall presently refer, should
be considered as accomplices
and therefore their evidence is required to
be corroborated in material particulars
before being accepted. On the proved
facts, even those who gave illegal
gratification to the appellants cannot be
considered as accomplices as the same
was extorted from them. Though PWs 1, 2,
4 and 17 can be considered as interested
witnesses as regards their evidence
relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is not
correct to say that their evidence cannot be
accepted without corroboration. See State
of Bihar v. Basawan Singh .”
19. In Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) this
Court held thus: (SCC p. 652, paras 33 and 34)
“This also leads to the question
whether all witnesses, who are called upon
to assist detection of a bribery case by
laying a trap, should be considered
unreliable as accomplices or at any rate
partisan witnesses. There is no rule of law
that even if a witness is otherwise reliable
and independent, his association in a pre-
arranged raid about which he had become
acquainted makes him an accomplice or a
partisan witness. In absence of anything to
warrant a contrary conclusion, conviction
is not untenable merely because it is based
on the testimony of such a witness.
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We are also not prepared to dub
every witness of a raiding party to be an
accomplice per se or even as an interested
witness in total absence of materials
justifying such an inference. While PW 4
will be a highly partisan witness in this case
in his own interest to oblige the police,
nothing was shown against PW 3. PW 7, the
Inspector, cannot be considered as an
absolutely partisan witness because he is a
police officer who took immediate action
on the complaint. Nothing unusual is
suggested against him. We have no
hesitation in accepting the testimony of
PWs 3 and 7 on their own. They do
corroborate the complainant.”
20. In Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn.) ,
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench while
repelling the contention that the evidence of trap
witness namely the police officer should not be
accepted unless corroborated observed thus:
(SCC p. 395, para 9)
“We, however, wish to say that the
evidence of PW 8 is entirely trustworthy and
there is no need to seek any corroboration.
We are not prepared to accept the
submission of Shri Frank Anthony that he is
the very police officer who laid the trap
should be sufficient for us to insist upon
corroboration. We do wish to say that there
is no rule of prudence which has
crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed
any rule of prudence, which requires that
the evidence of such officers should be
treated on the same footing as evidence of
accomplices and there should be
insistence on corroboration. In the facts
and circumstances of a particular case a
court may be disinclined to act upon the
evidence of such an officer without
corroboration, but, equally, in the facts and
circumstances of another case the Court
may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of
such an officer. It is all a matter of
appreciation of evidence and on such
matters there can be no hard and fast rule,
nor can there be any precedential
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2026:JKLHC-SGR:207guidance. We are forced to say this
because of late we have come across
several judgments of Courts of Session and
sometimes even of High Courts where
reference is made to decisions of this Court
on matters of appreciation of evidence and
decisions of pure question of fact.”
21. From the above resume of various decisions,
the following principles are deducible. Section
133 of the Evidence Act lays down that an
accomplice is a competent witness against an
accused person. The conviction based on such
evidence is not illegal merely because it proceeds
upon the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice. However, there is a rider in
Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Act which
provides that the court may presume that the
accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. This
presumption is in the nature of a precautionary
provision incorporating the rule of prudence
which is ingrained in the appreciation of
accomplice’s evidence. Therefore, the courts
should be guarded before accepting the
accomplice’s evidence and look for corroborating
evidence. The discretion of the court upon which
the rule of corroboration rests must be exercised
in a sound and reasonable manner. Normally the
courts may not act on an uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice but whether in a
particular case it has to be accepted without
corroboration or not would depend on an overall
consideration of the accomplice’s evidence and
the facts and circumstances. However, if on being
so satisfied the court considers that the sole
testimony of the accomplice is safe to be acted
upon, the conviction can be based thereon. Even
if corroboration as a matter of prudence is needed
it is not for curing any defect in the testimony of
the accomplice or to give validity to it but it is only
in the nature of supporting evidence making the
other evidence more probable to enable the court
to satisfy itself to act upon it.
22. Now coming to the witnesses in trap cases, as
held in Basawan Singh case by a Bench of five
Judges, if any of the witnesses are accomplices
who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual
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crime charge, their evidence must be treated as
the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are
not accomplices in that sense but are only
partisan or interested witnesses who are
concerned in the success of the trap, their
evidence must be tested in the same way as other
interested evidence is tested which may vary from
case to case and the corroboration in the case of
such interested witnesses can be in a general way
and not as one required in material particulars as
in the case of an approver. Therefore, in seeking
corroboration for the evidence of trap witnesses a
distinction has to be drawn where participation of
an individual in a crime is not voluntary but is the
result of pressure. In such a case the element of
mens rea to commit the crime is not apparent and
(sic) cannot strictly be classified as an
accomplice and at any rate he cannot be treated
as being on the same footing. Where a bribe has
already been demanded from a man and if
without giving the bribe he goes to the police or
magistrate and brings them to witness the
payment it will be a legitimate trap and in such
cases at the most he can be treated as an
interested witness and whether corroboration is
necessary or not will be within the discretion of
the court depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. However, as a rule
of prudence, the court has to scrutinise the
evidence of such interested witnesses carefully.
23. Now coming to the nature of corroborating
evidence that is required, it is well-settled that the
corroborating evidence can be even by way of
circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be
laid down with respect to quantum of evidence
corroborating the testimony of a trap witness
which again would depend upon its own facts and
circumstances like the nature of the crime, the
character of trap witness etc. and other general
requirements necessary to sustain the conviction
in that case. The court should weigh the evidence
and then see whether corroboration is necessary.
Therefore, as a rule of law, it cannot be laid down
that the evidence of every complainant in a
bribery case should be corroborated in all
material particulars and otherwise it cannot be
acted upon. Whether corroboration is necessary
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and if so to what extent and what should be its
nature depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. In a case of bribe,
the person who pays the bribe and those who act
as intermediaries are the only persons who can
ordinarily be expected to give evidence about the
bribe and it is not possible to get absolutely
independent evidence about the payment of
bribe. However, it is cautioned that the evidence
of a bribe-giver has to be scrutinised very carefully
and it is for the court to consider and appreciate
the evidence in a proper manner and decide the
question whether a conviction can be based upon
it or not in those given circumstances.”
26) The aforesaid ratio has been followed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Gupta vs. State of MP,
(1995) 5 SCC 320.
27) Recently, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in the case of Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T of
Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, while answering the question as
to whether in the absence of direct or primary evidence of
demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw
an inferential deduction of culpability/ guilt of a public
servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution,
surveyed the legal precedents on the issue laid down by the
Supreme Court in previous past and summarized the legal
position in the following manner:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by
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establish the guilt of the accused public servant
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has to first prove the demand of
illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance
as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved
either by direct evidence which can be in the nature
of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can
also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by
the public servant, the following aspects have to be
borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-
giver without there being any demand from
the public servant and the latter simply
accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per
Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there
need not be a prior demand by the public
servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant
makes a demand and the bribe-giver
accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of
obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the
prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer
by the bribe-giver and the demand by the
public servant respectively have to be proved
by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other
words, mere acceptance or receipt of an
illegal gratification without anything more
would not make it an offence under Section
7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively
of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
Act, in order to bring home the offence, there
must be an offer which emanates from the
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bribe-giver which is accepted by the public
servant which would make it an offence.
Similarly, a prior demand by the public
servant when accepted by the bribe-giver
and in turn there is a payment made which is
received by the public servant, would be an
offence of obtainment under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way
of an inference only when the foundational facts
have been proved by relevant oral and
documentary evidence and not in the absence
thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the
court has the discretion to raise a presumption of
fact while considering whether the fact of demand
has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of
course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal
by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal
presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence
during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be
proved by letting in the evidence of any other
witness who can again let in evidence, either orally
or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can
prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial
does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue,
Section 20 mandates the court to raise a
presumption that the illegal gratification was for the
purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the
said Section. The said presumption has to be raised
by the court as a legal presumption or a
presumption in law. Of course, the said
presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20
does not apply to Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of
fact referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as
the former is a mandatory presumption while the
latter is discretionary in nature.
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28) From the foregoing analysis of the legal position on the
subject, it emerges that there is no abstract rule that
uncorroborated testimony of a bribe giver should not be
accepted. It is also clear that a bribe giver can be termed as
a partisan witness who is interested in the success of trap
and his statement has to be analysed and scrutinized in the
same manner in which the statement of any other partisan
witness is to be analysed and scrutinized before placing
reliance upon it. It is further beyond any cavil that
corroboration to the statement of a complainant can be by
way of direct evidence or by way of circumstantial evidence
and it is not necessary that corroboration to his statement
has to be by direct evidence only. The quantum of evidence
corroborating the testimony of a trap witness would depend
upon its own facts and circumstances which would include
nature of the crime and the character of the trap witness.
The Court, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of
each case, will have to weigh the evidence and see whether
corroboration is necessary.
29) In the face of aforesaid legal position, let us now advert
to the facts of the present case. Complainant, PW Ab. Rashid
Wani, has, in his examination-in-chief, stated that after
taking tea in the nearby hotel, he told the accused that he
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has brought Rs.4000/ with him, to which the accused
replied that he had asked for Rs.7500/, whereafter he asked
the complainant to pay an amount of Rs.4000/ for the time
being. The complainant has further stated that he tendered
Rs.4000/to the accused and the other person who was
accompanying the accused, namely, PW Zahoor Ahmad,
asked about his share, to which the complainant replied that
had he been told about it, he would have brought Rs.1000/
for him also, whereafter said Zahoor Ahmad told him that he
should bring an amount of Rs.1500/for him along with the
balance amount.
30) There is no cross-examination of the complainant by
the defence on the aspect of tendering of amount of Rs.4000/
by him to the accused, nor there is any cross-examination
on the aspect of demand. In fact, the defence has not even
given a suggestion to the complainant that he had forcibly
tried to tender tainted currency notes to the accused. There
is no suggestion by the defence that the complainant was
having any grudge or previous enmity with the
appellant/accused that could have been a motive for him to
falsely implicate the accused. The only cross-examination by
the defence on this aspect of the matter is about the location
of the hotel where the transaction took place.
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31) It is correct that shadow witness, PW Prince Ahmad
Khan, has not supported the complainant on the aforesaid
aspect of the case as, according to him, he could not
overhear the conversation between the complainant and the
accused. At one place during his cross-examination, he has
stated that the accused demanded an amount of Rs.4000/
from the complainant in his presence but later on, he stated
that he as well as accused along with the complainant were
sitting in front of each other and he was able to watch their
activities. He went on to state that during that period there
was no conversation between the accused and the
complainant with regard to demand of bribe nor the bribe
money was tendered during the said period.
32) When the statement of the shadow witness is read as a
whole, it appears that he has neither overheard the
conversation that had taken place between complainant and
the accused nor has he seen the transaction of tainted
money taking place. Merely because the shadow witness has
not been able to overhear the conversation between
complainant and the accused and that he did not watch the
transaction of tainted money when it took place, the
statement of the complainant on this aspect of the matter
cannot be discredited, particularly in the absence of any
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cross-examination of the complainant on this aspect of the
matter. Just because the complainant happens to be the
bribe giver, his statement cannot be discarded, once it is
shown that the defence has been unable to impeach the
credit of the complainant during his cross-examination.
33) So far as statement of PW Zahoor Ahmad Mir, an
employee of SFC, who was also present on spot at the
relevant time, is concerned, he has been declared hostile by
the prosecution as he has not supported the prosecution
case. According to him, the complainant tried to tender bribe
money to the accused on two occasions but he refused to
accept the same. When the said witness was cross-
examined, he stated that in his presence neither the accused
demanded bribe from the complainant nor he accepted the
same. He also stated that the amount of bribe was not
recovered in his presence. However, he admitted his
signatures on the memo of recovery, EXTP-1/5 and he also
admitted that in his presence the accused was subjected to
search by the sleuths of VOK. He further admitted that the
tainted money was recovered from the pocket of the accused
when he was subjected to search on the roadside near the
hotel.
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34) PW Zahoor Ahmad Mir is a colleague of the
appellant/accused and for obvious reason, he has decided
not to support the prosecution case so as to save his
colleague Hence his statement that the appellant/accused
refused to take money from the complainant on two
occasions, cannot be relied upon, particularly when the
accused has not taken such a defence, either in his
statement under Section 342 of J&K Cr. P. C or while cross-
examining any of the prosecution witnesses.
35) The statement of the complainant, PW Ab. Rashid
Wani, so far as it relates to demand and acceptance of bribe
money and consequent recovery of the same from the left
side back pocket of trouser of the accused finds
corroboration from other circumstances proved on record.
All the members of the trap team which includes shadow
witness PW-Prince Ahmad Khan and even hostile witness
PW Zahoor Ahmad Mir, have categorically stated that during
the post trap proceedings, hand wash of the
appellant/accused was conducted and the solution of
Sodium Carbonate turned pink. They have also stated that
upon search of the appellant/accused, the tainted money
was recovered from left side back pocket of his trouser and
when the pocket of the trouser was subjected to wash in
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Sodium Carbonate, the solution turned pink. There are no
major contradictions in the statements of prosecution
witnesses on this aspect of the matter. Thus, it has been
proved that the appellant/accused has fiddled with the
currency notes with his hands and it is also established that
he put these currency notes in his pocket wherefrom the
same were recovered by the member of the trap team. This
circumstance corroborates the statement of the complainant
that the appellant/accused had demanded and accepted the
tainted money which was recovered from his possession. The
positive Sodium Carbonate test vis-Ã -vis hands of the
appellant/accused and left-side back pocket of his trouser
goes on to show that he had voluntarily accepted the bribe.
Thus, there is evidence of demand of illegal gratification and
voluntary acceptance thereof.
36) It has been contended by the appellant/accused that
having regard to his designation, he was neither competent
nor was it his duty to deal with matter relating to release of
timber in favour of the complainant and, therefore, there was
no occasion for him to demand bribe from the complainant.
This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the learned
trial court and it has been observed that being Incharge of
PC Depot, Parimpora, there was a representation on behalf
CrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 38 of 40
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207
of the accused to the complainant that he will release the
sanctioned timber. It has been observed that the accused
was capable of showing official favour being in charge of the
PC Depot. The said observation of the learned trial court is
perfectly in accordance with law because even if it is
assumed that the accused was not competent to actually
release the timber in favour of the complainant, still then he
was definitely in a position to make a representation to the
complainant that he is in a position to release the
sanctioned timber and, thus, had the occasion to demand
bribe from the complainant.
37) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, I do not find
any ground to interfere in the well-reasoned and lucid
judgment passed by the learned trial court. Accordingly, the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by
the trial court is upheld and the appeal shall stand
dismissed. The bail and surety bonds of the
appellant/accused are cancelled and he is directed to
surrender before the learned trial court within a period of
three weeks from the date of this judgment. Upon surrender
by the appellant, the learned trial court shall send him to jail
for serving the balance sentence. In case the appellant/
accused does not surrender before the trial court within the
CrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 39 of 40
2026:JKLHC-SGR:207
aforesaid period, coercive measures shall be taken for
securing his presence before the said court.
38) The trial court record along with a copy of this
judgment be sent back.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
Srinagar,
30.06.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the judgment is reportable: YES
ï€CrlA(S) No.1/2020 Page 40 of 40
