US-Israel v. Iran Case Study
Abstract
The article examines the continuing relevance of the United Nations (UN) in the context of contemporary conflict, with particular reference to the ongoing tensions involving the United States, Israel and Iran. Rather than treating relevance as a binary question, the paper argues threat the UN’s role must be understood across multiple dimensions: normative, operational and coercive with each reflecting a different degree of influence over global affairs.
At a normative level, the UN continues to provide the legal and moral framework through which state conduct is evaluated. Even in situations where the use of force is contested, debates surrounding the legality, self-defence and sovereignty remain anchored in the principles of the UN Charter. This indicates that the organisation retains a central role in shaping international discourse, even when compliance is uncertain.
Operationally, the UN remains engaged in monitoring, humanitarian coordination and the documentation of violations, particularly in conflict situations where direct intervention is not feasible. These functions, while often overlooked, contribute significantly to accountability and long-term governance.
However, the ongoing conflict also exposes the limits of the UN’s coercive capacity. The structure of the Security Council, especially the veto power of its permanent members, restricts the organisation’s ability to take decisive action in politically sensitive situations. This raises broader questions about whether the UN can effectively respond to conflicts involving major powers or their allies. Without offering definitive conclusions at the outset, this article explores the extent to which the UN continues to matter in shaping global conduct, and whether its limitations reflect institutional failure or structural design.
Keywords
- United Nations, International Law, Security Council Veto, Normative Relevance , Collective Security, Self-Defence
Introduction: Are we asking the right question?
The question whether the United Nations is still relevant is often framed too dramatically. Relevance is not an absolute condition; it is a matter of degree and dimension. When crises erupt, when wars escalate, when governments repress, when pandemics spread; does the UN matter? Rather than asking whether the UN has become irrelevant, the more precise question is to what extent it remains capable of shaping, influencing, or constraining global conduct? The UN remains the only truly universal, pan-world institution in existence. It is supranational in scope but not supranational in authority; it does not function as a dominant world government, nor was it ever designed to. It is a body composed of sovereign states, reflecting their diversity, interests and disagreements. Yet the very fact that 193 states continue to assemble under one institutional framework demonstrates that the need for a global forum persists. In a world marked by ideological division, economic disparity, nuclear capability and technological acceleration, some coordinating structure is indispensable. To answer the question of relevance properly, one must distinguish between three dimensions: normative relevance (law and standards), operational relevance (humanitarian and monitoring mechanisms), and coercive relevance (enforcement and power projection). The UN excels in the first two but remains structurally constrained in the third.
Research Methodology
This study employs a qualitative doctrinal approach combined with a case study method; drawing on primary sources such as the UN Charter, relevant resolutions, institutional practices alongside secondary literature and contemporary conflict analysis. It adopts a single-case analytical framework to examine the United Nation’s role in the ongoing conflict, systematically evaluating its normative, operational and coercive relevance.
Normative Relevance
Normative relevance refers to the United Nations’ ability to shape, define, and legitimize global standards of acceptable behaviour even when it cannot directly enforce them.[1]
Consider the war in Ukraine. In 2022, the Security Council was blocked by Russia’s veto, yet the General Assembly overwhelmingly condemned the invasion and reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty.[2] Although these resolutions were not binding, they framed the invasion as unlawful under international law, influencing sanctions, diplomacy and global opinion. The Un thus, provides the language such as “aggression”, “sovereignty” and “self-determination” , through which states justify their actions over national and international bureaucratic decisions.
Even if states violates these norms, they rarely reject them outright instead they resort to argue within the framework. Through resolutions, treaties and interpretations, the UN defines legitimacy and shapes international conduct. While it may not directly punish violation, its norms influences courts, policymakers and public disclosure ensuring indirect enforcement of international principles through domestic instrumentalization.
As discussed, even though UN resolutions or findings are not legally binding, they carry significant political and reputational weight. Decisions by bodies such as the International Court of Justice of the Human Rights Council shape how a conflict is to be perceived by globally and signals violations to the international norms which inadvertently dictate the further diplomacy of States. States, under the pressure of public scrutiny, international reputation and historical reputation record, adjust their diplomatic ties, trade relations and partnerships thus increasing the cost of non-compliance.
In today’s digital age, the impact is amplified through social media where UN reports and violations of norms can quickly reach a global audience. This heightened visibility generates public pressure and scrutiny, making it harder for governments to ignore criticism.
For e.g., the 2025 “Gen Z uprising” in Nepal was an intra-state war which ultimately led to a regime change in the country. In such situations, the UN does not intervene but plays a normative and monitoring role. The Un Human Rights Office in Nepal expressed “grave concern” over the violence and loss of life and prompted a transparent investigation into the use of force.[3] Thus, while the UN cannot intervene directly in such crises, it shapes legality, demands accountability and influences international perception.
Operational Relevance
Operationally, the UN plays a mixed but important role. In conflicts like Ukraine, it established investigative bodies and monitoring mechanisms to document violations, preserve evidence and support future accountability.[4] Similarly in Gaza, UN agencies coordinates with humanitarian aid providing essential relief to civilians despite server constraints.[5] These actions show that the UN contributes practically during crises however, its operational effectiveness is limited. Failures such as Rwanda highlight lack of resources and restrictive mandates can undermine action.[6] Even today, UN operations depend on state consent, security council agreement and access on the ground making its impact significant but conditional.[7]
Coercive Relevance
The UN’s coercive dimension reveals its sharpest limitations. In the current geopolitical climate, where tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran intensify regional instability, the Security Council’s structure constrains decisive action. The veto power of the permanent five ensures that when their core interests are engaged, enforcement measures stall. This is not accidental; it is structural. The UN was designed to prevent world war by embedding great powers within a collective system, not by overriding them. When the United States defends Israel in Council debates, or when Russia blocks resolutions concerning Ukraine, the institution reflects geopolitical realities rather than transcending them. In this sense, coercive relevance is limited not by irrelevance but by design.
From its inception, the United States structurally influenced the UN through its role as architect, largest financial contributor, and permanent Security Council member with veto power. This allowed it to shape outcomes, particularly on Israel-related resolutions. Over time, however, the UN has evolved into a platform where smaller states collectively challenge powerful nations through General Assembly majorities and human rights mechanisms. In the current US-Israel-Iran tensions, this dynamic is evident: while enforcement remains limited, the UN serves as a forum of accountability, shaping global opinion and diplomatic pressure. Yet its capacity to restrain major powers remains structurally constrained.
“UN is an institution to control the mice, while the tigers roam freely”- Hans V. Sponeck, Former UN Resident Coordination, India and Pakistan.[8]
What can UN do about the present US-Israel and Iran Situation?
Twisting the UN Charter to Justify the Attacks
The contemporary conflict involving the US, Israel and Iran raises serious concerns regarding the relevance, authority and effectiveness of the Un in modern warfare.
At the heart of the UN system lies the UN Charter, which establishes binding rules governing the use of force.[9] Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits states from using force against territorial integrity or political independence of the states, thereby forming the cornerstone of modern international law.[10] All UN member states have consented to abide by these rules and its violation constitutes a breach of international norm.[11] The justification of the attacks on Iran are being framed in terms of ‘anticipatory’ or ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence.[12] However, the threshold of imminence, requiring clear evidence that an armed attack was about to occur, has not been convincingly met. In the absence of such evidence, the use of force appears in contravention of the Charter’s provisions.
The growing consensus regarding the situation remains that the attacks are prima facie unlawful. Let me put this briefly, Article 2(4) permits only two exceptions for authorized attack on another state: (1) if the security council authorizes or (2) aggressor state acts in self-defence under Article 51.[13] In the present situation, neither conditions appears to be satisfied.[14] The claims by United States that it acted out of fear that once Iran developed nuclear capability, Israel would attack it and Iran would then retaliate against the US, do not hold legal ground.[15] First, there were no credible public reports indicating that Iran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons.[16] Second, prior strikes by Israel had already significantly weakened Iran’s nuclear capacity, reducing any immediate threat.[17] Third, even if Iran were to retaliate, the US, if not directly involved, could have invoked principles of neutrality and sought protection under international law rather than resorting to force.[18] Finally, statements by Donald Trump suggesting that the US itself encouraged or supported Israeli action further undermine the claim of self-defence, as the US cannot invoke protection against a situation it actively helped create.[19]
The UN Condemns
Accepting the broad and speculative claims by the US and Israel risks undermining the core principle of the Charter, allowing states to justify military action based on subjective perceptions rather than objective necessity. This legal uncertainty highlights the continuing importance of the UN as primary interpreter and guardian of international legal standards.
This position has been reinforced by UN human rights experts who have condemned the attacks as unlawful and inconsistent with international law. They emphasise that unilateral military action, particularly during ongoing diplomatic negotiations and without Security Council approval, violated principles such as sovereign, equality and integrity.[20] The legal justification of pre-emptive self-defence introduces multiple layers of uncertainty and fails to satisfy the requirement of necessity under the international law.
UN: Reduced to a mere Paper Tiger in Present Scenario
In theory, the UN possesses significant powers to respond to such violations. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN Security Council can impose binding measures, including economic sanctions, arms embargos and even authorization of force however, in practice their effectiveness is severely limited by the structure of Security Council itself.[21] The United States, as the permanent member and with a scandalous history of influencing the foundations of UN, is likely to veto and block any resolution that challenges its actions and those of its allies, particularly Israel. This means that even when there is clear international concern, the UN is unable to take coercive action. And in this sense, the UN does not transcend global power politics, it reflects them.
UN Human Rights authorities such as the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, can play an important but largely non-coercive role. They can investigate violations, establish fact-finding missions, document evidence of war crimes and publicly condemn unlawful conduct, thereby shaping global opinion and laying the groundwork for future accountability before bodies like the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice. While this can increase scrutiny and reputational pressure, it does not ensure compliance, as enforcement mechanisms still remain weak. And crucially, permanent membership of strong powers (and moody allies) like US, Russia and China limits the translation of these findings into binding actions.
This structural limitation in central to understanding both the relevance and the weakness of the UN. The organisation remains relevant because it continues to provide a platform of global debate, interpretations and diplomatic engagement. The United States’ ability to influence or block Security Council decisions demonstrates that the current system disproportionately favours powerful states.[22] As long as the veto power exists, the UN cannot act decisively against permanent members or their allies. This has led to increasing calls for reform, with many scholars arguing that the veto system and permanent membership structure must be re-evaluated to ensure a more equitable and effective system of global governance.[23]
The relevance of the law of neutrality further illustrates the challenges faced by the UN. Neutrality requires states to not get involved in a conflict and to remain impartial, to refrain from supporting either side for e.g., refrain from supplying weapons to any party. The UN’s system of collective security i.e., a system where all countries would act together to stop the aggressor state, was meant to replace the concept of neutrality however, this cannot be implemented when major powers like the US directly participate in the war.[24] As a result, the UN can promote neutrality as a principle but cannot enforce in practice. It cannot urge States to become or not to become ally to a particular state. [25]
A case before the International Court of Justice is theoretically possible for Iran against the US or Israel, but it depends entirely on the acceptance of jurisdiction by both parties, which must be based on consent, usually through treaties or prior acceptance of the court’s authority.[26]Although Iran has previously brought cases against the US,[27] states can challenge, refuse to participate or withdraw from the jurisdiction.[28] Moreover, even if ICJ rules in favour of Iran, the enforcement of the judgment would entirely depend on the political will of US and Israel.[29]
To exacerbate the predicament, neither the US nor Israel are parties to the Rome Statute, meaning the ICC generally lacks jurisdiction over them.[30] A case could proceed in ICC only if crimes occur on the territory of a member state or if the UN Security Council refers the situation.[31] But again, such a referral is highly unlikely due to the veto power of US. Additionally, even though ICC remains independent, its effectiveness is shaped by political realities i.e., states can refuse cooperation and might even influence the decision.
Suggestions
Ultimately, the UN’s role in the present conflict is best understood as normative rather than coercive. It defines legal standards, identifies violations, and shapes global discourse, but it lacks the power to enforce compliance against powerful states. This does not render the UN irrelevant; rather, it highlights the nature of its relevance. The organisation continues to serve as the foundation of international law and diplomacy, even if it cannot always ensure compliance. However, the current situation also underscores the urgent need for structural reform. Without changes to the veto system and the composition of the Security Council, the UN will remain constrained in its ability to address conflicts involving major powers.
The Glass Half Full?
Despite these limitations, the UN’s broader ecosystem remains deeply relevant. WHO coordinated global responses during the COVID-19 pandemic. UNICEF continues vaccination and education programs in fragile states. FAO monitors food insecurity amid climate shocks. ILO sets labour standards affecting global supply chains. UNDP’s Human Development Index shapes development discourse. These agencies operate beyond high-profile conflicts yet affect millions daily. Even where political leaders sign international covenants without immediate intention to implement them, domestic actors: NGOs, opposition parties, courts, and civil society invoke those commitments to demand reform. The very act of signing embeds norms into domestic discourse. Over time, international commitments become leverage for internal change.
Moreover, discussions about reforming Security Council membership indicate that the UN is not static. Calls to expand permanent membership or restrict veto use reflect dissatisfaction with entrenched hierarchies. The gradual loosening of unchallenged dominance by any single power suggests that the institution evolves alongside geopolitical shifts, even if slowly.
Ultimately, the UN’s relevance lies less in its capacity to stop wars and more in its ability to structure global conversation. It defines legitimacy. It produces data. It coordinates humanitarian relief. It preserves evidence. It creates vocabulary, “human rights,” “sustainable development,” “peacebuilding,” “climate justice”, that shapes global policy. A world without the UN might not necessarily be more violent, but it would be more fragmented, less informed, and more unequal. Without its agencies, hunger statistics would lack coordination, pandemics would lack unified guidance, and development benchmarks would lack shared metrics.
The UN today operates under severe strain: funding shortfalls, political polarisation, nationalist resurgence, and limited enforcement power constrain its performance. Responsibilities often exceed capacities. Yet these shortcomings reveal not irrelevance but overload. The institution bears expectations disproportionate to its structural authority.
Conclusion
The United Nations has struggled in moments of intense conflict, particularly where major power interests collide. Its coercive capacity remains limited, and many of its outputs are advisory rather than binding. Nevertheless, normatively and operationally it remains indispensable. It is the only universal forum where all states gather, debate, codify, and contest global rules. It continues to shape legal interpretation, coordinate humanitarian response, and generate knowledge essential for global governance. In a world facing nuclear risk, technological disruption, and climate crisis, the absence of a pan-world institution would not strengthen order but erode it.
“The UN may not control the world, but it remains the framework within which the world negotiates its shared future.”
Nandini Varshney
London School of Economics and Political Science
[1] Johnstone, I. (2009) ‘Normative Evolution at the UN: Impact on Operational Activities’, in B.D. Jones, S. Forman, and R. Gowan (eds.) Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187–214.
[2] James Landale, Patrick Jackson, US sides with Russia in UN resolutions on Ukraine, BBC NEWS, (25 Feb. 2025), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c7435pnle0go
[3] Nepal: Call for prompt, transparent investigation into killings of protesters, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, (8 Sept, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/nepal-call-prompt-transparent-investigation-killings-protesters
[4] Documenting the Truth in Ukraine’s War for future accountability, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, (14 Oct, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/10/documenting-truth-ukraines-war-future-accountability
[5] Gaza: Humanitarian response despite ongoing restrictions, UNITED NATIONS, (24 Dec, 2025), https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166669
[6] Stephen McLoughin, Jess Gifkins and Alex J. Bellamy, The Evolution of Mass Atrocity Early Warning in the UN Secretariat: Fit for Purpose?, TAYLOR & FRANCIS, (24 Jul, 2023), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2023.2236929
[7] A. Duursma, S. Brombley and A. Gour, The Impact of Host-State Consent on the Protection of Civilians in Un Peacekeeping, TAYLOR & FRANCIS, (14 Apr, 2023), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2023.2196185
[8] Hans V. Sponeck, How the United Nations should respond in the age of global dissent, NEW STATESMAN, (15 Mar, 2017), https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2017/03/how-united-nations-should-respond-age-global-dissent
[9] UN, explained: Understanding the UN Charter, Article 2 and the Rules that Shape Global Security, THE WORLD CAMPAIGN, (13Jan, 2026), https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-explained/what-is-the-united-nations-chapter-and-article-2
[10] UN Charter. Art 2, cl.4
[11] Member States, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states
[12] E.Lieblich, Double Preemption, Imminence, and the U.S. Attack Against Iran, JUST SECURITY, (3 Mar, 2026), https://www.justsecurity.org/133093/preemption-imminence-rubio-iran/
[13] Scott W. Hudson, The Iran Strikes and the Limits of International Law, FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (31 Mar, 2026) https://www.fordhamilj.org/iljblog/jadbx2m2xltdtas-sblz7-lm2fe-24hmr
[14] Supra note 12.
[15] M.Milanovic, The American-Israeli Strikes on Iran are (Again) Manifestly Illegal, EJIL: Talk!, (28 Feb, 2026), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-american-israeli-strikes-on-iran-are-again-manifestly-illegal/
[16] M. Milanovic, Is Israel’s Use of Force Against Iran Justified by Self-Defence?, EJIL: TALK!, (13 Jun, 2025), https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-israels-use-of-force-against-iran-justified-by-self-defence/
[17] ibid
[18] Supra note 12.
[19] J.Magid, Trump denies Israel dragged US into war with Iranian ‘lunatics,’ who he felt ‘were going to attack first’, TIMES OF ISRAEL, (3 Mar, 2026), https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-denies-israel-dragged-us-into-war-with-iranian-lunatics-which-he-says-were-going-to-attack-first/
[20] Iran: UN experts call for de-escalation and accountability, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, (4 Mar, 2026), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/iran-un-experts-call-de-escalation-and-accountability
[21] UN Charter. Ch. VII
[22] Yahli Shereshevsky, Complementarity (Un)Fairness: Powerful States and their Ability to Avoid ICC Proceedings by Conducting Domestic Investigations Open Access, OXFORD ACADEMICS, (23 May, 2025), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/23/2/227/8145327
[23] Question of Veto Central to General Assembly’s Debate on Security Council Reform, with Speakers Urging Its Limited Use as ‘Weapon of Hatred and War’ ,UNITED NATIONS, (17 Nov, 2023), https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12563.doc.htm
[24] Cambridge University Press, The United Nations’ Collective Security System and Neutrality, CAMBRIDGE, (22 Feb, 2022 ), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/nonparticipation-in-armed-conflict/united-nations-collective-security-system-and-neutrality/63200935E67666CB81D132767345F163
[25] ibid
[26] Basis of Court’s Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/basis-of-jurisdiction
[27] Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
[28] Z. Vermeer, Prior Consent by States to the Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals in Inter-State Disputes, OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS, LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT,(2019), https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/PriorConsent_Final_Report.pdf
[29] ibid
[30] The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties
[31] How the court works, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works
