Patna High Court
Dr. Shambhu Nath Singh vs Veer Kunwar Singh University on 23 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.10176 of 2026
======================================================
Dr. Shambhu Nath Singh S/o Sri Vaidya Nath Singh, R/o village Gorihari
Gopal, P.O.- Dariyapur Kaphen, P.S.- Kurhani, District- Muzaffarpur, Pin-
844127, and working as a Professor of Geography at M.P. College, Mohania
(Kaimur).
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. Veer Kunwar Singh University Ara through the Registrar.
2. Registrar, Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara.
3. Vice- Chancellor, Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara.
4. Governing Body/Managing Committee of Maharana Pratap College,
Mohania (Kaimur).
5. Dr. Mahatim Singh Professor In-charge, Maharana Pratap College, Mohania
(Kaimur).
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Akhouri Vipin Bihari Shrivastava, Advocate
Dr. Pramod Kumar, Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Rajesh Prasad Choudhary, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 23-07-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Veer Kuwar Singh
University.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“(i) For a direction/order to the respondents
to release the salary of the petitioner
immediately and ensure the payment of
salary on a regular monthly basis from
hereafter;
(ii) For a direction to the respondent to
clear all outstanding due/arrears of salaries
kept under hold i.e. January, 2026 to April,
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
2/182026 (Rs. 12,32,000/-).
(iii) For a direction to the respondent
concerned not ot interfere in the
discharging duty of the petitioner;
(iv) To pass any other order(s) as Hon’ble
this Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case.”
3. At the outset, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the University raises a preliminary objection with
regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground
that no relief has been sought for by the petitioner against the
University and relief, which has been sought for, is against the
College and its Governing Body.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, to support
his contention with regard to the maintainability of the writ
petition would refer to and rely upon an order dated 10.02.2025
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2007 of 2025 by a learned co-ordinate
Bench of this Court whereby a Hon’ble Single Judge of this
Court had directed the concerned Managing Committee to
release any due amount, which is required to be paid to the
petitioner for any period during which, the work has been taken
from him on daily basis, within a period of three weeks, in view
of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors. (SLP(C) No. 5580 of
2024) and Shripal & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad (Civil
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
3/18
Appeal Nos. 8158-8179 of 2024).
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further refers
to and rely upon a judgment dated 08.10.2025, passed in L.P.A.
No. 1016 of 2024 (The Secretary of the Governing Body,
Mirza Ghalib College, Gaya vs. Dr. Shujaat Ali Khan & Ors.)
by a Hon’ble Division Bench of this court, wherein the Hon’ble
Division Bench by referring to Section 57(A)(5) and Section
57(B) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, proceeded to
dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal by holding that the grievance
was with respect to a Principal in a college which is affiliated to
a University. The scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, in view of the public functions carried out by the college,
would stand extended to such appointment also and accordingly
proceeded to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal by holding that
the Minority college would be entitled to have a Professor-in-
charge/Administrative-In-Charge appointed by the Governing
Body, but only to be continued for six months, within which
time, they would make a regular appointment.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also refers to
and rely upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 (Andi Mukta Sadguru
Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
4/18
Smarak Trust & Ors. vs. V.R. Rudani and Ors.) wherein in
paragraph no. 17 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has
held as follows:-
“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of
mandamus is confined only to public authorities
to compel performance of public duty. The
“public authority” for them means everybody
which is created by statute – and whose powers
and duties are defined by statute. So government
departments, local authorities, police authorities,
and statutory undertakings and corporations, are
all “public authorities”. But there is no such
limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ
“in the nature of mandamus”. Article 226 confers
wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in
the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking
departure from the English law. Under Article
226, writs can be issued to “any person or
authority”. It can be issued “for the enforcement
of any of the fundamental rights and for any
other purpose”.”
7. From the pleadings in the writ petition as well as
from the documents annexed with the writ petition, it would
transpire that the writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
for payment of his salary, which has to be paid by the concerned
College or its Governing Body. The College is an affiliated
College being managed by the Governing Body, wherein the
only role of the University is to approve the decisions taken by
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
5/18
the concerned college or its Governing Body. Section 57(B) of
the Bihar Universities Act, 1976 gives power to the University
to interfere in the affairs of the College.
8. From the pleadings made in the writ petition and
the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, this Court would now consider that whether the writ
petition is maintainable in the present case for payment of
salary, which has to be paid by the concerned College, which is
an affiliated College of the University or not.
9. For deciding the issue in question, this Court would
like to refer to and rely upon a recent judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in (2024) 16 SCC 598 (Army
Welfare Education Society, New Delhi vs. Sunil Kumar
Sharma & Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos. 6, 41 and 42, it has
been held as follows:-
“6. The following two questions of law fall for
our consideration:
6.1. (a) Whether the appellant Army Welfare
Education Society is “State” within Article 12
of the Constitution of India so as to make a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
maintainable against it? In other words,
whether a service dispute in the private realm
involving a private educational institution and
its employees can be adjudicated upon in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
6/18Constitution?
6.2. (b) Even if it is assumed that the appellant
Army Welfare Education Society is a body
performing public duty amenable to writ
jurisdiction, whether all its decisions are
subject to judicial review or only those
decisions which have public law element
therein can be judicially reviewed under the
writ jurisdiction?
41. If the authority/body can be treated as
“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, then in such
circumstances, it goes without saying that a
writ petition under Article 226 would be
maintainable against such an authority/body for
the purpose of enforcement of fundamental and
other legal rights. Therefore, the definition
contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of
application of the provisions contained in Part
III. Article 226 of the Constitution, which deals
with powers of the High Courts to issue certain
writs, inter alia, stipulates that every High
Court has the power to issue directions, orders
or writs to any person or authority, including,
in appropriate cases, any Government, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
Part III and for any other purpose.
42. So far as Article 12 of the Constitution is
concerned, the “State” includes “all local and
other authorities within the territory of India or
under the control of the Government of India”.
The debate on the question as to which body
would qualify as “other authority” and the
test/principles applicable for ascertaining as to
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
7/18
whether a particular body can be treated as
“other authority” has been never ending. If
such an authority violates the fundamental right
or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as
the case may be), a writ petition can be filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution invoking
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
and seeking appropriate direction, order or
writ. However, under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the power of the High Court is
not limited to the Government or authority
which qualifies to be “State” under Article 12.
Power is extended to issue directions, orders or
writs “to any person or authority”. Again, this
power of issuing directions, orders or writs is
not limited to enforcement of fundamental
rights conferred by Part III, but also “for any
other purpose”. Thus, power of the High Court
takes within its sweep more “authorities” than
stipulated in Article 12 and the subject-matter
which can be dealt with under this Article is
also wider in scope.”
10. Further, Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in a
judgment reported in 1987 BLJ 823 (Manju Devi vs. District
Superintendent of Education, Bhagalpur & Ors.), wherein the
Hon’ble Full Bench, after considering the maintainability of the
matter related to a teacher in the privately managed school, even
though financially aided by the State, whose services was
terminated, after considering the entire aspect, in paragraph no.
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
8/18
14, has been held as follows:-
“14. To sum up, the answer to the question put
at the outset is rendered in the negative and it is
held that a teacher in a privately managed
school even though financially aided by the
State, cannot maintain a writ petition against
the termination of his services by such a
school. Consequently, the present writ petition
is dismissed, but there will be no order as to
costs.”
11. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a
recent judgment reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 (St.Mary’s
Education Society & Another vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava
& Ors.), in paragraph nos. 29 to 36, has held as follows:-
“29. Respondent 1 herein has laid much
emphasis on the fact that at the time of his
appointment in the school, the same was
affiliated to the Madhya Pradesh State Board.
It is his case that at the relevant point of time
the school used to receive the grant-in-aid
from the State Government of Madhya
Pradesh. Later in point of time, the school
came to be affiliated to CBSE. The argument
of Respondent 1 seems to be that as the school
is affiliated to the Central Board i.e. CBSE, it
falls within the ambit of “State” under Article
12 of the Constitution. The school is affiliated
to CBSE for the purpose of imparting
elementary education under the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2009 (for short “the 2009 Act”). As
Appellant 1 is engaged in imparting of
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
9/18
education, it could be said to be performing
public functions. To put it in other words,
Appellant 1 could be said to be performing
public duty. Even if a body performing public
duty is amenable to the writ jurisdiction, all its
decisions are not subject to judicial review.
Only those decisions which have public
element therein can be judicially reviewed
under the writ jurisdiction. If the action
challenged does not have the public element, a
writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the
action could be said to be essentially of a
private character.
30. We may at the outset state that CBSE is
only a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and the school
affiliated to it is not a creature of the statute
and hence not a statutory body. The distinction
between a body created by the statute and a
body governed in accordance with a statute
has been explained by this Court in Executive
Committee of Vaish Degree College v.
Lakshmi Narain [Executive Committee of
Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain,
(1976) 2 SCC 58 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 176] , as
follows : (SCC p. 65, para 10)
“10. … It is, therefore, clear that there is a well
marked distinction between a body which is
created by the statute and a body which after
having come into existence is governed in
accordance with the provisions of the statute.
In other words the position seems to be that
the institution concerned must owe its very
existence to a statute which would be the
fountainhead of its powers. The question in
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
10/18
such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute
would the institution have any legal existence.
If the answer is in the negative, then
undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the
institution has a separate existence of its own
without any reference to the statute concerned
but is merely governed by the statutory
provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory
body.”
31. As stated above, the school is affiliated to
CBSE for the sake of convenience, namely, for
the purpose of recognition and syllabus or the
courses of study and the provisions of the 2009
Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
32. The contention canvassed by Respondent 1
is that a writ petition is maintainable against
the Committee of Management controlling the
affairs of an institution (minority) run by it, if
it violates any rules and Bye-laws laid down
by CBSE. First, as discussed above, CBSE
itself is not a statutory body nor the regulations
framed by it have any statutory force.
Secondly, the mere fact that the Board grants
recognition to the institutions on certain terms
and conditions itself does not confer any
enforceable right on any person as against the
Committee of Management.
33. In Regina v. St. Aloysius Higher
Secondary School [Regina v. St. Aloysius
Higher Secondary School, (1972) 4 SCC 188 :
AIR 1971 SC 1920] , this Court held that the
mere fact that an institution is recognised by
an authority, does not itself create an
enforceable right to an aggrieved party against
the Management by a teacher on the ground of
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
11/18breach or non-compliance of any of the Rules
which was part of terms of the recognition. It
was observed as under :
(SCC p. 198, para 24)
“24. … The Rules thus govern the terms on
which the Government would grant
recognition and aid and the Government can
enforce these rules upon the management. But
the enforcement of such rules is a matter
between the Government and the management,
and a third party, such as teacher aggrieved by
some order of the management cannot derive
from the rules any enforceable right against
the management on the ground of breach or
non-compliance of any of the rules.”
34. In Anita Verma v. D.A.V. College
Management Committee [Anita Verma v.
D.A.V. College Management Committee,
(1992) 1 UPLBEC 30] :
“… 30. Where the services of a teacher were
terminated, the Court held that the writ petition
under Article 226 is not maintainable as the
institution cannot be treated as the
instrumentality of the State. The matter was
considered in detail in Harbans Kaur v. Guru
Tegh Bahadur Public School [Harbans Kaur v.
Guru Tegh Bahadur Public School, 1992 SCC
OnLine All 444 : 1992 Lab IC 2070], wherein
the services of the petitioner were terminated
by the Managing Committee of the institution
recognised by CBSE. It was held that the
Affiliation Bye-laws framed by CBSE have no
statutory force. The Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India can enforce
compliance of statutory provision against a
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
12/18committee of management as held in a Full
Bench decision of this Court in Aley Ahmad
Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools [Aley
Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools,
1976 SCC OnLine All 325 : AIR 1977 All
539]. The Affiliation Bye-laws of CBSE
having no statutory force, the only remedy
against the aggrieved person is to approach
CBSE putting his grievances in relation to the
violation of the Affiliation Bye-laws by the
institution.”
35. Thus, where a teacher or non-teaching staff
challenges the action of Committee of
Management that it has violated the terms of
contract or the rules of the Affiliation Bye-
laws, the appropriate remedy of such teacher
or employee is to approach CBSE or to take
such other legal remedy available under law. It
is open to CBSE to take appropriate action
against the Committee of Management of the
institution for withdrawal of recognition in
case it finds that the Committee of
Management has not performed its duties in
accordance with the Affiliation Bye-laws.
36. It needs no elaboration to state that a
school affiliated to CBSE which is unaided is
not a State within Article 12 of the
Constitution of India [see Satimbla Sharma v.
St Paul‘s Senior Secondary School [Satimbla
Sharma v. St Paul‘s Senior Secondary School,
(2011) 13 SCC 760 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S)
75] ]. Nevertheless the school discharges a
public duty of imparting education which is a
fundamental right of the citizen [see K.
Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
13/18
College of Engg. [K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri
Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg., (1997)
3 SCC 571 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 841] ]. The
school affiliated to CBSE is therefore an
“authority” amenable to the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India[see
Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan [Binny Ltd. v. V.
Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 881] ]. However, a judicial review of
the action challenged by a party can be had by
resort to the writ jurisdiction only if there is a
public law element and not to enforce a
contract of personal service. A contract of
personal service includes all matters relating to
the service of the employee — confirmation,
suspension, transfer, termination, etc. [see
Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P. Sebastian [Apollo
Tyres Ltd. v. C.P. Sebastian, (2009) 14 SCC
360 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 358 : (2010) 1 SCC
(L&S) 359] ].”
12. Having considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the petitioner and the judgments referred to
by him and on the basis of the judgments referred to above, it
appears that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for
payment of his salary, which has not been paid by the College
and its Governing Body. So far the judgment relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Andi Muka
Sadguru (supra), is concerned, the same has been considered
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of St. Mary’s
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
14/18
Education (supra) and the Army Welfare Education Society,
New Delhi (supra) and after considering all the relevant
judgments including Andi Mukta Sadguru (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of St. Mary’s Education
Society (supra) in paragraph nos. 75 to 75.5 has held as
follows:-
“75. We may sum up our final conclusions as
under:
75.1. An application under Article 226 of the
Constitution is maintainable against a person or
a body discharging public duties or public
functions. The public duty cast may be either
statutory or otherwise and where it is
otherwise, the body or the person must be
shown to owe that duty or obligation to the
public involving the public law element.
Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of a
public function, it must be established that the
body or the person was seeking to achieve the
same for the collective benefit of the public or
a section of it and the authority to do so must
be accepted by the public.
75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational
institution is imparting public duty, the act
complained of must have a direct nexus with
the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a
public law action which confers a right upon
the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative
writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual
contracts without having any public element as
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
15/18
its integral part cannot be rectified through a
writ petition under Article 226. Wherever
Courts have intervened in their exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226, either the
service conditions were regulated by the
statutory provisions or the employer had the
status of “State” within the expansive definition
under Article 12 or it was found that the action
complained of has public law element.
75.3. It must be consequently held that while a
body may be discharging a public function or
performing a public duty and thus its actions
becoming amenable to judicial review by a
constitutional court, its employees would not
have the right to invoke the powers of the High
Court conferred by Article 9226 in respect of
matter relating to service where they are not
governed or controlled by the statutory
provisions. An educational institution may
perform myriad functions touching various
facets of public life and in the societal sphere.
While such of those functions as would fall
within the domain of a “public function” or
“public duty” be undisputedly open to
challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the actions or decisions taken
solely within the confines of an ordinary
contract of service, having no statutory force or
backing, cannot be recognised as being
amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In the absence of the service
conditions being controlled or governed by
statutory provisions, the matter would remain
in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.
75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
16/18
education by private unaided school is a public
duty within the expanded expression of the
term, an employee of a non-teaching staff
engaged by the school for the purpose of its
administration or internal management is only
an agency created by it. It is immaterial
whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to
discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of
employment of contract between a school and
non-teaching staff cannot and should not be
construed to be an inseparable part of the
obligation to impart education. This is
particularly in respect to the disciplinary
proceedings that may be initiated against a
particular employee. It is only where the
removal of an employee of non-teaching staff
is regulated by some statutory provisions, its
violation by the employer in contravention of
law may be interfered with by the Court. But
such interference will be on the ground of
breach of law and not on the basis of
interference in discharge of public duty.
75.5. From the pleadings in the original writ
petition, it is apparent that no element of any
public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In
other words, the action challenged has no
public element and writ of mandamus cannot
be issued as the action was essentially of a
private character.”
13. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
the case of Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi
(supra) and St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) after
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
17/18
considering the different judgments including the judgment of
Andi Mukta Sadguru (supra) went on to allow the writ petition
filed by the Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi
(supra) with regard to maintainability of dispute with regard to
service conditions.
14. So far the judgment referred to and relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Secretary of
the Governing body vs. Mirza Ghalib College, Gaya (supra), it
would transpire that the said matter is related with the
appointment of the Principal of the College, wherein the role of
the University for constitution of the Selection Committee, in
terms of Section 57(B), has been defined, therefore, in the above
circumstances, the judgment was passed, however, in the
present case, the payment of salary has been prayed for by the
petitioner from the concerned College and its Governing Body.
15. On the basis of the consideration made above and
in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India, this Court is of considered opinion that the prayer sought
for in the present writ petition, has been prayed for against the
College or its Governing Body and they are not the State within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
16. Accordingly, in the considered opinion of this
Patna High Court CWJC No.10176 of 2026 dt.23-07-2026
18/18
Court, the prayer made in this writ petition does not relates to
the University or its authorities and therefore, the same is
dismissed.
17. Pending application, if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
vinita/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 27.07.2026 Transmission Date
