Jharkhand High Court
Dr. H.P. Narayan vs The State Of Jharkhand on 22 July, 2026
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
2026:JHHC:21663
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 332 of 2003
Dr. H.P. Narayan, son of late Udit Narayan, resident of Morabadi,
Bariyatu Road, P.S. - Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
4. Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation Ranchi
5. Kuari Toppo, W/o late Baijnath Oraon, resident of Morabadi, P.S.
- Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
6. Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon, resident of village - Morabadi,
P.S. - Bariyatu, District - Ranchi.
... ... Respondents
With
W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003
Smt. Veena Narayan, wife of Dr. H.P. Narayan, resident of
Morabadi, Bariyatu Road, P.S. - Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
(substituted v.o.d. 23.01.2023)
Dr. Hari Prakash Narayan, son of late Udit Narayan, resident of
Morabadi, Bariatu Road, P.O. & P.S. - Bariatu, District Ranchi.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi
3. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
4. Special Officer, Ranchi
5. Kuari Toppo, W/o late Baijnath Oraon, resident of Morabadi, P.S.
- Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
6. Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon, resident of village - Morabadi,
P.S. - Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
7. Sri Bishambhar Prasad Singh, son of late Bindeshwari Prasad
Singh, resident of House No.16-9/III, Pratibimb, New Area,
Morabadi, District - Ranchi
8. Smt. Kamna Singh, wife of Shri A.K. Singh, resident of Ramna
Club Road, P.S. - Sadar, Muzaffarpur, presently residing at New
Area Morabadi, P.S. - Bariyatu, District - Ranchi
... ... Respondents
---
CORAM :HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
—
For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
: Ms. Puja Agarwal, Advocate
: Ms. Arushi Agarwal, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. T.N. Jha, Advocate
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2026:JHHC:21663
For the State : Mrs. Shalini Shahdeo, AC to SC (L&C) I
—
CAV on 12.03.2026 Pronounced on 22.07.2026
W.P.(C) No.332 of 2003 has been filed for the following
reliefs:
“1. That the instant writ application is for the issuance of a writ
of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the Revisional Order dated
26.11.2002, Appellate Order dated 31.10.1998 and the Original
Order dated 1.3.97 (Annexures -10, 8 and 7 respectively) whereby
and whereunder the Respondent Authorities have allowed the
restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 Under
Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (referred to in
short as the Act’) although, the lands in question are
Chhaparbandi ever since 14.3.1943 and all along Chhaparbandi
rent was realised and as such the provisions of the Act were not at
all applicable, particularly when the restoration application filed
by the Respondent No. 5 was itself not maintainable as she is
neither the recorded tenant nor a legal heir or successor of the
recorded tenant and as such no application for restoration was
maintainable at all which was filed after almost 40 years and was
therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation; as also for issuance of
such other writ, order or direction as may appear just and proper
for doing equitable justice to the petitioner.”
2. W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003 has been filed for the following
reliefs:
“That the instant writ application is for the issuance of a writ of
or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the Revisional Order dated
26.11.2002 (Annexure-4), Appellate order dated 31.10.1998
(Annexure-3) and the Original Order dated 1.3.97 (Annexure-
2) whereby and whereunder the Respondent Authorities have
allowed the restoration application filed by the Respondent No.
5 Under Section 71 A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act
(referred to in short as the Act) although, the lands in question
are Chhaparbandi ever since 14.3.1943 and all along
Chhaparbandi rent was realised and as such the provisions of
the Act were not at all applicable, particularly when, the
restoration application filed by the Respondent No. 5 was itself
not maintainable as she is neither recorded tenant nor a legal
heir or successor of the recorded tenant and as such no2
2026:JHHC:21663application for restoration was maintainable at all which was
filed after almost 40 years and was therefore, hopelessly barred
by limitation; as also for issuance of such other writ, order or
direction as may appear just and proper for doing equitable
justice to the petitioner.”
Arguments of the Petitioner
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both
the writ petitions are identical in nature and they arise out of the same
proceedings.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that only two
points are involved in the present case:
(a) The petition seeking restoration of land filed in the
year 1983 was itself barred by limitation, inasmuch as
the applicant seeking restoration remained
dispossessed of the land for more than 30 years.
(b) The nature of land has changed from rayati to
chapparbandi.
5. He has submitted that the predecessor in interest of the
petitioner acquired the land through sada hukumnama dated
14.03.1943 and the petitioner acquired the same through registered
sale deed in the year 1978. Ultimately, mutation was carried out and
rent receipt was issued indicating that it was a chhaparbandi rent
receipt.
6. The learned counsel submits that the applicant remained
dispossessed from the property and the application seeking restoration
was filed stating that the owner of the property was of unsound mind
during the period from 1976 to 1980 and taking advantage of this
situation, the applicant and her family members were dispossessed.
7. The learned counsel has also submitted that the rent receipt
showing that it was chhaparbandi itself reveals that the property was
chhaparbandi, and therefore, Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy
Act is not applicable to chhaparbandi land. The learned counsel has
further submitted that these aspects of the matter have not been
3
2026:JHHC:21663
properly considered by the authorities, and therefore, the impugned
order ultimately upholding the order of restoration is fit to be set aside.
8. Since the predecessor in interest of the petitioner acquired the
land through sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1943, the applicants
seeking restoration of land were dispossessed more than 40 years prior
to filing the petition seeking restoration of land, the petition seeking
restoration of land filed in the year 1983 was itself barred by
limitation,
9. He has also submitted list of dates and written notes of
argument the aforesaid points have been elaborated as under.
A. Restoration Application under Section 71-A of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was filed by Respondent No. 5 in the year
1983 claiming that Respondent No. 5 had been dispossessed from the
land in question between the year 1976-80 by the Petitioners taking
advantage of the mental instability of her husband.
B. Land in question in the last Revisional Survey Records-of-
right was recorded in the name of Bhauwa Oraon and Most. Budhni
belonging to ex-landlord, Jamadar Babu Harihar Singh. It is the case
of the petitioners that the recorded raiyat surrendered the land in
question in favour of the ex- landlord. The ex-landlord granted
‘Chhaparbandi settlement’ in favour of Sheikh Rahman Ali, son of
Makbul Ali by way of Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943 after which
Sheikh Rehman Ali continuously paid rent to the ex-landlord and
thereafter, after vesting of the intermediary interest, rent was paid to
the State.
C. It is the case of the petitioners that Sheikh Rahman Ali sold
11 katha of the land-in-question by way of registered sale deed dated
09.06.1979 to the Petitioner after Permission from the competent
authority under the Urban Land Ceiling (Fixation of Ceiling Area and
Acquisition of Surplus Lands) Act, 1976 and the mutation was
allowed in favour of the Petitioners as follows:-
I. Veena Narayan (original writ petitioner in WPC
No. 557 of 2003 in Mutation Case No. 765-R-27 of
1979-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi rent.
4
2026:JHHC:21663
II. Dr. H.P. Narayan, petitioner of WPC No. 332 of
2003 in Mutation Case 673 R-27 of 1978-80 for
fixation of Chhaparbandi rent.
D. The following list of dates has been mentioned in the
written submissions filed by the writ petitioners in both the cases: –
List of Dates
Land-in- Plot No. 1123, Khata No. 77, Village Morabadi, Ranchi
question
Revisional 1.22 acres of Land in question in the last Revisional
Survey Survey Records-of-right was recorded in the name of
Records-of- Bhauwa Oraon and Most. Budhni belonging to ex-
right landlord Jamadar Babu Harihar Singh.
Unregistered The recorded raiyat surrendered the land in question in
Hukumnama favour of the ex- landlord.
The ex-landlord granted Chhaparbandi settlement in
14.03.1943 favour of Sheikh Rahman Ali, son of Makbul Ali by
way of Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943.
Sheikh Rahman Ali paid Chhaparbandi rent to the ex-
landlord.
After vesting of the intermediary interest, the ex-
landlord filed return showing receipt of Rent from
Sheikh Rahman Ali. Register-II was also prepared in his
name.
Two Sale Sheikh Rahman Ali sold 11 katha of the land-in-
deeds dated question by way of two sale deeds both deeds dated
09.06.1979 09.06.1979 to each of the original writ petitioners of
these two cases after Permission from the competent
authority under the Urban Land Ceiling (Fixation of
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Lands) Act,
1976.
Rent receipt Mutation with respect to land involved in WPC no 557
in the name of 2003 in favour of the Petitioner was numbered as
of Veena Mutation Case No. 673 R-27 of 1978-80 for fixation of
Narayan Chhaparbandi rent;
(Annexure-1
in WPC No. Mutation in favour of the original petitioner being WPC
557 of 2003 No. 332 of 2003 was numbered as Mutation Case
and No.765 R-27 of 1979-80 for fixation of Chhaparbandi
Annexure -3 rent.
in
W.P.C.No.
332 of 2003
@ Pg 27)
SAR Case An application under section 71-A of the Chotanagpur
No. Tenancy Act was filed by respondent No. 5, Kuari
5
2026:JHHC:21663
62/1983-84 Oraon for restoration of the land on the ground that the
recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon had executed registered
sale deed dated 9.12.1940 in favour of her father-in-law
Harihar Oraon.
Deposition WPC NO. 557 of 2003
of witnesses A show-cause was filed by the petitioner contending
& that the application for restoration was not maintainable
Certificate for being barred by limitation and for that the land is a
by CO Chhaparbandi land.
In order to prove that the land is Chhaparbandi in
nature:
• The Petitioner examined witnesses including the
Halka Karamchari of the Circle office who
proved Register-II and proved that Chhaparbandi
rent was being paid by the petitioner.
• The Petitioner produced Certificate issued by the
concerned Circle Officer stating that the land is
Chhaparbandi.
WPC No. 332 of 2003
A show-cause was filed by the petitioner contending
that the application for restoration was not maintainable
for being barred by limitation and for that the land is a
Chhaparbandi land.
In order to prove that the land is Chhaparbandi in
nature:
• The Petitioner examined witnesses including the
Circle officer who proved Register-II and proved
that Chhaparbandi rent was being paid by the
petitioner.
• The Petitioner produced Certificate issued by the
concerned Circle Officer stating that the land is
Chhaparbandi.
29.09.1986 An order was passed in SAR Case No. 62/1983-84
allowing the restoration application.
16.12.1991 Order dated 29.09.1986 was challenged by the
Petitioner in SAR Appeal No. 151 R-15/1986-87 on the
Ground that the land in question is Chhaparbandi which
has not been considered by the SAR Court.
Case of the applicant of SAR Application was that, that
the land is not Chapparbandi and has been recorded in
the Khatiyan in the name of adivasis. Also, the land was
never converted into Chhaparbandi either by the
Khatiyani Raiyat or the purchaser.
An order dated 16.12.1991 was passed in SAR Appeal,
wherein it was observed that the reasoning given by the
6
2026:JHHC:21663
lower court was in a cursory manner that the claim of
Chhaparbandi is not acceptable and does not meet the
ends of justice. The matter was remanded back to the
lower court for fresh examination in the light of the
observation.
Intervention of the respondent no.6
Respondent No. 6, Madho Oraon intervened in the matter claiming
that he is the son of one of the recorded tenant, i.e. Most. Budhni and
therefore the restoration of land should be granted in his favour.
Madho Oraon asserted that Title Suit bearing TS No. 151/72 was
instituted by the husband of the Respondent No. 5 against Respondent
No. 6, wherein it was prayed that khas possession be delivered to the
husband of the Respondent No. 5 after deciding the right, title and
interest in his favour. The Title Suit was allowed vide judgment dated
16.06.1977. The Respondent No. 5 has claimed to have been
dispossessed on 23.11.1971 by the Executing Court for execution of
the judgment passed in partition suit bearing P.S No. 50/1967 filed by
the Respondent No. 6. The schedule of Property in the Title suit was
0.77 acres of land on Khewat No. 2, Khata No. 77 Plot No. 1499
which is different from the land in question.
A Title Appeal bearing Title Appeal No. 117/77 was also preferred
against the judgment in TS No. 151/72, wherein it has been upheld that
the land in question has been sold to the father-in-law of respondent
No. 5 vide order dated 21.06.1978.
The Petitioners were never made party in such civil suit or appeal and
had no knowledge about the same.
01.03.1997 An order dated 01.03.1997 was passed in SAR Case
(Annexure- No. 62/1983-84 after remand, in violation of the order
2@ Pg 28) dated 16.12.1991 passed in SAR Appeal No. 151 R-
15/1986-87. The claim of the Petitioner of the land
being Chhaparbandi was not considered by the SAR
Court.
The date of dispossession was not proved by the
Respondent No. 5 and the date of dispossession was
assumed by the Special Officer, SAR Court to be
between the year 1976 and 1980 on the mere assertion
made by the Respondent No. 5. The order of restoration
was passed without considering the submissions and
assertions made by the Petitioner.
31.10.1998 Three Appeals were preferred against the order dated
(Annexure- 01.03.1997. Appeal preferred by the Petitioner was
3) in WPC registered as SAR Appeal No. 76 R-15/1997-98.
No. 557 of A common order was passed in appeals on 31.10.1998
7
2026:JHHC:21663
2003 and wherein all the appeals were dismissed and restoration
(Annexure- was allowed in favour of Respondent No. 5 on the
8) in WPC ground that no valid documents regarding surrender of
No. 332 of land and settlement of land through Sada Hukamnama
2003 were brought on record and also on the basis of
judgement passed by the civil court in title suit.
The findings given by the SAR Court regarding
dispossession was simply accepted by the Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi without giving any finding of its
own.
SAR WPC . No. 557 of 2003
Revision
Case No. SAR Revision Case No. 157/98 was filed by the
157/98 Petitioner against the order dated 31.10.1998.
SAR In the SAR Revision Case, one Vishwambar Prasad
Revision Singh (Respondent No. 7) & Kamna Singh
Case No. (Respondent No. 8) filed intervention application on
158/98 the ground that they have purchased 6 kathas and 5
kathas of lands respectively from Smt. Veena Narayan.
W.P.C. no. 332 of 2003
SAR Revision Case No. 158/98 was filed by the
Petitioner against the order dated 31.10.1998.
Written Argument was filed by the Petitioner in the
SAR Revision Case annexing many documents with
respect to the land in question including rent receipts
granted by the ex-landlord to the predecessor in interest
of the petitioner and subsequently by the state.
26.11.2002- Order dated 26.11.2002 was passed in SAR Revision
(common Case on the ground that no surrender deed was ever
order in both produced and the entire story of surrender and
the writ settlement was concocted to grab the land.
petitions) The order of restoration was passed mechanically
(Annexure- without even discussion of the date of dispossession of
4) in WPC the Respondent No. 5.
No. 557 of
2003 and
(Annexure-
10) in WPC
No. 332 of
2003
I. In the Counter Affidavit filed in W.P.(C) No. 557 of 2003 by
the Respondent No. 7 & 8, the Respondent has further brought
on record:
i. Sada Hukumnama dated 14.03.1942-Annexure-A.
8
2026:JHHC:21663ii. Rent Receipts granted in favour of SK Rehman Ali,
predecessor in interest of the Petitioner-Annexure-A/1 to
A/4.
II. The Present Writ Petitions have been filed against the order
dated 26.11.2002 passed in SAR Revision Case No. 157/1998
and 158/ 1998, wherein the revision preferred by the Petitioners
have been rejected and the land has been directed to be restored
in favour of Respondent No. 5.
Submissions
(i) Date of dispossession of Respondent No. 5 was not proved
and the burden of proof lied on the person claiming restorationRestoration Application under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur
Tenancy Act was filed by Respondent No. 5 in the year 1983
claiming that Respondent No. 5 had been dispossessed from the
land in question between the year 1976-80 by the Petitioner and
others taking advantage of the mental instability of her husband.
However, in the Counter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 5, the
date of dispossession has been mentioned to be 1981-82.
In T.S. No. 151/72, where the husband of Respondent No. 5 had
filed a Title Suit against the Respondent No. 6 for recovery of
khas possession after declaring the right, title and interest in his
favour, the husband of the Respondent No. 5 has claimed to be
dispossessed on 23.11.1971 by the Executing Court for execution
of the judgment passed in partition suit bearing P.S No. 50/1967,
filed by the Respondent No. 6.
It is important to note that the date of possession/dispossession
and also the mode of possession/dispossession have important
bearing in the matter and the same has not been disclosed by the
Respondent No. 5 in a proper manner.
The date of dispossession was not proved by Respondent No. 5
and the date of dispossession was assumed by the Special
Officer, SAR Court to be between the year 1976 and 1980 on the
9
2026:JHHC:21663
mere assertions made by Respondent No. 5 and the order dated
01.03.1997 was passed in SAR Case No. 62/1983-84 by the
Special Officer, SAR Court for restoration of the land in question
to Respondent No. 5. Further, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi
also simply accepted the findings given by the SAR Court
regarding dispossession without giving any finding of its own in
the order dated 31.10.998 in SAR Appeal No. 76 R-15/1997-98.
Further, the revisional authority while allowing the restoration
gave no consideration to the date or manner of dispossession.
The Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Lagni mundain v. State of
Jharkhand & Ors. [ W.P.(C) No. 668 of 2018] has held that :
“37… It is important to note that the date of
possession/dispossession and also the mode of
possession/dispossession have important bearing in
the matter. In this connection, the previous orders
passed in SAR cases for restoration of the land
involved in this case filed by the vendor of applicant
Arjun Munda and/or predecessor in interest of the
vendor against or in favour of the
petitioners/predecessor in interest of the petitioners
and also the execution of such orders, if any, are also
required to be considered. Although in the initial
application as perused by this Court and also by the
learned counsel for the parties, no specific statement
has been made by Arjun Munda regarding the date
and manner of dispossession but before the
authorities much was argued by both the parties, but
no clear finding has been recorded with regards to
the date and manner of possession/dispossession of
Arjun Munda from the disputed property. The
records received from the office of the Commissioner
reveals that the records which have been submitted
before this Court by the respondent State were not
produced for perusal and consideration as a result of
which the Commissioner in the impugned order has
straight away reached at the conclusion after
recording the arguments of the respective parties
without deliberating upon the points raised by the
parties and without considering the judgements
relied upon2025:JHHC:20479 by them in the
revision petition and also during the course of
arguments. The impugned order passed by the
learned Commissioner is non speaking on many
aspects of the matter, both factual and legal which10
2026:JHHC:21663has seriously prejudiced the cause of justice and
hence the impugned order calls for interference.”
It is further submitted that the burden of proof of the date of
dispossession lies on the person claiming to recover possession.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.S. Nanji and Company v.
Jatashankar Dossa & Ors.[ AIR 1961 SC 1474] has held that :
“11…A person having the right to the possession of a
property wrongfully taken from him by another can file
a suit to recover the said specific moveable property or
for compensation therefore within three years from the
date when lie first learns in whose possession it is.
Obviously where a person has a right to sue within
three years from the date of his coming to know of a,
certain fact, it is for him to prove that he had the
knowledge of the said fact on a particular date, for the
said fact would be within his peculiar knowledge. That
apart, s. 3 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory on
a court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence, indicating
thereby that it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish, at
any rate prima facie, that the suit is within time. It is
the obligation of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his
action is not barred by lapse of time: see Lalchand
Marwari v. Mahanth Rampur Gir (1) and Rajah Sahib
Perhlad Sein v. Maharajah Rajender Kishore Sing (2) .
Looking from a different perspective, we arrive at the
same result. Under the Evidence Act there is an
essential distinction between the phrase “burden of
proof” as a matter of law and pleading and as a matter
of adducing evidence. Under s. 101 of the Evidence Act,
the burden in the former sense is upon the party who
comes to court to get a decision on the existence of
certain facts which he asserts. That burden is constant
throughout the trial; but the burden to prove in the
sense of adducing evidence shifts from time to time
having regard to the evidence adduced by one party or
the other or the presumption of fact or law raised in
favour of one or the other. In the present case the
burden of proof in the former sense is certainly on the
respondents. But the question is whether they have
adduced evidence which had the effect of shifting the
onus of proof to the appellant.”
(ii) The Restoration Application has been filed beyond
reasonable time.
11
2026:JHHC:21663
The restoration Case has been filed by the Respondent No. 5 in
the year 1983 whereas the recorded raiyat surrendered the land in
question in favour of the ex- landlord and the ex-landlord had
settled the land in favour of the vendor of the Petitioner on
14.03.1943 who had further sold the land to the Petitioners vide
sale deed dated 09.06.1979. The Restoration Application has
been filed after lapse of almost 40 years.
In the light of contentions made above, the following Judgments
are being relied on:
(a) Jai Mangal Oraon v Mira Nayak & Ors. [2000(5) SCC 141],
para 16.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“16…Merely because Section 71A commence with
the words If at any time .. it cannot be taken to
mean that those power could be exercised without
any point of time limit, as in this case after nearly
about forty years unmindful of the rights of parties
acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law
and the Law of Limitation.”
(b) Situ Sahu & Ors. v State of Jharkhand & Ors [2004(8) SCC
340]
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of
the words “at any time” in section 71A is evidence
of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility
to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the
socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent
inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate
and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy
Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under
Section 71A it would be futile to contend that the
period of limitation under Limitation Act has
expired. The period of limitation under
the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought
in civil courts where the party himself chooses to
exercise his right of seeking restoration of
immovable property. But, where, for socio-
economic reasons, the party may not even be aware
of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by
making an officer of the State responsible for doing
social justice by clothing him with sufficient power.
However, even such power cannot be exercised
after an unreasonably long time during which third12
2026:JHHC:21663party interests might have come into effect. Thus,
the test is not whether the period of limitation
prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but
whether the power under Section 71A was sought to
be exercised after unreasonable delay.
….
14…. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the
present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special
officer exercised his powers under Section 71A within a
reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is
certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power,
even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. ”
(c) Fulchand Munda v State of Bihar & Ors [2008(14)
SCC 774]
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“15…..That apart, although there is no period of
limitation prescribed for exercising the power under
Section 71A by the Deputy Commissioner, the party
affected is called upon to approach the appropriate
authority or the power has to be exercised by the
Deputy Commissioner within a reasonable period of
time. The gap of more than 50 years for challenging
the transaction of 1922 cannot be said to be a
reasonable time for exercising the power even if it is
not hedged in by a period of limitation.”
(iii) The Land-in-question is Chapparbandi and Section
71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act does not apply.
The following documents are being relied upon to show that the
land in question is Chapparbandi:
Hukumnama dated 14.03.1943 (Annexure-A of the
Counter Affidavit file by Respondent No. 7 & 8)
granted Chhaparbandi Settlement to the Vendor of the
Petitioner;
And rent receipts were issued subsequently to the
vendor of the Petitioner and thereafter to the Petitioner
after purchase of the land vide sale deed dated
09.06.1979.
13
2026:JHHC:21663
The Full Bench of the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Most. Ugni
Devi & Anr. v. Chowa Mahto & Ors.[ AIR 1968 Pat 302 (FB)]
has upheld the judgment passed by the Subordinate Court
wherein it was held that:
“By virtue of sada hukumnama raiyati title cannot
be conferred but a sada hukumnama coupled with
rent receipts or even an oral settlement coupled
with rent receipts would confer good title.”
The Judgment passed in Ugni Devi has been relied by the
Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in Bharat Coking Coal Limited
& Anr. v. Ramakant Roy & Ors. [ S.A No. 382 of 2018] has
held that :
“47. This Court is of the considered view that the
learned 1st appellate court has not committed any
perversity in holding that the plaintiffs had title
over the suit property and the title has not been
declared on the basis of Sada Hukumnama rather
based on other materials on record establishing the
nature of possession of Devrani Devi as a raiyat.
The findings of the learned 1st appellate court is in
consonance with the full bench judgement passed in
the case of Mt.Ugni (supra) when seen particularly
in the light of the judgement passed in the suit
decided under section 87 of the CNT Act.”
i. Rent receipt (Annexure-1) was issued in the name of
the wife of the Petitioner for the same khata and Plot
and the nature of the land is shown as
“Chapparbandi”.
ii. The Petitioner examined witnesses in SAR Case
No.62/1983-84 including the Halka Karmchari who
proved Register-II and proved that Chapparbandi rent
was being paid by the petitioner.
iii. Certificate issued by Circle Officer, Town
Anchal, Ranchi stating that the Chapparbandi rent is
being paid by the Petitioner.
14
2026:JHHC:21663
In the light of contentions made above, the following Judgments are being
relied on:
(a) Ashwini Kumar Roy. v State of Bihar [1988(36) BLJR 180]
The Hon’ble High Court of Patna held that:
“4..It cannot be disputed that if a land is
Chhapparbandi, no proceeding under Section 71-
A of the Act can be initiated for restoration of that
land. If the land was Chhapparbandi, as alleged
by the petitioner, it will be governed by the
Transfer of Property Act and not by the
Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act.”
(b) Anupama Roy v State of Bihar & Ors [2003 SCC Online Jhar 380]
The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand held that:
“8. From the sale deed dated 29.5.1959 by which
the petitioner purchased the land in question it
appears that there is a recital in the deed that the
land is chapperbandi and chapperbandi rent has
been paid vide various chapperbandi receipts
referred in the sale deed. In my opinion, therefore,
the findings recorded by the appellate authority
and the revisional authority is based on no
evidence, rather, on extraneous considerations
ignoring series of documents referred by the
Special Officer in his order while recording a
finding that the land was converted into
chapperbandi in 1953.
Arguments of the private respondent
10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private
respondent/the original applicant has opposed the prayer and
submitted that the private respondent/the original applicant, has
purchased the property by virtue of a registered sale deed of the year
1940 and remained in possession. He has submitted that since the
property was already transferred by way of registered sale deed way
back in 1940, there was no question of any surrender of property and
subsequent settlement that too by sada hukumnama dated 14.03.1943.
11. The learned counsel has also submitted that the vendor of the
petitioner had no right, title, interest and possession over the property,15
2026:JHHC:21663and therefore, no rent receipt in the name of vendor of the petitioner
was produced before the authorities. The learned counsel submits that
there is no question of the petition being barred by limitation
inasmuch as the applicant and his family members were dispossessed
sometimes during the period from 1976 to 1980.
12. He has submitted that there is no question of any chhaparbandi
in agricultural land and chhaparbandi essentially means a house
property and non-agricultural land, and under such circumstances,
there is no question of issuance of rent receipt in connection with
chhaparbandi property.
13. He has also submitted that a specific order was passed by this
Court asking the petitioner to bring on record, the record of rights,
showing that the property was chhaparbandi as per record of rights as
argued by them, but no such affidavit/document has been filed by the
writ petitioner. He submits that merely because the revenue authority
has stated that the property was chhaparbandi, the same has no
bearing in the matter.
14. The learned counsel has also submitted that under the
provisions of Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, no period of
limitation as such has been provided and the proviso to Section 71A
provides that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of
transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or
portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not
willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the
same within a period of 6 months from the date of the order.
15. The learned counsel has also submitted that it has further been
provided that when the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the
transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building before
coming into force of Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may
notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Act, validates such
transfer where the transferee, either makes available to the transferor
an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, for
equivalent value and pay adequate compensation.
16
2026:JHHC:21663
16. The learned counsel has submitted that there is no cogent
material on record to show that the property was chhaparbandi and
the plea that the property was chhaparbandi has been rejected by the
learned authority.
17. He has submitted that there is no perversity in the impugned
orders, and therefore, the same do not call for any interference.
18. The private respondent representing the original applicant has
also filed written notes of argument in this case and has relied upon
the following judgements:
i. 1983 BLT (Rep.) 111 (Full Bench) [Amrendra Nath
Dutta and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and others] paragraph
10, 11, 13, 65 and 66
ii. 1992 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 77 [Pandey Oraon
Vs. Ram Chander Sahu and Ors.] Paragraph 6, 7 and 8.
iii. 2023 (1) JBCJ 18 (SC) [Kamla Neti (dead) through Lrs.
Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors.]
paragraph 7.1
19. The learned counsel submits that for the purposes of claiming
chhaparbandi, the actual structure should be standing over the
property which is used for residential purpose. He submits that there is
no such material on record to show that the property was
chhaparbandi. For the aforesaid proposition, the learned counsel has
relied upon the judgement reported in-
(a) 1986 SCC OnLine Patna 153 [Murlidhar Gupta and Ors. Vs.
State of Bihar and Others] paragraph 10;
(b) 1989 SCC OnLine Patna 250 [Akhileshwar Prasad
Srivastava & Ors. Vs. Commissioner, South Chotanagpur
Division, Ranchi & Ors.] paragraphs 15, 16 and 20;
(c) 2006 SCC OnLine Jhar 1199 [Subhash Singh Vs. The State
of Bihar & Ors.] paragraph 13.
Arguments of the State.
20. The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the
impugned orders do not call for any interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
17
2026:JHHC:21663
Findings of this Court.
21. In both the writ petitions, the impugned order is the same.
22. The original order was passed by respondent no.4 under Section
71A of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act whereby the land in question has
been directed to be restored to Respondent no.5. The petitioner has
lost in all the three courts. The petitioners [Dr. H.P. Narayan and
Smt. Veena Narayan (now deceased)] have challenged the original
order dated 01.03.1997, the appellate order dated 31.10.1998 and the
revisional order dated 26.11.2002.
23. Initially an order of restoration of land in favour of respondent
no.5 was passed on 29.09.1986 which was subject matter of appeal
and the appellate court remanded the matter. The learned appellate
court while remanding the matter for fresh consideration by S.A.R.
Court vide order dated 26.12.1991, observed that the evidences have
not been properly dealt with by the S.A.R. Court and it was not in
dispute that if the land is chhaparbandi, no proceeding under Section
71 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (CNT Act) could be initiated for
restoration of land. The court observed that the SAR court had
discarded the claim of chhaparbandi summarily and for the ends of
justice, it was necessary that the claim of chhaparbandi character of
the land should be examined minutely after giving opportunity to both
the parties both oral and documentary. The court also observed that
the Baijnath Oraon (husband of respondent no.5) had now recovered
his normal state of mind.
24. Upon remand, the SAR court issued notice to both the parties
and the fresh order reveals that the evidences were produced. The
learned S.A.R. Court referred to the persons, whose oral evidences
were recorded and observed that from the side of Veena Narayan, rent
receipt of municipality pursuant to Mutation Case No.151 of 1979 and
537 of 1979 and the correction slip of 23.01.1980 pursuant to sale
deed dated 30.03.1976 were produced. Additional written statement
was filed by the petitioners on 09.08.1993 wherein they stated that the
ex-zamindar had executed sada hukumnama converting the property
involved in this case as chhaparbandi in favour of Sk. Rahman and it
18
2026:JHHC:21663
was Sk. Rahman, who sold the property in their favour through
registered deed.
The learned SAR court recorded that the petitioners claimed that prior
to execution of registered sale deeds in the year 1979 in their favour,
the property was converted into chhaparbandi.
25. The S.A.R. Court held in SAR Case No.62 of 1983-84 dated
01.03.1997 (impugned order) as under: –
a. Once the property was already transferred by registered deed on
09.12.1940, there was no occasion to have any settlement by the
ex-zamindar in favour of Sk. Rahman by sada hukumnama
dated 14.03.1942. Further, the learned court has also recorded a
finding that the property was already sold vide registered deed
in the year 1940 by the recorded tenant, and therefore, there was
no question of surrender of the land by recorded tenant in
favour of ex-landlord or of any chhaparbandi settlement by the
ex-landlord in favour of Sk. Rahman.
b. When the property was transferred in favour of the petitioners at
that point of time, the husband of the applicant Baijnnath Oraon
was not in right state of mind and also recorded a finding that
the petitioners had prepared forged documents to get the
property, and therefore, the registered deeds, through which the
petitioners are claiming to have purchased the property from Sk.
Rahman, cannot be said to be valid document.
c. The property was transferred in favour of the petitioners and
others during the period from 1976 -1980 and the applicant
seeking restoration of land was dispossessed from the property
during this period and ultimately passed the order of restoration
of land in favour of the applicant (respondent no.5).
26. So far as the appellate court is concerned, all the appeals which
were filed by Madho Oraon, son of late Bhola Oraon, Dr. H.P.
Narayan, Smt. Veena Narayan and Smt. Urmila Verma have been
dismissed by common judgement dated 31.10.1998 (impugned)
wherein it has been recorded as under: –
19
2026:JHHC:21663
I. The appellate court has recorded that the land in question
stands recorded in Revisional Survey Record of Rights in the
name of Bhauwa Oraon, son of Paio Oraon and Most. Budhni
Orain, wife of Sonia Oraon each having equal share.
II. Pursuant to order of remand, notices were issued and during
course of hearing, Madho Oraon, son of Bhola Oraon filed an
objection before the learned court praying to be impleaded as
first party (applicant), but the learned SAR court vide order
dated 04.11.1994, rejected the claim of Madho Oraon to be
made the first party. Against which, Madho Oraon filed
Appeal No.1 R – 15/95-96 before the Additional Collector,
Ranchi. The Additional Collector, Ranchi vide order dated
28.06.1996 directed the SAR Officer to hear Madho Oraon
and give an opportunity to prove his stand. Consequently,
notice was issued to the applicant-Madho Oraon in compliance
of the order.
Case of Madho Oraon before appellate court
III. It was the case of Madho Oraon that he, along with his
brother Bodho Oraon, were the only surviving legal heirs of
the recorded raiyats and Kuari Toppo (respondent no.5) was a
stranger to the family of recorded raiyat and she had no legal
right to claim restoration of land in question. It was his case
that under Section 71A of CNT Act, only the legal heirs of the
recorded raiyats are entitled for restoration of land. It was also
asserted that Kuari Toppo or her husband or her father-in-law
were never in possession of the land in question by virtue of
alleged registered deed of sale dated 09.12.1940, which was
never given effect to at any point of time, and therefore, she
cannot claim restoration of land by virtue of the registered
deed dated 09.12.1940. It was asserted that the land in
question was required to be restored to Madho Oraon by the
SAR Officer vide his order dated 29.04.1997 in SAR case
no.220 of 1993-94, and as such, the subsequent proceeding for
restoration of the same land by the applicant namely Kuari
20
2026:JHHC:21663
Toppo was not maintainable and the same was hit by the
principles of res judicata. It was also argued by Madho Oraon
that the other respondents claimed that the recorded tenant
surrendered the land to the ex-landlord and the ex-landlord
after the surrender got the land converted into chhaparbandi
and made sada settlement in favour of Sk. Rahman and they
had purchased the land from Sk. Rahman during the period
from 1976-1980 by virtue of registered sale deed. It was
argued by Madho Oraon that no document regarding surrender
or chhaparbandi was filed and there was contravention of
Sections 72 and 46 of the CNT Act and Section 71A of CNT
Act was well applicable for restoration of land to Madho
Oraon.
Case of the petitioners before the appellate court
IV. So far as the petitioners [Dr. H.P. Narayan and Smt. Veena
Narayan] and another person namely Smt. Urmila Verma is
concerned, they argued that the recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon
surrendered the land in question to the ex-landlord and on
14.03.1942, the ex-landlord settled the land in favour of Sk.
Rahman Ali by sada hukumnama with chapparbandi right and
permission of the Deputy Commissioner was not necessary at
that point of time.
V. It was also argued that the land was chapparbandi in nature
and hence provision of Section 71A of CNT Act was not
applicable and by virtue of the registered sale deed during the
period from 1976-1980, Sk. Rahman sold the land to Dr. H.P.
Narayan, Smt. Veena Narayan and Urmila Verma through
registered sale deeds in the year 1976-1980 and they got their
name mutated in the Circle Office and were paying rent to the
State as well as municipality and receipts were granted.
VI. It was also submitted by the aforesaid 3 purchasers of land
from Sk. Rahman Ali that the Karamchari of town anchal
brought Register II and gave evidence before the SAR Officer
and chapparbandi entry along with mutation cases were
21
2026:JHHC:21663
proved and the restoration petition was filed after lapse of 40
years from the settlement date as such it was time barred.
VII. It was asserted that as per Oraon customary law, the land
cannot be restored to females and they had only limited
ownership and the registered sale deed of the year 1940
executed in favour of Harihar Oraon, the father-in-law of
Kuari Toppo was sham and was never acted upon and no rent
receipt either by ex-landlord or by the State of Bihar was filed
by Kuari Toppo.
VIII. It was also argued that Madho Oraon was not the son of Most.
Budhni and Madho Oraon and his brothers were imposters and
strangers to the family.
IX. It was also asserted that after obtaining permission by the
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under Urban Land Ceiling Act,
the vendor Sk. Rahman sold the land to the 3 persons by
registered sale deeds and this permission was not considered
by the SAR court.
X. It was also asserted that Kuari Toppo did not depose herself or
did not examine herself as witness and the learned SAR officer
was wrong in not relying upon the return submitted by ex-
landlord which clearly showed that the lands were
chhaparbandi.
Case of respondent no.5 before appellate court
XI. On the other hand, it was the specific case of Kuari Toppo that
the recorded tenant Bhauwa Oraon sold the land in question
along with other lands to Harihar Oraon by virtue of registered
sale deed dated 09.12.1940, who had one son namely Baijnath
Oraon and Kuari Toppo is the wife of Baijnath Oraon. It was
asserted that Baijnath Oraon was of unsound mind and his son
was minor and as such restoration petition was filed by Kuari
Toppo.
XII. The right, title of Baijnath Oraon, the husband of Kuari Toppo
was finally decided on 16.06.1977 in Title Suit No.151/35 of
72-75 in respect of land under Khata No.77 and delivery of
22
2026:JHHC:21663
possession of the land was given to Baijnath Oraon and in the
title suit, the Deputy Commissioner was also a defendant. Title
Appeal No.117 of 1977 was dismissed on 21.06.1978.
XIII. It was submitted that the claim that land was chapparbandi
was false and frivolous and the petition for restoration of land
by Kuari Toppo was not barred by limitation as the settlement
of land as claimed is based on sada patta and Budhni Oroan
had already lost her case in civil court.
Findings of appellate court.
XIV. The learned appellate court recorded a finding that the
petitioners could not explain whether the land in question has
been surrendered or not, as such sada hukumnama dated
14.03.1942 could not be recognized, when the lands have been
transferred by registered deed dated 09.12.1940 by the
recorded tenant to Harihar Oraon, the father-in-law of the
applicant seeking restoration and at that point of time, the
required permission of the Deputy Commissioner was not
necessary and on that basis of sale deed, rent receipts were
issued to the father-in-law of the applicant. The learned
appellate court also recorded that the case of Madho Oraon
was not acceptable as his status as descendant of the recorded
tenant was not accepted by the competent court in the title suit.
XV. The court recorded a clear finding that the lands were
purchased by father-in-law of the applicant in the year 1940
and by fraudulent method, the applicant was dispossessed
taking advantage of unsound mind of her husband during the
period from 1976-1980 and as such the possession of the
purchasers of land during the period from 1976 to 1980 was in
contravention of Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and
the learned SAR court rightly passed the order for restoration
of the land in favour of Kuari Toppo, the daughter-in-law of
Harihar Oraon, who in turn was purchaser of the property vide
sale deed dated 09.12.1940.
23
2026:JHHC:21663
XVI. The learned court ultimately recorded that the orders passed by
the SAR court in Case No.220 of 1993-94 on 29.04.1997 had
no relevance as the land involved in the said case was different
from the case at hand and further the order dated 29.04.1997
was of a later date and the present impugned order was dated
01.03.1997. The court also recorded that no objection recorded
under Urban Land Ceiling Act, has also no relevance in the
case. Ultimately, the court recorded the following findings:
“Considering the above facts and circumstances, and in
absence of valid document regarding surrender of land in
question by recorded tenant and also settlement of land
through sada hukumnaa with chapparbandi rights dated
14.03.1942 by ex-landlord to Sk. Rahman and subsequent
transfers does not give any right to consider on point of
time-barred and it clearly contravenes the provisions of
CNT Act. Moreso, the verdict given by civil court
regarding right, title and interest of the land on the basis
of registered deed dated 9.12.1940 in favour of Kuari
Toppo. I do not find any reason to interfere with the orders
dated 1.03.1997 passed by learned lower court and as
such, the above three appeals are dismissed.”
27. The appellate order was challenged in revision before the
learned Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R.
Revision No.157 and 158 of 1998 which was also dismissed. The
order reveals that Madho Oraon also filed revision and his case was
numbered as Revision Case No.101/99. The revisional court recorded
the following findings after recording and considering the case of the
respective parties: –
“I am of the view that since petitioners and interveners are
claiming the land on the basis of Sada Hukurnama the petitioner
of S. A. R. case no. 157/98 and 158/98 and interveners never
produced any surrender deed even they have not disclosed date
of surrender. Thus, the entire story of surrender and settlement is
false and concocted only to grab the land of the raiyats who are
member of Schedule Tribes. The claim of land being
Chhaparbandi also was not proved by any document. There in24
2026:JHHC:21663C.Os report but he was not examined on oath and so his
certificate is void ab-initio. Intervener has purchased the land
when the case was still subjudice in the courts, what prevented
them from not appearing in the lower court. And they have come
before the Revision Court Straight away. So the land should be
restored to the bonafide tenants.
O.P. No. 2 Kuari Toppo (158/98 and 101/99) claims that since
her husband Baijnath was not capable she was doing everything,
Baijnath also died recently on 10.9.01 leaving behind 3 sons. The
verdict dated 21.6.78 in T.S.No. 117/77, given by Civil Court
regarding right title and interest of the land on the basis of
registered deed dated 9.12.40 is in favour of Baijnath Oraon,
(husband of Kuari Toppo).
Thus, the disputed land is restored to O.P. No.2 i.e. Kuari
Toppo.”
28. The 1st point raised by the petitioner is that the nature of land
has changed from rayati to chapparbandi, and therefore, the petition
seeking restoration of land under Section 71 A of CNT Act is not
maintainable and 2nd point is that the petition seeking restoration of
land was filed after expiry of 40 years from date of dispossession and
hence the petition was barred by limitation.
29. The records of this case reveals that the land in question was
purchased by the father-in-law of respondent no.5 by registered sale
deed dated 09.12.1940. The case of the petitioner is that the recorded
tenant surrendered the land in favour of ex-zamindar, who in turn
settled the land with Sk. Rahman Ali by way of sada hukumnama on
14.03.1943 (unregistered) and the said settlement was chhaparbandi
settlement. It was their case that since 14.03.1943, the property
remained chhaparbandi and all along chhaparbandi rent was realized
and as such the provision of CNT Act is not applicable and their
vendor sold chhaparbandi land to them. It is also their case that
chhaparbandi rent receipt was issued to the petitioner also after they
purchased the property in the year 1978 by registered deed from Sk.
Rahman Ali. It was also their case that at the time of vesting, ex-
landlord filed return showing chhaparbandi rent from Sk. Rahman Ali
in lieu of settlement of aforesaid properties and accordingly Register
25
2026:JHHC:21663
II was prepared showing payment of chhaparbandi rent and Sk.
Rahman Ali continued in possession on payment of chhaparbandi rent
to the State.
30. Since the petitioner claimed that in record of rights (register-II)
the property was recorded as chhaparbandi, an order dated 01.07.2025
was passed by this Court directing the petitioner to bring on record the
relevant Khatian from where it could be seen that the record of rights
shows that the property was chhaparbandi. The said order reads as
follows:
“In view of the specific claim made on behalf of the
petitioners that the land in question was recorded as
Chhaparbandi land, learned counsel for the petitioners
is directed to bring on record the relevant Khatiyan to
show and it was entered as such in the Record of Rights.
Put up these cases on 21.07.2025.”
Thereafter, on 22.08.2025, the following order was passed:
“Learned counsel for the petitioners prays for two
weeks more time to comply the order dated 01.07.2025.
Considering the said prayer, put up these cases under
the same heading after two weeks.”
On 12.01.2026, the following order was passed:
“1. No supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf
of the petitioners bringing on record the relevant
Khatiyan suggesting that the land in question was
recorded as Chhaparbandi.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
though a copy of the revisional survey record of rights
has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the W.P. (C) No.
332 of 2003, however, the petitioners have not been able
to obtain a copy of Khatiyan so as to suggest that the
land in question was recorded as Chhaparbandi. Under
the said circumstance, she prays for two weeks’ time to
file an interlocutory application in this regard.
26
2026:JHHC:21663
3. Considering the said prayer, put up these cases under
the same heading after two weeks.”
On 09.03.2026, the following order was passed:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner and private
respondents are present.
2. With consent of the learned counsels appearing for
the parties and by way of last indulgence, post these
cases on 12th March, 2026 to be taken up as the 1st
case at 02:15 p.m.”
31. No supplementary affidavit was filed to bring on record the
Record of Rights showing that the land was recorded as chhaparbandi
land. Even the Annexure – 1 does not reveal that the property was
chhaparbandi. The petitioners have relied upon the report of the
Circle Officer, but the same is of no consequences when the record of
rights does not record the property as chhaparbandi as claimed by the
petitioners. The report of the Circle Officer has been rejected by the
learned courts/authorities by citing reasons.
32. Thus, the petitioners have completely failed to prove their case
that the property was recorded as chhaparbandi in Records of Rights
in Register II and were settled through sada hukumnama way back in
1942 by way of chhaparbandi settlement. Mere one rent receipt
showing chhaparbandi rent in favour of the petitioners does not have
any relevance if it was not backed by similar rent receipts showing
chhaparbandi rent right from 1943 i.e. the date of issuance of sada
hukumnama till the date of transfer of property in the names of the
petitioners in the year 1978.
33. This Court has gone through the judgments passed by the initial
court, appellate court as well as the revisional court, who have
completely discarded the theory of the property being chhaparbandi
by detailed judgments as quoted/discussed above. In such
circumstances, the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioners that no petition under Section 71A of the CNT Act can be
filed once the property is chhaparbandi, are of no consequences as the
petitioner has miserably failed to prove before the SAR Court,
27
2026:JHHC:21663
Appellate Court and the Revisional authority and also before this
Court that the property involved in these cases were chhaparbandi.
34. This Court is sitting in writ jurisdiction, that too against 3
orders passed by 3 authorities, who have given concurrent findings
rejecting the claim of the petitioner that the property was
chhaparbandi and there being no perversity or illegality in
appreciating the materials on record, this Court finds no reason to
interfere with the impugned orders under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
On the point of limitation
35. It was the specific case of the applicant that her husband was
mentally unstable during the period 1976 to 1980 and taking
advantage of this, the registered deeds were executed and they were
dispossessed. The petitioners had purchased the property vide
registered deed of 1979. Even the courts have found that husband of
the applicant was mentally unstable during the period 1976 to 1980
and recorded a finding that the applicant was dispossessed from the
property in the year 1976-1980. In the 1st round, the appellate court
while remanding the case before the SAR Court also observed that by
now the husband of respondent no.5 has recovered from his unstable
mental situation. Meaning thereby, it stands established from the
records that the husband of the applicant was having unstable mental
status during the period from 1976-1980, when they were
dispossessed from the property. There are consistent findings recorded
by the court that the applicants were dispossessed from the property
during the period from 1976-1980. There is no cogent reason much
less material on record to disturb this finding of fact in writ
jurisdiction. The petitioners have completely failed to establish, as
argued by them, that the applicants were dispossessed from the
property by virtue of surrender and settlement by sada hukumnama
(unregistered) in favour of the vendor of the petitioners way back in
1943. Rather, the father-in-law of respondent no.5 had purchased the
property in the year 1940 by way of registered sale deed. Once the
property was already sold, there was no question of any subsequent
28
2026:JHHC:21663
surrender and settlement after 1940, as discussed above, in the context
of the claim of the land being ‘chhaparbandi’. Further, there is no
materials on record to suggest that the vendor of the petitioners ever
remained in possession of the property. Accordingly, the case of the
petitioners that respondent no.5 was dispossessed from the property
way back in the year 1943, that is prior to 30 years from the date of
filing application seeking restoration of land in the year 1983 which is
barred by limitation, is completely devoid of any merit. The applicant
has clearly mentioned about the date and manner of dispossession
which was within 8 years from the date of filing the application for
restoration. The judgements cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioners on the point of limitation does not help the petitioners in
any manner whatsoever. The point raised by the petitioners that the
application seeking restoration of land was barred by limitation is
rejected.
36. It is important to note that the revisional court clearly recorded
a finding that the vendor of the petitioners had no title over the
property. The story of surrender by the recorded tenant in favour of
Zamindar, and then settlement through sada hukumnama in favour of
Sk. Rahman (vendor of the petitioner), was completely disbelieved.
The Court clearly rejected the story of surrender and settlement and
held it to be false and concocted only to grab the raiyati land of the
applicant, who was the member of the Schedule Tribe. It was also held
that the claim of land being chhaparbandi was also not proved by any
document. The court further recorded that there is one C.O. report, but
the Circle Officer was not examined on oath so his certificate was of
no consequence. The title with respect to the suit property was already
decided in Title Suit No. 151/72 and in Title Appeal No. 117/77
regarding right, title and interest on the basis of registered deed dated
09.12.1940 executed in favour of Baijnath Oraon, the husband of the
applicant (respondent no.5 herein) and ultimately dismissed the
revision.
37. The claim of Madho Oraon, has been completely rejected by
well speaking order by learned appellate court. Against which, he filed
29
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separate revision numbered as Revision Case No.101 of 1999, and that
was dismissed by the revisional court. Against the Revision Case
No.101 of 1999, he has not preferred any writ petition before this
Court. Otherwise also, the reason assigned by the court to reject his
claim is well reasoned order.
38. This Court finds that all the three authorities have rightly dealt
with every aspect of the matter and this Court is of the view that there
is no perversity or illegality in the impugned orders when seen in the
light of the two points as argued by the learned counsel for the
petitioner.
39. Hence, both the writ petitions are dismissed.
40. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not
pressed.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Date of pronouncement:22.07.2026
Saurav/-
Date of Uploading:23.07.2026
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