Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Dodda Venkata Satya Prasad vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 6 July, 2026
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Date of reserved for orders : 07.05.2026
Date of pronouncement : 06.07.2026
Date of uploading : 08.07.2026
APHC010626902025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3396]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 6th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 12048/2025
Between:
DODDA VENKATA SATYA PRASAD, S/O CHINNA REDDAMMA,AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS, R/O.PRASADAMPADU VILLAGE,VIJAYAWADA,
ANDHRA PRADESH.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP BY THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, VELGAPUDI, AMARAVATI,GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM, SIT C.I.D. POLICE STATION,
MANGALAGIRI GUNTUR.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. JITHENDRA P
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The instant petition under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 has been filed seeking to grant anticipatory bail to the
Petitioner/Accused No.3, in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 of CID
2
Police Station, Mangalagiri, registered for the offences 409, 420, and 120-B
read with Sections 34, 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 and Sections 7,
7(a), 8, 13(1)(b) & 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19882.
2. The present crime arises out of allegations concerning large-scale
irregularities in the implementation of the excise policy and functioning of the
Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited (APSBCL) during 2019
to 2024. The matter came to light upon a representation made to the Principal
Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, on 26.08.2024 by one
Venkateswara Rao Srinivas, alleging irregularities in the excise policy from
2019 to 2024. The report highlighted issues such as unfair discrimination in
the allocation of Orders for Supply (OFS) of liquor, leading to the suppression
of established brands and preferential treatment for new brands, in violation of
existing norms. It also raised concerns about the shift from an automated to a
manual OFS system, which could allow for manipulations. After an enquiry,
Principal Secretary referred the complaint to CID Police, Mangalagiri, which
registered a case in Crime No.21 of 2024 against unknown persons on
23.09.2024, alleging offences under Sections 409, 420, and 120-B of IPC. On
05.02.2025, the Government constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT),
vide G.O.Rt.No.262 to investigate the alleged irregularities in the excise policy
and related crimes.
1
For short „IPC‟
2
For short „PC Act‟
3
3. Heard Sri K.Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
P.Jitendra, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana,
learned Public Prosecutor for State.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner / Accused No.3 would submit
that the Petitioner, who was appointed as Special Officer in the Revenue
Excise Department in November 2019, acted under the directions and
pressure of his superiors. Upon realizing the gravity of the matter, he
voluntarily cooperated with the investigation and expressed his intention to
turn approver by making a full and true disclosure.
Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the Petitioner was
examined on multiple occasions and his statements were recorded under
Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS, including a voluntary confessional
statement before the Magistrate on 25.02.2025. In these statements, he not
only admitted his own role but also disclosed the involvement of other
principal conspirators, thereby significantly aiding the investigation. It is further
contended that his self-incriminatory disclosures demonstrate his bona fide
intention to assist the prosecution, and he is willing to provide further
information as required.
It is further argued that the learned Special Judge misread Section 306
Cr.P.C (Section 343 of BNSS) by holding that grant of anticipatory bail would
weaken judicial dignity. The Special Court dealt with such an application as if
the Court was deciding the application of tender of pardon. It is argued that
the issue of approvership is primarily between the State and the Accused, and
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the Court‟s role is limited to examining compliance with statutory
requirements. The Petitioner‟s cooperation, duly acknowledged by the
prosecution, warranted consideration for grant of anticipatory bail.
It is further submitted that the findings naming the Petitioner as a “prime
accused” and expressing apprehensions about non-compliance with bail
conditions are premature and speculative. The observation that grant of bail
would collapse the prosecution case is unsustainable. It is contended that the
Petitioner, is aged 52 years, and is a permanent resident with no criminal
antecedents, poses no flight risk, and undertakes to abide by any conditions.
His continued liberty is essential to fulfil his role as an approver, and arrest at
this stage would defeat the purpose of his cooperation. Hence, prayed to grant
anticipatory bail to the Petitioner. In support of their contentions, learned
Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Md.Asfak Alam vs. State of Jharkhand and another 3, Pradip
N.Sharma vs. State of Gujarat and another4, Jasbir Singh vs. Vipin
Kumar Jaggi5, Lt.Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. State6, D.Siva
Sankar Reddy vs. CBI and others7, High Court of A.P in Gajjala Uma
Sankar Reddy vs. CBI8, Konajeti Rajababu vs. State of A.P 9, High Court
Delhi in Bangaru Laxman vs. State through CBI & Another 10, Prem Chand
3
(2023) 8 SCC 632
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 457
5
(2001) 8 SCC 289
6
1967 SCC OnLine SC 37
7
SLP (Crl.) D.No.29297 of 2022, dated 10.10.2022
8
2022 SCC OnLine AP 346
9
2002 SCC OnLine AP 3
10
ILR (2012) II Delhi 102
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vs. State11, Jayalakshmi Jaitly vs. CBI12, High Court of Jharkhand in Lalan
Singh vs. Union of India13, Sudhanshu Ranjan vs. Union of India14, High
Court of Madras in Munisamy vs. Superintendent, Central Prison15,
Subramanian vs. State16, High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Sahu vs.
State of Chhattisgarh17, High Court Jammu & Kashmir in Tariq Ahmed Dar
vs. National Investigation Agency18 and High Court of Rajasthan in Noor
Taki @ Mammu vs. The State of Rajasthan19.
5. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the Petitioner has been
cooperated with the investigating agency, appeared before the Investigating
Officer, furnished required information, clarified several issues and his
statements were also recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of BNSS, 2023.
Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the Court may pass appropriate
orders. The Prosecution placed on record the written instructions received
from the investigating agency as well as the police report filed against
Accused Nos.1, 6 to 17, 25, 26 and 30 in the present crime.
6. Having heard the submissions on both sides, the point that would
emerge for determination is:
Whether the Petitioner / Accused No.3 is entitled to anticipatory bail?.
11
1984 SCC OnLine Del 311
12
2012 SCC OnLine Del 3152
13
2011 SCC OnLine Jhar 425
14
2022 SCC OnLine Jhar 290
15
1987 SCC OnLine Mad 425
16
2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3760
17
2020 SCC OnLine Chh 109
18
2023 SCC OnLine J & K 236
19
1986 SCC OnLine Raj 11
6POINT:
7. According to the prosecution, the Petitioner, along with the other
accused, participated in the formation of a syndicate with the objective of
exercising complete control over the procurement, supply, and sale of liquor in
the State, thereby generating unlawful pecuniary gains in the form of
commissions, kickbacks, and inflated pricing. It is not the case that no
accusations found against Petitioner / Accused No.3 during the course of
investigation. The name of the Petitioner / Accused No.3 is very much
available from the inception of the registration of the crime. He is a public
servant and the investigating agency did not choose to arrest him. Be that as
it may, the police report placed on record would show the material against the
Petitioner / Accused No.3 and his role in implementation of the excise policy
under conspiracy.
8. The allegations leveled against the Petitioner / Accused No.3 in the
police report filed against Accused Nos.1, 6 to 17, 25, 26 and 30 are as
follows:
(a) The Petitioner was strategically positioned within the
administrative framework of APSBCL to facilitate the
implementation of the conspiracy relating to liquor procurement and
distribution in the State.
(b) On 08.10.2019, the Petitioner met Accused No.4 at Tirupati and
requested him to accompany Accused No.2 to the residence of
7Accused No.5 at Hyderabad with APSBCL’s annual sales data of
previous years.
(c) On 13.10.2019, the Petitioner, along with Accused Nos.1 to 5
and 7, attended a meeting at the residence of Accused No.5, where
the liquor sales data was analysed and it was estimated that the
proposed scheme would generate approximately Rs.50 to Rs.60
crores per month by way of kickbacks from distilleries and
suppliers.
(d) During the said meeting, it was proposed that the Petitioner
would oversee supplies to APSBCL depots and sales through
Government Retail Outlets by bypassing the automatic Order for
Supply (OFS) mechanism, thereby enabling the syndicate to
manipulate procurement decisions.
(e) The Petitioner was promised appointment to an IAS post by the
year 2023 in consideration of his role in furthering the conspiracy.
(f) Pursuant to the conspiracy, the Petitioner was appointed as
Special Officer, APSBCL, on 15.11.2019.
(g) In December, 2019, the Petitioner, along with Accused No.2,
met Accused No.1 at his office in Hyderabad on the instructions of
Accused No.4, where directions were issued to promote the sale of
liquor supplied by those distilleries and suppliers who had agreed to
pay the demanded kickbacks.
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(h) At a meeting held after the Sankranthi festival in January, 2020,
attended by Accused Nos.1, 2, 3 and 6, the authority to issue
Orders for Supply (OFSs) was delegated to the Petitioner in
February, 2020, thereby conferring upon him substantial control
over the procurement process.
(i) The Petitioner, being an Assistant Commissioner in the Excise
Department, possessed detailed knowledge of the liquor
procurement and distribution system and of the modus operandi
through which illegal kickbacks could be generated.
(j) By virtue of his official position, the Petitioner implemented the
decisions of the syndicate by manipulating the supply process.
(k) The Petitioner conducted daily conference calls with APSBCL
Depot Managers through WhatsApp using his personal mobile
number, during which directions were issued regarding the
placement of indents.
(l) The Petitioner ensured preferential placement of indents in
favour of liquor brands supplied by manufacturers and suppliers
who had agreed to pay kickbacks, while simultaneously reducing or
suppressing indents for popular brands whose manufacturers
declined to make such illegal payments.
(m) The Petitioner acted upon draft indent plans prepared by
Accused Nos.1, 7 and 8, who determined the allocation of indents
9based on the quantum of kickbacks received from various
suppliers.
(n) By exercising control over the issuance of OFSs and the
distribution of liquor to APSBCL depots and Government Retail
Outlets, the Petitioner implemented such indent plans and
facilitated the objectives of the syndicate.
(o) The Petitioner played a pivotal operational role in the alleged
conspiracy by manipulating the procurement and supply process,
extending preferential treatment to favoured suppliers, and using
his official position to facilitate the generation of unlawful pecuniary
gains in the form of commissions and kickbacks.
9. It is represented that the Petitioner has voluntarily submitted an
application before the Special Court seeking tender of pardon and the same
was returned with some defects. At that juncture, the Petitioner had moved an
application for anticipatory bail before the Special Court and the Special Court
rejected the said application mainly on the ground that he had voluntarily filed
an application seeking tender of pardon to become an approver and,
therefore, in view of Section 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. (Section 343(4)(b) of the
BNSS), the Petitioner shall be in the custody till the completion of the trial.
10. In the above factual background, apprehending arrest the Petitioner has
approached this Court seeking anticipatory bail. The principal contention of the
Petitioner is that, in spite of the allegations levelled against him, he has
voluntarily cooperated with the investigation, gave statements under Sections
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180 and 183 of the BNSS, made full disclosures regarding the alleged
conspiracy, voluntarily moved an application seeking tender of pardon before
the Special Court, he is ready to furnish sureties to the satisfaction of the
Court and he is always ready and willing to cooperate with the investigation in
this matter.
11. It is well settled that, to invoke the jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail
for a non-bailable offence, there should be a reasonable apprehension of
arrest. The existence of such apprehension has to be examined independently
by the Court and cannot be negatived merely because the prosecution has not
expressly opposed the application or has stated that it has no objection if
appropriate protection is granted. Equally, the seriousness of the allegations
or the specific role attributed to the Accused does not, by itself, answer the
question whether the Accused has a reasonable apprehension of arrest.
Those aspects may be relevant while considering the merits of the application,
but the threshold requirement for invoking the jurisdiction under the relevant
provision remains the existence of a bona fide apprehension of arrest.
12. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, the Constitution Bench
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the very object of the provision relating
to anticipatory bail is to protect an individual who has reason to believe that he
may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence.
The Court observed that the expression “reason to believe” postulates the
existence of reasonable grounds for apprehending arrest and that such
apprehension cannot be dismissed on mere assumptions or conjectures.
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Similarly, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and
others20, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the provision for
anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty against
unnecessary arrest and that the Court must examine whether the
apprehension of arrest is genuine and reasonable in the facts of the case.
13. Prosecution has not filed counter opposing the application. The written
instructions received from the investigating agency are placed on record. For
ready reference, the said written instructions are extracted hereunder:
In this regard, it is submitted that the individuals who have filed the
anticipatory bail are the previous employees of APSBCL and they
are in a position to bring all the facts of the crime to light during the
course of investigation. It is to further bring to your notice that, Sri
D. V. Satya prasad (A-3) was issued notice u/s. 179 BNSS/160
CrPC and he attended before the 10 and given his statement on 21
-2-2025. To strengthen the investigation, He has also given his
statement before the Hon’ble court u/s. 183 BNSS on 25-2-2025.
Again, he has appeared before the I.O for informing the additional
facts of the crime and the same was recorded in his further
examination statements on 16-7-2025. He also appeared before
the investigating officer and clarified many of the issues so as to
move ahead in the investigation and the same was recorded as
mediators report on 10-8-2025.
The accused A-3’s statements and cooperation with the
investigation have helped the investigation agency to understand
the crime, conspiracy involved, magnitude of the criminal proceeds
and also to find out the accused persons who perpetuated the
crime and who all are benefitted from the crime, complete
conspiracy and modus operandi of the persons in crime. In light of
these facts, it is submitted that the petitions may be argued in the
interest of further investigation.
Therefore, in the Anticipatory bail petitions filed by D.V.Satya
Prasad vide CRL.P.No. 12048 of 2025, in view of the cooperation
and crucial information provided by him which led to finding the
conspiracy, discovery of several material evidence, establishment20
(2011) 1 SCC 694
12of role of all the persons involved, Modus operandi of the crime Etc.
So, the investigation agency has no objection in case this Hon’ble
court is willing to grant anticipatory bail to A-3. These facts may
kindly be brought to the notice of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra
Pradesh during the hearing and appropriate orders may be sought
in the interest of further investigation and justice.
14. In the light of the serious allegations made against Petitioner / Accused
No.3 in the report filed before the Court, apprehension of arrest of the
Petitioner / Accused No.3 cannot be ruled out simply because the
investigating agency has no objection if the Court considers his application for
anticipatory bail for the present.
15. The High Court of Delhi in Bangaru Laxman‘s case referred to supra,
while referring to the judgment of the said Court in Prem Chand vs. State21
and while examining the scope of Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C., reiterated that an
approver who accepts a tender of pardon is ordinarily required to remain in
custody till the termination of trial unless he was already on bail at the time of
grant of pardon. The object of such detention is not to punish the approver but
is intended to protect him and ensure his adherence to the conditions of
pardon. In the said case, one of the Accused namely T. Satyamurthy, was
granted anticipatory bail and subsequently, CBI moved an application seeking
his pardon so as to make him a witness and said application was allowed by
the Special Court. Aggrieved by the grant of pardon to T.Satyamurthy, the co-
accused in the said crime moved an application before the High Court of
Delhi. The High Court consequently dismissed the said application having
regard to the fundamental right to life and liberty of the approver in the said
21
1995 Crl.L.J. 1534
13
case when his statement had already been record, no purpose would be
served to send him in custody.
16. The High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Sahu‘s case referred to
supra, while granting bail to an approver, categorically held that it is quite
pellucid that the provision contained in Section 306(4)(b) of the Code requiring
the approver to be detained in custody till the termination of trial if he is not
already on bail, is meant not to punish the person in whose favour the pardon
has been tendered but to protect him from possible indignation, rage and
resentment of his associates in a crime to whom he has chosen to expose.
17. A Coordinate Bench of this Court, in Gajjala Uma Sankar Reddy’s
case referred to supra, held that merely because an accused who intends to
become an approver is granted anticipatory bail, or because the investigating
agency does not oppose such bail, it cannot be presumed that there was any
illegal bargain or understanding between the accused and the investigating
agency. Such an inference can be drawn only if there is independent material
showing that the statutory procedure for granting pardon was misused or that
there was an improper agreement between them.
18. In D.Siva Shankar Reddy‘s case referred to supra, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition without expressing
anything on the merits of the pardon granted to Accused No.4.
19. In Jayalakshmi Jaitly‘s case referred to supra of the High Court of
Delhi, one of the Accused moved an application seeking anticipatory bail
before the Special Judge for CBI, the same was not opposed by the CBI and
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anticipatory bail was also granted. Thereafter, on an application filed by the
said Accused, his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C was also recorded.
Subsequently, CBI filed an application seeking pardon of the said Accused
and the same was also allowed. After long delay, one of the co-accused
challenged the impugned order of pardon. The High Court of Delhi had
categorically observed that the pardon proceeding is neither an enquiry nor a
trial in which an opportunity must be given to the other Accused to show to the
Court that the statement of the Accused seeking pardon is not true. Only
during the course of trial, the opportunity will be given to the Accused to show
to the Court that the approver‟s evidence at the trial is untrustworthy in view of
the contradictions or improvements made by him by allowing the accused to
cross-examine. It was further held that an Accused can be granted pardon on
the condition of his making a full and true disclosure of whole of the
circumstance within his knowledge relative to the offence. Holding so, the High
Court dismissed the petition.
20. The Composite High Court of A.P., in Konajeti Rajababu‘s case
referred to supra, while dismissing the revision petition which was filed by a
co-accused challenging the pardon granted to Accused No.3, clearly observed
that, ordinarily, it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular accused out of
several may be tendered pardon. It is because the State may not desire that
any accused be tendered pardon as it does not need approver’s testimony, or
it may not also like the tendering of pardon to a particular accused because he
may be the brain behind the crime or the worst offender. After all, the Court
15
shall not be oblivious of the fact that the power which it exercises is not on its
own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency. Therefore, the power shall
be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request. This does not,
however, preclude the accused from directly applying the Court. When the
accused directly applies to the Court, the Court must first refer the request of
the accused to the prosecuting agency and ask for a statement from the
prosecution on the request of the accused. If the prosecution thinks that the
tender of pardon will be in the interests of successful prosecution of the other
offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver’s testimony, it
would indubitably agree to the tender of pardon. The Court should, therefore,
embark upon such a procedure in the interests of justice.
21. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Fernandes‟ case
referred to supra, which is reiterated in Jasbir Singh‘s case referred to
supra, is that, although the power to tender pardon is vested in the Court, the
decision as to whether the evidence of an accomplice is necessary for
securing the conviction of the remaining accused lies exclusively within the
domain of the prosecution. The Court must not assume the role of a
prosecuting agency or independently determine the propriety of granting
pardon. Ordinarily, the initiative for tendering pardon must come from the
prosecution, and even where an accused directly seeks pardon, the Court
should first obtain the views of the prosecution. The Court’s role is confined to
satisfying itself that the statutory requirements are fulfilled and that the request
for pardon is made in the interest of an effective prosecution. These cases
16
support the proposition that the prosecution has the primary role in deciding
whether an Accused should be tendered pardon, those decisions are not
precedents for granting anticipatory bail. Consequently, they cannot be treated
as authorities conferring a right to anticipatory bail merely because the
accused claims to be a prospective approver. The entitlement of the Petitioner
to anticipatory bail must, therefore, be determined on the independent merits
of the present case.
22. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Pradip N.Sharma‘s case
referred to supra, while granting anticipatory bail to the Accused,
categorically held that, considering the nature of the allegations and the fact
that the matter is to be investigated primarily based on documentary evidence,
the Court is inclined to grant the relief of anticipatory bail to the appellant. The
prosecution had not demonstrated any necessity for the custodial
Interrogation of the Appellant / Accused beyond scrutiny of official records,
which can be done without placing him in detention. Additionally, the Appellant
had expressed his willingness to cooperate with the investigation, and no
material has been placed before the Court to suggest that he has evaded or
obstructed the investigation in any manner. Furthermore, it is well-settled that
anticipatory bail can be granted where custodial interrogation is not essential,
particularly in cases where the allegations hinge on official records and the
presence of the accused can be secured without pre-trial detention. The Court
also takes note of the fact that the FIR in question is part of a series of similar
allegations against the appellant, and in the absence of any concrete material
17
indicating a likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, the
grant of anticipatory bail is justified. Accordingly, while the appellant shall
cooperate with the investigation as and when required, he shall not be taken
into custody, subject to conditions imposed hereinafter to ensure his
participation in the inquiry process.
23. In Lalan Singh‘s case (supra), the petitioner challenged the order of
the Special Judge, CBI, Dhanbad rejecting his application under Section 306
Cr.P.C seeking grant of pardon as an approver. The Jharkhand High Court
found that the trial court had not exercised its discretion in a proper and
judicious manner despite the prosecution agency itself not opposing and
rather supporting the plea, and held that the request for pardon required a
conscious and fair consideration in terms of Section 306 CrPC and Section
306(5) CrPC. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the impugned order and
allowed the revision, granting pardon to the petitioner on the condition of full
and truthful disclosure of facts relating to the offence. This judgment pertains
to the grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. and does not lay down any
principle governing the grant of anticipatory bail.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Md. Asfak Alam‘s case referred to
supra, held that while considering bail or anticipatory bail, the Court must
balance personal liberty with the interests of justice, keeping in view the
nature and gravity of the offence, the possibility of the accused tampering with
evidence or influencing witnesses, the likelihood of absconding, and the need
for custodial interrogation. The Court further held that where the accused has
18
cooperated with the investigation and the charge-sheet has been filed, bail
should ordinarily be granted unless there are compelling reasons to deny such
relief, and a mechanical rejection of bail or insistence on surrender is
impermissible.
25. In Noor Taki‘s case referred to supra, the High Court of Rajasthan
had categorically held that, although Section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C. mandates that
an approver who is not already on bail shall remain in custody until the
conclusion of the trial, the inherent powers of the High Court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. are not curtailed by that provision. In exceptional cases, where
the continued detention of an approver becomes unreasonable, oppressive, or
violative of the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution, particularly due to prolonged delay in trial, the High Court may
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to enlarge the approver on bail or declare
such detention illegal. The Court held that this extraordinary power must be
exercised sparingly, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case, to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice.
26. The High Court of Madras in Munisamy‘s case referred to supra,
while granting bail to an approver, categorically held that, no doubt, under
Section 306(4)(b) of Cr.P.C (Section 343 of BNSS) the approver shall be
detained in custody until termination of the trial, unless he is already on bail.
But, that does not mean that he can be kept in detention without any limit on
the ground that some of the accused are absconding and the trial could not go
on. That would amount to grave injustice to a citizen and deprivation of life
19
and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
and thereby granted bail to an approver. In the similar circumstances, the
same view was expressed by the High Court of Madras in Subramanian’s
case (supra), while granting bail to an Accused, who was treated as an
approver.
27. The High Court of Jharkhand in Sudhanshu Ranjan‘s case referred to
supra, while granting bail to the Accused, who was in jail custody for more
than three years and who had been tendered pardon, has categorically
observed that, a person who has been made approver cannot be allowed to
be remained in jail custody indefinitely. Moreover, section 306(4)(b) Cr.P.C
seems to be directory and not mandatory. To keep the approver indefinitely in
jail is not the intention of the legislature.
28. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Tariq Ahmed Dar‘s case
(supra), had categorically held that, the law is no longer res integra that the
High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C in
appropriate case can release an approver on bail. In the present case, since
the Petitioner has not yet been granted pardon and has not acquired the
status of an approver, the principles laid down therein do not directly govern
the Petitioner’s claim for anticipatory bail and are of limited assistance.
29. It is well settled that the proceedings relating to grant of anticipatory bail
and the proceedings relating to tender of pardon operate in distinct statutory
fields governed by separate considerations. Anticipatory bail is granted on the
touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution, primarily to protect an individual
20
from unnecessary arrest, subject to the satisfaction of the Court that custodial
interrogation is not required and that the accused is not likely to abscond or
tamper with evidence. On the other hand, the power to tender pardon is
exercised under Section 306 of Cr.P.C. (Section 343 of BNSS) to secure the
evidence of an accomplice in aid of a fair trial, by obtaining a full and true
disclosure of the circumstances relating to the offence.
30. The grant of anticipatory bail does not, in any manner, preclude the
competent Court from considering an application seeking tender of pardon.
Even where anticipatory bail has been granted, it remains open to the trial
Court to examine whether the statutory requirements under Section 306 of the
Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 343 of the BNSS) are satisfied and whether
tender of pardon ought to be granted in the facts and circumstances of the
case. Therefore, the grant of anticipatory bail cannot be construed as an
impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court in dealing with an
application for pardon, in accordance with law.
31. Conversely, the mere grant of tender of pardon does not have the effect
of extinguishing or curtailing the constitutional right of an Accused to seek
liberty by filing an application for bail. The right to apply for bail is an integral
facet of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and continues to
subsist unless curtailed by a valid procedure established by law.
32. Thus, both the grant of anticipatory bail and the grant of tender of
pardon are independent judicial determinations serving different purposes.
One does not operate as a bar to the other. The judicial discretion exercised in
21
one proceeding cannot be treated as foreclosing the statutory jurisdiction of
the Court in the other. The issue relating to tender of pardon falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the competent Court depending on the stage of the
case and it is for the competent Court to independently consider whether the
statutory requirements for granting pardon are satisfied, based on the facts,
role of the accused, and overall interests of a fair trial. In the present case, the
Petitioner has filed an application seeking tender of pardon and no final
decision has been taken thereon. Therefore, this Court, while dealing with the
application for anticipatory bail, is not called upon to adjudicate upon the
merits or maintainability of the said application for pardon, as it is not the
subject matter of the present proceedings. Accordingly, this Court is of the
view that the question relating to grant of tender of pardon is wholly beyond
the scope of the present adjudication and shall be decided independently by
the trial Court in accordance with law, without being influenced by any
observations made herein.
33. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court finds
that the Petitioner has been arrayed as Accused No.3 in a serious economic
offence and specific allegations have been levelled against him in the police
report.
34. The Court cannot take the place of investigating agency. It is not the
duty of the Court to ensure the arrest of an individual in a petition filed for
anticipatory bail. It is not the decision of the Accused to become an approver
and ultimately it is the strategy of the investigating agency to choose a person
22
for the purpose of pardon. Taking the view expressed in Jayalakshmi Jaitly’s
case (supra) and Konajeti Rajababu‘s case (supra), this Court is of the
considered opinion that the mere pendency of proceedings for tender of
pardon cannot be a ground to deny the relief of anticipatory bail. Further,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence
of any material indicating that the Petitioner is likely to abscond or evade the
process of law, this Court finds that there is no flight risk involved. In such
circumstances, this Court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioner /
Accused No.3.
35. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed granting anticipatory bail to
the Petitioner / Accused No.3, on the following conditions:
(i) In the event of his arrest, the Petitioner/Accused No.3 shall be
enlarged on bail on execution of a personal bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh only), with two sureties for the like sum each to the
satisfaction of the arresting police officials;
(ii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall surrender his passport, if any,
before the trial Court and shall not leave India without prior permission of the
said Court.
(iii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall appear before the
Investigating Officer as and when required and shall cooperate with further
investigation, if any.
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(iv) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not directly or indirectly
tamper with evidence nor influence, intimidate, or induce any prosecution
witness.
(v) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not contact any of the
prosecution witnesses or co-accused, except during legal proceedings.
(vi) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall file his affidavit before the trial
Court disclosing all his movable and immovable properties, bank accounts,
demat accounts, business interests, and financial holdings, whether held
individually or jointly within a period of two weeks from the date of his release.
(vii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not make or publish or
disseminate any information, statement, or post whether in print, electronic or
social media concerning the present crime till conclusion of the trial.
(viii) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not alienate, encumber, or
create third-party interests in any property disclosed by him or identified by the
prosecution, without prior permission of the trial Court.
(ix) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall not operate or manage any
company, firm, or bank account alleged to have been used in connection with
the offence, except with prior intimation to the Investigating Agency.
(x) The Petitioner / Accused No.3 shall furnish his active mobile
number to the Investigating Officer and shall be available at all times and any
change shall be intimated forthwith.
In the event of violation of any of the above conditions, the prosecution
shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail.
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The trial Court is at liberty to decide the Petitioner‟s application for
tender of pardon independently on its own merits, in accordance with law,
without being influenced by any findings or observations made herein.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________________________
Dr.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
Date: 06.07.2026
Dinesh
Whether the order is :
Speaking No / Reasoned Yes
Reportable No / Non-Reportable Yes
25THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.12048 of 2025
DATE: 06.07.2026
Dinesh
