Allahabad High Court
Dinesh Kumar Verma vs State Of U.P. on 7 July, 2026
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:43819
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 189 of 2010
Dinesh Kumar Verma
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Arun Sinha, Huzoor Alam Alvi, R.N. Yadav
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt. Advocate
Court No. - 12
HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.
1. Heard Mr. Arun Sinha learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Ankur Singh learned counsel for appellant and learned AGA for the respondent-state.
2. The instant Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. has been filed against judgment and order dated 20th January, 2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C-3, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No. 187 of 2007, State v. Dinesh Kumar Verma and others arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1990 under Section 323, 504, 506, 307 I.P.C. and 25/27 Arms Act, Police Station Talkatora, District Lucknow convicting and sentencing the appellant as under:-
(i) under Section 323/34 I.P.C. to six months imprisonment
(ii) under Section 307/34 I.P.C. to five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/- and in default of fine, two month’s additional imprisonment
(ii) Both sentences shall run concurrently.
3. As per prosecution version, allegedly the appellant along with co-accused demanded a sum of Rs. 200/- from the informant on 7th August 1990 for purposes of purchase of liquor. It is alleged that on the same day at about 6.00 PM, the informant met one Anjani Kumar Srivastava and complained to him with regard to activities of the appellant and co-accused. Allegedly when the appellant along with co-accused reached the spot where the informant and said Anjani Kumar Srivastava was present, the said Mr. Srviastava accosted the appellants requiring reason for demand of such amount from the informant. It is alleged that a heated discussion took place resulting in an altercation between the parties, during the course of which the appellant opened fire upon Anjani Kumar Srivastava by a local firearm, resulting in one pellet injury on the right side of his back and below the neck with the second injury being a lacerated wound over the right eye brow.
4. It is also alleged that the co-accused Umesh also opened fire but missed. The said Umesh was acquitted while the appellant along with co-accused Pawan were convicted. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that trial court has erred in awarding conviction against the appellant under section 307/34 IPC particularly since prosecution has been unable to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. He has drawn attention to the deposition of the attending director V.N. Singh as PW5 to submit that injuries were proved by the said doctor on the basis of a carbon copy of injury report, the original injury report not being available before trial court. He has therefore placed reliance on Section 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act to submit that in such circumstances, secondary evidence could not have been taken into account by trial court unless and until cogent explanation was furnished by the prosecution for unavailability of the preliminary evidence.
5. Learned counsel has also drawn attention to the deposition of Narendra Singh examined as PW7 and was the second injured to submit that the said prosecution witness did not support prosecution version so far as appellant is concerned since he specifically asserted that injuries upon Anjani Kumar Srivastava were inflicted by co-accused Umesh and not by the appellant. It is submitted that since the said Narendra Singh was not declared a hostile witness, trial court should have taken into account his testimony particularly since it was totally contrary to testimony of the informant as PW1.
6. It is further submitted that even otherwise, it has been indicated in the testimony of the attending doctor that in case of firing beyond six paces, there would not be a case of blackening or tattooing of the body whereas the doctor has deposed that there was blackening and tattooing present on the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava.
7. He therefore submits that the aforesaid factor clearly indicates that firing took place within six paces but yet was only on the back of the injured and therefore ingredients of section 307 cannot be said to be made out. It is submitted that at best the provisions of section 324 IPC can be made out since there was neither knowledge nor intention that the result of fire arm injury would lead or may cause death of the injured. He has placed reliance on judgments rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh versus State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 2020 as well as judgment rendered by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dharmeshwar and another versus State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 216 of 2013.
8. He submits that it is also evident from testimony of the attending doctor that injury no.1 sustained by injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava was kept under observation with X-ray being recommended, which was not produced nor any supplementary injury report was prepared. The said aspect is relevant since the injury suffered, therefore, would not come within the scope of a grievous injury as defined under Section 320 IPC.
9. Learned AGA has opposed appeal with submission that trial court has rightly recorded a conviction under Section 307 IPC against appellant particularly in view of nature of injuries suffered by the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava. It is submitted that injuries clearly indicated not only on the back of the injured but also 20 centimeters below the neck, which can be considered to be a vital part of the body and therefore the intention to cause hurt grievous enough to cause death is clearly made out. He further submits that the aspect of secondary evidence would be irrelevant where explanation for non-production of primary evidence has been cogently explained as in the present case, particularly when the secondary evidence as well has been corroborated by the issuing authority, which in the present case was the doctor himself who was examined as PW-5.
10. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, it is evident that conviction has been recorded under various provisions including Section 307 IPC. Learned counsel for appellant at present is restricting his prayer to submit that Section 307 IPC not being made out, requires to be converted to Section 324 IPC with lesser sentence being imposed.
11. With regard to aforesaid aspect, it would be imperative to consider the ingredients of Section 307 IPC which are as follows:-
“307. Attempt to murder.?
Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.? When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.”
12. Thus for applicability of Section 307 IPC, it is imperative that the accused has done any act with such intention or knowledge that if he by that act causes death, he would be guilty of murder and would be sentenced to imprisonment. The second portion of Section 307 IPC pertains to the aspect where hurt is caused to any person by such act.
13. In the present case therefore it was necessary for the prosecution to have established that the act of the appellant was either with such intention or knowledge that such act would cause death.
14. With regard to aforesaid, injury sustained by Anjani Kumar Srivastava have been adverted to in the judgment as follows:-
“1-???? ???? ?????? ???? ?? ????? (???? ?? ???) 10 ????. 7 ????. ????? ??? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ????? ?? ????? 20 ???? ???? ??????? ?? ?? ?????? ? ????? ????? ??? ???? ?? ???? ?? ????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ?? ???? 0.2 ???? ?? ???? 0.5 ???? x 0.3 ???? ?? ?? ??? ???? ?? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ????
2-??? ??? ??? ?? ????x???? ???? ??? ?? ????? ?? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?? ????? ??? ??? ??? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ??? ???????? 86 ????????? ????? ? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??. 1???? ???? ?????? ?????? ??? ???-2 ?????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??-1 ?? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ??? ???-2 ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ???????? ??? ????? ???? ???? ????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ?? ??????? ??? ????? ?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ???-?-9/2 ?? ?? ???? ??????? ? ????????? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??????? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ????????-4 ?? ??? ??? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ????? ?? ?? ???????? -4 ??????? ??????? ???????? ?? ?????? ???? ??? ??????? ?????????? ?? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ????? 6 ????? ?????? ???? ?? ?? ?? ????? ???? ???? ?? ???? ?? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ???-2 ???? ????? ?? ?? ? ???? ?? ???? ??? ???????????? ??????? ????? ???? ?? ?? ? ?? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ??.1 ?? ???? ?? ?? ? ???? ??? ??? ????? ?? 6 ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?? ???? ???”
15. The aforesaid injuries have been proved by attending doctor V.N. Singh as PW5 and has stated that injury No.1 has been caused by discharge of firearm whereas injury No.2 has been caused by a blunt object and is simple in nature. It is relevant that the second injury has been caused above the right eye brow, which although is a vital part but has been certified as only skin deep and simple in nature.
16. It is the injury No.1 which has been indicated as having been caused due to discharge of firearm but relevantly is also on the back of the injured and 20 centimeters below the neck.
17. The deposition of doctor as P.W.5 also indicates the aspect that blackening and tattooing can be present over body in case the firearm is discharged within six paces. As per his deposition, blackening and tattooing are clearly present on the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava. The obvious conclusion of such a deposition is that firearm was discharged within six paces. The said aspect is quite relevant since in case there was any intention of the appellant to do an act which would cause death, he could very well have aimed for the head or other vital part of the body and not on the back of the injured. It is also evident that there is only a single firearm injury without any of the prosecution witnesses stating the second discharge of firearm. The aforesaid aspect would also be relevant since in case there was any intention to cause death, the close proximity of the accused with the injured would surely have lead to a second discharge of firearm.
18. The aforesaid discussion clearly indicates the aspect that the discharge of firearm at the instance of the appellant was only to cause hurt and not to cause death and therefore the imputation of Section 307 of IPC would not be made out.
19. Another startling aspect as evidenced in judgment itself is deposition of the second injured Narendra Singh as PW7 who in his testimony has indicated that the firearm injury sustained by injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava was in fact by the co-accused, Umesh. The said witness has not made any allegation with regard to firearm injury being sustained by Anjani Kumar Srivastava at the instance of appellant. Therefore, the testimony of Narendra Singh as PW7 is clearly contrary to the testimony of the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava who was produced as PW2. Despite such contradistinction, the PW7 Narendera Singh has not been declared hostile but the trial court has clearly ignored the testimony of PW7 while convicting the appellant. The aspect of applicability of Section 307 IPC viz-a-viz Section Section 324 IPC has been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Anuj Singh (supra) in the following manner:-
“20. It is a well-known fact that the term “hurt” simply means performing an act which leads to physical pain, injury or any disease to a person. At times, hurt may be caused voluntarily or it can by caused by using dangerous weapons or mean. A person will be liable to have caused hurt voluntarily through dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 IPC which reads as under:-
“324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means. Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
21. To establish an offence under Sec 324 IPC, the presence of following ingredients is a must which are as follows:-
1. Voluntary hurt caused to another person by the accused, and
2. Such hurt was caused:
a. By any instrument used for shooting, cutting or stabbing, or any other instrument likely to cause death, or
b. By fire or other heated instruments, or
C By poison or other corrosive substance, or
d. By any explosive substance, or
e. By a substance that is dangerous for the human body to swallow, inhale, or receive through blood, or
f. By an animal.
When a person commits an offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons and means under Section 324 of Indian Penal Code, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of three years, or with fine.
22. In the case at hand, it is evident from the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the two appellants have caused hurt on the body of the informant, PW-6 by using firearm on account of an altercation which took place between the appellants and the informant PW-6. It also stands corroborated from the evidence of the prosecution witness that there existed previous enmity between the parties due to a land dispute and the same can be perceived from their acts. Thus, the charge of Section 324 IPC stands established against the two appellants. Once the charge against the appellants under Section 324 IPC of voluntarily causing injuries by firearm, which is a dangerous weapon stands established, they cannot escape the punishment for using arms prescribed by Section 27 of the Arms Act.”
20. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present facts circumstances, it is thus established that the term ‘hurt’ means to performing an act which deals to physical pain, injury or any disease to a person and may be caused voluntarily by use of dangerous weapons or means.
21. From the discussions made herein above, it is thus evident that the intention of appellant was to cause hurt and not death of the injured even if the deposition of P.W. 7 Narendra Singh is to be ignored.
22. It is also a relevant factor as evident from deposition of the attending doctor as PW5 that injuries sustained by the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava was proved on the basis of carbon copy of injury report and not the original, which he stated was available in the hospital. No reason has been indicated by the doctor for not producing original injury report and therefore in such circumstances, the carbon copy of injury report can clearly stated to be a secondary evidence as defined under section 63 of the Evidence Act 1872. The aspect of proving injuries by secondary and not by primary evidence therefore is contrary to the provisions of Section 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act particularly since the conditions indicated in section 65 of the Evidence Act have not been followed nor adverted to by trial court.
23. In view of observations made herein above, it being evident that the act of appellant in alleged injury of the injured Anjani Kumar Srivastava comes within the scope only of causing hurt without any intention to cause death, the conviction of appellant under Section 307 IPC being unsustainable is set aside.
24. However also in view of discussion made herein above, it being evident from the deposition of Anjani Kumar Srivastava himself and since learned counsel for appellant is restricting his submissions for conversion of conviction, the same is found to come within the scope of Section 324 IPC and therefore conviction recorded under Section 307 IPC is converted to one Section 324 IPC. Consequently, the sentence is also reduced to a period of 3 years.
25. It has also been submitted that despite plea of first offender having been taken before the trial court, same was rejected without indicating any cogent reason. The said fact is evident from the impugned judgment itself.
26. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submits that appellant has not been convicted previously for any offence and at the very outset submits that he is not arguing this case on merit and also is not challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction while confining his submission in the appeal only with respect to the order of sentence. It is also submitted that despite recording submission of learned counsel for appellant that he was entitled to be granted benefit under The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 there is no discussion with regard to same.
27. It is submitted that a perusal of impugned judgment will reveal that despite plea having been raised for grant of benefit of probation under the provisions of the First Offenders Act, Act 1958 since the appellant did not have any previous criminal history, the same has been declined without indicating any reason.28. In view of aforesaid submission of learned counsel for accused-appellant, the appeal is dismissed so far as it relates to impugned judgment and order of conviction. The judgment and order of conviction passed by the court below dated 20th January, 2010 is hereby upheld.
29. Learned counsel for accused-appellant submits that in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances including the fact that appellant has not been convicted previously for any offence, trial court ought to have invoked the provisions of The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1958’). It is further submitted that the trial court neither invoked provisions of the Act, 1958 nor the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C., while sentencing accused-appellant. Impugned judgment also does not indicate any special reason for not giving benefit of provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or the provisions of Act, 1958.
30. Section 361 of the Code is required to be applied with or without beneficial provisions, i.e., Section 360 of the Code or the provisions of the Act, 1958. If the Court chooses not to apply either of these provisions, it is required to give special reasons for not applying beneficial provision in case the accused offender otherwise, is eligible for provisions of Section 360 of the Code or Section 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958.
31. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the accused-appellant has statutory right for claiming benefit of beneficial legislation, i.e., the provisions of the Act, 1958 and the court was under a duty to consider the applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958 as mandated under Section 361 Cr.P.C. If the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or provisions of the Act, 1958 were not applied, then the court should have recorded reasons for same. It is, thus, submitted to that extent, impugned judgment and order suffers from serious illegality being violative of provisions of section 361 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it cannot be sustained.
32. Learned A.G.A. has opposed criminal appeal however he admits that there is nothing adverse to the aspect that appellant does not have previous criminal history. It is also submitted that in terms of provisions under Sections 360/361 CrPC, this Court may consider the grant of benefit. It is however admitted that plea with regard to benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 has been raised but has not been addressed.
33. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, since only the aspect of probation for good conduct is being adjudicated upon, Sections 360 and 361 CrPC pertain to order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition and provides that where a person not under the age of 21 years is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when a person under the age of 21 years is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, the Court recording conviction is required to consider various aspects including age, character or antecedents of the offender and circumstances in which offence was committed and should release the offender on probation on good conduct and instead of sentencing him to any punishment, direct that he may be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence for said period to keep the peace and good behaviour. Provision has also been made for exercise of such powers by Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session.
34. Section 361 of the said Code indicates special reasons to be recorded in certain cases to the effect that in case an accused is entitled to benefit of Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or the Youthful Offender under the Children Act, 1960 or any other law pertaining to training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not been granted such benefit, it shall record special reasons in its judgment for not having done so.
35. The Central Legislation on the subject being Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 particularly Sections 3 and 4 thereof indicate power of court to release certain offenders after admonition and power to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.
36. The State Legislation applicable in the State of U.P. is the Uttar Pradesh First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938 in which also Sections 3 and 4 pertain to powers of Court to release certain offenders after admonition and on probation of good conduct respectively.
37. The aspect of applicability of Sections 360 and 361 CrPC was dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Uttar Pradesh v. Misri Lal and others reported in 1982 CrLJ 1420. Relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:-
“26. …The application of Section 360 in Utter Pradesh was taken away by an Ordinance of the year 1975. The Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Criminal P.C. (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 1976. This Act received the assent of the President on 30-4-1975 and published in the Utter Pradesh Extraordinary Gazette dated 1-5-1976. Section 12 of this Act repealed the Ordinance and laid down that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the provisions of this Act as if this Act had come into force on November, 28, 1975. The learned trial judge decided the case on 2-2-1976. Section 10 of the Amending Act No. 16 of 1976 amended S.484 of the Code and inserted the following clause (e) after clause (d) :-
“(e) …the United Provinces First Offenders’ Probation Act 1938……shall continue in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh …. and accordingly the provisions of Section 360 of this Code shall not apply to that State and the provisions of Section 361 shall apply with the substitution or reference to the Central Acts named therein by references to the corresponding Act in force in that State”.
Section 361 of the CrPC lays down that where in any case the Court could have dealt with an accused person under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, or a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960 or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgement the special reasons for not having done so.
It follows from this provision read with clause (e) of S.484 mentioned above, the Court is required to record special reasons for not extending the benefit of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938.”
38. Thus, provisions of U.P. Probation of First Offenders’ Act shall be followed, in the geographical area where that has been made applicable and not Section 360 of the CrPC. In this way enforcement of Probation Act in some particular area, thus excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 360 of the Code in that particular area, however, it will be the bounden duty of the Court to consider as to why not to proceed to grant the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, as provided under Section 361 of the CrPC.
39. Coming to the point of desirability of extending the benefit of Probation Act to the accused-appellant, in Sitaram Paswan and another Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3534, Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as under:-
“For exercising the power which is discretionary, the Court has to consider circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the Court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. Thebenefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word “may” clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the Court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the Court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the Courts while finding the person guilty and if the Court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the Court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”
40. In Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P and others, reported in AIR 2017 SC 660, Hon’ble Supreme Court opined as under:-
“20. …In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444. Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority, opined thus:-
“The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case; including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.”
41. Upon applicability of aforesaid provisions and judgments in the present case, it is evident that the incident is said to have taken place in the year 1990 with maximum sentence of five years with fine having been imposed. More than 35 years since have passed.
42. So far as the conviction part is concerned, this Court does not find any illegality, perversity or infirmity in the order passed by the courts below, but keeping in view the discussion made above, the sentence inflicted on the accused-appellant requires modification.
43. The appeal is partly allowed with following modifications:-
43.1. The conviction of the accused-appellant is altered from under Section 307 IPC to Section 324 IPC with sentence being modified as reduction to three years. The fine is upheld. The sentence of appellant-accused is modified to the tune that he is provided benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of Offenders Act and is released on probation on the condition that he will keep peace and good conduct for one year from today and shall file two sureties to the tune of Rs.20,000/- each along with his personal bond before the court below and also an undertaking to the effect that he shall maintain peace and good behavior during the period of one year from today. In case of breach of any of the conditions mentioned above, the appellant will be subjected to undergo the sentence as awarded by the courts below. The bonds aforesaid will be filed by the appellant within one month from today before the District Probation Officer, Lucknow under intimation to the concerned court.
44. A certified copy of the order be also sent to the court concerned and District Probation Officer, Lucknow for necessary compliance, forthwith.
(Manish Mathur,J.)
July 7, 2026
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