Gujarat High Court
Dilipbhai Prabhudas Patel vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax on 9 March, 2026
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/2403/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/03/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2403 of 2026
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2428 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA sd/-
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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DILIPBHAI PRABHUDAS PATEL
Versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
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Appearance:
MR TUSHAR HEMANI SENIOR COUNSEL with MS VAIBHAVI K
PARIKH(3238) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR.VARUN K.PATEL(3802) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI
Date : 09/03/2026
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Tushar Hemani appearing with
Learned Advocate Ms. Vaibhavi K. Parikh for the petitioners and
learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Varun K. Patel for the
respondent.
2. Having regard to the controversy involved, with the consent of the
learned advocates for the respective parties, the matters are taken up
for final hearing.
3. RULE. Learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr.Varun K Patel waives
service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondent. The affidavit-
in-reply of the respondent tendered by learned Senior Standing
Counsel Mr. Patel is taken on record.
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4. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioners challenges the Notice dated 26.03.2025 issued under
Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”)
seeking to re-open income tax assessment of the petitioners for the
Assessment Year 2014-15 (for short “the assessment year under
consideration”) by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Central Circle 2(2), Ahmedabad (for short “the respondent”).
4.1 For the sake of relevance, the facts are recorded from Special Civil
Application No.2403 of 2026, which shall be treated as a lead
matter.
4.2 The petitioner is an individual who filed his return of income for the
assessment year 2014-15 on 31.07.2014 declaring total income at
Rs. 6,89,070/-. The petitioner is part of PSY Group which is
engaged in the business of real estate. The said PSY group and its
associated groups of Gandhinagar including the petitioner were
subjected to search action under Section 132 of the Act on
08.02.2024. The Respondent issued a notice dated 26.03.2025 under
Section 148 of the Act for the year under consideration. It is stated
therein that a search was initiated under Section 132 of the Act on
08.02.2024 in the case of the Petitioner or in the case of the person
in respect of which the Petitioner is assessable under the Act. It was
further stated that the Respondent is satisfied, with the approval of
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that the books of
accounts or documents, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or
section 132A of the Act in the case of PSY and its associated Groups
pertains or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relate to
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the Petitioner or the person in respect of which, the Petitioner is
assessable under the Act and hence, the notice dated 26.03.2025 is
issued under Section 148 of the Act after obtaining prior approval of
Directorate General of Income Tax (Investigation), Ahmedabad. The
Petitioner has challenged the said notice under Section 148 of the
Act principally on the ground of limitation.
5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Tushar P. Hemani for the petitioners
submitted that the respondent has acted illegally and without
jurisdiction while issuing Notice under Section 148 of the Act as the
same is barred by limitation. It was further contended that the
impugned notice is time-barred under the statutory scheme
governing search assessment. It was submitted that in the present
case, search action in question was carried out on 08.02.2024 i.e.
during the Financial Year 2023-24 and A.Y.2024-25. Since the
search under Section 132 of the Act was initiated on or after 1 st
April, 2021 but before 1st September, 2024, the provisions of
Sections 147 to 151 of the Act as they stood immediately before the
commencement of Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 shall apply, as
contemplated under Section 152(3) of the Act. Hence, relying upon
Section 149 of the Act, it is contended that the Notice under Section
148 of the Act can be issued up to six years from the end of the
relevant assessment year. Further, relying upon the Section 153A of
the Act, it is submitted that Notice under Section 153A of the Act
can be issued for a period of “ten assessment years” immediately
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is carried out and for the “relevant assessment years”, subject
to fulfillment of certain conditions.
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5.1 It is further submitted that the “relevant assessment year” means
assessment year preceding the assessment year relevant to the
previous year in which search is carried out or requisition is made,
which falls beyond six assessment years but not later than ten
assessment years from the “end of the assessment year relevant to
the previous year in which search is conducted”.
5.2 Reference is also made to the provisions of Section 149 of the Act,
more particularly the proviso to Section 149 read with explanation –
1 to Section 153A of the Act. It is submitted that so far as the
limitation is concerned, for reopening of the assessment, the same is
pari materia to Section 153C of the Act.
5.3 It is submitted that in the instant case, the search action was carried
out in the case of third party on 08.02.2024 i.e. during the Financial
Year 2023-24, and hence relevant assessment year to the previous
year in which the search was undertaken under Section 132 of the
Act is Assessment Year 2024-25. It is further submitted that the
Notice under Section 148 of the Act for the Assessment Year 2014-
15 would be time-barred, as the period of ten years would end at the
Assessment Year 2015-16, since the Assessment Year 2024-25 will
become the first assessment year as per the provisions of Section
153A of the Act. The table showing the calculation was placed
before this Court and the same is reproduced as under:
Number Assessment Year
1st year Assessment Year 2024-25
2nd year Assessment Year 2023-24
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3rd year Assessment Year 2022-23
4th year Assessment Year 2021-22
5th year Assessment Year 2020-21
6th year Assessment Year 2019-20
7th year Assessment Year 2018-19
8th year Assessment Year 2017-18
9th year Assessment Year 2016-17
10th year Assessment Year 2015-16
5.4 In support of his submissions, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Hemani
has placed reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the
case of Dinesh Jindal vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2024] 164 taxmann.com 746/469 ITR 32 (Delhi)/Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 12091 of 2023 decided on 27.05.2024. Reliance is also
placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central-1) vs. Ojjus
Medicare (P.) Ltd. [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160/465 ITR 101
(Delhi). Finally, he has also placed reliance on the judgment of
Madras High Court, Bench at Madurai, passed in A.R. Safiullah vs.
ACIT [Writ Petition (MD) No. 4327 of 2021, dated 24-3-2021].
5.5 Thus, it is urged that the impugned notice issued under Section 148
of the Act for the assessment year 2014-15 may be quashed and set
aside.
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6. Per contra, learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Varun Patel for the
respondent Department opposed the petition and contended that the
impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act is valid and within the
limitation. It is further contended that the proviso to Section 149 of
the Act, which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, will apply
only to those categories of cases in which the Assessing Officer, at
the relevant time, was unable to issue any Show Cause Notice and
had not taken action beyond the time limit, which is not the case of
the present writ petition.
6.1 While referring to Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act, it is
contended that the “relevant assessment year” which finds place in
the provisions of Section 153A(b) of the Act cannot be construed by
adopting two different methodologies – one wherein, for calculating
the six assessment years, the period would start from the previous
year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made, and
for the very same assessee, if it is found that the income of Rs.50
lakhs has escaped, for calculating ten years, the first assessment year
has to be ignored. It is submitted that the expression “from the end
of the assessment year” as mentioned in Explanation (1) to Section
153A of the Act would mean that it would commence from 1 st April,
and if we go backwards, in the present case, the reopening of the
assessment for the year 2014-15 would get encompassed within a
period of ten years.
6.2 While placing reliance on the notes of the legislature relating to the
provisions of Section 153A and Explanation (1) to Section 153A of
the Act, it is contended that the word “end” is missing, and hence it
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is submitted that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the
word “end” from the statute. It is further submitted that if
appropriate calculation is made, the calculation of ten years of
assessment years under Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act
would include the previous year as per the provisions of Section
153A(1)(b) of the Act. It is submitted that considering the
memorandum and explanatory note of the Finance Act, 2017, the
intention of the legislature, even for the purpose of calculating ten
years, is to exclude the search year and it is always six plus four
years, and therefore “end” is to be construed as 1 st April for going
backward.
6.3 An attempt is also made to distinguish the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (supra), by submitting
that two methods cannot be adopted for computation of the six-year
block period as mentioned in Sections 153A and 153C of the Act
and for calculation of the ten-year block period by excluding the
previous year from computation of ten years. Thus, it is urged that
this Court may take a different view, disagreeing with the judgments
of the Delhi High Court as well as the Kerala High Court, and it is
urged that the action of the respondent may be upheld for reopening
the Assessment Year 2014-15.
6.4 Thus, it is urged that the action of the respondent in issuing the
impugned notice for the A.Y. 2014-15 under Section 148 of the Act
may be upheld and the present petition may be dismissed.
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ANALYSIS AND OPINION:
7. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties at
length. We have also perused the case laws cited, considered the
provisions threadbare and have also perused the material on record.
8. The sole issue that arises for consideration in the present petition
is that –
(i) Whether the notice issued by the respondent for the Assessment
Year 2014-15 is barred by limitation;
(ii) Dealing with this issue, uncontroverted facts are that the search took
place in the case of the petitioner on 08.02.2024 which indisputably
falls in the Financial Year 2023-24 and Assessment Year 2024-25.
Therefore, the date of search would be taken into consideration for
the purpose of initiation of proceedings under Section 153A of the
Act. Keeping that legal principle in mind, ten years that could be
covered subject to fulfilling other conditions emanating from the
statute, would be as under:
Number Assessment Year
1st year Assessment Year 2024-25
2nd year Assessment Year 2023-24
3rd year Assessment Year 2022-23
4th year Assessment Year 2021-22
5th year Assessment Year 2020-21
6th year Assessment Year 2019-20
7th year Assessment Year 2018-19
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8th year Assessment Year 2017-18
9th year Assessment Year 2016-17
10th year Assessment Year 2015-16
ï‚· The only difference between the calculation as per the revenue and
the petitioner is the inclusion or exclusion of the search year. Revenue
contends that while calculating the period of ten years, search year is to
be excluded and the calculation starts from assessment year
immediately preceding the previous year relevant to the assessment year
in which search is conducted whereas the petitioner’s contention is that
the calculation of the period of ten years would include the search year.
9. The short controversy turns upon whether, while computing the
ten-year block, the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
search is conducted (hereinafter “the search assessment year”) is to be
included in the reckoning, unlike the computation of six assessment years
which expressly excludes it.
10. With reference to the relevant assessment year, it is necessary to
refer to the provisions of Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act which reads as
under :
“Section 153A(1)(b) : (The Assessing Officer shall) assess or reassess
the total income of six assessment years immediately preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is
conducted or requisition is made and for the relevant assessment year or
years.”
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10.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section is “six
assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to
the previous year in which such search is conducted” and “for the
relevant assessment year or years.” is phrased independently, disjointed
from earlier phrase.
11. In juxtaposition, the Fourth Proviso permits assessment beyond six
years subject to specified conditions and refers to “relevant assessment
year” as stated in Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act defines
“relevant assessment year” as:
“For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression “relevant
assessment year” shall mean an assessment year preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted or requisition is made which falls beyond six assessment
years but not later than ten assessment years from the end of the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted or requisition is made.”
11.1 The key expression that flows from reading of the section is “not
later than ten assessment years from the end of the assessment year
relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted”.
12. Thus, the computational framework of Section 153A of the Act,
including Explanation 1, applies pari materia to the proceedings under
Section 153C of the Act. A plain reading of Section 153A of the Act
reveals that the Parliament has consciously adopted two different
phraseologies:
Six-Year Block Ten-Year Block
"not later than ten assessment
"six assessment years
years from the end of the
immediately preceding"
assessment year"
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12.1 This linguistic distinction is deliberate and must be given full
effect. Under Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act, the anchor point is “the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted”. Therefore, six years must be “immediately preceding” that
assessment year. The phrase “immediately preceding” necessarily
excludes the search assessment year itself. In contrast thereto,
Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act introduces a materially
different formulation: “not later than ten assessment years from the end of
the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted”. This computation mechanism does not use the phrase
“immediately preceding” but instead, requires reckoning from the end of
the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search. Thus, the
assessment year relevant to the previous year of search becomes the
reference year and the ten-year period is counted from the end of that
assessment year. This necessarily includes the search assessment year
within the ten-year framework and resultantly, the search year becomes
the first year in the reckoning of the ten-year block.
12.2 If Parliament intended identical computation for both six and ten
years, it would have used identical language. Instead, it has consciously
used different phraseology, for six years “immediately preceding” and for
ten years “from the end of the assessment year”. Legally, it is well settled
that while interpreting plain language of a Statute, the Court must give
meaning to every word used by the Legislature. To compute ten years by
excluding the search year (as is done for six years) would render the
phrase “from the end of the assessment year” otiose and merge two
distinct statutory schemes into one that would violate settled principles of
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statutory interpretation. The scheme of Section 153A reflects calibrated
expansion in as much as ordinary search assessment would be computed
as six years immediately preceding the search year whereas exceptional
extended jurisdiction up to ten years is not a mere arithmetic extension of
the six-year model; it is governed by a separately structured
computational rule. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has consciously
created:
ï‚· A backward-looking “preceding” model (six years), and
ï‚· A reckoning “from the end of the assessment year” model (ten
years).
12.3 Thus, it can be concluded that Section 153A of the Act prescribes
two distinct and independent computational regimes. The six assessment
years are those “immediately preceding” the assessment year relevant to
the previous year of search, thereby excluding the search year whereas
the ten assessment years under Explanation 1 of Section 153A of the Act
are to be computed “from the end of the assessment year” relevant to the
previous year of search. The statutory language necessarily results in
inclusion of the search assessment year within the ten-year reckoning.
Any interpretation that applies the six-year exclusion model, if made
applicable to the ten-year block, would defeat the legislative scheme and
render material words redundant. Accordingly, while computing the
extended ten-year period under Explanation 1 to Section 153A read with
Section 153C of the Act, the assessment year relevant to the previous
year of search is to be included in the reckoning.
12.4 Even otherwise, this issue is no more res integra as the same is
covered by the judgement of this Court in the case of Jayantibhai
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Karamshibhai Maniya vs. Income-tax Officer, [2026] 182 taxmann.com
493 (Guj.). This Court has taken a view, after considering the earlier
judgement in the case of Bhavin Zinzuwadia (supra), that while
calculating the period of ten years under Section 153C of the Act,
keeping in mind the language of Explanation 1 to Section 153A of the
Act, the search year or the year in which seized material is received by
the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the petitioner is required to be
taken into consideration. Relevant extract of the said judgement can be
usefully referred to as under:
“9.2 The provisions of Sections 153A / 153C of the Act find place in the
proviso to Section 149 of the Act and, hence, the limitation as provided in
Sections 153A / 153C of the Act gets triggered upon the initiation of
assessment proceedings emanating from a search under Sections 132 / 132A
of the Act. We may, at this stage, mention that the Delhi High Court as well
as the Madras High Court has already considered the implications of
Explanation (1) to Section 153A of the Act to the limitation and the
expression “relevant assessment year” used therein in Explanation (1) to
Section 153A of the Act. The Delhi High Court, in the case of Ojjus
Medicare (P.) Ltd. (supra), after considering an array of judgments of other
High Courts as well as of the Supreme Court and upon a threadbare
consideration and analysis of the statutory provisions of Sections 153A, 148
and 149 of the Act, has held thus:
” 88 Section 153A replicates the basis on which the six AYs’ are to
be identified and computed with the solitary distinction being that in
the case of the searched person, the six AYs’ are liable to be
computed from the AY pertaining to the FY in which the search was
conducted. The starting point for the purpose of identifying the six
AYs’ in the case of section 153A would thus turn upon the year of
search as opposed to the handover of material which is spoken of in
the First Proviso to section 153C. If one were to therefore assume
that a search took place on a person between 01 April 2021 to 31
March 2022, the pertinent AY would become AY 2022-23 and the
corresponding six AYs’ would by as follows:
Computation of the six-year block period as No of
provided under section 153C of the Act years
AY 2021-22 1
AY 2020-21 2
AY 2019-20 3
AY 2018-19 4
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AY 2017-18 5
AY 2016-17 6
89. That takes us then to the issue of identifying the “relevant
assessment year” for the purposes of computing the ten year block.
Explanation 1 to section 153A specifies the manner in which the
entire ten AY period is to be computed. While the computation of six
AYs follows the position as enunciated and identified above,
Explanation I prescribes that the ten AYs’ would have to be
computed from the end of the AY relevant to the FY in which the
search was conducted or requisition made The ten AY period
consequently is to be reckoned from the end of the AY pertaining to
the previous year in which the search was conducted as distinct
from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the six
relevant Ays.
90. Viewed in that light, and while keeping the period of 01 April
2021 to 31 March 2022 as the constant, the relevant AY would be
AY 2022-23. The ten AYs would have to be computed from 31
March 2023with the said date indubitably constituting the end of
the AY relevant to the previous year of search. Viewed in light of
the above, the block period of 10 AYs would be as follows.-
Computation of the six-year block period as No of
provided under section 153C read with Section years
153Aof the Act
AY 2022-23 1
AY 2021-22 2
AY 2020-21 3
AY 2019-20 4
AY 2018-19 5
AY 2017-18 6
AY 2016-17 7
AY 2015-14 8
AY 2014-15 9
AY 2013-14 1091 Tested on the aforesaid precepts, it would be manifest that AY
2022-23 would form the first year of the block of ten AYs’
terminating in AY 2013-14. We, in this regard also bear in
consideration the following instructive passages as appearing in
the decision handed down by a learned Judge of the Madras High
Court in A. R. Safiullah. We deem it appropriate to extract the
following paragraphs from that decision:-
“9 Explanation-I is clear as to the manner of computation of the
ten assessment years. It clearly and firmly fixes the starting point.
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It is the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted or requisition is made. There cannot be
any doubt that since search was made in this case on 10.04.2018,
the assessment year is 2019-20. The end of the assessment year
2019-20 is 31.03.2020. The computation of ten years has to run
backwards from the said date i.e. 31.03.2020. The first year will of
course be the search assessment year itself. In that event, the ten
assessment years will be as follows:
1st Year 2019-2020
2nd Year 2018-2019
3rd Year 2017-2018
4th Year 2016-2017
5th Year 2015-2016
6th Year 2014-2015
7th Year 2013-2014
8th Year 2012-2013
9th Year 2011-2012
10th Year 2010-2011
The case on hand pertains to AY 2009-10. It is obviously beyond
the ten year outer ceiling limit prescribed by the statute. The
terminal point is the tenth year calculated from the end of the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is
conducted. The long arm of the law can go up to this terminal point
and not one day beyond. When the statute is clear and admits of no
ambiguity, it has to be strictly construed and there is no scope for
looking to the explanatory notes appended to statute or circular
issued by the department.
10. In the case on hand, the statute has prescribed one mode of
computing the six years and another mode for computing the ten
years. Section 153A(1)(b) states that the assessing officer shall
assess or reassess the total income of six years immediately
preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which search is conducted. Applying this yardstick, the six years
would go up to 2013-14. The search assessment year, namely,
2019-20 has to be excluded. This is because, the statute talks of
the six years preceding the search assessment year. But, while
computing the ten assessment years, the starting point has to be
the end of the search assessment year. In other words, search
assessment year has to be including in the latter case. It is not for
me to fathom the wisdom of the parliament. I cannot assume that
the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 intended to
bring in four more years over and above the six years already
provided within the scope of the provision. When the law has
prescribed a particular length, it is not for the court to stretch it.
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Plasticity is the new mantra in neuroscience, thanks to the
teachings of Norman Doidge. It implies that contrary to settled
wisdom, even brain structure can be changed. But not so when it
comes to a provision in a taxing statute that is free of ambiguity
Such a provision cannot be elastically construed.
11. One other contention urged by the standing counsel has to
be dealt with. It is pointed out that the petitioner has invoked the
writ jurisdiction at the notice stage. Since the petitioner has
demonstrated that the subject assessment year lies beyond the
ambit of the provision, the respondent has no jurisdiction to issue
the impugned notice Once lack of jurisdiction has been
established, the maintainability of the writ petition cannot be in
doubt.”
In our considered opinion, the decision in A.R Safiullah correctly
expounds the legal position and the interpretation liable to be
accorded to the identification of the ten AYs which are spoken of
in sections153A and 153C.”
9.3 Thus, it is precisely held hereinabove that the statute prescribes
different modes of computation for six years and ten years. We reiterate
that the provisions of Section 153A(1)(b) of the Act stipulate that the
Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the total income of six years
immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which the search is conducted. However, the ten assessment year period,
consequently, is to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year
pertaining to the previous year in which the search was conducted, as
distinct from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the six
relevant assessment years. Thus, the contention with regard to the
computation of six years as well as ten years under the provisions of
Section 153A of the Act has already been gone into by the Delhi High Court
as well as the Madras High Court, and we have no convincing reason to
take a divergent view from the view expressed hereinabove. Applying the
aforesaid computation to the facts of the present case, taking the date of the
search as 09.05.2024 during the Financial Year 2024-25, the Assessment
Year 2025-26 will become the first assessment year and, in the same
manner, the Assessment Year 2016-17 will become the tenth assessment
year. Thus, the year under consideration, namely, Assessment Year 201516,
for which the impugned notice has been issued under Section 148 of the
Act, would fall beyond the period of ten years prescribed under the statute
as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021,
and hence, on this count, the impugned notice can be said to be barred by
limitation. ”
13. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned Notices issued
under Section 148 of the Act dated 26.03.2025 for A.Y. 2014-15Page 16 of 17
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NEUTRAL CITATIONC/SCA/2403/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/03/2026
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are barred by limitation as the same falls beyond the permissible
period of ten years. We, therefore, quash and set aside the Notices
dated 26.03.2025 issued under Section 148 of the Act for
Assessment Year 2014-15 on the ground of limitation.
Accordingly, the present writ petitions are allowed. RULE is
made absolute. No order as to cost.
sd/-
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
sd/-
(PRANAV TRIVEDI,J)
Radhika/11-12Page 17 of 17
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