Jharkhand High Court
Dilip Kumar Ghosh vs Union Of India Through The Directorate … on 22 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:12131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.1861 of 2025
------
Dilip Kumar Ghosh, aged about 56 years, son of Late Nitya Gopal
Ghosh, resident of P-162, C.I.R. Road, Scheme-VII, M. Kankurgachi,
P.O. & P.S.-Phoolbaghan, District-Kolkata, Kolkata-700054 (West
Bengal). …. …. Petitioner
Versus
Union of India through the Directorate of Enforcement, Government
of India, Plot No.1502, Airport Road, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District-
Ranchi-834002, Jharkhand.
…. …. Opp. Party
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
——
For the Petitioner : Mr. S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Advocate
(Through V.C.)
Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Abhishek Agrawal, Advocate
Ms. Pragunee Kashyap, Advocate
Mrs. Shweta Suman, Advocate
Mr. Md. Imran Beig, Advocate
For the E.D. : Mr. Amit Kr. Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
——
12/Dated: 22.04.2026
Prayer
1. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by
the petitioner under Section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 and prayer
has been made for quashing and setting aside the entire
criminal proceedings including the Complaint in ECIR Case
No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated
21.10.2022] for the offences punishable under Section 3 read
with Section 70 and punishable under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and all other
consequential orders including order taking cognizance dated
19.06.2023 (Anneuxre-3) whereby cognizance of the alleged
offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the PML
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Act has been taken by the PMLA, Court, Ranchi; order dated
12.03.2024 (Annexure-4) whereby discharge application filed
vide Misc. Cr. Application No.197/2024 stood rejected by the
PMLA, Court Ranchi and order framing charges dated 8.7.2024
(Annexure-5) passed by the Judge, PMLA, Ranchi; and the
case is presently pending in the Court of Special Judge, PMLA,
Ranchi.
Prosecution case/Facts
2. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged by
Bariatu P.S. Case for offences under Sections 420, 467 and
471, Indian Penal Code (IPC) on the complaint of one Mr. Dilip
Sharma, Tax Collector posted at Ranchi Municipal Corporation,
Ranchi. It has been alleged in the FIR that the holding
nos.0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A5 pertaining to
Ward No.21, Lotus Garden Complex, Block-B of the accused
Pradip Bagchi were verified by him and in the process of
verification it was found that the accused Pradeep Bagchi was
not residing in the said Apartment. It has been further alleged
that the documents submitted by the accused/Pradeep Bagchi
for obtaining holding numbers upon verification were found to
be forged, i.e. Aadhar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession
Letter.
3. The Opposite Party recorded an ECIR No.18/2022 dated
21.10.2022 against the suspected person on the basis of the
aforesaid FIR No.141/2022 dated 4.6.2022 registered by
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Bariatu P.S. Case for offences under Sections 420, 467 and
471, Indian Penal Code (IPC). As per the ECIR No.18/2022
recorded on 22.10.2022 by Opposite Party, following allegation
has been made which are as follows: –
(a) New holding number 0210004194000A1 in Ward No.21,
and new Ward No.19 was obtained on the basis of the self-
assessment declaration form. The self-assessment declaration
form bearing No.2101934R was submitted by accused
Pradeep Bagchi, son of Late Prafull Bagchi on the basis of
which Ranchi Municipal Corporation issued holding
No.0210004194000A1, under Memo No. SAM/021/0167/21/22
dated 13.9.2021.
(b) Self-assessment declaration form was submitted by the
accused Pradeep Bagchi for property having the description as
Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, Ward No.21/19, having an
area of the plot measuring 455 decimals at Ranchi.
(c) For obtaining the holding number of the above said
property, forged Aadhar Number, Electricity bill and the
possession letter of the Flat at 101, Block-B, Lotus Garden
Complex, Bariatu Road, Morabadi, Ranchi, was submitted by
the accused Pradeep Bagchi, which was later found fake.
(d) The said property at Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza,
Ward No.21/19, having an area of 455 decimals at Ranchi had
been sold by Pradeep Bagchi (Aadhaar No.511337882315,
PAN AMBPB13173) to M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd.
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(PAN AABCJ3705F), represented by its director Dilip Kumar
Ghosh (the petitioner herein) and it is registered at the office of
the SRO Ranchi, bearing deed No.6888, Vol. No.919, Page
No.525-576, Year 2021.
(e) Sale deed of the said property registered on 1.10.2021, it
was seen that the declared government value/guideline Value
of the said property was Rs.20,75,84,200/- whereas the said
property had been sold for an amount of Rs.7,00,00,000/-
which was highly undervalued as compared to the declared
government rate.
(f) In the description of the above said landed property
measuring 4.55 acres, Mouza Morabadi, P.S Bariatu, District
Ranchi, Ward No.21, the holding number of the above said
property had been mentioned 0210004194000A1, which had
been obtained fraudulently.
(g) Pradeep Bagchi had allegedly created forged documents
and had dishonestly cheated the government authorities for the
above-said property admeasuring 4.55 acres, which are
criminal activities relating to scheduled offences under the
PMLA. He had obtained holding No.0210004194000A1 in
order to frivolously show the ownership of the property
measuring 4.55 acres at Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza,
Ward No.21/19, and to further transfer the ownership of the
property to M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., represented
by its director Dilip Kumar Ghosh (present petitioner). The
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declared government value/guideline Value of the said property
was Rs.20,75,84,200/- whereas the said property had been
sold for an amount of Rs.7,00,00,000/- which was highly
undervalued as compared to the declared government rate
thus, the said property has been sold to the M/s Jagatbandhu
Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., represented by its director Dilip Kumar
Ghosh (present petitioner) by creating forged documents in the
connivance of the accused persons including the present
petitioner and the said alleged act comes under the purview of
Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 punishable under Section 4 of
the Act 2002.
4. The petitioner was arrested on 7.6.2023 and on 12.6.2023, the
Enforcement Directorate had filed a Prosecution Complaint
under Section 45 read with Section 44 PMLA, 2002 against 13
accused persons for commission of alleged offence of money-
laundering as defined under Section 3 and punishable under
Section 4 read with Section 70 of the PMLA Act, 2002.
5. On the basis of the said complaint and material available on
record, the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence
under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 read with
Section 70 of the PMLA Act, 2002.
6. Thereafter, the petitioner has preferred bail application being
B.A. No. 7233 of 2023 before the co-ordinate Bench of this
Court and vide order dated 28.11.2023, the aforesaid
application has been allowed and petitioner was consequently
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released on the bail.
7. Thereafter, the discharge application being Misc. Cr.
Application No.197/2024 has been filed before the special
Court but vide order dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure-4), the said
discharge application stood rejected by the PMLA, Court
Ranchi and consequent thereto, vide order dated 08.07.2024
(Annexure-5), the order framing charges has been passed by
the Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi against the petitioner.
8. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid orders, the present petition
has been filed by the petitioner on 02.05.2025 under Section
528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. and quashing of the aforesaid orders,
i.e., order taking cognizance dated 19.06.2023 (Anneuxre-3),
order dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure-4) whereby discharge
application filed by the petitioner stood rejected, order framing
charges dated 8.7.2024 (Annexure-5) including the entire
criminal proceeding has been sought for.
9. It requires to refer herein that vide order dated 28.01.2026,
status report of the trial of the ECIR Case No. 01 of 2023 was
called for by this Court and consequently, the status report of
the trial has been received and the same has been kept on
record. It is evident from the aforesaid report that the trial in the
said ECIR case is in progress and till 19.01.2026, out of 31
witnesses, 6 witnesses have already been examined.
10. It needs to refer herein that the present matter was argued on
merit by the learned senior counsel representing the petitioner
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but the argument having not been concluded on earlier
occasion, therefore, the present matter was posed for hearing
on 11.02.2026.
11. It is evident from the order dated 11.02.2026, the learned
counsel for ED has sought two weeks’ time to file additional
affidavit by way of supplementary counter affidavit and
accordingly, time as sought for, has been granted by this Court,
for ready reference, the order dated 11.02.2026 is being quoted
as under:
“1. Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel for the Opp.
Party-E.D. has sought for two weeks’ time to file
additional affidavit by way of supplementary counter
affidavit.
2. Such submission has been made in presence of
Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, who has appeared through virtual mode
assisted by Mrs. Amrita Sinha, Advocate.
3. Time, as has been sought for, is allowed.
4. Accordingly, list this matter on 18.03.2026.
5. If any affidavit will be filed, the copy thereof will be
supplied well in advance to the learned counsel for
the petitioner so that response of the aforesaid
affidavit, if any, be filed on or before the next date of
hearing.”
12. Accordingly, in compliance of order dated 11.02.2026, the
respondent-ED has filed supplementary counter affidavit
wherein, the issue of maintainability of the present petition filed
under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C., has been raised.
13. Thereafter, on 08.04.2026 learned senior counsel for the
petitioner appeared through virtual mode and sought time for
taking instruction from the petitioner and accordingly, time was
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granted and the present case was directed to be listed on
10.04.2026, for ready reference, the order dated 08.04.2026 is
being quoted as under:
“10/Dated: 08.04.2026
1. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner through virtual mode has
sought for time to have an instruction from the
litigant, petitioner and for the aforesaid purpose, has
prayed to list this case day after tomorrow, i.e., on
10.04.2026.
2. Considering the aforesaid, let this matter be listed
on 10.04.2026 at 4:15 p.m.”
14. Accordingly, the case was heard on 10.04.2026 and the
learned counsel for the parties have argued on the issue of
maintainability of the present petition and accordingly, the
instant matter was fixed ‘for orders’ on 22.04.2026 on the
issue of maintainability of the present petition which has been
filed under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C wherein quashing of
the entire criminal proceeding including the orders taking
cognizance, order rejecting discharge and consequent order
framing charge, have been sought for.
15. It requires to refer herein that the supplementary rejoinder has
been filed by the petitioner in response to the supplementary
affidavit filed by the ED by taking ground in support of the
maintainability of the present petition.
Submission of the learned counsel for the E.D:
16. Learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-E.D. has filed
one supplementary counter affidavit raising the issue of
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maintainability by taking the following grounds: –
i. It is the well settled principle of law that a petitioner
cannot challenge multiple, distinct judicial orders passed
at different stages of a criminal trial each arising from a
separate exercise of judicial mind through a single,
rolled-up Criminal Miscellaneous Petition.
ii. This multiplicity of prayers in a single application is a
procedural irregularity that renders that the petition is not
maintainable in its current form.
iii. The petitioner has deliberately by-passed the
statutory remedies available under the law. Both the order
rejecting the discharge application dated 12.03.2024 and
the order framing charges dated 08.07.2024 are revisable
orders under the law. The petitioner could have challenged
these specific orders by way of criminal revision within the
statutory period of 90 days. However, the petitioner chose
not to avail these remedies at the appropriate time and
only in order to escape the limitation period the present
petition has been filed under section 528 BNSS/482
iv. Further, the instant petition has been filed on
02.05.2025, almost a year after the discharge application
was rejected and presently trial of the said ECIR case is in
progress and substantial witnesses have already been
examined.
v. The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used as a
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substitute for a statutory revision that has bene barred by
limitation and the petitioner is attempting to circumvent the
law.
vi. The jurisdiction of this Court to quash criminal
proceedings is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised
sparingly and not when the trial has already gathered
momentum. The petitioner, having participated in the trial
and cross-examined the witnesses, is now estopped from
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to derail a
trial which is effectively in progress and further the
petitioner’s discharge application has already been
dismissed on merits by a speaking order, as such filing of
the instant petition is a manifest abuse of process of law.
vii. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the present petition may not
be entertained, otherwise, it will be the sheer misuse of
inherent power conferred to this Court under Section 528
of the BNSS or 482 Cr.P.C.
Submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
17. Rejoinder to the supplementary counter affidavit has also been
filed on behalf of the petitioner. The ground in rebuttal has also
been taken on behalf of the petitioner.
18. Per contra, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the present petition in the present
form of Section 482 CrPC pari materia to Section 528 of the
B.N.S.S., is well maintainable.
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19. It has been submitted that the nomenclature has got no issue
in entertaining the petition, rather, the substantial justice is to
be made, as such, in any form, if any grievance has been
raised before this Court, the same is required to be decided
irrespective of nomenclature of petition.
20. It has been contended that for the first time, objection as to the
maintainability was raised by the opposite party in course of
hearing dated 10.12.2025 (being the 4th date in the matter
before the Hon’ble Court). Thus, at this advance stage of the
proceeding/hearing, raising an objection as to the
maintainability of the present Cr.M.P. is not fit to be sustained.
21. It has further been contended that there is no statutory bar in
maintaining the present Cr.M.P. challenging different orders
passed at different stage of the criminal proceeding, including
the entire criminal proceeding and the present petition is
absolutely maintainable and fit to be sustained under the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 528, Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita/482 Cr.P.C.
22. It has further been submitted that even if the petitioner has
participated in a criminal trial, it does not debar the petitioner
from invoking High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 528,
BNSS to quash the criminal proceeding. The inherent power is
to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of law or process
of court or to secure the ends of justice.
23. It has further been contended that Section 528 starts with non
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obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the
Act, this clause makes it very clear that section 397 and 401 of
Cr.P.C. (Section 438 and 442 of the BNSS Act) could not deter
this Hon’ble Court from exercising its inherent power in the
circumstances as stated above, therefore, the present petition
is maintainable.
24. Learned senior counsel, however, has relied upon the following
judgments, i.e.,
(i) Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited & Ors. Vrs. State
of Maharashtra & Another, (2009) 2 SCC 370;
(ii) Prabhu Chawla Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2016)
16 SCC 30;
(iii) Amit Mittal & Anr. Vrs. Punjab Government, passed
in Criminal Appeal No.326 of 2025 [arising out of SLP
(Criminal) No.6729 of 2019]
25. Learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that he is
ready to convert the instant petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
pari materia to Section 438 of BNSS, if the liberty would be
granted by this Court to convert it.
Response of the learned counsel for Opp. Party-E.D.
26. Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-
E.D., on the issue of applicability of the judgment upon which
reliance has been placed, has submitted that all the judgments
are in different context on facts and has not dealt with the
issue, as to whether, Section 482 Cr.P.C. pari materia to
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Section 528 of BNSS, can be invoked by giving go-by to the
revisional jurisdiction as conferred to this Court only in order to
misuse the inherent power conferred to the High Court in a
situation where every stages of the proceeding was known to
the petitioner, even then, the conventional forum has not been
approached and belatedly, this petition has been filed,
therefore, the judgments as relied upon by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable in the facts of the
instant case.
27. It has been submitted that so far as the submission made on
behalf of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the
leave may be granted to convert this petition, the same will also
not be proper, reason being that, if it will be allowed to be
converted, then, what happen to the period of limitation in
absence of any condonation delay application.
28. It has been submitted that the matter would have been
different, if the present petition would have been filed within the
period of 90 days, then, there would not have been difficulty in
allowing such leave to convert this petition under revisional
jurisdiction and in such circumstances, the prayer would also
been confined restricting the revision to one prayer as per the
High Court Rules but that is not the situation herein, rather, no
delay condonation application is available on record.
29. Hence, the prayer of conversion of the present petition filed
under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., may not be allowed.
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Analysis
30. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties on the
issue of maintainability. Since, the affidavit for maintainability of
the present petition under Section 528 of the BNSS has been
filed and as such, this Court has heard the issue of
maintainability first and depending upon its outcome, is to hear
the matter on merit.
31. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the
B.N.S.S., pari materia to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
32. This Court, before proceeding, needs to refer herein the
provision as contained under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., pari
materia to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which is being quoted
hereinbelow: –
“528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. –
Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to given effect to any order
under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
33. It requires to refer herein that the Section 528 BNSS/482
C.P.C. merely safeguards all existing inherent powers
possessed by a High Court, necessary, among other purposes,
to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers of the High
Court, preserved by section 482 Cr.P.C., are to be exercised in
making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order
under the Code/BNSS, or to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
34. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the High Court
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has been conferred with inherent powers to make such orders
as may be necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.
35. Before adverting into facts of the instant case, it will be
profitable to discuss herein the ambit and scope of inherent
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS.
36. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
2008 SC 527, the Supreme Court held that section 482 of Cr.
P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only
saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure
can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts,
therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions
of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions
and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine
which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
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express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
itsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it
gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising
powers under the section, the Court does not function as a
Court of Appeal or Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly.
37. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
Courts exist.
38. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if
any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an
abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise
of the power, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice.
39. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
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(corresponding section 528 BNSS) are the exception and not
the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent
powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
But the expressions “abuse of process of law” or “to secure the
ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High
Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of
justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including
procedural law and not otherwise. Reference in this regard may
be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
40. It is settled proposition of law that to invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (corresponding section
528 BNSS) the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the
material produced by the accused is such that would lead to
the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound,
reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is
such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in
the charges levelled against the accused; and the material
produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the
veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled
by the prosecution/complainant. Reference in this regard may
be taken by the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
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in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor
[(2013) 3 SCC 330] which reads as under:
“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the
prosecution against an accused at the stage of
issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even
at the stage of framing of charges. These are all
stages before the commencement of the actual trial.
The same parameters would naturally be available
for later stages as well. The power vested in the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages
referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching
consequences inasmuch as it would negate the
prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the
prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a
determination must always be rendered with caution,
care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court
has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by
the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion
that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable,
and indubitable facts; the material produced is such
as would rule out and displace the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the
accused; and the material produced is such as would
clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the
allegations contained in the accusations levelled by
the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to
rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled
by the prosecution/complainant, without the
necessity of recording any evidence. For this the
material relied upon by the defence should not have
been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably18
2026:JHHC:12131refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the accused
should be such as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of
the accusations as false. In such a situation, the
judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade
it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to
quash such criminal proceedings, for that would
prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure
the ends of justice.”
41. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC
568] the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
and Article 226 of the Constitution of India were highlighted
and the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that:
“29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to
face the trial despite being in a position to produce
material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality,
the width of the powers of the High Court under Section
482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is
unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High
Court can make such orders as may be necessary to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid
down in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”
42. In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home [(2019) 11 SCC 706], referring to the
provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the Hon’ble Apex Court
held as follows:
“16. There is nothing in the words of this section which
restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent
the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only19
2026:JHHC:12131to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the
High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with
the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2
SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v.
State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 338 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]. Indeed, it would be a
travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person
can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has
advanced and the allegations have materialised into a
charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the
abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the
FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after
investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to
prevent abuse of process of power of any court.”
43. Thus, it is settled position in exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to
the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The
saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and
criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public
purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame
prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the
structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the
High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.
44. As can be gathered from the above, Section 482 Cr.P.C./528
BNSS recognizes the inherent powers of the High Court to
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quash initiation of prosecution against the accused to pass
such orders as may be considered necessary to give effect to
any order under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is a
statutory power vested in the High Court to quash such
criminal proceedings that would dislodge the charges levelled
against the accused and based on the material produced, lead
to a firm opinion that the assertions contained in the charges
levelled by the prosecution deserve to be overruled.
45. While exercising the powers vested in the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS, whether at the stage of
issuing process or at the stage of committal or even at the
stage of framing of charges, which are all stages that are prior
to commencement of the actual trial, the test to be applied is
that the Court must be fully satisfied that the material produced
by the accused would lead to a conclusion that their defence is
based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts. The
material relied on by the accused should also be such that
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss the
accusations levelled against them as false.
46. The interpretation of word “inherent power” by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the judicial pronouncement which clarifies that
the High Court is to exercise the power, in the ends of justice,
so there may not be any mis-use of judicial proceeding and to
exercise the power to avoid the miscarriage of justice to face
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the litigant concerned, the unnecessary litigation to restrict the
abuse of process of law.
47. At the same time, the Court must be careful to see that its
decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court
of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and
hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether
factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their
true perspective without sufficient material.
48. While exercising power under section 482 of the Cr PC, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In
exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any
proceedings if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise defeat the ends of justice when no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact.
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49. This Court is not averse what has been submitted by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner regarding the
conferment of inherent power upon the High Court as also the
reference of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases referred hereinabove.
50. The law is well settled as rendered in the said judgments. It is
also well settled that the parties may not be relegated to other
forum, rather, to meet the ends of justice if the application filed
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable, then, it needs
to be converted into revision so as to decide the issue on
merit.
51. At this juncture, it requires to refer herein the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court as stipulated in Section 397
Cr.P.C/438 BNSS. For ready reference, Section 438 BNSS is
being quoted herein which reads as under:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision.-(1) the High Court or any sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order,
recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when
calling, for such record, direct that the execution of
any sentence or order be suspended, and if the
accused is in confinement that he be released on his
own bond or bail bond pending the examination of
the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or
Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate23
2026:JHHC:12131jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the
Sessions Judge for the purpose of this sub-section of
section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been
made by any person either to the High Court or to the
Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of them.”
52. The object of the provisions of revision is to set right a patent
defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-
founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinize the orders which upon the face of them bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. Revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions
under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance
with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no
evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive
classes but merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits. Another well accepted norm is
that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One
of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be exercised
against an interim or interlocutory order, reference in this
regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex
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Court in the case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander,
(2012) 9 SCC 460.
53. Though, Section 397 CrPC does not specifically use the
expression “prevent abuse of process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice”, the jurisdiction u/s
397 CrPC is a very limited one. The legality, propriety or
correctness of an order passed by a court is the very
foundation of exercise of jurisdiction u/s 397 CrPC but
ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction
can be exercised where there is palpable error, noncompliance
with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous
or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily.
54. It is settled position of law that Inherent power of the High
Court can be exercised when there is no remedy provided in
the CrPC for redressal of the grievance. It is well settled that
inherent power of the High Court can ordinarily be exercised
when there is no express provision in the Code under which
order impugned can be challenged, reference in this regard be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Mohit Vs. State of UP, AIR 2013 SC 2248 (Para
23). Meaning thereby, if convention or alternate forum like
revisional jurisdiction has not been exhausted then the
invoking the jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr. P.C
is not suitable, particularly when the learned trial court after
appreciating the evidence has already applied its mind and
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consequent thereto discharge application has been dismissed
and charges has already been framed which is the case
herein.
55. Further, it is also settled position of law that the remedy of
revision to Sessions Judge u/s 399 CrPC does not bar a
person from invoking the power of the High Court u/s 482
CrPC but the High Court should not act as a second revisional
court under the garb of exercising inherent powers u/s 482
CrPC. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ganesh
Narayan Hedge vs. S. Bargarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41.
56. The learned counsel for the petitioner has put his reliance on
the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited & Ors. Vrs. State of
Maharashtra & Another (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court has categorically held that at the inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC cannot be dismissed merely
because an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397
CrPC exists.
57. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex in the case of Prabhu Chawla Vrs. State of
Rajasthan & Anr., (supra) wherein it has been observed that
the inherent powers of the High Court are not curtailed by the
availability of revision under Section 397.
58. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed his
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reliance on the ratio rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Amit Mittal & Anr. v. Punjab Government, (supra)
wherein it has been held that the High Court erred in
dismissing a petition under Section 482 CrPC merely on the
ground that revision under Section 397 CrPC was available.
59. Thus, there is no dispute about the settled position of law that
only because revision petition u/s 397 CrPC is maintainable,
an application u/s 482 CrPC is not barred but generally
inherent power of the High Court can be exercised when there
is no remedy provided in the CrPC for redressal of the
grievance. Section 482 CrPC empowers the High Court to
exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of
court and to quash the proceeding instituted on the complaint
but such power could be exercised only in cases where the
complaint does not disclose any offence or is vexatious or
oppressive.
60. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
basing upon the aforesaid observation made in the said
judgments, has also made prayer before this Court that he
may be allowed to convert this petition said to be filed under its
revisional jurisdiction.
61. There would not have been any difficulty in granting such
leave but the riders as available in the present case are of two
folds, i.e.,
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(i) That altogether four prayers have been made in the
instant petition as referred hereinabove. If the present
petition would be allowed to be converted, then, what
would happen to all four prayers and the petitioner is to
restrict to one prayer, for which, the learned senior counsel
has not agreed to.
The obvious reason of not agreeing is that after
taking cognizance, the discharge application has been
rejected, charge has been framed and now the trial has
already been commenced wherein substantial number of
witnesses have already been examined and therefore, the
prayer for quashing of the entire proceedings have also
been made.
As such, at the midst of trial, all the prayers which
have been made in the instant petition, has become inter-
related.
(ii) The second reason is that under the provision of
Section 397 Cr.P.C. pari materia to Section 438 of the
B.N.S.S., the statutory period of limitation as per the
statutory requirement, the revision is to be filed within the
period of 90 days.
62. The admitted position herein is that the present petition has
been filed after 90 days period, meaning thereby, the present
petition has not been filed within the period of limitation and if
the petition would have been filed within the period of
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limitation, there would not have been difficulty in granting leave
for its conversion to that of revision on the principle that the
litigant has approached to the Court of law within time but
before the wrong forum but that is not the case herein, rather,
the present petition has been filed after delay of 90 days and
as such, there cannot be any order of reversion of the present
petition to that of revision.
63. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove and after going
through the settled position of law, this Court is now re-
adverting to the facts of the instant case.
64. The Petitioner, by way of the instant application, has sought a
composite and omnibus relief. The prayers are as follows:
(i) Quashing of the entire criminal proceedings,
(ii) Quashing of the order taking cognizance dated 19.06.2023,
(iii) Quashing of the order rejecting discharge dated 12.03.2024, and
(iv) Quashing of the order framing charges dated 08.07.2024.
65. Admittedly, each of these impugned orders arise from a
distinct judicial exercise of mind and constitutes a separate
cause of action.
66. It is the well-settled principle of law that multiple, distinct
judicial orders passed at different stages of a criminal trial
cannot be challenged together in a single, rolled-up Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition. The rejection of discharge and the
subsequent framing of charges are substantive judicial
milestones. These cannot be brushed aside under a general
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prayer for “quashing of entire proceedings.” Each order
requires an independent challenge through appropriate
proceedings.
67. Further, both the order rejecting the discharge application
dated 12.03.2024 and the order framing charges dated
08.07.2024 are revisable orders within the contemplation of
the Code/BNSS. The Petitioner had the efficacious and
conventional remedy of filing a Criminal Revision against these
specific orders within the statutory period of ninety days. The
Petitioner, however, chose not to avail the said remedies at the
appropriate time. Instead, the present petition has been
instituted belatedly on 02.05.2025, almost a year after the
rejection of the discharge application. Such conduct
demonstrates that the instant petition is a clear afterthought.
The inherent jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court cannot be
invoked as a substitute for a statutory revision that has already
been barred by limitation. The extraordinary jurisdiction under
Section 528 BNSS, 2023, is not intended to resurrect
challenges, which the Petitioner has effectively waived by his
own inaction. By seeking to file a quashing petition at this
extremely belated stage, when the trial has already progressed
and witnesses have been examined, the Petitioner is
attempting to circumvent the law and reopen issues that stand
concluded. Such an attempt is impermissible and amounts to
an abuse of the process of Court.
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68. This Court is conscious of the settled position of law that the
mere availability of an alternative forum does not, by itself, bar
the invocation of jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS/482
Cr.P.C. However, in the present case, the conduct of the
Petitioner assumes significance. The Petitioner, having
actively participated in the trial and having cross-examined
witnesses, has now approached this Court seeking the
aforesaid relief. Such conduct is indicative of an attempt to
circumvent the conventional forum and the limitation period
prescribed for revision. The petition thus appears designed to
protract and linger the judicial process rather than to seek
bona fide redress.
69. This Court is mindful that the jurisdiction to quash criminal
proceedings is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised
sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances and herein,
the trial has already gathered momentum and petitioner has
actively participated in the trial and if at this stage, the said
jurisdiction will be invoked, then, it will amount to giving
premium to the petitioner to abuse the process of law.
70. It is a matter of record that as on the date of filing of the instant
petition, i.e., 02.05.2025, the Learned Special Court has
already commenced the recording of evidence and two
prosecution witnesses had been examined and now
substantial witnesses have already been examined.
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71. It is pertinent to reiterate herein that the discharge application
of the petitioner has already been dismissed and consequent
thereto, charges have already been framed in July, 2024 itself
and after lapse of one year, the instant petition has been
preferred, therefore, in such circumstances, the invocation of
inherent jurisdiction is impermissible. The petition, being a
belated attempt to by-pass statutory remedies and further
multiple, distinct judicial orders passed at different stages of a
criminal trial cannot be challenged together in a single,
rolled-up Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and further, once the
discharge application has been dismissed and consequent
thereto, the charges have been framed in the month of July,
2024 and the aforesaid orders have not been challenged
before the higher forum in conventional revisional jurisdiction
and the Petitioner has pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried, then in such situation, the legally appropriate remedy
available to the petitioner is to face the trial and attempt to
prove his innocence on the basis of evidence, therefore, the
filing of the present petition at such a belated stage, after the
trial has advanced and substantive judicial orders have been
passed, amounts to a circumvent the process of law.
72. It is settled position of law that the extraordinary jurisdiction of
this Court under section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. cannot be
permitted to be used as a device to abuse the process of law.
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73. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is the considered view of
this Court that the instant petition is not fit to be maintainable.
74. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the petitioner, being
conscious with all proceedings right from the date of
cognizance, the filing of application for discharge and the
framing of charge and even on commencement of trial and
even in the trial, he has already cross-examined the said
witness, for examination/cross-examination of the witnesses,
then, at this juncture, will it be proper for the petitioner to grant
leave to convert this petition to that of revision.
75. This Court, is of the view that the statutory remedy is to have
the recourse to the sufferers/parties who are to face the rigour
of trial on institution of criminal case and as such, it is the
bounden duty of such litigant to approach the Court of law for
redressal of his/her grievance for either quashing the order
taking cognizance or the rejection of discharge or even the
order by which the charge has been framed but the petitioner
has chosen not to avail the said statutory remedy at each and
every appropriate stages and now after commencement of
trial, i.e., at the stage of examination of witnesses, the present
petition has been filed.
76. The inherent power does not mean that the other remedy as
provided under the procedural law is to be given go-by or
discarded, rather, all the statutory remedies available under
the procedural law have been mandated for specific purposes
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and not to mis-use by not availing the statutory remedy, which
was to be availed at the appropriate stage.
77. This Court, therefore, is of the view that allowing the present
petition will not be just and proper. Further, even no order can
be passed granting leave to convert this petition by converting
it into the criminal revision application due to the expiry of the
period of limitation.
78. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reasoning, is of the view
that the present petition is not maintainable as also it is not the
case where the leave is to be granted to convert the instant
petition to that of criminal revision application.
79. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed.
80. Pending interlocutory application(s), also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Dated:22.04.2026
Rohit/-A.F.R.
Uploaded on 24.04.2026
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