Himachal Pradesh High Court
Devinder Kumar & Ors vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Anr on 25 April, 2026
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
2026:HHC:13536
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,
SHIMLA
.
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 along with CWP Nos.3623,
3738, 3968, 4004, 4018, 4019, 4045, 4123, 4132, 4212,
4214, 4325, 4374, 4439, 4444, 4485, 4758, 4959, 4960,
4961, 4962, 4964, 5188, 5189, 5192, 5375, 5488, 5489,
5496, 5570, 5632, 5633, 5634, 5635, 5636, 5769, 5814,
5815, 5821, 5822, 5823, 5827, 5829, 5832, 5834, 5836,
5837, 5838, 5839, 5840, 5841, 5845, 5846, 5847, 5848,
of
5854, 5855, 5883, 6127, 6129, 6152, 6153, 6155, 6157,
6164, 6322, 6324, 6326, 6328, 6330, 6332, 6336, 6491,
6494, 6495, 6499, 6518, 6549, 6551, 6555, 6577, 6600,
6716, 6738, 6784, 6786, 6787, 6789, 6791, 6792, 6793,
6794, 6797, 6830, 6836, 6837, 6911, 6912, 6913, 6914,
rt
6917, 6976, 7022, 7029, 7032, 7112, 7225, 7227, 7231,
7234, 7236, 7238, 7240, 7244, 7245, 7246, 7247, 7248,
7249, 7250, 7251, 7252, 7253, 7254, 7255, 7256, 7257,
7258, 7259, 7260, 7261, 7300, 7468, 7470, 7471, 7478,
7480, 7503, 7504, 7505, 7508, 7509, 7510, 7511, 7512,
7532, 7543, 7550, 7552, 7553, 7574, 7618, 7686, 8066,
8188, 8252, 8337, 8338, 8339, 8379, 8386, 8388, 8727,
8761, 8786, 8831, 8838, 8840, 8855, 8876, 8878, 8952,
9007, 9029, 9030, 9052, 9077, 9178, 9256, 9312, 9348,
9472, 9666, 9676, 9677, 9678, 9681, 9682, 9683, 9689,
9690, 9691, 9699, 9716, 9746, 9748, 9758, 9776, 9780,
9840, 9841, 9842, 9843, 9844, 9899, 9944, 10073, 10074,
10122, 10143, 10163, 10165, 10168, 10172, 10231,
10300, 10364, 10365, 10453, 10486, 10514, 10528,
10559, 10699, 10757, 10759, 10775, 10776, 10820,
10981, 11009, 11129, 11162, 11163, 11283, 13, 11325,
11350, 11352, 11353, 11355, 11369, 11381, 11653, 11678,
11679, 11681, 11682, 11747, 11766, 11823, 12086,
12095, 12211, 12220, 12455, 12588, 12590, 12594,
12638, 12674, 12678, 12679, 12687, 12713, 12715,
12758, 12759, 12760, 12761, 12766, 12767, 12791,
12792, 12793, 12794, 12795, 12814, 12815, 12870,
12872, 12883, 12910, 12912, 12913, 12941, 12942,
12943, 12948, 12968, 12998, 12999, 13009, 13043,
13075, 13076, 13116, 13154, 13224, 13226, 13247,
13278, 3284, 13285, 13286, 13287, 13288, 13289,
13290, 13291, 13292, 13293, 13294, 13295, 13317,
13343, 13460, 13572, 13677, 13685, 13729, 13734,
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
13804, 13822, 13835, 13846, 13892, 13953, 13957,
14139, 14140, 14222, 14336, 14373, 14380, 14393,
.
14414, 14416, 14418, 14487, 14554, 14673, 14741,
14742, 14745, 14753, 14767, 14799, 14800, 14802,
14935, 14942, 14968, 14977, 14979, 14981, 15005,
15048, 15088, 15089, 15102, 15119, 15126, 15209,
15232, 15256, 15257, 15373, 15409, 15410, 15427,
15527, 15528, 15756, 15903, 15919, 16303, 16359,
16360, 16362, 16508, 16519, 16528, 16533, 16615,
16648, 16693, 16745, 16885, 16972, 17069, 17087,
of
17139, 17172, 17264, 17311, 17407, 17909, 17980,
18028, 18032, 18202, 18360, 18424, 18426, 18492,
18607, 18689, 18690, 18744, 18745, 18748, 18919,
rt19151, 19200, 19349, 19357, 19387, 19494, 19523,
19721, 19741, 19742, 19806, 19807, 19808, 19809,
19955, 20022, 20310, 20312, 20543, 20969, 21076
of 2025, CWP No.10184 of 2023, CWP Nos.103 &
104 of 2026, EX.PT No.165 & 248 of 2024, EX.PT
No.176 of 2023, EX.PT No.29 of 2025, LPA No.364
of 2024, COPC/183/2025 and CMP No.5397 of 2025
in COPC No. 866 of 2024
Reserved on : 05.01.2026
Date of Decision : 25.4.2026
1. CWP No. 3361 of 2025
Devinder Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. ...Respondents.
2. CWP No.3623 of 2025
Radhe Shyam & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
3. CWP No.3738 of 2025
Harsh Deepika Datta & Ors. ...Petitioners.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. ...Respondents.
4. CWP No.3968 of 2025
Amit Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...
Respondents.
5.
rt
CWP No.4004 of 2025
Sanya Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
6. CWP No.4018 of 2025
Vivek Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
7. CWP No.4019 of 2025
Dr. Ranjit Singh Thakur & others. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
8. CWP No.4045 of 2025
Shivani Sood. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
9. CWP No.4123 of 2025
Lekh Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
10. CWP No.4132 of 2025
Madan Lal. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
11. CWP No.4212 of 2025
Ranjit Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
12. CWP No.4214 of 2025
Ritu Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
13. CWP No.4325 of 2025
Rita Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
14. CWP No.4374 of 2025
Vijay Rana. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
15. CWP No.4439 of 2025
Roshan Lal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
16. CWP No.4444 of 2025
Kusum Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
17. CWP No.4485 of 2025
Joginder Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
18. CWP No.4758 of 2025
Rakesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
19. CWP No.4959 of 2025
Joginder Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
20. CWP No.4960 of 2025
Usha Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
21. CWP No.4961 of 2025
Raj Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
22. CWP No.4962 of 2025
Anil Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
23. CWP No.4964 of 2025
Laxman Ram. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
24. CWP No.5188 of 2025
Ajmer Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
25. CWP No.5189 of 2025
Yashvinder Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
26. CWP No.5192 of 2025
.
Vijay Kaushal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
27. CWP No.5375 of 2025
Dinesh Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
28. CWP No.5488 of 2025
rt
Roop Rani. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
29. CWP No.5489 of 2025
Rajinder Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
30. CWP No.5496 of 2025
Jagar Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
31. CWP No.5570 of 2025
Satwant Kaur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
32. CWP No.5632 of 2025
Rosy Gupta. ...Petitioner.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
33. CWP No.5633 of 2025
Poonam Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
34. CWP No.5634 of 2025
of
Deepak Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
35.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
CWP No.5635 of 2025
...Respondents.
Surender Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
36. CWP No.5636 of 2025
Chater Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
37. CWP No.5769 of 2025
Anjana Kumari Dhiman. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
38. CWP No.5814 of 2025
Sushil Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
39. CWP No.5815 of 2025
Reena Banyal. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
40. CWP No.5821 of 2025
Deep Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
41. CWP No.5822 of 2025
rt
Vikas Chakor & Ors.
Versus
...Petitioners.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
42. CWP No.5823 of 2025
Vijai Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
43. CWP No.5827 of 2025
Kamlesh Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
44. CWP No.5829 of 2025
Ranjan Gupta & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
45. CWP No.5832 of 2025
Sanjay Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
46. CWP No.5834 of 2025
Uma Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
47. CWP No.5836 of 2025
of
Sita Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
48.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
CWP No.5837 of 2025
...Respondents.
Radha Chaudhary & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
49. CWP No.5838 of 2025
Panchi Ram Parmar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
50. CWP No.5839 of 2025
Ramesh Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
51. CWP No.5840 of 2025
Sangeeta Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
52. CWP No.5841 of 2025
Dev Sawroop Bansal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
53. CWP No.5845 of 2025
Dev Sawroop & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
54. CWP No.5846 of 2025
rt
Tejbir Singh & Ors.
Versus
...Petitioners.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
55. CWP No.5847 of 2025
Neelam Parmar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
56. CWP No.5848 of 2025
Simita Dutta & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
57. CWP No.5854 of 2025
Man Singh Thakur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
58. CWP No.5855 of 2025
Raj Kumar Thakur. ...Petitioner.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
59. CWP No.5883 of 2025
Neela Kanth & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
60. CWP No.6127 of 2025
of
Santosh Kumar Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
61.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
CWP No.6129 of 2025
...Respondents.
Uttam Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
62. CWP No.6152 of 2025
Pawan Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
63. CWP No.6153 of 2025
Rakesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
64. CWP No.6155 of 2025
Ashok Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
65. CWP No.6157 of 2025
Piar Singh. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
66. CWP No.6164 of 2025
Ajay Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
67. CWP No.6322 of 2025
Pawan Kumar.
rt Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
68. CWP No.6324 of 2025
Reeta Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
69. CWP No.6326 of 2025
Sarita Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
70. CWP No.6328 of 2025
Hem Raj Gupta. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
71. CWP No.6330 of 2025
Sunka Ram. ...Petitioner.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
72. CWP No.6332 of 2025
Vijay Laxmi & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
73. CWP No.6336 of 2025
of
Vidya Prakash. ...Petitioner.
Versus
74.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
CWP No.6491 of 2025
...Respondents.
Prem Lal Verma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
75. CWP No.6494 of 2025
Pritam Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
76. CWP No.6495 of 2025
Dharam Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
77. CWP No.6499 of 2025
Desh Raj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
78. CWP No.6518 of 2025
Vijay Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
79. CWP No.6549 of 2025
Kiran Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
80. CWP No.6551 of 2025
rt
Beena Naryal & Ors.
Versus
...Petitioners.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
81. CWP No.6555 of 2025
Sunita Chauhan. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
82. CWP No.6577 of 2025
Jai Ram. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
83. CWP No.6600 of 2025
Birbal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
84. CWP No.6716 of 2025
Arun Kumar. ...Petitioner.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
85. CWP No.6738 of 2025
Hem Raj & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
86. CWP No.6784 of 2025
of
Pinki Sharma & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
87.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
CWP No.6786 of 2025
...Respondents.
Shilpa Sood & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
88. CWP No.6787 of 2025
Rajni Bali & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
89. CWP No.6789 of 2025
Pawan Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
90. CWP No.6791 of 2025
Renu Dhar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
91. CWP No.6792 of 2025
Kali Dass. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
92. CWP No.6793 of 2025
Ranjana Gupta & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
93. CWP No.6794 of 2025
Sanjay Kumar.
rt Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
94. CWP No.6797 of 2025
Shiv Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
95. CWP No.6830 of 2025
Vikas Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
96. CWP No.6836 of 2025
Hoshiar Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
97. CWP No.6837 of 2025
Daler Singh. ...Petitioner.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
98. CWP No.6911 of 2025
Sunil Dutt & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
99. CWP No.6912 of 2025
of
Anita Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
100. CWP No.6913 of 2025
...Respondents.
Rakesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
101. CWP No.6914 of 2025
Bimla Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
102. CWP No.6917 of 2025
Neelima Verma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
103. CWP No.6976 of 2025
Suresh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
104. CWP No.7022 of 2025
Anjana Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
105. CWP No.7029 of 2025
Naresh Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
106. CWP No.7032 of 2025
Dev Raj.
rt Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
107. CWP No.7112 of 2025
Kamlesh Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
108. CWP No.7225 of 2025
Sukarma Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
109. CWP No.7227 of 2025
Ajay Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
110. CWP No.7231 of 2025
Jagat Pal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
111. CWP No.7234 of 2025
.
Hitesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
112. CWP No.7236 of 2025
Rajesh Sharma. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Harpal Singh.
rt
113. CWP No.7238 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
114. CWP No.7240 of 2025
Surinder Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
115. CWP No.7244 of 2025
Dharam Pal Verma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
116. CWP No.7245 of 2025
Kali Dass & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
117. CWP No.7246 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Rajinder Prasad & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
118. CWP No.7247 of 2025
Veena Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
119. CWP No.7248 of 2025
Kanchan Bhatia & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
120. CWP No.7249 of 2025
Amarti Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
121. CWP No.7250 of 2025
Manjeet Kaur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
122. CWP No.7251 of 2025
Pawan Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
123. CWP No.7252 of 2025
Vipin Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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21
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
124. CWP No.7253 of 2025
.
Tarun Bala. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
125. CWP No.7254 of 2025
Namrata Sharma. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Rikhi Ram.
rt
126. CWP No.7255 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
127. CWP No.7256 of 2025
Surinder Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
128. CWP No.7257 of 2025
Ram Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
129. CWP No.7258 of 2025
Inder Dutt. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
130. CWP No.7259 of 2025
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22
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Chander Kala. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
131. CWP No.7260 of 2025
Bagga Ram. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
132. CWP No.7261 of 2025
Jeet Ram Thakur. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
133. CWP No.7300 of 2025
Rajinder Singh Thakur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
134. CWP No.7468 of 2025
Sushil Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
135. CWP No.7470 of 2025
Sunita Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
136. CWP No.7471 of 2025
Neeru Chauhan & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
137. CWP No.7478 of 2025
.
Rajesh Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
138. CWP No.7480 of 2025
Romila Datta & Anr. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Rajinder Kumar.
rt
139. CWP No.7503 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
140. CWP No.7504 of 2025
Vinesh Kumar Dhiman. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
141. CWP No.7505 of 2025
Sushil Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
142. CWP No.7508 of 2025
Munish Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
143. CWP No.7509 of 2025
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24
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Neelam Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
144. CWP No.7510 of 2025
Amit Tanwar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
145. CWP No.7511 of 2025
Monika Thakur. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
146. CWP No.7512 of 2025
Subhash Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
147. CWP No.7532 of 2025
Vinay Kumar Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
148. CWP No.7543 of 2025
Gopal Singh Sadrehru & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
149. CWP No.7550 of 2025
Pawan Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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25
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
150. CWP No.7552 of 2025
.
Balvinder Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
151. CWP No.7553 of 2025
Narender Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Madan Mohan.
rt
152. CWP No.7574 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
153. CWP No.7618 of 2025
Rama Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
154. CWP No.7686 of 2025
Suresh Lal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
155. CWP No.8066 of 2025
Krishan Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
156. CWP No.8188 of 2025
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26
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Ankit Gupta. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
157. CWP No.8252 of 2025
Sunil Kumar Sharma & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
158. CWP No.8337 of 2025
Chuni Lal. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
159. CWP No.8338 of 2025
Anita. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
160. CWP No.8339 of 2025
Kaushal Rana. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
161. CWP No.8379 of 2025
Renu Bala. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
162. CWP No.8386 of 2025
Satish Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
163. CWP No.8388 of 2025
.
Vipan Chander Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
164. CWP No.8727 of 2025
Lokpal. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
165. CWP No.8761 of 2025
Rafi Mohammed & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
166. CWP No.8786 of 2025
Pammi Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
167. CWP No.8831 of 2025
Sangita Kaushal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
168. CWP No.8838 of 2025
Narender Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
169. CWP No.8840 of 2025
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28
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Puja Rani & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
170. CWP No.8855 of 2025
Ajay Raghuvanshi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
171. CWP No.8876 of 2025
Dila Ram & Anr. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
172. CWP No.8878 of 2025
Amar Singh & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
173. CWP No.8952 of 2025
Anjana Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
174. CWP No.9007 of 2025
Bhisham Dutt & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
175. CWP No.9029 of 2025
Ranjit Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
176. CWP No.9030 of 2025
.
Amit Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
177. CWP No.9052 of 2025
Jai Kumar. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
178. CWP No.9077 of 2025
Pradeep Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
179. CWP No.9178 of 2025
Manju Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
180. CWP No.9256 of 2025
Yudhbir Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
181. CWP No.9312 of 2025
Nitin Gupta & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
182. CWP No.9348 of 2025
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30
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Sneh Lata & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
183. CWP No.9472 of 2025
Padam Dev Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
184. CWP No.9666 of 2025
Kusum Lata. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
185. CWP No.9676 of 2025
Raj Kumar Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
186. CWP No.9677 of 2025
Sajeeli Manhas & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
187. CWP No.9678 of 2025
Vidya Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
188. CWP No.9681 of 2025
Gurpreet Kaur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
189. CWP No.9682 of 2025
.
Avinash Kumar Kaushal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
190. CWP No.9683 of 2025
Puran Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
191. CWP No.9689 of 2025
Neelam Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
192. CWP No.9690 of 2025
Sita Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
193. CWP No.9691 of 2025
Babita Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
194. CWP No.9699 of 2025
Anil Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
195. CWP No.9716 of 2025
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32
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Salra Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
196. CWP No.9746 of 2025
Kaku Ram. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
197. CWP No.9748 of 2025
Narender Kumar. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
198. CWP No.9758 of 2025
Vivek Singh Sandhu & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
199. CWP No.9776 of 2025
Dinesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
200. CWP No.9780 of 2025
Prem Lal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
201. CWP No.9840 of 2025
Dimple & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
202. CWP No.9841 of 2025
.
Hem Prakash. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
203. CWP No.9842 of 2025
Manoj Kumar. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Vijender Singh.
rt
204. CWP No.9843 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
205. CWP No.9844 of 2025
Arun. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
206. CWP No.9899 of 2025
Ajay Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
207. CWP No.9944 of 2025
Suniti Rani & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
208. CWP No.10073 of 2025
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34
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Veena Bhardwaj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
209. CWP No.10074 of 2025
Ritu Gupta & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
210. CWP No.10122 of 2025
Richa Mishra. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
211. CWP No.10143 of 2025
Ashish & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
212. CWP No.10163 of 2025
Priyanka Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
213. CWP No.10165 of 2025
Harish Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
214. CWP No.10168 of 2025
Rahul Goswami & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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35
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
215. CWP No.10172 of 2025
.
Sanjeev Acharya & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
216. CWP No.10231 of 2025
Ajay Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Nigam Avasthi.
rt
217. CWP No.10300 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
218. CWP No.10364 of 2025
Rajesh Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
219. CWP No.10365 of 2025
Guddi Devi & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
220. CWP No.10453 of 2025
Jyoti. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
221. CWP No.10486 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Hans Raj Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
222. CWP No.10514 of 2025
Hemant Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
223. CWP No.10528 of 2025
Basu Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
224. CWP No.10559 of 2025
Devender Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
225. CWP No.10699 of 2025
Raj Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
226. CWP No.10757 of 2025
Sushil Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
227. CWP No.10759 of 2025
Pawan Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
228. CWP No.10775 of 2025
.
Sapan Bala & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
229. CWP No.10776 of 2025
Poonam Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
230. CWP No.10820 of 2025
Rajesh Kumar Verma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
231. CWP No.10981 of 2025
Lucky Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
232. CWP No.11009 of 2025
Poonam Guleria. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
233. CWP No.11129 of 2025
Raj Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
234. CWP No.11162 of 2025
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38
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Sunil & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
235. CWP No.11163 of 2025
Bhupender Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
236. CWP No.11283 of 2025
Parul Shukla & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
237. CWP No.11309 of 2025
Anurag Khurana & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
HP University. ...Respondent.
238. CWP No.11325 of 2025
Sunil Dogra & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
239. CWP No.11350 of 2025
Harbaksh Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
240. CWP No.11352 of 2025
Madan Lal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
241. CWP No.11353 of 2025
.
Shyam Lal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
242. CWP No.11355 of 2025
Kulwant Kaur. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
243. CWP No.11369 of 2025
Banita Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
244. CWP No.11381 of 2025
Pernita Kumari Gurdel. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
245. CWP No.11653 of 2025
Anju Patyal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
246. CWP No.11678 of 2025
Tek Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
247. CWP No.11679 of 2025
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40
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Bhuvneshwar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
248. CWP No.11681 of 2025
Nagesh Bhardwaj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
249. CWP No.11682 of 2025
Suneeta Kanwar. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
250. CWP No.11747 of 2025
Ham Raj Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
251. CWP No.11766 of 2025
Ranju Bala & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
252. CWP No.11823 of 2025
Bodh Raj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
253. CWP No.12086 of 2025
Dinesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
254. CWP No.12095 of 2025
.
Dinesh Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
255. CWP No.12211 of 2025
Paul Singh. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Rajiv Kumar.
rt
256. CWP No.12220 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
257. CWP No.12455 of 2025
Veena Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
258. CWP No.12588 of 2025
Mohan Lal Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
259. CWP No.12590 of 2025
Reena Kumari & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
260. CWP No.12594 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Kusum Bala. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
261. CWP No.12638 of 2025
Sawroop Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
262. CWP No.12674 of 2025
Surender Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
263. CWP No.12678 of 2025
Kamlesh Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
264. CWP No.12679 of 2025
Neelam Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
265. CWP No.12687 of 2025
Hem Raj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
266. CWP No.12713 of 2025
Satish Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
267. CWP No.12715 of 2025
.
Bharat Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
268. CWP No.12758 of 2025
Amar Nath. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
269. CWP No.12759 of 2025
Satish Chand Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
270. CWP No.12760 of 2025
Shakuntla Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
271. CWP No.12761 of 2025
Surjit Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
272. CWP No.12766 of 2025
Rameshwar Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
273. CWP No.12767 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Bir Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
274. CWP No.12791 of 2025
Ranbir Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
275. CWP No.12792 of 2025
Ashok Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
276. CWP No.12793 of 2025
Achla Bhardwaj & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
277. CWP No.12794 of 2025
Anil Kumar Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
278. CWP No.12795 of 2025
Samarjit Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
279. CWP No.12814 of 2025
Sneh Lata. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
280. CWP No.12815 of 2025
.
Rajesh Bala. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
281. CWP No.12870 of 2025
Yashwant Singh. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Jai Kishan Sharma.
rt
282. CWP No.12872 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
283. CWP No.12883 of 2025
Naresh Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
284. CWP No.12910 of 2025
Ashwani Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
285. CWP No.12912 of 2025
Shalu Kanwar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
286. CWP No.12913 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Provinder Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
287. CWP No.12941 of 2025
Ankit Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
288. CWP No.12942 of 2025
Dinesh Kumar Bhatia & Anr. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
289. CWP No.12943 of 2025
Gulshan Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
290. CWP No.12948 of 2025
Amrita Bhaik Khimta & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
291. CWP No.12968 of 2025
Hem Raj & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
292. CWP No.12998 of 2025
Mahesh Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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47
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
293. CWP No.12999 of 2025
.
Sanjeev Kumar Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
294. CWP No.13009 of 2025
Prashant & Ors. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Sant Ram.
rt
295. CWP No.13043 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
296. CWP No.13075 of 2025
Vikrant Kaundal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
297. CWP No.13076 of 2025
Tilak Raj & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
298. CWP No.13116 of 2025
Daljeet Kumar Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
299. CWP No.13154 of 2025
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48
2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Rachna Gupta & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
300. CWP No.13224 of 2025
Suneeta Sood. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
301. CWP No.13226 of 2025
Anita Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
302. CWP No.13247 of 2025
Rekha Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
303. CWP No.13278 of 2025
Dinesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
304. CWP No.13284 of 2025
Karam Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
305. CWP No.13285 of 2025
Neha Verma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
306. CWP No.13286 of 2025
.
Bharat Bhushan Pathak. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
307. CWP No.13287 of 2025
Nitin Kashyap. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Kapil Bhardwaj.
rt
308. CWP No.13288 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
309. CWP No.13289 of 2025
Bimla Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
310. CWP No.13290 of 2025
Sunil Dutt & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
311. CWP No.13291 of 2025
Rajinder Prasad & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
312. CWP No.13292 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Raj Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
313. CWP No.13293 of 2025
Mukesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
314. CWP No.13294 of 2025
Kailash Chand. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
315. CWP No.13295 of 2025
Meena Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
316. CWP No.13317 of 2025
Raj Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
317. CWP No.13343 of 2025
Neeta Dhawan. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
318. CWP No.13460 of 2025
Ajit Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
319. CWP No.13572 of 2025
.
Anita Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
320. CWP No.13677 of 2025
Saroj Kumari. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
rt
321. CWP No.13685 of 2025
Rattan Chand Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
322. CWP No.13729 of 2025
Jaipal Garg & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
323. CWP No.13734 of 2025
Inder Kumar Garg & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
324. CWP No.13804 of 2025
Tara Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
325. CWP No.13822 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Mohan Dutt. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
326. CWP No.13835 of 2025
Tilak Raj & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
327. CWP No.13846 of 2025
Saroj Kumari. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
328. CWP No.13892 of 2025
Jagdish Chand. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
329. CWP No.13953 of 2025
Prem Lata. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
330. CWP No.13957 of 2025
Urmil Thakur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
331. CWP No.14139 of 2025
Sushil Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
332. CWP No.14140 of 2025
.
Anjana Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
333. CWP No.14222 of 2025
of
Sawaran Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
rt ...Respondents.
334. CWP No.14336 of 2025
Ravinder Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
335. CWP No.14373 of 2025
Amrik Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
336. CWP No.14380 of 2025
Raman Kumar Abhilashi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
337. CWP No.14393 of 2025
Ashok Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
338. CWP No.14414 of 2025
Leela Dhar. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
339. CWP No.14416 of 2025
Ramesh Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
340. CWP No.14418 of 2025
Promila Thakur.
rt Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
341. CWP No.14487 of 2025
Arun Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
342. CWP No.14554 of 2025
Bhupender Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
343. CWP No.14673 of 2025
Rohit Sharma & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
344. CWP No.14741 of 2025
Aarti Kumari Dogra. ...Petitioner.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
345. CWP No.14742 of 2025
Anil Chandel. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
346. CWP No.14745 of 2025
Rajneesh Paul & Ors. ...Petitioners.
rt Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
347. CWP No.14753 of 2025
Nisha Kumari Sood & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
348. CWP No.14767 of 2025
Raj Kumar Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
349. CWP No.14799 of 2025
Jatinder Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
350. CWP No.14800 of 2025
Kamla Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
351. CWP No.14802 of 2025
Manju Lata. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
352. CWP No.14935 of 2025
Vipin Kumar Guleria & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
353. CWP No.14942 of 2025
rt
Inderjit Singh Sahotra.
Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
354. CWP No.14968 of 2025
Raj Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
355. CWP No.14977 of 2025
Rajiv Kumar Sondhi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
356. CWP No.14979 of 2025
Hitender R Dulta. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
357. CWP No.14981 of 2025
Parveen Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
358. CWP No.15005 of 2025
Milan Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
359. CWP No.15048 of 2025
Prem Chand. ...Petitioner.
rt Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
360. CWP No.15088 of 2025
Satya Pal. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
361. CWP No.15089 of 2025
Nagin Chand Thakur. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
362. CWP No.15102 of 2025
Kanchan Lata. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
363. CWP No.15119 of 2025
Khem Raj. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
364. CWP No.15126 of 2025
Sanjay. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
365. CWP No.15209 of 2025
Monika Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
366. CWP No.15232 of 2025
Ishu Sharma.
rt Versus
...Petitioner.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
367. CWP No.15256 of 2025
Mansa Ram Sharma & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
368. CWP No.15257 of 2025
Som Dutt & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
369. CWP No.15373 of 2025
Radha Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
370. CWP No.15409 of 2025
Rajesh Chauhan. ...Petitioner.
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
371. CWP No.15410 of 2025
Vijay Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
372. CWP No.15427 of 2025
of
Subash Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
373. CWP No.15527 of 2025
...Respondents.
Narender Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
374. CWP No.15528 of 2025
Anand Dev. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
375. CWP No.15756 of 2025
Sonika Kapoor & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
376. CWP No.15903 of 2025
Amit Khan & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
377. CWP No.15919 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Rajnish Kumar Rana & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
378. CWP No.16303 of 2025
Lucky Sharma & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
379. CWP No.16359 of 2025
Rishab Dev. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
380. CWP No.16360 of 2025
Ram Pal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
381. CWP No.16362 of 2025
Manoj Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
382. CWP No.16508 of 2025
Manju Madan. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
383. CWP No.16519 of 2025
Achhar Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
384. CWP No.16528 of 2025
.
Kuldeep & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
385. CWP No.16533 of 2025
Naresh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Sushil Kumar & Ors.
rt
386. CWP No.16615 of 2025
...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
387. CWP No.16648 of 2025
Gurcharan Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
388. CWP No.16693 of 2025
Mohinder Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
389. CWP No.16745 of 2025
Salochana Devi. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
390. CWP No.16885 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Madhu Sudan Bakshi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
391. CWP No.16972 of 2025
Ranjit Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
392. CWP No.17069 of 2025
Karam Chand. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
393. CWP No.17087 of 2025
Surinder Singh Chauhan. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
394. CWP No.17139 of 2025
Kaul Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
395. CWP No.17172 of 2025
Naresh Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
396. CWP No.17264 of 2025
Harish Kharbanda. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
397. CWP No.17311 of 2025
.
Deepak Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
398. CWP No.17407 of 2025
Yog Raj. ...Petitioner.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Ramesh Chand.
rt
399. CWP No.17909 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
400. CWP No.17980 of 2025
Chattar Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
401. CWP No.18028 of 2025
Poonam Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
402. CWP No.18032 of 2025
Randhir Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
403. CWP No.18202 of 2025
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
Keshav Rana. ...Petitioner.
Versus
.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
404. CWP No.18360 of 2025
Krishan Chand Chauhan. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
of
405. CWP No.18424 of 2025
Subhash Chand. ...Petitioner.
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Versus
...Respondents.
406. CWP No.18426 of 2025
Kanwar Singh Rana. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
407. CWP No.18492 of 2025
Jaiparkash & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
408. CWP No.18607 of 2025
Karun Nagar & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
409. CWP No.18689 of 2025
Deepshikha Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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2026:HHC:13536
CWP No. 3361 of 2025 & connected matters.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
410. CWP No.18690 of 2025
.
Manish Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
411. CWP No.18744 of 2025
Kavita Kumari & Anr. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
Sangeeta Rani.
rt
412. CWP No.18745 of 2025
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
413. CWP No.18748 of 2025
Rajender Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
414. CWP No.18919 of 2025
Sunil Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
415. CWP No.19151 of 2025
Tek Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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416. CWP No.19200 of 2025
.
Anand Sagar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
417. CWP No.19349 of 2025
Balwant Singh Chauhan & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
418. CWP No.19357 of 2025
Murari Lal & Ors.
rt ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
419. CWP No.19387 of 2025
Shikha Kumari. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
420. CWP No.19494 of 2025
Jeet Singh. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
421. CWP No.19523 of 2025
Sudesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
422. CWP No.19721 of 2025
Indu Devi. ...Petitioner.
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Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
.
423. CWP No.19741 of 2025
Poonam Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
424. CWP No.19742 of 2025
of
Kiran Bala & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
425. CWP No.19806 of 2025
...Respondents.
Pawan Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
426. CWP No.19807 of 2025
Rajesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
427. CWP No.19808 of 2025
Rakesh Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
428. CWP No.19809 of 2025
Karan Bir & Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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429. CWP No.19955 of 2025
Sanjeev Kumar Sharma. ...Petitioner.
.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
430. CWP No.20022 of 2025
Nisha Devi & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
431. CWP No.20310 of 2025
Vivek Kumar & Ors.
rt Versus
...Petitioners.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
432. CWP No.20312 of 2025
Revati Ramson. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
433. CWP No.20543 of 2025
Manoj Kumar. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
434. CWP No.20969 of 2025
Jugal Kishor Sharma. ...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
435. CWP No.21076 of 2025
Chander Kant. ...Petitioner.
Versus
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State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
436. CWP No.10184 of 2023
.
Ravinder Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
437. CWP No. 103 of 2026
Aditya Chauhan & others. ...Petitioners.
of
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & others. ...Respondents.
438. CWP No. 104 of 2026
rt
Kesar Singh & others.
Versus
...Petitioners.
State of Himachal Pradesh & others. ...Respondents.
439. EX.PT No.165 of 2024
Prashant Thakur & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
440. EX.PT No.248 of 2024
Manohar Lal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
441. EX.PT No.176 of 2023
Vijay Kaushal & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
442. EX.PT No.29 of 2025
Lekh Ram & Ors. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents.
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443. LPA No.364 of 2024
State of H.P. & Anr. ...Appellant.
.
Versus
Arun Kumar. ...Respondent.
444. COPC No.183 of 2025
Anita Thakur & Anr. ...Petitioner.
Versus
RD Nazeem & Anr. ...Respondents.
445. CMP No.5397 of 2025 in COPC No.866 of 2024
of
Diwaker & Ors. ...Applicants.
Versus
Rakesh Kanwar & Anr. ...Respondents.
445. CWP No. 104 of 2026
Kesar Singh & Another
rt ....Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & others. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the petitioners : Mr. Dilip Sharma, Mr. Rajnish Maniktala,
Mr.Sanjeev Bhushan, Mr. K. S. Banyal, Mr.
T.S. Chauhan, Mr.Lovneesh Kanwar, Mr.
Bimal Gupta, Mr. Neeraj Sharma, Senior
Advocate(s), with Uday Singh Banyal, Mr.
Dinkar Bhaskar, Mr. Surya Chauhan, Mr.
Sparsh Bhushan, Mr. Tek Chand, Ms. Kusum
Chaudhary, Mr. Hemant Thakur, Advocates,
Mr. Onkar Jairath, Advocate, Mr. Piyush
Mehta, Advocate and Mr. Anshul Jairath,
Advocate, Mr. Nitin Thakur, Mr. Vinay Mehta,
Mr. Amit Kumar Dhumal, Ms. Vishali
Lakhanpal, Mr. Shekar Badola, Mr.
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?
1
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Mohammad Ahamed Safee, Mr. Pranav
Kumar, Mr. Vaibhav Tanwar, Mr. Adarsh
.
Kumar Vashista, Mr.Raju Ram Rahi, Mr.
Shivom Vashishta, Mr. Munish Datwalia, Ms.
Amita Chandel/Ms. Ruchika Khachi, Mr. Nishant
Khidta, Ms. Shalini Thakur, Mr. Parveen Kumar
Chandel, Mr. Yash Sharma, Mr. Naveen K.
Bhardwaj, Mr. H.R. Bhardwaj, Mr.Sanjeev Kumar
Suri, Mr. Suresh Singh Saini, Mr. Somesh Raj,
Mr. Thakur, Mr. Ashok Kumar, Mr. Ashwani
Kumar Sharma, Mr. Vishal Singh Thakur, Ms.
of
Shivani, Mr. Nitin Rishi, Mr. Amrinder Singh
Rana, Mr. Sat Prakash, Mr. Shyama Prashad
Chatterji, Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik, Mr.Parav
Sharma, Shekhar Badola, Rupesh Kumar, Mr.
rt
Rahul Thakur, Mr. Vikas Rajput, Mr. Ganesh
Barowalia, Mr. Ajeet Singh Saklani, Mr. Ashwani
Kaundal, Mr. Suneel Awasthi, Mr. Sanjeev K.
Motta, Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Mr. Vivek Thakur, Mr.
Pradeep Kumar Sharma, Mr. Naresh Kaul, Ms.
Sheetal Kaul, Mr. Balwant Singh Thakur, Ms.
Anchal Sharma, Mr. Inder Sharma, Mr. Surila
Sangam Mr. Virbahadur Verma, Ms. Shashi
Kiran, Ms. Anu Minhas, Ms. Anita Devi, Mr.
Mukul Sharma, Mr. Yogesh Kumar Chandel, Mr.
Rajesh Prakash, Mr. Prashant Sharma, Mr.
Deven Krishan Khanna, Sumeet Raj Sharma,
Ms. Yamini Sharma, Mr. Lal Singh Mehta, Mr.
Roop Lal Chaudhary, Mr. Tarun K. Sharma, Mr.
Yash P. Sharma, Mr. Ranbir Rathore, Mr.
Rakesh Kumar Dogra, Mr. Sanjeev Mankotia, Mr.
Vinod Kumar Thakur, Mr. Sat Prakash, Mr.
Sameer Miyan, Mr. Vikas Rathore, Ms. Anu
Minhas, Mr. Lal Chand, Ms. Sumita Rani, Mr.
Rinkesh Kumar, Mr. Lesh Singh, Mr. Anil Kumar,
Mr. Sandeep Kumar Pandey, Mr. Bhupinder
Kumar, Mr. Mukul Sood, Mr. Ankit Dhiman, Mr.
Deepanshu Bindal, Mr. Arun Kaushal, Ms.
Shagun Sharma, Mr. Anil Kumar God, Mr.
Vivekanand, Ms. Rajni Gandhi, Mr. Rajesh
Kumar, Mr. Rakesh Chauhan, Mr. Paresh
Sharma, Mr. Rajiv Rai, Mr. Mayank Sharma, Mr.
Manohar Lal Sharma, Mr. Himanshu Kapila, Mr.
Bonit Prakash, Mr. Sajeev Kumar, Mr. Surender
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Prakash Sharma, Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, Mr.
Lalit Kumar Sehga, Mr. Sumeet Raj Sharma, Mr.
.
Hitesh Kumar, Mr. Shashwat Dadwal, Mr. Gurdev
Singh, Mr. Vishwa Bhushan, Mr. Ravinder Singh,
Mr. C.D. Negi, Mr. Pawanish Kumar Shukla, Mr.
Rocky, Mr. B. Nandan Vashisht, Ms. Deepmala,
Mr. Mandeep Chandel, Mr. Ram Kumar, Mr.
Ramesh Chand Sharma, Mr. Rajat Kumar, Mr.
Mohit Thakur, Mr. Vinod Kumar Thakur, Mr.
Sumesh Raj, Mr. Mohar Singh, Mr. Rupinder
Singh, Mr.Devender K. Sharma, Mr. Arvind
of
Sharma, Mr. Bharat Thakur, Mr. Manish Sharma,
Mr. Nitin Thakur, Mr. Ajay Chandel, Mr. Ajay
Thakur, Ms. Anamika Kohali, Mr. Raman
Jamalta, Mr.Paras Dhaulta, Mr. Jai Krishan
rt Sharma, Mr.Abhimanyu Rathore, Mr.Abhinav
Mohan Goel, Mr. Abhijeet Singh Chauhan, Mr.
Praneet Gupta, Advocates, Mr.Amrick Singh,
Advocate, Ms. Shubh Mahajan, Mr. Naresh
Mahajan, Ms Shrutika Chauhan, Advocate vice
Mr. Dheeraj Kumar Vashisht, Advocate,
Mr.Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, Advocate,
Ms.Dhanwanti, for respective petitioner(s).
For the Appellant: Mr.Anup Rattan, Advocate General with
Ms.Swati Draik, Dy. A.G. and Mr. Shalabh
Thakur, Asstt. A.G. in LPA No. 364 of 2024.
For the Respondents: Mr.Paramjit Singh Patwalia, Senior Advocate
with Ms.Harshika Verma, Advocate and
Mr.Anup Rattan, Advocate General with
Ms.Swati Draik, Dy. A.G. and Mr. Shalabh
Thakur, Asstt. A.G. for the respondents/State.
: Ms. Salochana Rana, Advocate, for
respondent/ State Pollution Control Board.
: Ms.Kiran Lata Sharma, Advocate, for H.P.
State Marketing Board.
: Mr.Vikrant Thakur & Mr. Rishabh Kumar
Dogra, Advocates, for the respondent-
HPPSC.
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: Mr.Vinod Chauhan and Mr.Tara Chand
Chauhan, Advocates, for respective
.
respondents in respective petitions.
: Mr.Dheeraj Kumar Vashisht/Ms Shrutika
Chauhan, Mr.Raman Jamalta, Mr.Rahul
Thakur, Mr. Virender Singh Kanwar and Mr.
Deepak Sharma, Advocates for respondent-
H.R.T.C. in respective petitions.
: Mr.Rajesh Prakash and Om Prakash,
of
Advocates, for respective respondents in
respective petitions.
: Mr.Devender K. Sharma and Ms.Archana
rt Dutt, Advocates, for HPU in respective
petitions.
: Mr. Tek Ram Sharma, Mr. Tara Chand
Chauhan and Mr. Rangil Singh, Advocates,
for the respondent/Accountant General in
respective petitions.
: Mr.Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, for
respondents in respective petitions.
: Mr.Ramesh Chand, Advocate, for
respondents in respective petitions.
: Mr. Rajesh Kosh, Advocate, for
respondent/Accountant General in CWP
No.8602 of 2025.
: Ms. Komal Chaudhary, Advocate, for the
respondent/Accountant General in CWP
No.10300 of 2025.
: Mr. Anil Kumar, Advocate, for HPSEBL-
respondent in the respective petitions.
: Mr. Tejasvi Dogra, Mr. Rahul Thakur, Mr. Nitin
Thakur, Mr. Mukul Sharma, Mr.Amrick Singh,
Mr. Ranbir Rathore, Mr. Mukul Sood,
Advocates, for respective respondent(s).
: Mr. Vishwabhushan, Advocate, for
respodnent(s) in LPA No. 364 of 2024.
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Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge
.
For deciding common issued involved to be adjudicated on
the basis of common question of law and facts, these petitions are being
decided by this common judgment.
2. In all these petitions, the petitioners are mainly aggrieved by
of
the enactment of the Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Conditions of
Service of Government Employees Act, 2024 (Act No. 23 of 2025) (in
rt
short ‘Govt. Employees Act’/the Act/the impugned Act).
3. In this common judgment, we are adjudicating only the
constitutionality, validity, and legality of the Govt. Employee Act. For other
reliefs, the consequences shall follow accordingly, and in case any further
relief(s) is/are required to be determined after adjudication of additional
facts, not discussed or adjudicated or covered in this judgment, the
petitioners shall be at liberty to avail appropriate remedies, including the
filing of fresh petitions for redressal of grievance based on such other
issues raised or not raised in these petitions.
Background
4. For adjudicating the issue being decided in present writ
petitions, it is relevant to refer to background and the past conduct of the
State and history of certain cases, which have resulted in present
litigations.
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5. Service jurisprudence and law permits the employer/State to
.
make adhoc appointments by appointing/engaging employees temporarily
to cope with emergent situation in the larger public interest till
appointment/engagement of regular incumbent on sanctioned post,
functioning whereof is necessary for governance including teaching.
of
Such adhoc engagement/appointment is termed as stopgap arrangement.
6. In the past by taking advantage of aforesaid power, the State
rt
made it norm to resort to adhoc appointments by terming them as
stopgap arrangement and continue the same for a considerable long
period of several years to say 7 to 10 years, but extending restricted
service benefits lesser than the regular appointees. Such practice, being
exploitative in nature, was deprecated by the Courts and such adhoc
appointees serving for several years, depicting the availability of work,
and necessity of performance thereof for governance, were held entitled
for service benefits including the pay scale and vacation salary like
regular appointees.
7. In the decade of 1970s, the State had been in practice of
appointing employees, including teachers, on ad hoc basis without
resorting to the prescribed procedure for engagement of employees as
mandated in the Constitution, either to deprive such employees of their
lawful remuneration payable for appointment against the post or to adjust
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their well-wishers through back-door entry, and sometimes for both
.
reasons as well as to gain cheap popularity. The Government used to
regularize or deny regularisation of such persons after utilizing their
services on ad hoc basis for a considerably long period. On being
approached by some of such employees, the Courts/Administrative
of
Tribunals interfered, and after completion of 90 days ad hoc of service,
such employees were held entitled to continuation of service as well as
rt
certain service benefits like regular employees.
8. After suffering verdict of the Courts, in order to avoid
implementation of order/directions of the Court(s) and to defeat the
endeavours made by the Courts to protect the interests of such
employees, the Government to continue exploiting them, and to surpass
the verdict of Court, instead of making appointments on regular basis,
devised a method by making appointments on tenure basis for 89 days
and after completion of such period, after giving break, again re-engaged
such employees for another 89 days, and so on, so as to avoid extension
of service benefits to such employees and to avoid to treat such
appointments as a continuing temporary appointments for several years,
which had been recognized as such, for granting relief by passing various
orders/judgments of the Tribunal and the Courts, including the High Court
and the Supreme Court.
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9. Again Courts came to rescue against exploitative
.
policy/action of the State because such tenure appointments were also
being continued for several years, to say more then 7-8 years and some
time 10 years. It was held by the Court that the breaks, given to such
tenure appointees, after 89 days were frictional in nature, whereas work
of
was available, post was available, but State was shirking from making
regular appointments and instead exploiting the unemployed by
rt
appointing them on tenure of 89 days and thereafter they were being
continued by giving breaks of 1 or 2 or more days to avoid service
benefits as well as verdict of the Courts. Irrespective of frictional breaks,
tenure appointees were held entitled for benefits similar to
adhoc/temporary appointees continued for a considerable long period
against the sanctioned post.
10. The aforesaid practice of tenure appointment was also
depreciated by the Court and in this regard judgment in Rattan Lal &
Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 43 and State of
Haryana & Ors. vs. Piara Singh & Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 118, are relevant
to be referred.
11. In Rattan Lal‘s case (supra), the practice of ad hoc
appointment was deprecated and depriving, ad hoc and tenure
employees, of salary for the vacation period was declared to be illegal,
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and such employees were held entitled to salary for all 12 months in a
.
year. Verdict of the Apex Court in Rattan Lal & Ors. vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC 43 reads as under:-
“In all these petitions the common question which arises for
decision is whether it is open to the State Government to appoint
teachers on an ad-hoc basis at the commencement of an academicof
year and terminate their services before the commencement of the next
summer vacation or earlier to appoint them again on an ad-hoc basis at
the commencement of next academic year and to terminate their
services before the commencement of the succeeding summer
rt
vacation or earlier and to continue to do so year after year. A
substantial number of such ad-hoc appointments are made in theexisting vacancies which have remained unfilled for three to four years.
It is the duty of the State Government to take steps to appoint teachers
in those vacancies in accordance with the rules as early as possible.
The State Government of Haryana has failed to discharge that duty in
these cases. It has been appointing teachers for quite some time on an
ad-hoc basis for short periods as stated above without any justifiablereason. In some cases the appointments are made for a period of six
months only and they are renewed after a break of a few days. Thenumber of teachers in the State of Haryana who are thus appointed on
such ad-hoc basis is very large indeed. If the teachers had beenappointed regularly they would have been entitled to the benefits of
summer vacation along with the salary and allowance payable in
respect of that period and to all other privileges such as casual leave,
medical leave, maternity leave etc. available to all the Government
servants. These benefits are denied to these ad-hoc teachers
unreasonably on account of this pernicious system of appointment
adopted by the State Government. These ad-hoc teachers are
unnecessarily subjected to an arbitrary ‘hiring and firing’ policy. These
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compelled to accept these jobs on an ad-hoc basis with miserable
conditions of service. The government appears to be exploiting this.
situation. This is not a sound personnel policy. It is bound to have
serious repercussions on the educational institutions and the children
studying there. The policy of ‘ad-hocism’ followed by the StateGovernment for a long period has led to the breach of Article 14 and
Article 16 of the Constitution. Such a situation cannot be permitted to
last any longer. It is needless to say that the State Government isof
expected to function as a model employer.
2. We, therefore, direct the State Government to take immediate
steps to fill up in accordance with the relevant rules. With respect, why
should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge
rt
in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view,
is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitmentsand is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent
transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make
permanent — the distinction between regularization and makingpermanent, was not emphasized here — can only encourage the State,
the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue
benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect,the direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara Singh (supra) are to some
extent inconsistent with the conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With
great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs
counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in theearlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision
has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees
engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be
made permanent. the vacanies in which those who are appointed on
an ad-hoc basis are now working and to allow all those who are now
holding these posts on ad-hoc basis to remain in those posts till the
vacancies are duly filled up. The teachers who are now working on
such ad-hoc basis if they have the prescribed qualification may also
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Government may also consider sympathetically the question of relaxing
the qualification of maximum age prescribed for appointment to those.
posts in the case of those who have been victims of this system of ‘ad-
hoc’ appointments. If any of the petitioners in these petitions has under
any existing rule acquired the right to be treated as a regularly
appointed teacher, his case shall be considered by the State
Government and an appropriate order may be passed in his case.
3. We strongly deprecate the policy of the State Government under
of
which ‘ad-hoc’ teachers are denied the salary and allowances for the
period of the summer vacation by resorting to the fictional breaks of the
type referred to above. These ‘ad-hoc’ teachers shall be paid salary and
allowances for the period of summer vacation as long as they hold the
rt
office under this order. Those who are entitled to maternity or medical
leave, shall also be granted such leave in accordance with the rules.”
12. In Piara Singh‘s case (supra), after discussing the nature of
employment of ad hoc, work-charge and other temporary employees, it
was observed as under:-
“45. The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the
prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call
for an adhoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation,
effort should always be to replace such an adhoc/temporary employee
by a regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporaryemployee may also compete along with others for such regular
selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does
not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The
appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or
kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc/temporary employee.
46. Secondly, an adhoc or temporary employee should not be
replaced by another adhoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced
only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid
arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.
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47. Thirdly, even where an adhoc or temporary employment is
necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should.
ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot
brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file.
If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employmentexchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of
Article 16 should be followed. In other words, there must be a notice
published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all thoseof
who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly.
48. An unqualified person ought to be appointed only when qualified
persons are not available through the above processes.
49.
rt
If for any reason, an adhoc or temporary employee is continued
for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case forregularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to rules and
his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run
counter to the reservation policy of the State.
50. The proper course would be that each States prepares a
scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such
employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme isalready framed, the same way be made consistent with our observations
herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. If and whensuch person is regularised he should be placed immediately below the
last regularly appointed employee in that category, class or service, asthe case may be.”
13. In order to overcome the judgments, including that of the
Supreme Court, the State kept on changing the nomenclature of
temporary appointments, with efforts to make appointments through back-
door entry and/or to deprive employees of the service benefits which were
available to such employees on regular appointment to the said posts.
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14. Adhoc, tenure, volunteer and other such temporary
.
appointments were deprecated by the Courts and certain rights were
extended to such employees by the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal and
Piara Singh’s judgments (supra) and some other judgments dealing with
similar issues. Because of such judgments, the Government was not able
of
to appoint persons, replace such appointee(s) and to extend or restrict
the benefits to its whims and fancies.
15.
rt
In 1996, to avoid the extension of service benefits to the
temporary employees in terms of verdict of the Court, the State devised
another method to make temporary appointments by formulating policy to
engage employees on contract basis, though again terming the same as
a short term appointment/stopgap arrangement till the appointment of
regular incumbent through due process.
16. In this chain, the State had also formulated Contract Policy
which was circulated vide communication No.PA-DE-10/96-Cont. 96/97-
(DEO) by Directorate of Education, Himachal Pradesh dated 08.10.1996
to All District Education Officers of Himachal Pradesh with the ‘subject –
appointment of teaching staff against short term/leave vacancies on
contractual basis’.
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17. In the memo of afore policy, intention of the Government and
.
purpose for which this policy was formulated, was reflected in first two
paras, which read as under:-
“At present all appointments on short term/leave vacancies of
teaching staff on adhoc/tenure basis is banned because many High
Courts have given judgments giving different ruling causing considerableof
difficulties to continue the arrangement of adhoc/tenure/ part time
appointments. The Supreme Court judgment delivered in the case of
State of Haryana and others V/S Piara Singh directing the Govt.
organisations to avoid the adhoc appointments has necessitated to
rt
review the complete arrangement.
2. Keeping in view the judgment of various High Courts/Supreme
Court the Govt. have decided that all appointments of teaching staff in
the schools against short term/leave vacancies shall be on contractual
basis and it has been decided to pay full wages at the minimum of thescale including the allowances to the teachers appointed on contractual
basis.”
18. Though the subject of aforesaid communication and purpose
stated therein indicate that such contract appointments were to be made
against short term/leave vacancies, but this policy was made a rule as a
tool to fill-up all vacant sanctioned posts of Teachers in Himachal
Pradesh under this Policy on contract basis, and such contract
employees were continued for 8 to 10 years or more, and thereafter, their
services were regularised on completion of requisite years of service, as
prescribed and notified by the Government in its subsequent Policy(ies).
Later on in all Departments, Contract appointments were started.
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19. Later on, in numerous cases, orders were passed by the
.
Tribunal, which were affirmed and approved by the High Court and
upheld by the Supreme Court declaring that temporary employees,
including contract employees, cannot be replaced by another temporary
or contract employee, but can be replaced by regular appointee(s). They
of
were also held entitled to salary at the minimum of the pay scale of the
post, including allowances available to regular employees, and were also
rt
held entitled to vacation salary.
20. In order to get rid of the verdicts of the Courts, the
Government formulated almost similar policies by changing the
nomenclature of appointments as Primary Assistant Teachers, Para
Teachers, and PTA Teachers, Vidya Upasak etc., by formulating and
circulating Notification No.EDN.C.B.(2)-4/2003 dated 27.08.2003 notifying
the Himachal Pradesh Prathmik Sahayak Adhyapak/Primary Assistant
Teacher (PAT) Scheme, 2003; Communication No.EDN-H(6)1-1/2003-
PT-2003 Plan by Directorate of Education, Himachal Pradesh dated
17.09.2003 with ‘subject – Regarding Hiring/Engagement of Para
Teachers (Lecturer School Cadre), Para Teacher (T.G.T’s) and Para
Teachers (C&V)’; and Notification No.EDN-A(Kha))7-3/2006 dated
29.06.2006 notifying ‘Grant-in-Aid to Parents Teachers Association Rules,
2006’.
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21. Dealing with the same issue the Apex Court in Secretary,
.
State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1; has
observed and held as under:-
3. A sovereign government, considering the economic situation in
the country and the work to be got done, is not precluded from making
temporary appointments or engaging workers on daily wages. Going byof
a law newly enacted, The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act,
2005, the object is to give employment to at least one member of a
family for hundred days in an year, on paying wages as fixed under that
Act. But, a regular process of recruitment or appointment has to be
rt
resorted to, when regular vacancies in posts, at a particular point of
time, are to be filled up and the filling up of those vacancies cannot bedone in a haphazard manner or based on patronage or other
considerations. Regular appointment must be the rule.
4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the
Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union,
the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to
irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service,without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure
through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rulesadopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on
contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keepingout those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and
depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led
to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular
procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages,
approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in
their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts.
Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have
occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set
in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular
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or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment
which can only be called ‘litigious employment’, has risen like a phoenix
.
seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed
apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the
concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to
affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by
of
our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that
Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or
recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions
for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments
rt
as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance,
tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It
has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts
in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of
perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the
whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the
guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten.
xx xx xx
6. These two sets of appeals reflect the cleavage of opinion in
the High Court of Karnataka based on the difference in approach in two
sets of decisions of this Court leading to a reference of these appeals
to the Constitution Bench for decision. The conflict relates to the right,
if any, of employees appointed by the State or by its instrumentalities
on a temporary basis or on daily wages or casually, to approach the
High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing that they be
made permanent in appropriate posts, the work of which they were
otherwise doing. The claim is essentially based on the fact that they
having continued in employment or engaged in the work for a
significant length of time, they are entitled to be absorbed in the posts
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in which they had worked in the department concerned or the authority
concerned. There are also more ambitious claims that even if they
.
were not working against a sanctioned post, even if they do not
possess the requisite qualification, even if they were not appointed in
terms of the procedure prescribed for appointment, and had only
recently been engaged, they are entitled to continue and should be
directed to be absorbed.
xx xx xx
of
11. In addition to the equality clause represented by Article 14 of the
Constitution, Article 16 has specifically provided for equality of
opportunity in matters of public employment. Buttressing these
rt
fundamental rights, Article 309 provides that subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, Acts of the legislature may regulate the recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. In view of
the interpretation placed on Article 12 of the Constitution by this Court,
obviously, these principles also govern the instrumentalities that come
within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. With a view to make
the procedure for selection fair, the Constitution by Article 315 has also
created a Public Service Commission for the Union and Public Service
Commissions for the States. Article 320 deals with the functions of
Public Service Commissions and mandates consultation with the
Commission on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil
services and for civil posts and other related matters. As a part of the
affirmative action recognized by Article 16 of the Constitution, Article
335 provides for special consideration in the matter of claims of the
members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for
employment. The States have made Acts, Rules or Regulations for
implementing the above constitutional guarantees and any recruitment
to the service in the State or in the Union is governed by such Acts,
Rules and Regulations. The Constitution does not envisage any
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employment outside this constitutional scheme and without following
the requirements set down therein.
.
12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the
sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in
posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or
taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge
the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are
required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by
of
the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not
needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State
Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on
rt
daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such
engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very
scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or
the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in
various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project
is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the
mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is
respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion
that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under Article
226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct
absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged
without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the
constitutional scheme.
xx xx xx
16. In B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1979) 3
SCR 937, this court clearly held that the words “regular” or
“regularization” do not connote permanence and cannot be construed
so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They
are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are
meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology
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followed in making the appointments. This court emphasized that when
rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force,
.
no regularization is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of
the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention
of the rules. These decisions and the principles recognized therein
have not been dissented to by this Court and on principle, we see no
reason not to accept the proposition as enunciated in the above
decisions. We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and
of
proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of
compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which
does not go to the root of the process, can be regularized and that it
alone can be regularized and granting permanence of employment is a
rt
totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularization.
Xx xx xx
26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the
normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts?
This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular
and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes
to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The
direction to make permanent — the distinction between regularization
and making permanent, was not emphasized here — can only
encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and
would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to
compete. With respect, the direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara
Singh (supra) are to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in
paragraph 45 therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last
of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of
employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it
cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc,
temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular
recruitment procedure should be made permanent.
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43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public
employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of
.
law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled
from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering
the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article
14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with
the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the
law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of
of
the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified
persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a
contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end
of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages
rt
or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is
discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be
made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to
be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual
wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his
appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service
or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the
original appointment was not made by following a due process of
selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court
to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees
whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc
employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire
any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption,
regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself
was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely
because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court,
which we have described as ‘litigious employment’ in the earlier part of
the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or
made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court
may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if
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ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may
be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no
.
prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to
continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for
selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee
who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that
they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its
affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the
of
instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory
mandates.
44. The concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is different from the
concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed
rt
on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection
as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied
the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the
parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are
rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the
light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that
principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that
appointments made without following the due procedure established by
law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as
permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of
opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing
complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court,
would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure
established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the
situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka.
Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued
repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc
employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and
departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions
and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the
orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have
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even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to
pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the
.
Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed
or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or
engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and
though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court
would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an
of
illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be
regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the
concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a
rt
considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an
engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the
nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open.
It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain — not at arms length
— since he might have been searching for some employment so as to
eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground
alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme
of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily
or casually got employed should be directed to be continued
permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public
appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a
contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties
were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the
court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such
casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies
of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people
who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually,
would not be getting even that employment when securing of such
employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable
citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not
compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not
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inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one
has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully
.
knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other
words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned
knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post
in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in
which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be
considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the
of
procedure established, for making regular appointments to available
posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has
been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue
him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when
rt
he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the
procedure established by law for public employment and would have to
fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of
opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
xx xx xx
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is
not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or
procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being
temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot
invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the
post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following
a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in
consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory
of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by
temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that
the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons
either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent.
The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also
obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of
being made permanent in the post.
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xx xx xx
53. Coming to Civil Appeal Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001, in view of our
.
conclusion on the questions referred to, no relief can be granted, that
too to an indeterminate number of members of the association. These
appointments or engagements were also made in the teeth of
directions of the Government not to make such appointments and it is
impermissible to recognize such appointments made in the teeth of
directions issued by the Government in that regard. We have also held
of
that they are not legally entitled to any such relief. Granting of the relief
claimed would mean paying a premium for defiance and
insubordination by those concerned who engaged these persons
against the interdict in that behalf. Thus, on the whole, the appellants in
rt
these appeals are found to be not entitled to any relief. These appeals
have, therefore, to be dismissed.”
22. A Division Bench of this High Court in CWP No.415 of 2000
tiled as ‘Baldev Singh & Ors. vs. State of H.P. & Ors.‘ along with
connected matters vide judgment dated 01.09.2008 reported in Latest
HLJ 2009 (HP) 293, after taking into consideration judgments rendered in
Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. Uma Devi & Ors., (2006) 4
SCC 1; B.N. Nagarjan & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1979) 3
SCR 937; and Rattan Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 43, has
observed as under:-
“2. The whole problem has arisen because the Government in spite
of repeated judicial pronouncements continues to make appointments
to certain posts in violation of the rules. Persons are appointed to
various posts without following the recruitment and promotion rules.
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regularized. This problem can be best avoided if the Government
strictly follows the rules.
.
3. In the last 15 years, various governments have framed Schemes
for appointments of teachers. Some of these Schemes are Voluntary
Teacher Scheme, Vidya Upasak Scheme, Para Teacher Scheme, PTAteachers scheme etc. etc. The entire purpose of framing these
schemes is to avoid making recruitments to the post of teachers by
following the procedure prescribed by law. Under normal Recruitmentof
and Promotion Rules, the appointment of teachers is made through the
H.P. Public Service Commission. Under the schemes, which have been
framed in violation of the rules and are against the very ethos of Article
311 of the Constitution of India, appointments are made at a very lower
rt
level some times at the school level. The Selection Committees consist
of people who can be easily manipulated. At the time when theschemes are framed, the Government promises that regular
appointments shall be made in accordance with rules. H owever, once
the persons appointed against the schemes have continued for a fewyears, they start raising protests that their services should not be
dispensed with in accordance with the terms of the scheme but they
should be regularized.
4. In the present cases, we are concerned with teachers employed
on contract basis in various schools in Himachal Pradesh. The teachers
were appointed on contract basis as College lecturers, School
lecturers, JBT teachers, C & V teachers and Lab attendants. When thecontractual period of appointment of these teachers had ended or was
coming to an end, a large number of cases were filed against their
termination or proposed termination before the learned H.P State
Administrative Tribunal.
xx xx xx
7. At the outset, we may mention that most of questions raised in
these writ petitions do not survive in view of the judgment rendered by
the Apex Court in (2006) 4 SCC 1, Secretary, State of Karnataka and
others versus Uma Devi (3) and others…..
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…..The aforesaid erudite and absolutely relevant observations of
the Apex Court can only lead to one conclusion that when the.
Recruitment & Promotion Rules ( for short R& P Rules) have been
framed, the State should not make any appointment without following
the said rules except when the same becomes absolutely necessary.
8. In the present case, the teachers in normal course should have
been appointed through the Public Service Commission. The contract
teachers were appointed directly by the Principals of the schools. Thisof
obviously would lead to shoddy selections and poor competition since
many competent candidates would not be able to apply for the posts
filled in at the local level. The State should as a rule not make any
appointment without following the R&P rules. However, if in case of
rt
exigencies of service a departure has to be made, then the persons so
appointed cannot claim that they must be regularized.
9. On the one hand, the case sought to be made out for the
employees is that since they have worked for a long period of time,
they should be regularized without even following the R&P Rules, onthe other hand this Court cannot be oblivious to the rights of a large
number of well qualified candidates who are unemployed but because
of lack of proper advertisements and due to improper selections atlower level, they were denied the opportunity to be applied for or be
appointed to such post(s). If this Court approves the action of the
State, it would result in depriving many well qualified unemployed youth
of their opportunity and right to compete for public employment.
In fact, in a poor economy like ours and especially in a State like
Himachal where the main employer is the State, everybody looks
forward for public employment. Government service also gives
security of tenure and status to the employee.
xx xx xx
12. Having held that the State should not normally make
appointments without following the R & P Rules, this Court cannot shut
its eyes to the fact that the State is repeatedly indulging in this
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some cases, the rules have also been amended and contractual
appointments have been made part and parcel of the rules.
.
13. The rule of law operates for everybody including the State. No
man is above the law. The R & P rules have the statutory force of law.
They in fact have the constitutional backing of Article 309 of theConstitution of India. In case the appointments are made in
accordance with the rules, all the appointments including the
contractual appointments made in accordance with rules would be legalof
and valid. We would recommend that in all cases, the appointments
should be made strictly in accordance with rules and in case for some
very urgent reasons, the regular process of appointments cannot be
followed and the State is compelled to make ad hoc / temporary
rt
appointments then before the posts are filled up, the authority
proposing to make such appointments de hors the rules should obtainadministrative approval from an authority not below the rank of
Principal Secretary to the State of H.P after giving reasons as to why
the appointments cannot be made by following the rules.
14. There is one other point which has been agitated before us. This
point is that the State must follow the principle of ‘first come last go’
while dealing with the persons appointed without following the R & Prules. This Court vide a detailed interim order dated September 19,
2000 had directed the State Government to prepare a seniority list of all
such appointees.
We have found that in a number of cases, the officials of the
State follow a very devious and highly unethical method of ousting the
employees who have been employed on contract earlier. We may give
two examples of law this is done. Supposing a person ‘A’ has been
appointed as contract teacher and is posted at station ‘S’ for a long
duration. The State, on regular selections being made, posts a regular
appointee at station ‘S’. Person ‘A’ will be removed but the other
person(s) who may have worked for a much shorter period as contract
teacher(s) at other stations are permitted to continue. Another method
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appointee is transferred to some other station and a contract employee
at some other station, who may have a much shorter tenure than “A” is.
brought to station “S”. Sometimes the second person is also removed
and a fresh contract appointee is appointed. This practice cannot be
permitted to continue. Therefore, we direct that the State shall followthe principle of ‘first come last go’ even in the case of contract
employee(s). We hereby direct that though normally no appointments
should be made de hors the rules, in case such appointments areof
made then the State must follow the principle of ‘last come first go’
while removing the persons not appointed in accordance with R & P
rules. The State cannot raise the bogey that the appointments have
been made by the school level or at the tehsil level and therefore, it
rt
cannot follow this principle of ‘last come first go’. In case under the R &
P rules the cadre to which a person is appointed is a State cadre, theState Government must follow the principle of ‘last come first go’ by
taking all the employees in the State into consideration. In case of a
district cadre post, it will follow ‘first come last go’ principle in relation tothe employees of the concerned district.
15. The contention of the State that the employees’ appointed on
contract basis are lower in status to the ad hoc employees andtherefore, cannot be granted salary during the vacations is totally ill
founded. In fact, a contractual employee has been appointed after
following some procedure even though the procedure may not be in
accordance with rules. His status is better than that of an ad hocemployee who may be appointed without following any procedure
whatsoever. The apex Court in 1985 (4) SCC 43, Rattan Lal versus
State of Haryana, has clearly held that the persons appointed on ad
hoc basis are entitled to salary for the vacations and the State being a
model employer cannot follow invidious method of making public
appointments from the first day of the academic term and terminate the
appointment on the last date of the academic term. The teachers were
appointed on contract basis have worked for a period of more than 2 to
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period.
16. In view of the above discussion, we dispose of the writ petitions
.
by summarizing our findings as follows:
i) that the State should normally not make any appointment
without following the R & P rules;
ii) that in a situation where the State or its instrumentalities
are forced to make public employment without following
the R &P rules, we recommend that the approval of the
Administrative Secretary not below the rank of Principalof
Secretary should normally be obtained after given
complete reasons, in respect of each post, as to why the
post could not be filled up by following the R & P rules;
iii) that the appointees on contract basis are to be treated at
par with the ad hoc appointees;
rtiv) that this court has no power to direct the State to
regularize the services of any employee appointedwithout following the R & P rules;
v) that this court cannot direct the State to frame a policy of
regularization; and
vi) that the State must follow the principle of ‘last come first
go’ as enumerated above vis-a-vis the employees who
are appointed dehors the rules.
vii) that normally the State should not regularize the
employees appointed without following the rules since
this adversely affects the rights of many eligible
candidates.”
23. In Baldev Singh‘s case (supra), it was categorically held by
the Court that the Contract appointees were also entitled for benefits at
par with ad hoc appointees but with unambiguous clarification that Court
has no power and cannot direct the State to frame a policy of
regularization of service of any employee appointed without following the
R&P Rules with further directions that the State should normally not make
any appointment without following R&P Rules and normally should not
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regularize the employees appointed without following the R&P Rules.
.
Irrespective of aforesaid direction, State formulated Policy(ies) for
regularization of contract employees and made these policies applicable
to all employees appointed under above referred Schemes/Policies with
different nomenclature of appointees.
of
24. The persons appointed under the aforesaid policies,
ultimately directed to be governed by the Contract Policy and were
rt
regularized after completion of period of contract service prescribed in
regularisation Policy(ies). After regularization, they filed petitions seeking
the benefit of past contract service followed by regularisation without
interruption. After taking into consideration the Central Civil Services
(CCS) Pension Rules, 1972, and other relevant provisions of law, it was
held by the Courts that such contract employees, after regularization,
shall be entitled to all service benefits, including pay scale and counting of
contract service period for pensionary benefits by adding increments, but
excluding seniority.
25. In case of persons appointed on contact basis in furtherance
to the Contract Policy formulated by the State but without following
procedure prescribed in R&P Rules, it would be relevant to refer judgment
of Division Bench of this High Court in LPA No.322 of 2024 titled as Ram
Chand & Ors. vs. State of H.P. & Ors. decided on 02.09.2024, wherein
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history of judgments passed by the Courts in various cases has been
.
noticed, which reads as under:-
“3. In CWP No.850 of 2010, titled as Paras Ram vs. State of H.P.
and another, decided on 19.10.2010, reported in Latest HLJ 2009 (H)887, it was held that ad hoc service followed by regular service in the
same post could be counted for the purpose of increments.
4. Approving the aforesaid judgment in Paras Ram‘s case, a
of
Division Bench of this High Court in LPA No.36 of 2010, titled as Sita
Ram vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 15.07.2010, had observed
that appellant in Sita Ram‘s case was entitled for counting of ad hoc
rt
service followed by regular service for the purpose of increments and
pension, but he was not entitled for counting the said ad hoc service forthe purpose of seniority.
5. It is also apt to record that judgments in Paras Ram’s and Sita
Ram’s cases have attained finality.
6. In CWP No.4550 of 2010, titled as Ravi Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and another, decided on 16.12.2010 alongwith connected matters,
in case of tenure appointees, direction was given to grant annual
increment during period of tenure services and to count the said periodfor the purpose of pension like ad hoc appointees in the Education
Department. However, issue related to contract Teachers was kept open
to be decided by the Authority.
7. In CWP No.5400 of 2014, titled as Veena Devi vs. Himachal
Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd & another, decided on
21.11.2014, contract service followed by regular appointment without
interruption was directed to be considered for the purpose of qualifying
service for pensionary benefits.
8. Special Leave to Appeal CC No(s) 18898 of 2015, titled as
H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd. and another vs. Veena Devi,
preferred against the said order was dismissed by the Supreme Court
on 26.10.2015.
9. A Division Bench of this High Court in CWP No.8953 of 2013,
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titled as Joga Singh and others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and
others, decided on 15.06.2015, had held that services rendered by the.
petitioners therein, who were appointed Vidya Upasaks on honorarium
basis which was followed by regular appointment as Junior Basic
Teachers (JBTs), were entitled for counting of their service for thepurpose of pensionary benefits and annual increments.
10. After dismissal of SLP(C) No.183 of 2016, titled as State of H.P.
& others vs. Joga Singh and others, Review Petition (Civil) No.274of
of 2017 filed in the said SLP (C) No.183 of 2016, was also dismissed by
the Supreme Court on 02.03.2017.
11. In similar case CWPOA No.195 of 2019, titled as Sheela Devi
vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 26.12.2019, after taking into
rt
consideration Rule 17 of Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CCS Pension Rules’), and otherpronouncements of this High Court as well as Supreme Court, Division
Bench of this Court had directed to count period of contract service
followed by regular service as qualifying service for granting pension.
12. CWP No.2411 of 2019, titled as Jagdish Chand vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others, decided on 10.01.2020, alongwith
connected matters, by a Division Bench of this High Court. In thesematters petitioners, who were not JBT but having qualification as TGT,
O.T., Shastri etc., were appointed against sanctioned vacant post(s) of
JBT as Vidya Upasak and were regularized as JBTs in the year 2007
after awarding them special JBT certificates. In these matters, it wasdirected to count contract service followed by regularization against the
post of JBT towards qualifying service for the purpose of pension under
CCS Pension Rules as well as for annual increment, but restricting
actual financial benefits to three years prior to filing of writ petitions.
13. It is also an admitted fact that SLP (Civil) No.10399 of 2020,
titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Sheela Devi, has
been dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 07.08.2023 with
direction that past service of contractual employee on regularization is to
be counted for the purpose of pension and thus judgment in Sheela::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:18 :::CIS
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Devi’s case, referred supra, has attained finality.
14. Undisputedly, SLP(C) Nos.8012-8013 of 2021, titled as State of
.
Himachal Pradesh vs. Jagdish Chand, has also been dismissed on
7.8.2023 and, thus, judgment in Jagdish Chand‘s case has also
attained finality.
15. Learned Additional Advocate General has contended that in
Sheela Devi‘s case benefits of counting contract service for annual
increment has not been granted and, therefore, has supported theof
impugned judgment.
16. In Sheela Devi‘s case (supra), the High Court had directed to
count the contract service for the purpose of qualifying service towards
pension. However, the Apex Court, in its order dated 7.8.2023 has
rt
directed the respondents/State to count the contract service for the
purpose of pension. As a matter of fact, counting of contract service forthe purpose of qualifying service towards pension and ‘counting of
contract service for the purpose of pension’ means one and the same
thing. In both directions, there is mandate to consider the contractservice for determining pension.
17. Following the aforesaid judgments in Sheela Devi’s and
Jagdish Chand’s cases, this Court in CWPOA No.5507 of 2020, titledas Oma Wati and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and
others, has directed to extend benefit of annual increments and
counting of period of contract service followed by regular appointment
for the purpose of pensionary benefits, by observing as under:-
“8. Despite repeated observations as well as directions of the
Courts in numerous cases that State must behave like a Model
Employer, State, irrespective of persons in power and change in
Guard, successively keeps on to formulate, adopt and practise
exploitative policies as a device to avoid extension of legitimate
rights of the employees for which they are otherwise entitled. On
intervention of the Courts directing the State to extend such
benefits like pay scale, increment, leave and counting of service
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benefit by changing nomenclature of post and scheme to
continue with practice of temporary/ad-hoc appointments.
.
Appointment of Voluntary Teachers, ad-hoc Teachers, Vidya
Upasaks, Contract Teachers, PARA Teachers, PAT, PTA and
SMC Teachers are examples of clever phraseology devised byState to overcome directions of the Courts in order to avoid
permanent appointments by appointing adhoc/Temporary
Teachers depriving them of service benefits available to regularof
employees. When Courts upheld the entitlement of ad-hoc
employees for service benefits, State came with Scheme for
appointment of Voluntary Teachers. Again, on intervention of the
Court, State continued changing the name of Policy but for
rt
appointment on exploitative terms. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that all these terms are similar temporary appointmentsirrespective of their nomenclature. Therefore, verdict of the Court
regarding extension of service benefits with respect to one kind
of temporary appointment is equally applicable to similartemporary appointment with different nomenclature.”
18. Taking into consideration aforesaid judgment, a Division Bench
of this High Court, vide judgment dated 29.8.2023, has decided CWPOA
No.5187 of 2020, titled as Sunil Dutt & others vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others alongwith connected matters, wherein
petitioners have been held entitled for counting of contract service,
followed by regularization on the same post without interruption, for the
purpose of pensionary benefits as well as annual increments with
following observations:-
“17… … … …Needless to say that for counting the service to
extend the benefit thereof for pension, annual increment for the
relevant period is an essential factor required to be considered
for calculating pension. Observations by the Division Bench of
this Court in this regard in CWP No.850 of 2010, titled Paras
Ram vs. State of HP and others, Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 887, as::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:18 :::CIS
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also referred in order dated 15.7.2010 passed by a Division
Bench of this Court in LPA No.36 of 2010, titled Sita Ram vs..
State of H.P., are relevant wherein it has been stated that
service counted for the purpose of annual increment will be
counted for pension also. There is direction for counting thecontractual service for pension/pensionary benefits. Counting of
service for pension includes, counting of length of service for
qualifying service for pension, as well as for quantifying theof
amount of pension payable by calculating it on the basis of basic
pay with addition of increment. Therefore, direction to count
service for pension also mandates calculation of pension by
granting annual increment for relevant period either actual or
rt
notional basis.”
19. Undoubtedly, pension is calculated on the basis of last pay
drawn by the employee and last pay of the employee depends upon the
Basic Pay earned by the employee on the basis of pay scale as well as
annual increments earned by him during his entire service and,
therefore, for counting service for pensionary benefits or as a qualifying
service towards pension, the annual increments for the said service
period, are inevitable to be taken into consideration. It is relevant to
record here that it was not the case of the respondent-State that during
contract period, services rendered by the appellants were not
satisfactory, rather contrary to that considering their services satisfactory
their services were regularized by the State-Department.
20. In Sheela Devi‘s case, prayer made by the petitioner was only
with respect to count past service of her husband, on contract basis, for
the purpose of pension. However, it is apt to record that when past
contract service is considered valid for counting for the purpose of
pensionary benefits, the same period is also to be taken into
consideration by granting annual increment because for calculation of
pensionary benefits, last pay drawn, determined on the basis of annual
increment drawn, is a decisive factor and last pay drawn also depends
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on the annual increments earned by the employee. Therefore, for
calculating and determining pensionary benefits, annual increments and
.
length of service are major relevant factors.
21. Entitlement or disentitlement for annual increments, for contract
period service followed by regular appointment on the same post,
without interruption, was not a issue and thus was not agitated and
decided in Sheela Devi‘s case specifically and separately. Though, as
discussed supra, at the time of taking into consideration contract service
of
for the purpose of pensionary benefits, annual increments for the said
service are also to be taken into consideration, however, even
otherwise, settled position in Paras Ram’s, Sita Ram’s, Joga Singh’s
rt
and Jagdish Chand’s cases, mandatory entitlement of an employee for
annual increments for the contract period of service followed by regular
appointment on the same post, without interruption, cannot be unsettled
on the basis of a judgment in which the said issue has not been
discussed and decided, particularly when judgment in Joga Singh’s and
Jagdish Chand’s cases have attained finality after dismissal of SLPs
preferred by the State in those cases.
22. Judgment in Sheela Devi‘s case, which declared that contract
service period is to be counted for the purpose of pension, cannot be
taken a judgment as a denial of annual increments for the said period.
23. As evident from judgment in CWPOA No.195 of 2019, titled as
Sheela Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the moot question
adjudicated and decided by the Court was that whether the services of
an employee appointed on contractual basis, in temporary capacity, can
be counted towards qualifying service for grant of pension after
regularization of his services. The Division Bench has answered this
issue by holding that service rendered by an employee on contract, prior
to his regularization, shall be treated as qualifying service for grant of
pension. Issue with respect to grant or non-grant of annual increments
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for the contract service period, after regularization, was neither in issue
specifically nor discussed.
.
24. It is also relevant to record here that Division Bench of this Court
in judgment dated 07.12.2011 passed in CWP No.10529 of 2011, titled
as Youdhishther Kumar Sharma vs. The State of H.P. and another,
has decided the issue of entitlement of counting contract service in those
cases wherein employees had served on contract/temporary basis on
different posts but had been regularized or appointed as regular on
of
some other posts. In such a situation, the employee was held entitled
for counting of his ad hoc/tenure/temporary service only for the purpose
of pension, but not for annual increment. In present case, the facts are
rt
entirely different because temporary/contract appointment of petitioner is
followed by regularization on the same post without interruption and,
therefore, this judgment is not applicable in present case.
25. Though judgment in CWPOA No.5187 of 2020, alongwith
connected matters, has been considered by learned Single Judge in
Para-3 of the impugned judgment, but by taking into consideration only
part of the relief granted to the petitioners therein, regarding counting of
service for the purpose of pensionary benefits. However, perhaps due
to oversight, observations that counting of contract service period for
pensionary benefits also includes grant of increment for the said period
and direction to grant annual increments for contract service period, on
regularization, has been overlooked, which has resulted into passing a
judgment by learned Single Judge contrary to the judgment passed by a
Division Bench.
26. It is apt to record that the aforesaid judgment in CWPOA
No.5187 of 2020, by the Division Bench, has been passed by taking into
consideration judgment in Sheela Devi‘s case. In any case, as
discussed supra, when contract service is to be taken into consideration
for the purpose of pensionary benefits, then natural corollary thereof is
that for the said period annual increments are also required to be
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granted. Therefore, learned Single Judge has fallen in error by inferring
that in Sheela Devi‘s case, on regularization, annual increments for
.
contract service have not been granted or have been denied.
27. On dismissal of SLP in Sheela Devi‘s case, the State did not
contest the SLP filed in Jagdish Chand‘s case and had withdrawn the
same, in terms of judgment passed in Sheela Devi‘s case.
28. From aforesaid facts, it is apparent that on adjudication of the
of
issue with respect to counting of contract service for pensionary benefits
by the Supreme Court, the State did not prefer adjudication of the issue
of entitlement for annual increments for the contract service period, after
regularization, but withdrew the SLP filed in Jagdish Chand‘s case.
rt
29. As discussed supra, counting of contract service for pensionary
benefits would entail grant of annual increments for the said period.
Therefore, for judgment of Supreme Court in Sheela Devi‘s case,
dismissing the SLP, and also for withdrawal of SLP by the State in
Jagdish Chand‘s case, contractual period of service of an employee,
followed by regularization on the same post, is to be counted for the
purpose of pensionary benefits and annual increments.
30. A Division Bench of this High Court in CWPOA No.5363 of 2020,
titled as Ishwar Verma & others v. H.P. University & others, has
observed as under:
“15. State, including its functionaries, has to make appointment
by following procedure prescribed under Recruitment and
Promotion Rules/Service Rules framed under Article 309 of the
Constitution of India. However, sometimes, State or its
functionaries resort to make appointment without following
process prescribed under Recruitment and Promotion Rules i.e.
dehors of Service Rules but following some procedure
prescribed in some valid Policy formulated and adopted by it.
16. Sometimes, not only dehors of Recruitment and Promotion
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appointments are made. Such appointment made in last
category are not protected by law and/or Courts being backdoor.
entry.
17. In first two categories, sometimes initial appointments are
made on temporary or contract basis and such services areregularized later on.
18. It is now settled that temporary/contract appointee of first
category on regularization shall be entitled for counting ofof
temporary/contractual service for all service benefits since their
initial date of appointment including seniority, annual increments
and pensionary benefits, whereas such appointee of second
category, on regularization shall be entitled for annual increment
rt
and pensionary benefits etc. but not for seniority.”
31. Similar observation has been made by Division Bench in
judgments passed in LPA No.207 of 2023, titled as Subodh Kumar &
others v. Rakesh Kumar & others.
32. Contract service of the petitioners was followed by regular
service, without interruption, on the same post. Therefore, they are
definitely entitled for counting their contract service for the purpose of
annual increments as well as pensionary benefits.
33. The issue stands already settled in various judgments, including
the cases of Joga Singh and Jagdish Chand cases and other matters,
but it has not only been implemented by the State in respect of all
similarly situated employees and employees are compelled to prefer
identical petitions for getting the benefit of judgments of the Supreme
Court, which are judgments in rem and based on policy decisions of the
State.
34. Legal principles summed up by the Supreme Court in State of
UP v. Arvind Kumar Shrivastva, (2015) 1 SCC 347 are relevant in
present matter, which are:
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“22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the
aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the.
respondents, can be summed up as under.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees
is given relief by the court, all other identically situated personsneed to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so
would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be appliedof
in service matters more emphatically as the service
jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates
that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly.
Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other
rt
similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they
are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge thewrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and
woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their
counterparts who had approached the court earlier in timesucceeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim
that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly
situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as
fencesitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence,would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases
where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in
rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons,
whether they approached the court or not. With such a
pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself
extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such
a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision
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and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC
721). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in
.
personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue
to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated
expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from
the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get
the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to
satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and
of
delays or acquiescence.”
35. In present case also, above referred legal principles contained in
Paras 22.1 and 22.3 of the judgment in Arvind Kumar Shrivastva’s
case are applicable, because the issue that contract period of service,
rt
followed by regular appointment on the same post without interruption, is
to be taken for consideration for annual increments and pensionary
benefits, is no longer res integra, rather is well settled, and the State has
also implemented it, if not thousand but with respect to hundreds of
employees, but despite that all similarly situated employees entitled for
the said relief are not being treated in the same manner, due to which
Court is being engaged to decide the same issue again and again,
leading to wastage of time and energy and the resources.
36. It has been invariably noticed that issues, which stood decided
once, are being raised by the State repeatedly again and again causing
not only wastage of time and energy of the State, but also of the Court
as well as poor litigants. Such an act of the State is contrary to the
Litigation Policy adopted by the State.
37. Such practice and conduct on the part of the State, because of
wastage of precious time of the Court, leads to delay in dispensation of
justice to other litigants whose claims or cases are pending adjudication
since long.
38. State is expected not to repeat such practice in the cases, which
have already been decided by this Court as well as by the Supreme
Court and even implemented by the State.
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39. Accordingly, judgment passed by learned Single Judge is
modified with observation that reasoning assigned for deciding CWPOA
.
No.5187 of 2020, shall be mutatis mutandi applicable to the present
matter also and appellants shall be entitled for counting their contract
service for the purpose of pensionary benefits as well as annual
increments for the said period with all consequential benefits, but
restricting actual consequential financial benefits to three years prior to
filing of the writ petition.”
of
26. The persons appointed by the respondent-State in
furtherance of policies formulated under Notification No.EDN.C.B.(2)-
rt
4/2003 dated 27.08.2003 notifying the Himachal Pradesh Prathmik
Sahayak Adhyapak/Primary Assistant Teacher (PAT) Scheme, 2003;
Communication No.EDN-H(6)1-1/2003-PT-2003 Plan by Directorate of
Education, Himachal Pradesh dated 17.09.2003 with ‘subject- Regarding
Hiring/Engagement of Para Teachers (Lecturer School Cadre), Para
Teacher (T.G.T’s) and Para Teachers (C&V)’; and Notification No.EDN-
A(Kha))7-3/2006 dated 29.06.2006 notifying ‘Grant-in-Aid to Parents
Teachers Association Rules, 2006’, were converted into contract
employee and, after completion of requisite period of contract service,
their services were also regularized. These employees also approached
the Courts for extension of service benefits of their contract service, like
the teachers appointed on contract in pursuance of the policy formulated
in the year 1996. 485 petitions preferred by numerous such employees
have been decided by the Coordinate Division Bench vide judgment
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dated 12.11.2024 passed in LPA No. 338 of 2024 titled as Narayan Dutt
.
vs. State of HP and others with connected matters. In the cases of these
employees also, similar judgments, like judgment in LPA No.322 of 2024
have been passed by Division Benches of this Court.
27. State also formulated policy for appointing Vidya Upasaks in
of
Primary Schools instead of making regular appointments against the
sanctioned post. The persons appointed as Vidya Upasak, on completion
rt
of certain period of service as Vidya Upasak, were also converted into
contract teacher, and thereafter, they were also regularized. These
teachers also approached the Court for the service benefits, and one of
such case CWP No.8953 of 2013 titled as ‘Joga Singh & Ors. vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.‘ was decided on 15.06.2015 along with
connected matters, declaring them entitled for counting of their service for
the purpose of pensionary benefits and annual increments. SLP(C)
No.183 of 2016 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Joga Singh
and Review Petition (C) No.274 of 2017 filed against the said judgment
dated 15.6.2015 was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on
02.03.2017.
28. With respect to counting of contract period for pensionary
benefits, the issue has attained finality after decision of SLP(C) No.10399
of 2020 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. vs. Sheela Devi &
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Ors. passed by the Apex Court vide order dated 07.08.2023. Similarly, in
.
another case this issue was also decided by this High Court in CWP
No.2411 of 2019 titled as Jagdish Chand vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh & Ors. on 10.01.2020 along with connected matters and the
said decision has also attained finality in SLP (C) No. 8012-8013 of 2021
of
titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Jagdish Chand.
29. Because of the verdicts of the Courts, the Government was
rt
again and again restrained from making appointments on temporary basis
dehors the Recruitment and Promotion Rules (in short ‘R&P Rules’) that
too without following the procedure prescribed under the R&P Rules for
appointment through prescribed agencies, i.e. the H.P. Public Service
Commission or the H.P. Subordinate Services Selection Board,
whereupon the Government started making appointments on a contract
basis, but by adopting the procedure prescribed under the R&P Rules
through the prescribed agencies.
30. It was held by the Courts that the Government cannot resort
to extra-constitutional methods for appointments by making appointments
on contract or otherwise on temporary basis without having such
provision in the R&P Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. It
was further held that, in the absence of any provision for contract
appointments under the R&P Rules, all employees, appointed on contract
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basis after following the prescribed procedure under the R&P Rules, were
.
to be treated as regular employees from the very first day of their
appointment.
31. After suffering the judgments of the Courts, vide
communication dated 12.12.2003, the Government of Himachal Pradesh,
of
Department of Personnel, through Chief Secretary to the Government of
Himachal Pradesh, issued the directions to all Secretaries to the
rt
Government of Himachal Pradesh, All Heads of Departments of Himachal
Pradesh, all Divisional Commissioners in Himachal Pradesh and all
Deputy Commissioners in Himachal Pradesh to prescribe the provisions
for appointment on contract basis by amending the provisions of Column
No.10 of concerned Recruitment and Promotion Rules. The
communication reads as under:-
“……. 12.12.2003
Subject:- Prescribing of Provision for appointment on contract basis.
Sir,
I am directed to say that it has been decided by the
Government that the mode of recruitment by way of “contract
recruitment” may also be prescribed in addition to other mode of
recruitment in all the Recruitment and Promotion Rules.
It is, therefore, requested that all existing Recruitment
and Promotion Rules where the mode of direct recruitment of the post
has been prescribed, the same may be amended. As such provision of
Col No.10 of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules be prescribed in
the following manner:-
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“Col.No.10: By direct recruitment or on Contract basis”
Since the matter has already been approved by the Council of
.
Ministers, it is therefore, requested to amend the Recruitment &
Promotion Rules accordingly without referring the matter to the
Cabinet……..”
32. Thereafter, appointments in all departments on contract
basis were made by adopting the procedure prescribed under the R&P
of
Rules through the prescribed agencies.
33. However, necessary amendment in relevant R&P Rules was
rt
not carried out immediately but recruitment process was initiated on the
basis of unamended Rules however offering appointment on contract
basis. In some cases, R&P Rules were amended during the process of
selection. It led filing of various petitions by aggrieved appointed/selected
persons. 34 such petitions were decided by the Single Bench of this High
Court along with CWP No. 1811 of 2008 titled Dev Raj vs. State of HP
vide judgment dated 14th November, 2011 in following terms:-
“18. The Apex Court in P.Mohanan Pillai vs. State of Kerala and
others (2007) 9 SCC 497 held as follows:-
“9. Why such a decision had been taken after the publication of
the result of the written examination and after calling 36
candidates for interview is not known. Why the Company
intended to enlarge the zone of consideration from 1: 3 to 1: 4
has also not been disclosed. Why the cut-off mark was also
lowered remained a mystery.
10. It may be that in a given situation, a decision of the State
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be assigned. The Company failed to do so. The decision taken
in this behalf smacks of arbitrariness. It prejudiced the.
candidates like the appellant.
11. It is now well-settled that ordinarily rules which were
prevailing at the time, when the vacancies arose would beadhered to. The qualification must be fixed at that time. The
eligibility criteria as also the procedures as were prevailing on
the date of vacancy should ordinarily be followed.”
of
19 The Apex Court in Arjun Singh Rathore and others vs.
B.N.Chaturvedi and others (2007) 11 SCC 605 held that the
vacancies occurring prior to the promulgation of the new Rules have to
be filled in according to the old rules even though the interviews were
rt
held after the promulgation and notification of the new Rules.
….. ….. ……
25. At the time when the selection process was initiated and
selection made the Government had not even thought of making
contractual appointments. All appointments under Government are
expected to be made as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and
if the Rules do not permit, the Government cannot make contractual
appointments. The decision to make direct recruitment on contractual
basis was taken at a later stage. The argument of Shri Vivek Thakur,
learned Addl. A.G. that when the Government has the power to appoint
it also has the power to appoint on contractual basis cannot be
accepted. Government appointments are made in accordance with the
Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. When such
Rules are framed the Government is expected to act and make
appointments in accordance with the Rules. If the Rules do not permit
the Government to make appointments on contract basis they must be
made on regular basis.
…… ….. …..
29. In view of the above discussion, all the writ petitions are allowed
and the petitioners except the petitioners in CWP No. 7376 of 2010
shall be deemed to be regular employees of the State Government
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from the date of their appointment. As far as the petitioners in CWP
No. 7376 of 2010 are concerned they shall be deemed to be regular
.
teachers from the dates their colleagues were offered contractual
appointment in the year 2009 and have now to be treated as regular
employee. Their earlier appointment on contractual basis or as para
teachers will not be counted towards seniority and their seniority shall
be governed as per the merit list of the Subordinate Selection Board.
The petitioners shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.
of
30 The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms and the
respondent-State is directed to grant all financial benefits to the
petitioners latest by 31st March, 2012 failing which the State shall be
liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum.”
34.
rt
Aforesaid judgment dated 14.11.2011 passed in CWP No.
1811 of 2008 was assailed by the State by filing LPA No. 420 of 2012
titled State of HP vs. Dev Raj and another.
35. In the meanwhile, CWP No. 7538 of 2010 titled Gopi Devi
Thakur vs. State of HP was decided on 28th December, 2012 by the
Single Bench of this High court on the basis of aforesaid judgment dated
14th November, 2011 passed in Dev Raj‘s case in following terms:-
“2. Having perused the records, I am of the considered view that facts
in the instant case are similar to that of Dev Raj (Supra). In the instant
case also petitioner is seeking appointment on regular and not contract
basis as per merit wise recommendations made by H.P Subordinate
Selection Board, Hamirpur, with respect to the requisition sent by IPH
Department of the State. In Dev Raj (Supra) the Court has held that at
the time of initiation of selection process, Government had not even
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directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners and
grant all financial benefits.
.
3. As such, directions issued in Dev Raj (Supra) shall mutatis mutandis
apply to the present case also.”
36. The judgment passed in CWP No. 7538 of 2010 was also
assailed by the Government by filing LPA No. 367 of 2012 titled State vs.
Gopi Devi Thakur, which was dismissed by the Division Bench on
of
23rd December, 2014 with observation that appellant/State had already
complied with Court direction, with finding that on perusal of pleadings,
rt
record and impugned judgment, the Division Bench was of the considered
view that Writ Court had rightly directed the State to consider the case of
petitioner and judgment was speaking and legal one. This judgment in
LPA No. 367 of 2012 was not assailed further.
37. Along with CWP No. 1811 of 2008, one CWP No. 6893 of
2010 titled Manju Bala vs State of HP was also decided by common
judgment dated 14.11.2011. The judgment in Manju Bala‘s case was also
assailed by State by filing LPA No. 237 of 2012 titled State vs. Manju
Bala.
38. LPA No. 237 of 2012 titled State of HP vs. Manju Bala was
decided vide judgment dated 30.5.2015 on the basis of judgment passed
in LPA No. 367 of 2012 in the same terms.
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39. The judgment in LPA No. 237 of 2012 was assailed by the
.
State by fling SLP (C ) No. 1171 of 2017 which was decided by the Apex
Court on 24.3.2017 saying that no ground to interfere with impugned
order was found except to direct that respondent(petitioner) will not be
entitled to arrears of financial benefits. The law point decided by learned
of
Single Judge was upheld by the Apex Court with finding that no ground to
interfere was made out.
40.
rt
Above referred LPA No. 420 of 2012 titled State of HP vs.
Dev Raj, preferred against decision rendered in CWP No. 1811 of 2008,
was also decided by the Coordinate Division Bench on 6.4.2021 in terms
of judgment passed in LPA No. 237 of 2012 as modified by the Apex
Court vide order dated 24.3.2017 passed in SLP(C) No. 1171 of 2017.
Therefore, ratio of law that in absence of any provision for contract
appointment in R&P Rules, the appointment made by following the
procedure as per R&P Rules has to be considered as regular
appointment from the very first day of appointment remained intact.
41. CWP No. 6727 of 2010 titled Ravinder Kumar vs. State of
HP and 7 other petitions were decided by common judgment dated
2.5.2012 passed by learned Single Judge with lead case CWP No. 7602
of 2010, wherein it was held as under:-
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“……. No doubt, Government took a policy decision to make all
appointments on contract basis after 12th December, 2003, but then.
this could be done only by amending the rules and incorporating
specific conditions therein……”
42. The aforesaid judgment was assailed by Sate by filing LPA
No. 21 of 2013 titled State of HP vs. Ravinder Kumar and the same was
decided by the Division Bench on 4.10.2019 upholding the findings
of
returned by the Single Judge with following observations:-
“4(iii)……..
rt There is no provision in the above notification for taking over
services of staff of privately managed colleges on contract basis, moreso, in the facts of instant case, in view of Recruitment and Promotion
Rules of Lecturer (School cadre) as they existed on 6.2.2007 i.e. the
date of take over, whereunder no provision for appointment on contractbasis was there, regular recruitment was the only prescribed mode.”
43. The Coordinate Division Bench of this High Court, vide
common judgment dated 9.11.2023 passed in 38 petitions, filed by
numerous petitioners and decided along with CWPOA No. 2343 of 2020
titled as Vikram Singh vs. HRTC, has held that in absence of any
provision for contract appointment in R&P Rules, the appointment, made
by following the procedure prescribed in R&P Rules, is to be considered
as regular from the very first day. The relevant observations are as
under:-
“9. The respondent-Corporation has further, in it reply, contended that
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Policies relating to recruitment, condition of service, training of its
employees and wages being paid as issued by the State Government.
in this regard. Based on the aforesaid, it is contended that the
instructions dated 12.12.2003, whereby the State had directed all
concerned to modify their Recruitment and Promotion Rules in order toincorporate a new mode of recruitment, i.e., contractual appointment, is
being followed “in principle” by the respondent-Corporation, though
service regulations in this respect were amended on 03.08.2006 ……
of
27. The recruitments in question, as has already been stated supra,
had been initiated in furtherance of approval accorded in this regard in
the 95th Board meeting held on 02.08.2003 prior to issuance of
instructions dated 12.12.2003 and its adoption by the Board on
rt
03.08.2006. Therefore, the petitions filed by the petitioners, being
similarly situate as their counterparts who had been appointed earlierwith respect to whom parity was being sought, deserves to be allowed
on this account also.”
44. Later on, in pursuance to communication dated 12.12.2003,
referred supra, necessary amendments were incorporated in Recruitment
and Promotion Rules for recruitment in all Departments of the
Government of Himachal Pradesh by amending Column 10 and
incorporating Column 15-A therein. The Himachal Pradesh Higher
Education Department, Lecturer (College Cadre), Class-I, Gazetted
Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2007 notified vide Notification dated
20.9.2007 are being referred herein as an example/sample. Relevant
provisions whereof are as under:-
“HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 20th September, 2007::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:18 :::CIS
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1. Short title and Commencement: (1) These rules may be called the
Himachal Pradesh, Higher Education Department, Lecturer (College.
Cadre) Class-I (Gazetted) Recruitment and Promotion Rules,
2007………..
Annexure – A
Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Lecturers (College
Cadre) Class-I, Gazetted in the Department of Higher Education,
Himachal Pradesh.
1. Name of the Post : Lecturer (College Cadre)
of
2……………
10. Method of recruitment: Whether by direct or by contract basis
and promotion / deputation / transfer and the percentage of posts to be
rt
filled in the various method: 100% by direct recruitment or on contract
basis.
11……..
15. Selection for appointment to post by direct recruitment :
Selection for appointment to the post in case of direct recruitment shall
be made on the basis of viva-voce test, if Himachal Pradesh Public
Service commission or other recruiting agency, as the case may be, soconsider necessary or expedient, by a written test or practical test, the
standard / syllabus etc. of which will be determined by the Commission /
other recruiting agency as the case may be.
15-A. Selection for appointment to the post by Contract
appointment(I) CONCEPT (a) Under this policy the Lecturers (College Cadre) in the
Department of Higher Education, H.P. will be engaged on contract basis
initially for one year, which may be extendable for two more years on
year to year basis.
(b) The Principal Secretary/Secretary (Hr.Education) to the Government
of Himachal Pradesh after obtaining the approval of the Government to
fill up the vacant posts on contract basis will place the requisition with
the concerned recruiting agency i.e. H.P. Public Service Commission.
(c) The selection will be made in accordance with the eligibility
conditions prescribed in these Rules.
(d) Contract appointee so selected under these Rules will not have any
right to claim for regularization or permanent absorption in the
Government job.
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(II) CONTRACTUAL EMOLUMENTS: The Lecturers (College
Cadre) appointed on contract basis will be paid consolidated fixed
contractual amount @ Rs. 12,000 P.M. (Rs. twelve thousand only)
.
(which shall be equal to initial of the pay scale + (Dearness pay).
No amount will be paid for vacation period. An amount of Rs. 275/- as
annual increase in contractual emoluments for the second and third
years respectively will be allowed if contract is extended beyond one
year.
(III) APPOINTING/DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY: The Principal
Secretary/Secretary (Hr.Education) to the Government of Himachal
of
Pradesh will be appointing and disciplinary authority.
(IV) SELECTION PROCESS: Selection for appointment to the post in
the case of Contract Appointment will be made on the basis of viva-voce
test or if considered necessary or expedient by a written test or practical
rt
test the standard/syllabus etc. of which will be determined by the
concerned recruiting agency i.e. H.P. Public Service Commission,
Shimla.
(V) COMMITTEE FOR SELECTION OF CONTRACTUAL
PPOINTMENTS: As may be constituted by the concerned recruiting
agency i.e. the H.P. Public Service Commission, Shimla from time to
time.
(VI) AGREEMENT: After selection of a candidate, he/she shall sign
an agreement as per Annexure-B appended to these Rules.
(VII) TERMS AND CONDITIONS: (a) The contract appointee will be
paid fixed contractual amount @ Rs. 12000/- per month (which shall be
equal to initial of the pay scale + dearness pay). No amount will be paid
for vacation period. The Contract Appointee will be entitled for increase
in contractual amount @ Rs. 275/- per annum for second and third years
respectively and no other allied benefits such as senior/selection scales
etc. shall be given.
(b) The service of the Contract Appointee will be purely on temporary
basis. The appointment is liable to be terminated in case the
performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not found satisfactory.
(c) Contractual appointment shall not confer any right to incumbent for
the regularization in service at any stage.
(d) Contract Appointee will be entitled for one day casual leave after
putting one month service. This leave can be accumulated up to one
year. No leave of any other kind is admissible to the contract appointee.
He/She shall not be entitled for Medical Re-imbursement and LTC etc.
only maternity leave will be given as per rules.
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(e) Unauthorized absence from the duty without the approval of the
controlling Officer shall automatically lead to the termination from the
contract. Contract Appointee shall not be entitled for contractual amount
.
for the period of absence from duty.
(f) Transfer of a contract appointee will not be permitted from one place
to another in any case.
(g) Selected candidate will have to submit a certificate of his/her fitness
from a Government/Registered Medical Practitioner. Woman candidate
pregnant beyond 12 weeks will stand temporarily unfit till the
confinement is over. The woman candidate will be re-examined for the
of
fitness from an authorized Medical Officer/Practitioner.
(h) Contract appointee will be entitled to TA/DA if required to go on tour
in connection with his/her official duties at the same rate as applicable to
regular officials at the minimum of pay scale.
rt
(VIII) RIGHT TO CLAIM REGULAR APPOINTMENT: The candidate
engaged on contract basis under these Rules shall have no right to
claim for regularization/ permanent absorption as Lecturer (College
cadre) in the Department at any stage.
16. Reservation: The appointment to the service shall be subject to
orders regarding reservation in the service for Scheduled Castes /ST /
Other Backward classes other categories of persons issued by the
Himachal Pradesh Government from time to time.
17. Departmental Examination: Every member of the service shall
pass a departmental examination as prescribed in the Himachal
Pradesh Departmental Examination Rules, 1997 as amended from time
to time.
18. Power to relax. – Where the state Govt. is of the opinion that it is
necessary or expedient to do so, it may, by order for reason to be
recorded in writing and in consultation with the HPPSC relax any of the
provisions of these rules with respect to any class or category of
persons or post.
Form of contract/agreement to be executed between the
_____________ (Name of the post) and the Government of
Himachal Pradesh through ______________ (Designation of the
Appointing Authority).
This agreement is made on this __________________day of
_____________in the year______________ Between Sh. / Smt.
_________________S/o/D/o Shri_______________ R/o
______________________________________________ Contract
appointee (hereinafter called the FIRST PARTY), AND the Governor of
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Himachal Pradesh through _________________ (Designation of the
Appointing Authority) Himachal Pradesh (here-in-after the SECOND
PARY).
.
Whereas, the SECOND PARTY has engaged the aforesaid FIRST
PARTY and the FIRST PARTY has agreed to serve as a Lecturer
(College Cadre) on contract basis on the following terms & conditions:-
1. That the FIRST PARTY shall remain in the service of the
SECOND PARTY as a Lecturer (College Cadre) for a period of 1 year
commencing on day of ______________and ending on the day of
_____________ It is specifically mentioned and agreed upon by bothof
the parties that the contract of the FIRST PARTY with SECOND PARTY
shall ipso-facto stand terminated on the last working day i.e. on
________________ And information notice shall not be necessary.
2. The contractual amount of the FIRST PARTY will be Rs.12,000/-
rt
per month. No amount will be paid for vacation period.
3. The service of FIRST PARTY will be purely on temporary basis.
The appointment is liable to be terminated in case the
performance/conduct of the contract appointee is not found good or if a
regular incumbent is appointed / posted against the vacancy for which
the first party was engaged on contract.
4. The contractual appointment shall not confer any right to
incumbent for the regularization of service at any stage.
5. Contractual appointee will be entitled for one day casual leave
after putting in one month service. This leave can be accumulated up to
one year. No leave of any kind is admissible to the contractual
appointee. He will not be entitled for Medical Reimbursement and LTC
etc. Only maternity leave will be given as per Rules.
6. Unauthorized absence from the duty without the approval of the
controlling Officer shall automatically lead to the termination of the
contract. A contractual appointee will not be entitled for contractual
amount for the period of absence from duty.
7. Transfer of an official appointed on contract basis will not be
permitted from one place to another in any case.
8. Selected candidate will have to submit a certificate of his/her
fitness from a Government/Registered Medical Practitioner. In case of
women candidates pregnancy beyond twelve weeks will render her
temporarily unfit till the confinement is over. The women candidate
should be re-examined for fitness from an authorized Medical
Officer/Practitioner.
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9. Contract appointee shall be entitled to TA/DA if required to go on
tour in connection with his official duties at the same rate as applicable
to regular counter-part official at the minimum of pay scale.
.
10. The Employees Group Insurance Scheme as well as EPF/GPF will
not be applicable to contractual appointee(s).
IN WITNESS the FIRST PARTY AND SECOND PARTY have herein to
set their hands the day, month and year first, above written.
IN THE PRESENCE OF WITNESS:
1. __________________________
__________________________of
__________________________
(Name and Full Address)
(Signature of the FIRST PARTY)
2. __________________________
__________________________
rt
__________________________
(Name and Full Address)
IN THE PRESENCE OF WITNESS:
1. __________________________
__________________________
__________________________
(Name and Full Address)
(Signature of the SECOND PARTY)
2. __________________________
__________________________
__________________________
(Name and Full Address)”
45. In the year 2011, nomenclature of Lecturer (College Cadre)
was changed to Assistant Professor (College Cadre) and accordingly
R&P Rules were notified vide Notification dated 29.10.2011 afresh
wherein Column Nos. 10 and 15 remained as such as were in Rules
2007, however there was slight change in Column No. 15-A regarding
transfer of contract appointee and non-applicability of Service Rules
applicable to regular employee. There was change in nomenclature of
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the R&P Rules as well as the post. Relevant extract of the said
.
Notification is as under:-
“HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 29th October, 2011
1. Short title and Commencement: (1) These rules may be called
the Himachal Pradesh, Higher Education Department, Assistant
Professors (College cadre), Class-I (Gazetted) and Contractof
Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2010.
…….
Annexure-A
Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Assistant
rt
Professor (College Cadre) Class-I, Gazetted and contract in the
Department of Higher Education, Himachal Pradesh.
1. Name of the Post- Assistant Professor (College Cadre).
10 ………..
15. Selection for appointment to post by direct recruitment –
Selection for appointment to the post in case of direct recruitment shallbe made on the basis of viva-voce test, if Himachal Pradesh Public
Service commission or other recruiting agency, as the case may be, so
consider necessary or expedient, by a written test or practical test, the
standard /syllabus etc. of which will be determined by the Commission /other recruiting agency as the case may be.
15-A. Selection for appointment to the post by Contract
appointment- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules,
contract appointments to the post will be made subject to the terms and
conditions given below:-
(I) CONCEPT (a) Under this policy the Assistant Professor (College
Cadre) in the Higher Education Department, H.P. will be engaged on
contract basis initially for one year, which may be extendable on year to
year basis.
Provided that for extension / renewal of contract period on year
to year basis the concerned HOD shall issue a certificate that the
service and conduct of the contract appointee is satisfactory during the
year and only then his period of contract is to be renewed / extended.
(b) POSTS FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF HP PSC:- The Principal
Secretary / Secretary (Hr. Education) to the Government of Himachal
Pradesh after obtaining the approval of the Government to fill up the
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vacant posts on contract basis will place the requisition with the
concerned recruiting agency i.e. H.P. Public Service Commission.
.
(c) The selection will be made in accordance with the eligibility
conditions prescribed in these Rules.
(II) CONTRACTUAL EMOLUMENTS: The Assistant Professor (College
Cadre) appointed on contract basis will be paid consolidated fixed
contractual amount @ Rs.21,600/-PM (Rs. Twenty one thousand and
six hundred) only ( which shall be equal to the minimum of the pay band
plus AGP). An amount of Rs. 648/- (3% of the minimum of pay band +
AGP of the post) as annual increase in contractual emoluments for the
of
subsequent year(s) will be allowed, if contract is extended beyond one
year.
(III) APPOINTING / DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY: The Principal
Secretary / Secretary (Hr. Education) to the Government of Himachal
rt
Pradesh will be appointing and disciplinary authority.
(IV) SELECTION PROCESS: Selection for appointment to the post in
the case of Contract Appointment will be made on the basis of viva-voce
test or if considered necessary or expedient by a written test or practical
test the standard / syllabus etc. of which will be determined by the
concerned recruiting agency i.e. H.P. Public Service Commission,
Shimla.
(V) COMMITTEE FOR SELECTION OF CONTRACTUAL
APPOINTMENTS: As may be constituted by the concerned recruiting
agency i.e. the H.P. Public Service Commission, Shimla from time to
time.
(VI) AGREEMENT After selection of a candidate, he/she shall sign an
agreement as per Annexure-B appended to these Rules.
(VII) TERMS AND CONDITIONS The contract appointee will be paid
fixed contractual amount @ Rs. 21,600/- per month (which shall be
equal to minimum of the pay band + AGP). The Contract Appointee will
be entitled for increase in contractual amount @ Rs. 648/-(3% of
minimum of pay band + AGP of the post) for further extended years and
no other allied benefits such as senior / selections etc. will be given.
(b) The service of the Contract Appointee will be purely on temporary
basis. The appointment is liable to be terminated in case the
performance / conduct of the contract appointee is not found
satisfactory.
(c) Contract Appointee will be entitled for one day casual leave after
putting one month service. This leave can be accumulated up to one
year. No leave of any other kind is admissible to the contract appointee.
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He/She shall not be entitled for Medical Re-imbursement and LTC etc.
only maternity leave will be given as per rules.
.
(d) Unauthorized absence from the duty without the approval of the
controlling Officer shall automatically lead to the termination from the
contract. Contract Appointee shall not be entitled for contractual amount
for the period of absence from duty.
(e) An official on contract basis who have completed five years tenure at
one place of posting will be eligible for transfer on need based basis
wherever required on administrative grounds.
of
(f) Selected candidate will have to submit a certificate of his / her fitness
from a Government / Registered Medical Practitioner. Woman candidate
pregnant beyond 12 weeks will stand temporarily unfit till the
confinement is over. The woman candidate will be re-examined for the
fitness from an authorized Medical Officer/Practitioner.
rt
(g) Contract appointee will be entitled to TA/DA, if required to go on tour
in connection with his/her official duties at the same rate as applicable to
regular counterpart officials at the minimum of pay scale.
(h) Provisions of service rules like FR SR, Leave Rules, GPF Rules,
Pension Rules & Conduct Rules etc. as are applicable in case of regular
employees will not be applicable in case of contract appointees. They
will be entitled for emoluments etc. as detailed in this Column.”
46. In consonance with aforesaid R&P Rules, a large number of
posts of Assistant Professor in college cadre were filled-in on contract
basis by following the procedure prescribed under R&P Rules and after
completion of 3 years service on contract basis, these Assistant Professor
(College Cadre) were regularized.
47. Similar recruitments were made in various Departments for
filling-up various sanctioned regular posts on contract basis and those
employees were also regularized after completion of requisite period of
contract service as notified by the Government.
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48. These employees after regularization claimed benefit of
.
contract service for all service benefits including the seniority.
49. These employees approached the Courts for counting of
their past contract service for extension of service benefits on the grounds
that the said past contract service was followed by regular service without
of
any interruption, as their appointment on contract was made by following
the procedure prescribed under the R&P Rules.
50.
rt
In the cases of this set of employees, it was observed by the
Court that these contract employees were appointed by following the
procedure prescribed for regular appointments and had been selected
after competing with all eligible aspirants in an open competition in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, and therefore, upon
regularization, their past contract service was directed to be counted for
all service benefits, like regular employees, including seniority from the
first day of their initial appointment.
51. Similar set of employees of Food and Civil Supply
Department, who were appointed on contract basis, after insertion of
provision for contract appointments in the R&P Rules, approached the
Court for service benefits of contract period of service. In this matter,
Lekh Ram and others (petitioners in CWP No. 4123 of 2025) had
preferred Original Application No. 3337 of 2016 titled Lekh Ram vs. State
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of HP and others before the Erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
.
Shimla who were though initially appointed on contract during September,
2008/May 2010/November, 2010, but in accordance with procedure
prescribed under Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2007 by an open
competition for all eligible desirous candidates through H.P. Service
of
Selection Board. Private respondents therein were promoted on regular
basis but before regularization of petitioners therein. The Erstwhile H.P.
rt
State Administrative Tribunal allowed the petition vide order dated
25.5.2017, with direction to count entire service of petitioners, including
initially on contract and subsequently on regularization, towards seniority
along with consequential benefits.
52. The aforesaid order passed in Original Application No. 3337
of 2016 was assailed by one Taj Mohammad by filing CWP No. 2004 of
2017 titled Taj Mohammad vs State of HP as well as Government by filing
CWP No. 629 of 2018 titled as State of HP and another vs. Lekh Ram
and others. Both these petitions were decided by a Division Bench of this
High Court vide judgment dated 3.8.2023 by taking into consideration the
various pronouncements of the Supreme Court including Direct Recruits
Class II Engineering Officer’s Association vs. State of Maharashtra
and others (1990) 2 SCC 715. Writ petitions preferred by Taj Mohammad
as well as State were dismissed upholding the order passed by the
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Erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal and it was held that the H.P.
.
State Administrative Tribunal had rightly held that the services rendered
by the petitioners on contract basis were liable to be counted for the
purpose of seniority and consequential benefits after their regularization,
as their initial appointment on contract basis was made after following the
of
procedure prescribed under the R&P Rules.
53. The aforesaid judgment was assailed by State of HP in the
rt
Supreme Court by filing SLP (C) No. 25641-25642/2023 titled State of HP
vs. Lekh Ram and others which was dismissed on 4.12.2023 with
observation that after hearing the learned counsel for petitioner for a
considerable time, impugned order was found perfectly justified and did
not call for interference.
54. Thereafter, Review Petition No. 146 of 2023 titled Taj
Mohammad and others vs. State of HP preferred by Taj Mohammad and
others was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this High Court vide
judgment dated 6.3.2024.
55. The Government had also preferred Review Petition along
with application for condonation of delay CMP(M) No. 428 of 2024 titled
State of HP vs. Lekh Ram and others, which was also dismissed by the
Division Bench on 5.9.2024 alongwith unregistered Review Petition by
rejecting the reasons for preferring the Review Petition.
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56. Lekh Ram and others had filed Execution Petition (T) No. 79
.
of 2024 in this High Court. Order dated 5.12.2024 passed in the said
Execution Petition (T) No. 79 of 2024 was also assailed by the
Government in the Supreme Court by filing SLP (C) No. 3052 of 2025,
titled State of HP vs. Lekh Ram and others, which was dismissed on
of
10.02.2025 with finding that after hearing the learned counsel for
petitioner, no reason and ground to interfere with order was seen.
57.
rt
Thereafter, seniority was assigned to the petitioners Lekh
Ram and others on 10.9.2024 in terms of judgment and they were
promoted amongst others on 26.10.2024.
58. Vide order dated 5.12.2024, the Execution Petition preferred
by Lekh Ram was also decided by Division Bench of this High Court
directing the respondents to consider them for promotion from
retrospective date with all benefits as per judgment in their favour.
59. Thereafter, State has notified the assent of Governor on
7th February, 2025 to the Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Conditions
of Service of Government Employees Act, 2024. Thereupon vide order
dated 1.3.2025, promotion and posting order of petitioners were
withdrawn and vide order dated 15th March, 2025 seniority assigned to
them was also withdrawn.
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60. Contempt Petition No. 183 of 2023 preferred by some of
petitioners in Lekh Ram‘s case was ordered to be listed along with CWP
.
No. 3361 of 2025 vide order dated 18.3.2025, however, in the meanwhile,
restraining the State from initiating any action to the prejudice of
petitioners therein.
61. Other similarly situated employees of other Departments
including Assistant Professor of College Cadre (petitioners in CWP No.
of
10559 of 2025) had also approached the Court and in these cases
judgments/orders were passed either deciding the writ petitions in their
rt
favour or directing the concerned competent Authority to consider and
decide their representations for redressal of their grievances in terms of
judgment passed in Taj Mohammad‘s case. Several Assistant Professors
(College Cadre) also approached the Court by filing various writ petitions
which were decided by different orders of this High Court directing the
concerned competent Authority to consider and decided their
representations in terms of judgment passed in Taj Mohammad‘s case.
Government Employees Act/Impugned Act
62. In some cases, benefits were extended to the employees
whereas other cases were pending consideration before the competent
Authority. In the meanwhile, impugned Act came into force and
resultantly, benefits extended to employees in terms and compliance of
judgments of the Court were withdrawn or proposed to be withdrawn and
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all pending cases including the representations of the Assistant
.
Professors in college cadre were rejected by referring the provisions of
impugned Act.
63. In the aforesaid background, the State has enacted The
Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Government
of
Employees Act, 2024 (Act No.23 of 2025) with following statement of
object and reasons:-
rt “STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS
The provision under Article 309 of the Constitution provides for
making law for regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service of
persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the State. It has also been provided that until provisions on this
behalf are made under an Act, rules may be made. Accordingly, the
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the public
services are being regulated by making the rules. In the recruitment and
promotion rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the appointments on contract
basis have also been included. Since, the service conditions of the
persons working on contract basis are regulated as per the agreement
signed between the parties, the various service rules applicable to the
Government employees, do not apply to such persons and as such the
contract appointees are not part of public services. On account of the
inclusion of contract appointments in the recruitment and promotion
rules, these appointments are being treated as appointments to the
public services wrongly, which is totally against the intention and
purpose of engaging the persons on contract basis. Hence, it is
necessary to harmonise the interests of the persons appointed on
regular basis to the public services and contract appointees. In case, the
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contract appointees are treated as equivalent to the regular employees,
it will not only put a huge burden on the State Exchequer, but the settled
.
position will also get unsettled. The contract appointments have been
made since 2003 and treating them as equivalent to regular employees
will result into revising the seniority lists for the last more than 21 years
and many employees may have to be demoted to adjust the contract
persons. The persons engaged on a contract basis were aware at the
time of their engagement that they were not entitled to seniority and
of
other service benefits for the period of contract service. Such persons
had accepted these terms and conditions and signed contracts to this
effect. Moreover, most of the regular employees were already in the
service and had sufficient experience about the working of the
rt
department, which fact cannot be ignored. Therefore, to avoid a huge
burden on the State Exchequer and not to unsettle the settled position,
the Bill is required to be processed.
This Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid objectives.
(SUKHVINDER SINGH SUKHU)
Chief Minister
DHARAMSHALA:
THE…………, 2024″
64. As the challenge has been laid to all the provisions of the Act
and the entire Act is under challenge, it would be relevant to reproduce
the Act, which reads as under:-
“Act No. 23 of 2025
THE HIMACHAL PRADESH RECRUITMENT AND CONDITIONS OF
SERVICE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ACT, 2024
(AS ASSENTED TO BY THE GOVERNOR ON 7TH FEBRUARY, 2025)
AN
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to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed, to public services in connection with the affairs of the State
and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
.
WHEREAS, article 309 of the Constitution provides for making
law for regulating the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons
appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the State;
AND WHEREAS, in the recruitment and promotion rules framed
in exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to article 309 of
the Constitution, the appointments on contract basis have also been
included;
of
AND WHEREAS, on account of inclusion of contract
appointments in the recruitment and promotions rules, these
appointments are being treated as appointments to the public services;
rtAND WHEREAS, since, the service conditions of the persons
working on contract basis are regulated as per the agreement signed
between the parties, the various service rules applicable to the
Government employees, are not applicable to them and as such thecontract appointees are not part of public service;
AND WHEREAS, it is necessary to harmonise the interests of
the persons appointed on regular basis to the public services and on
contract basis;
NOW THEREFORE, it is expedient to exclude the contract
appointments from the recruitment and promotion rules.
BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh
in the Seventy-fifth Year of the Republic of India as follows:–
1. Short title and commencement.–(1) This Act may be called
the Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Conditions of Service ofGovernment Employees Act, 2024.
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the State
Government may, by notification in the Rajpatra (e-Gazette), Himachal
Pradesh, appoint.
2. Definitions.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,–
(a) “Competent Authority” means an authority, as may be
prescribed;
(b) “Department” means any Department of the
Government of Himachal Pradesh;
(c) “Government” or “State Government” means the
Government of Himachal Pradesh;
(d) “Government employee” means a person appointed
to the public services on regular basis;
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(e) “notification” means a notification published in the
Rajpatra (e-Gazette), Himachal Pradesh;
.
(f) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under
this Act; and
(g) “State” means the State of Himachal Pradesh.
3. Method of recruitment.–All recruitments to the public
services in the State shall be made by regularisation of services, or by
promotion, or in the manner as may be prescribed.
4. Conditions of service.–The conditions of service of a
Government employee shall be such, as may be prescribed.
of
5. Regularisation of persons working on contract basis.–
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, rule, notification,
Government order etc. for the time being in force, the services of a
person appointed on contract basis or on daily wage basis shall be
regularised, in the manner and subject to fulfillment of such terms and
rt
conditions, as may be prescribed.
6. Extension of service benefits.–(1) The service benefits
available under various Central Civil Services Rules, as applicable in the
State, the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Rules, and other service
benefits such as, seniority, increment, promotion, etc. shall be applicable
only to the employees appointed on regular basis.
(2) No person working in any Government Department, who has
not been appointed as per the provisions of this Act and rules made
thereunder on regular basis shall be entitled to service benefits available
under the various Central Civil Services Rules, as applicable in the
State, the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Rules and other service
benefits such as, seniority, increment, promotion etc.:
Provided that a person shall be entitled for service benefits only
from the date of regularisation of his services:
Provided further that a person whose services have been
regularised after 12th December, 2003 shall also be entitled to servicebenefits from the date of regularisation, as if their services have been
regularised under the provisions of this Act:
Provided also that the service benefits already extended to the
persons for the service other than regular service shall stand withdrawn.
7. Validity of rules and orders, etc.–No rule, regulation, order,
direction, or notification made or published and no adjudication, inquiry
or act done under any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder, which is substantially in consonance with the same, shall be
deemed to be illegal, void or invalid only by reason of any defect or form.
8. Amendment in Column 10 of the rules.–Notwithstanding
anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court; law,
rule, notification, order, etc., for the period commencing on and from
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12th December, 2003 and ending on the date of commencement of this
Act, in Column number 10 of the recruitment and promotion rules
notified in exercise of powers conferred by proviso to article 309 of the
.
Constitution of India, the words “on contract basis”, or such simlar words
conveying the same meaning, wherever occurs, the words “by
regularisation” shall be deemed to have always been substituted as if
this Act had been in force at all material times:
Provided that the appointments, if any, already made on contract
basis will be regularised or deemed to have been regularised under the
provisions of this Act.
9. Overriding effect.–The provisions of this Act shall have
of
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistant therewith contained in any
other law, rule, notification, etc., if any.
10. Power to make rules.–(1) The State Government may, by
notification in the Rajpatra (e-Gazatte), Himachal Pradesh; and after
previous publication, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this
Act.
rt(2) Every rule made under this section shall be laid, as soon as
may be after it is made, before the Legislative Assembly, while it is in
session for a total period of not less than ten days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and if,
before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid or the session
immediately following, the Assembly makes any modification in the rule
or decides that the rules should not be made, the rule shall, thereafter,
have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case
may be, so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be
without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that
rule.
11. Power to remove difficulties.–(1) If any difficulty arises in
giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Government may, by
general or special order, published in the Rajpatra (e-Gazette),
Himachal Pradesh, make provision, not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removing
difficulty:
Provided that no such order shall be made under this section
after the expiry of a period of two years from the commencement of this
Act.
(2) Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be
after it is made, be laid before the State Legislative Assembly.
12. Repeal and savings.–(1) All rules, notifications, etc. made
or notified in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to article
309 of the Constitution of India, which are contrary to the provisions of
this Act, are hereby repealed.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Himachal
Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968 with respect to repeals, any rule
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made under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution, any
notification, rule, order, appointment, decision, direction, approval,
authorisation, consent, application, request or thing made, issued, given
.
or done except to the extent that a provision may be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act, continue to be in force and shall have effect as
if made under the corresponding provisions of this Act.”
Petitioners’ submissions
65. Mr. Rajnish Maniktala, Senior Advocate for the petitioners
of
has submitted that public employment must conform to the Constitutional
scheme and that regular appointments against sanctioned posts must be
the rule. While the State may make temporary appointments in genuine
rt
exigencies, making temporary or contractual appointments as a norm
undermines the Constitution and violates Articles 14 and 16. Section 3 of
the Act, which provides regularisation, promotion or any other prescribed
mode as modes of recruitment, is in direct conflict with Articles 315 and
320 because it excludes the role of the H.P. Public Service Commission
by excluding temporary/ad-hoc/contractual appointments from “public
services”. The Act is also attacked being vague and arbitrary as it is silent
as to the manner, authority and timing of regularisation and thereby is
open to misuse, and it permits executive regularisation excluding the
HPPSC, which would defeat equality of opportunity. Further, validity of
the legislation has been challenged on the ground that its retrospective
applicability is a device to nullify judicial decisions (including Direct
Recruits, Lekh Ram, Taj Mohammad and others cases) wherein it has
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been held that persons, appointed after competitive selection and
.
continued uninterruptedly till regularisation, are entitled to consequential
benefits including seniority. Reliance has been placed on a string of
authorities (e.g. State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, M.L. Kesari, Narender
Kumar Tiwari, Mineral Area Development Authority), and it has been
of
urged that the Act facilitates exploitation and “back-door” entry contrary to
the State’s duty to be a Model Employer.
66.
rt
Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has submitted
that the Constitution does not envisage any employment outside the
Constitutional Scheme and without following the requirements set down
therein. The Act, enacted violating the Constitutional Scheme, is bad in
law. There is no legislative competence to enact laws in violation of
Constitutional Scheme. Further that not adhering to Constitutional
Scheme is violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India. To substantiate
the plea reliance has been placed on State of Karnataka vs Uma Devi
(2006) 4 SCC 1, paras 3, 4, 11, 12 (quoted supra).
67. Further reliance has been placed on para 11 of judgment of
the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247,
which reads as under:-
“11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi is two-
fold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of
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or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi was rendered, are
considered for regularization in view of their long service. Second is to.
ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the
practice of employing persons on daily-wage/ad-hoc/ casual for long
periods and then periodically regularize them on the ground that theyhave served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional
or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true
effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more thanof
ten years as on 10.4.2006 (the date of decision in Umadevi) without the
protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts,
possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for
regularization. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such
rt
exercise of regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi
or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, willnot disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for
regularization in terms of the above directions in Umadevi as a one-time
measure.”
68. Reliance has also been placed on paras 5 and 7 of the Apex
Court judgment in Narender Kumar Tiwari vs State of Jharkhand,
(2018) 8 SCC 238, which read as under:-
“5. The decision in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), SCC 1 was
intended to put a full stop to the somewhat pernicious practice ofirregularity appointing daily-wage workers and continuing with them
indefinitely. In fact, in para 49 of the Report, it was pointed out that the
rule of law requires appointments to be made in a constitutional manner
and the State cannot be permitted to perpetuate an irregularity in the
matter of public employment which would adversely affect those who
could be employed in terms of the constitutional scheme. It is for this
reason that the concept of a one-time measure and a cut-off date was
introduced in the hope and expectation that the State would cease and::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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desist from making irregular or illegal appointments and instead make
appointments on a regular basis.
.
6. … …. …
7. The purpose and intent of the decision in State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3), SCC 1 was therefore twofold, namely, to prevent irregularor illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on
those who had been irregularly appointed in the past. The fact that the
State of Jharkhand continued with the irregular appointments for almostof
a decade after the decision in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), SCC 1
is a clear indication that it believes that it was all right to continue with
irregular appointments, and whenever required, terminate the services
rt
of the irregularly appointed employees on the ground that they were
irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of exploitation of theemployees by not giving them the benefits of regularisation and by
placing the sword of Damocles over their head. This is precisely what
State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), SCC 1 and State of Karnataka v.
M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 sought to be avoid.”
69. Mr. Maniktala, Senior Advocate has further placed reliance
on paras 31 and 40 of Mineral Area Development Authority vs Steel
Authority, (2024) 10 SCC 1, which read as under:-
“31. Part XI of the Constitution deals with the relations between the
Union and the States. Article 245 provides that subject to the provisions
of the Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part
of the territory of India and the Legislature of a State may make laws for
the whole or any part of the State. The power to enact laws is inherently
related to the sovereignty of the Union and State legislatures in their
respective fields. While the sovereign legislative powers of Parliament
and the State legislatures are plenary, they are subject to well-defined
constitutional limitations. The language of Article 245 makes the
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Constitution. Therefore, laws made by a legislature may be void not only
for the lack of legislative power in respect of the subject-matter, but also.
for transgressing constitutional limitations. It is the duty of constitutional
courts to resolve disputes regarding a breach of constitutional limits by
the Union and State legislatures.”
….. …… …..
40. With respect to the powers of taxation, Article 265 provides that
no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. In Mafatlalof
Industries v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536, a nine-Judge Bench of
this Court held that the “law” mentioned under Article 265 refers to a
valid law whose validity has to be determined with reference to other
provisions in the Constitution. Therefore, with respect to taxation laws
rt
particularly, there is a constitutional requirement that the law imposing
tax must be in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution,particularly Part III dealing with the fundamental rights. This is also a
constitutional limitation because the appropriate legislature has to
ensure that the law is in accord with the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. Any legislation enacted by the legislature in excess of its
constitutional powers is void.”
70. Mr. Maniktala, Senior Advocate has submitted that the Act is
totally silent as to how the regularisation of temporary or ad hoc or
contractual appointments would take place. As per the Act, the
regularisation will take place in the manner and terms & conditions that
may be prescribed. Which authority will be responsible for regularisation,
is uncertain. Whether it takes place after completion of certain number of
years of such service? If it does, it totally excludes role of Public Service
Commission and is contrary to Constitutional Scheme. The Act also does
not provide any role of HPPSC at any stage of appointment by way of
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regularisation or promotion in contrast with Recruitment Rules. The Act is
.
vague, open to misuse/abuse and arbitrary thereby violative of Article 14.
To substantiate this plea, reliance has been placed on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
71. It has been submitted by Mr.Maniktala, that the provisions of
of
Act are vague & open to abuse in sense that regularisation of services
can be done by any Executive Authority excluding role of HPPSC. It will
rt
defeat the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection of laws and
equality before law. Articles 14 & 16 will be violated.
72. Mr.Maniktala has further submitted that the impugned Act is
not to remove some defect, pointed out in the Judgments of Apex Court
or this Court, but it is simply to nullify the effect of judicial decisions by
making the law retrospectively, which is impermissible under law.
73. It has been submitted by Mr. Maniktala that the Act nullifies
the judgments in Direct Recruits, Lekh Ram, Taj Mohammed cases etc.
(supra) where it is laid down that if the appointment is made after
considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee
continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in
accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments,
there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of
seniority. In support of this plea learned Senior Advocate has referred
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judgments/orders in CWP 1235 of 2007 decided on 17.9.2013, Bhojia
.
Dental College vs State; CWP 851 of 1996 Narain Singh vs State of
HP; (2000) 3 Shim LC 103; and WP (C) 1018 of 2021 decided on
19.11.2025, titled as Madras Bar Association vs Union of India.
74. It has also been pleaded by Mr. Maniktala that Act is also not
of
sustainable as Articles 14 and 16 require that the State should not exploit
its employees nor should it seek to take advantage of the helplessness
rt
and misery of either the unemployed persons or the employees. The
State must be a Model Employer, whereas the impunged Act will facilitate
back door entry.
75. Mr.Dilip Sharma, Senior Advocate has also submitted on
behalf of petitioners that impugned Act is inconsistent with provisions of
Part-III of the Constitution and, therefore, in view of Article 13 of the
Constitution, it is void abinitio.
76. Article 13 of the Constitution of India reads as under:-
“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental
rights.—
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency,
be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges
the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of
this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
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(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,
.
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of
India the force of law;
(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by Legislature
or other competent authority in the territory of India before the
commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed,
notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be
of
then in operation either at all or in particular areas.
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this
Constitution made under article 368.”
rt
77. Mr.Dilip Sharma, Senior Advocate has submitted that
there are two parts of Article 13, first part deals with law which was in
force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and
second limb of this Article deals with laws to be made after
commencement of the Constitution, whereby State has been prohibited
by stating that State shall not make any law, which takes away or
abridges the Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution with further
declaration that any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the
extent of the contravention, be void. He has submitted that law for the
purpose of this Article, includes Ordinance, order, bye-laws, rule,
regulation, notification, custom or usage, and by giving wide meaning,
intention of the framers of the Constitution is clear that in no eventuality
any law can be permitted to be violative of Part-III of the Constitution of
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India. It has been submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution,
.
propounding the guarantee of equality, is part of Part-III of the
Constitution and in numerous pronouncements, the Courts, including the
Apex Court, have held that arbitrariness is in negation to the doctrine of
equality, and arbitrariness is antithesis to the principle of equality
of
enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. He has further submitted
that Article 16 of the Constitution, subject to certain exceptions carved out
rt
therein, guarantees equal opportunity before making any appointment in
a transparent manner.
78. It has been submitted by Mr.Sharma, Senior Advocate that
Section 3 of the impugned Act provides entry in public service on
regularisation of service, which clearly indicates that person would be
appointed/engaged before regularisation of the service, i.e. entry in public
service which is nowhere provided in Recruitment and Promotion Rules
and, therefore, an extra constitutional mode has been proposed to be
devised by the Government to make appointment to the public service
without following the mandate of the Constitution, which is definitely
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and thus the impugned
Act being violative of provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, is void ab
initio and thus deserves to be declared ultra vires to the Constitution and
thereby to be quashed.
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79. It has been further submitted by Mr. Dilip Sharma, Senior
.
Advocate that the contract appointees in Taj Mohammad and other
similar cases were appointed on contract basis, following the Recruitment
and Promotion Rules and, therefore, after regularisation, the Courts have
rightly extended benefits to them of judgment of Direct Recruit Class II
of
Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others, (1990) 2 SCC 715, but Section 8 of the impugned Act provides
rt
that instead of following Recruitment and Promotion Rules, the
appointments shall be made otherwise. It has been further submitted that
the candidates appointed either on contract basis or on regular basis, but
following the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, facing the same rigour of
process, competing with all eligible candidates, who had applied for the
post, are no manner different from each other except the nomenclature
used by the State as “contract appointee” and “regular appointee” and,
therefore, in Taj Mohammad‘s case and other similar cases, the Courts
have rightly treated such candidates equal to each other with direction to
extension of service benefits of contract service period to such
appointees alongwith seniority.
80. It has been further submitted that cut off date, i.e.,
12.12.2003, is also arbitrary in nature because prior to 12.12.2003, there
was no provision in the Recruitment and Promotion Rules to make
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appointment on contract basis, but despite that the candidates appointed
.
prior to 12.12.2003 have been treated as having been appointed
differently than the candidates appointed on contract after 12.12.2003,
whereas the candidates after insertion of “contract appointment” in
Recruitment and Promotion Rules were and have been appointed by
of
following the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, but the State is extending
the benefits to such contract employees, who were appointed without
rt
following the procedure without any policy, whereas the contract
appointees appointed as per policy and/or following the Recruitment and
Promotion Rules are being denied the same and thus, impugned Act is
intended to justify the illegal and dishonest conduct and practice of the
respondents-State, which is not permissible in the Constitutional Scheme.
81. It has been further submitted by Mr. Sharma, Senior
Advocate that provisions of entire Act clearly display the intention of the
State that appointments to the Government job are firstly to be made
dehors of Recruitment and Promotion Rules without following the
Constitutional Scheme and thereafter, their entry in public service shall be
treated only on regularisation, for which procedure has nowhere been
provided, either in the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and in the
impugned Act, therefore, the Statute enacted by way of impugned Act is
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nullity, being arbitrary which cannot withstand with the settled law of the
.
land and thus, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
82. Mr.Sharma, Senior Advocate has submitted that present
enactment is a glaring example of abuse of power of legislature as the
Act has been enacted to use as a shield against the pronouncement of
of
the Apex Court, more particularly by applying the law retrospectively.
83. It has been submitted by Mr. Dilip Sharma, Senior Advocate
rt
that Court has not given any verdict in favour of contract appointees on its
own, but it has interpreted law and no law has been struck down,
therefore, there is no question of removing the base of findings, which
has caused the State to suffer judgment, but verdict of the Court is in
consonance with the Recruitment and Promotion Rules and, therefore,
impugned Act, has been enacted with ulterior motive which is clearly
evident from the Statement of Object and Reasons for enactment of the
Act, whereas such enactment in the given facts and circumstances, is
impermissible because benefit of judgment cannot be withdrawn by the
Legislature/Government by doing anything indirectly which is not
permissible directly.
84. It has been submitted by learned arguing counsel Mr.
Sharma that the plea of the State, which is clear from the Object and
Reasons, wherein it has been stated that contract appointments are being
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treated by the Courts as regular appointments from the date of initial
.
appointment, is also misleading and mischievous because during period
of contract appointments, no such benefits have been given by the Courts
to the contract appointees, but it is only after regularisation of their
services, who were working on contract after appointment by following the
of
Recruitment and Promotion Rules, the Courts, by applying the principle of
Director Recruits case, have extended the benefit of contract service. It is
rt
not a case where any contract appointee has been extended benefit of
service before regularisation of the service, but on regularisation of
contract appointee, after appointment on contract basis according to
Recruitment and Promotion Rules and Policy, followed by regularisation
without interruption, the benefits have been extended by the Courts to the
contract appointees by interpreting Recruitment and Promotion Rules as
well as CCS Pension Rules. It has been submitted that neither Pension
Rules have been amended nor any benefits have been given by the Court
to any employee before regularisation by the State and, therefore, the
impugned Act deserves to be quashed and set aside.
85. It has been submitted by Mr. Dilip Sharma, Senior Advocate
that direct recruits are being treated differently, some employees were
appointed on regular basis under the same Recruitment and Promotion
Rules, whereas some of them were appointed on contract despite being
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governed by the same Recruitment and Promotion Rules and, therefore,
.
such contract appointees are not backdoor entrants, but are similarly
situated to the candidates who were appointed on regular basis, and the
appointments of the contract appointees were and are not illegal, but
these were irregular because of conduct of the State and when such
of
irregularity has been removed by regularization of the service, then
definitely such appointees are entitled for service benefits in terms of
rt
Direct Recruits-II case including the seniority, as has been held by the
Courts, and to overrule the same, present impugned Act has been
enacted and thus petitions deserve to be allowed by quashing impugned
Act.
86. Mr.Sharma has submitted that in Lekh Ram‘s case, decided
alongwith Taj Mohammad‘s case, there was no different procedure for
recruitment/engagement within the Recruitment and Promotion Rules,
followed for appointment/engaging employees on contract basis and
there was also no difference of duty. Therefore, there is no question of
unsettling the settled position because the persons, who are entitled for
seniority for their appointment by following the same process, but were
and are being deprived from the same by mischievous act of the State by
offering appointment on contract, have been held entitled for benefit of
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seniority, and therefore, it cannot be a ground for the State to enact the
.
law to avoid the judgment suffered by the State.
87. It has been submitted by learned arguing counsel Mr.
Sharma that Preamble of the Act and Statement of Object and Reasons
published for enactment of the Act, are clearly indicating that this is a
of
deliberate attempt of the Legislature/Government to override the
judgment, whereas affirmation of rights of the employees and benefits
rt
extended to them, are findings of the fact which cannot be taken away by
enacting a Law to surpass the judgment of the Court. Appointments,
though were made by following proper procedure, are being declared
illegal. Attempt of the Government to nullify appointments made by
following due process, by bringing the impugned Act is definitely illegal.
88. Mr. Sharma has also contended that provisions of impugned
Act, especially Section 3 of the Act provides that direct recruitment shall
be made as prescribed and entry of such appointees to the public service
shall be on regularisation which presupposes pre-regular service and
there is no mode provided for pre-regularisation engagement. Therefore,
impugned Act is giving complete go-by to the Constitutional Scheme,
especially Article 309 of the Constitution.
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89. It has also been submitted by Mr. Sharma that legislature
.
cannot nullify the judgment which has attained finality between the
parties. The parties shall be governed by principle of resjudicata.
90. To substantiate his plea, Mr. Sharma has referred following
paras of the Apex Court judgment in G.C. Kanungo Vs. State of Orissa,
of
(1995) 5 SCC 96:-
“8. …… …… ……
……
rt …… ……
4. If the awards of Special Arbitration Tribunals did not
merge in the judgments and decrees of Courts, when they weremade ‘Rules of Court’, can it be said that the 1991 Amendment
Act which nullifies the judgments and decrees of Courts by which
the awards of the Special Arbitration Tribunals, were made‘Rules of Court’ is enacted by the Orissa State Legislature by
encroaching upon the judicial power of the State exclusively
vested in Courts as sentinals of Rule of Law, a basic feature ofour Constitution, and hence is unconstitutional?
17. It is true, as argued on behalf of the petitioners, that a
Legislature has no legislative power to render ineffective the earlier
judicial decisions by making a law which simply declares the earlierjudicial decisions as invalid or not binding, for such power if exercised
would not be a legislative power exercised by it but a judicial power
exercised by it encroaching upon the judicial power of the State
exclusively vested in Courts. The said argument advanced, since
represents the correct and well-settled position in law, we have thought
it unnecessary to refer to the decisions of this Court cited by learned
counsel for the petitioners, in that behalf and hence have not referred to
them.
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18. For the 1991 Amendment Act to become unconstitutional on the
ground that it has rendered judgments and decrees of Courts by which.
the Special Arbitration Tribunals’ awards are made “Rules of Court”,
invalid or ineffective, such judgments and decrees must be decisions of
Courts rendered by them in exercise of their judicial power of decisionmaking in respect of the subjects of dispute before them and not where
they render judgments and decrees to make the awards of the Special
Arbitration Tribunals “Rules of Court” so that they could be madeof
enforceable through the machinery of Courts. Thus, the awards of the
Special Arbitration Tribunals when get the super-added seals of Courts
for such awards, by the Courts making them `Rules of Court’ by their
judgments and decrees, such awards do not get merged in judgments
rt
and decrees of Courts so as to make them the decisions of Courts,
rendered in exercise of State’s judicial power of decision making, as ithappens in the causes directly brought before them by way of suits for
their decisions. As we have already pointed out, question of claim or
cause of a party which gets merged in the award of a Special ArbitrationTribunal, in turn, getting merged in judgment and decree made by Civil
Court, for the purpose of making the award a “Rule of Court”, so as to
make it enforceable, can not arise. What needs to be noted is, thatCourts even if render their judgments and decrees for making the
awards “Rules of Court”, those judgments and decrees cannot
substitute their own decisions for the decisions of Special Arbitration
Tribunals contained in their awards. This situation makes it clear thatpower exercised by the Civil Courts in making the awards of Special
Arbitration Tribunals `Rules of Court’ by their judgments and decrees is
not their judicial power exercised in rendering judgments and decrees,
as Civil Courts exercise their powers vested in them for resolving
disputes between parties. To be precise, judgments and decrees made
by Civil Courts in making the awards of the Special Arbitration Tribunals
the “Rules of Court” for the sole purpose of their enforceability through
the machinery of Court, cannot make such judgments and decrees of
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power of the State exclusively invested in them under our Constitution.
Thus, when the judgments and decrees made by Civil Courts in making.
the awards of Special Arbitration Tribunals “Rules of Court” are not
those judgments and decrees of Courts made in exercise of judicial
power of State vested in them under our Constitution, the 1991Amendment Act when nullifies the judgments and decrees of Courts by
which awards of Special Arbitration Tribunals are made “Rules of
Court”, cannot be regarded as that enacted by the Orissa Stateof
Legislature encroaching upon the judicial powers of State exercisable
under our Constitution by Courts as sentinels of Rule of Law, a basic
feature of our Constitution. Hence, the 1991 Amendment Act in so far as
it nullifies judgments and decrees of Courts by which awards of Special
rt
Arbitration Tribunals are made “Rules of Court”, even where they are
affirmed by higher Courts, cannot be regarded as that made by theOrissa State Legislature transgressing upon the judicial power of State
vested in Courts as would make it unconstitutional.
Point 5
19. If the awards made by Special Arbitration Tribunals which are
sought to be nullified by the 1991 Amendment Act enacted by the
Orissa State Legislature, are regarded as those made by the SpecialArbitration Tribunals in exercise of judicial power of the State conferred
upon them, by an enactment of the State Legislature, the 1984
Amendment Act, was it open to the State Legislature to enact the 1991
Amendment Act to simply nullify such awards without encroaching uponthe judicial power of the State especially conferred on Special
Arbitration Tribunals in the matter of adjudicating upon arbitral disputes
not coming before them at the instance of parties, is the point.
20. When awards are made in disputes between the parties by the
arbitrators of their choice or arbitrators who may be appointed by the
Court on their behalf, as provided for under the Principal Act, such
awards, can never be regarded as those made by the arbitrators in
exercise of the judicial power of the State conferred upon them.
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constituted under a legislative enactment in exercise of the power
conferred upon them under such enactment in the matter of adjudicating.
upon disputes between the parties according to accepted norms of
judicial procedure, can such awards be not regarded as those rendered
by the arbitration tribunals in exercise of the judicial power of the Stateconferred upon them under the legislative enactment, is the principal
question.
21. As the Objects and Reasons annexed to the Bill on the basis of
of
which the impugned 1991 Amendment Act has been enacted for
constituting Special Arbitration Tribunals by the State and for conferring
power of adjudicating disputes between parties referred to them,
furnishes the historical background in which the Bill was introduced in
rt
the State Legislature, it would be useful to reproduce the same thus:
“Section 41-A of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as it applies to the
State of Orissa was amended with effect from 26.3.1983 by the
Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act 1984, whereby, a proviso to
sub-section (1) of the said section was inserted to the effect thatreference to arbitration of disputes specified in the said sub-
section involving claims of rupees one crore or above may be
made to a Special Arbitration Tribunal comprising one or moreretired High Court Judges, as may be constituted by the State
Government from time to time. In the course of operation of this
proviso it was experienced that a tendency has developed
among the Contractors to seek constitution of Special ArbitrationTribunals by inflating their claims to rupees one crore and above,
inter alia, to avoid depositing the security money required for
reference to the Arbitration Tribunal. Therefore, the said proviso
was deleted with effect from 25.1.1990 by the Arbitration (Orissa
Amendment) Act 1989 (Orissa Act 1 of 1990). While so deleting
the proviso, the cases which were pending before the Special
Arbitration Tribunal for disposal, whereas the cases in which
award was already passed were left unaffected in view of
prospective operation of the amendment.
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Later it came to the notice of the Government that in
some of the cases, in which award was made by a Special.
Arbitration Tribunal, not only the Contractors inflated their claims
abnormally but also the awards passed in respect thereof are
surprisingly high and unreasonable. This is a matter of seriousconcern for the Government since the amounts involved in such
awards, besides being unreasonable and assessed improperly
and inaccurately for the reason that the one man Specialof
Arbitration Tribunals were not assisted by any Technical and
Finance members as in the case of the Arbitration Tribunal, put a
heavy and undesirable burden on the public exchequer to which
the Government, in view of its serious responsibility to the people
rtas well as the obligation to the Constitution cannot close their
eyes.
Accordingly, it is considered necessary in the public
interest to make the provision relating to reference of disputes to
the Special Arbitration Tribunals during the period of operation ofthe proviso to sub-section (1) of section 41-A i.e., between
26.3.1983 and 24.1.1994, subject to one more condition so that
any reference to arbitration made to a Special ArbitrationTribunal during the said period inconsistently with the proposed
new condition shall be invalid and, in every such case, a fresh
reference shall be made to the Arbitration Tribunal within the
stipulated period for adjudication of the dispute.
For the above purpose, the Arbitration (Orissa
Amendment) Ordinance, 1991 (Orissa Ordinance No. 7 of 1991)
was Ordinance, 1991 was promulgated to amend section 41-A of
the Arbitration Act, 1940 as applicable to the State of Orissa and
necessary consequential provision was made in such Ordinance.
The said Ordinance is required to be replaced by an Act of the
State Legislature.
The Bill seeks to achieve the above object.”
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22. What are the Special Arbitration Tribunals, adverted to in the
above Objects and Reasons of the Bill, the awards of which are sought
.
to be invalidated by the Amendment Act to be made pursuant to that Bill
requires mention here for understanding as to how they have come into
existence, as to what is the power exercised by them in resolving the
disputes referred to them and as to how they are resolved by making
the award. Under the 1982 Amendment Act, a Special provision had
been made empowering the State Government to constitute Arbitration
of
Tribunals consisting of three members and referring certain disputes for
decision by those Arbitration Tribunals. When 1984 Amendment Act
was enacted by the State Legislature, it provided for referring certain
disputes involving claims of Rs. 1 crore or above, to Special Arbitration
rt
Tribunals to be constituted by the State Government comprised of one
or more retired High Court Judges, from time to time. It also provided for
transfer of disputes involving claims of Rs. 1 crore or above pending
before the Arbitration Tribunals constituted under the 1982 Amendment
Act to the Special Arbitration Tribunal to be constituted by the State
Government under 1984 Amendment Act. One of the provisions in the
1984 Amendment Act read thus:
“The business of the Arbitration Tribunal or Special Arbitration
Tribunal shall be conducted in such manner as the Tribunal may
determine and awards made and signed shall be supported by
reasons.”
23. From what we have stated hereinbefore, it becomes obvious that
the Special Arbitration Tribunals had been constituted by the State
Government in accordance with the 1984 Amendment Act to adjudicate
upon or decide the disputes referred to them under that Act, by making
reasoned awards. The power of deciding the disputes conferred upon
those Special Tribunals was not conferred upon them by the parties to
the disputes. Instead such power had been conferred upon them by the
State under the provisions of the 1984 Amendment Act. Such Arbitration
Tribunals had to make the reasoned awards because they were
enjoined to do so under that Amendment Act itself. Though the Special
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Arbitration Tribunals themselves are entitled under the provisions of the
said Amendment Act to evolve their own procedure for conducting its
.
proceedings, ordinary norms of judicial procedure had to be adopted by
them so as to conform to the principles of natural justice being Tribunals
constituted under a legislative enactment with power conferred upon
them to adjudicate upon disputes between parties.
24. Thus, when under the 1984 Amendment Act, the Special
Arbitration Tribunals had been constituted by the State Government and
of
were conferred by that enactment the power of adjudicating upon the
disputes between parties referred to them, conforming to the normal
judicial procedure and by making reasoned awards, the awards so
made by Special Arbitration Tribunals, we cannot but hold are those
rt
made in exercise of State’s judicial power conferred upon them under
the 1984 Amendment Act for deciding the disputes between the parties
by having recourse to normal judicial process.
25. No doubt, by the 1989 Amendment Act, referred to in the Objects
and Reasons of the Bill, the provision relating to constitution of Special
Arbitration Tribunals introduced in the Principal Act by the 1984
Amendment Act was deleted and a provision was made therein for
transfer of matters pending consideration before such Special
Arbitration Tribunals to the Arbitration Tribunals constituted under the
1982 Amendment Act and decision to be made thereon. But, for getting
rid of the awards which had already been made by the Special
Arbitration Tribunals referred for their decision under the 1984
Amendment Act, by the State Government, 1991 Ordinance was
promulgated by the State and the same is subsequently replaced by the
1991 Amendment Act.
26. The 1991 Amendment Act which is reproduced by us earlier
contains hardly four Sections. Out of the Sections 2 and 3 alone are
material. Insofar as Section 2 is concerned by its deemed retrospective
operation between 26th day of March 1983 and 24 th day of February,
1990 forbids the making of reference under sub-section (1) of Section
42-A of the Principal Act, involving a claim of Rs.1 crore or more unless
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the amount agreed to by the parties in the Contract exceeds the amount
of such claim.
.
27. Then, coming to Section 3 it declares that all the awards made
by the Special Arbitration Tribunals on references made to it under the
1984 Amendment Act during the period adverted to under Section 2
invalid even where those awards were made `Rules of Court’, i.e.,
judgments and decrees of Courts. Further, that Section requires the
making of fresh references to arbitration of such dispute to the
of
Arbitration Tribunals constituted under the 1982 Amendment Act. Thus,
Sections 2 and 3 of the 1991 Amendment Act seek to nullify the awards
of Special Arbitration Tribunals, made on disputes referred to them from
the 26th day of March, 1983 to 24th day of February, 1990 under the
rt
1984 Amendment Act becomes obvious.
28. Thus, the impugned 1991 Amendment Act seeks to nullify the
awards made by the Special Arbitration Tribunals constituted under the
1984 Amendment Act, in exercise of the power conferred upon them by
that Act itself. When, the awards made under the 1984 Amendment Act
by the Special Arbitration Tribunals in exercise of the State judicial
power conferred upon them which cannot be regarded as those merged
in Rules of Court or judgments and decrees of Courts, are sought to be
nullified by 1991 Amendment Act, it admits of no doubt that legislative
power of the State Legislature is used by enacting impugned 1991
Amendment Act to nullify or abrogate the awards of the Special
Arbitration Tribunals by arrogating to itself, a judicial power. [See Re:
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1991) Supp. 2 SCR 497]. From this,
it follows that the State Legislature by enacting the 1991 Amendment
Act has encroached upon the judicial power entrusted to judicial
authority resulting in infringement of a basic feature of the Constitution
the Rule of Law. Thus, when the 1991 Amendment Act nullifies the
awards of the Special Arbitration Tribunals, made in exercise of the
judicial power conferred upon them under the 1984 Amendment Act, by
encroaching upon the judicial power of the State, we have no option but
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undisputed legal position that a legislature has no legislative power to
render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions by making a law which.
simply declares the earlier judicial decisions as invalid and not binding,
for such powers, if exercised, would not be legislative power exercised
by it, but judicial power exercised by it encroaching upon the judicialpower of the State vested in a judicial Tribunal as the Special Arbitration
Tribunals under 1984 Amendment Act. Moreover, where the arbitral
awards sought to be nullified under the 1991 Amendment Act are thoseof
made by Special Arbitration Tribunals constituted by the State itself
under 1984 Amendment Act to decide arbitral disputes to which State
was a party, it cannot be permitted to undo such arbitral awards which
have gone against it, by having recourse to its legislative power for
rt
grant of such permission as could result in allowing the State, if nothing
else, abuse of its power of legislation.”
91. Further reliance has been placed on paras 12, 15 and 20 of
judgment in S.R. Bhagwat and others Vs. State of Mysore, (1995) 6
SCC 16, which read as under:-
“12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a
binding judicial pronouncement between the parties cannot be made
ineffective with the aid of any legislative power by enacting a provision
which in substance over-rules such judgment and is not in the realm of
a legislative enactment which displaces the basis or foundation of thejudgment and uniformly applies to a class of persons concerned with the
entire subject sought to be covered by such an enactment having
retrospective effect. We may only refer to two of these judgments.
… ….. …
15. We may note at the very outset that in the present case the High
Court had not struck down any legislation which was sought to be re-
enacted after removing any defect retrospectively by the impugned
provisions. This is a case where on interpretation of existing law, the
High Court had given certain benefits to the petitioners. That order of::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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mandamus was sought to be nullified by the enactment of the impugned
provisions in a new statute. This in our view would be clearly.
impermissible legislative exercise.
….. …… …..
20. We, therefore, strike down Section 11 sub-section (2) as
unconstitutional, illegal and void. So far as the underlined impugned
portions of Section 4 sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) are concerned, they
clearly conflict with the binding direction issued by the Division Bench ofof
the High Court against the respondent-State and in favour of the
petitioners. Once respondent-State had suffered the mandamus to give
consequential financial benefits to the allottees like the petitioners on
the basis of the deemed promotions such binding direction about
rt
payment of consequential monetary benefits cannot be nullified by the
impugned provisions of Section 4. Therefore, the underlined portions ofsub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 will have to be read down in
the light of orders of the court which have become final against the
respondent-State and in so far as these provisions are inconsistent withthese final orders containing such directions of judicial authorities and
competent courts, these impugned provisions of Section 4 have to give
way and to the extent of such inconsistency must be treated to beinoperative and ineffective. Accordingly the aforesaid provisions are
read down by observing that the statutory provisions contained in sub-
sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 providing that such persons who
have been given deemed promotions shall not be entitled to any arrearsfor the period prior to the date of their actual promotion, shall not apply
in cases where directions to the contrary of competent courts against
the respondent-State have become final.”
92. Reliance has also been placed on paras 122 of Secretary to
Government of Kerala Irrigation Department and others Vs. James
Varghese and others, (2022) 9 SCC 593, which read as under:-
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“122. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of T.N. v.
State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696, after an elaborate survey of all the.
earlier judgments, has summed up the Law on “separation of powers
doctrine” under the Constitution of India, as under: (SCC pp. 770-772,
para 126)“Summary of separation of powers doctrine under the Indian
Constitution
…. …… ….
of
126.6 If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter
and competence to make a validating law, it can at any time
make such a validating law and make it retrospective. The
validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the
rt
legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the
subject-matter and whether in making the validation law itremoves the defect which the courts had found in the existing
law.
126.7. The law enacted by the legislature may apparently seem
to be within its competence but yet in substance if it is shown as
an attempt to interfere with the judicial process, such law may be
invalidated being in breach of doctrine of separation of powers.
In such situation, the legal effect of the law on a judgment or a
judicial proceeding must be examined closely, having regard to
legislative prescription or direction. The questions to be asked
are:
(i) Does the legislative prescription or legislative direction
interfere with the judicial functions?
(ii) Is the legislation targeted at the decided case or whether
impugned law requires its application to a case already
finally decided?
(iii) What are the terms of law; the issues with which it deals
and the nature of the judgment that has attained finality?
If the answer to Questions (i) and (ii) is in the affirmative and the
consideration of aspects noted in Question (iii) sufficiently
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establishes that the impugned law interferes with the judicial
functions, the Court may declare the law unconstitutional.”
.
93. Mr. Sharma has also placed reliance on para 13 of Direct
Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others, (1990) 2 SCC 715, which reads as under:-
“13. When the cases were taken up for hearing before us, it was faintly
of
suggested that the principle laid down in Patwardhan’s case was
unsound and fit to be over-ruled, but no attempt was made to
substantiate the plea. We were taken through the judgment by the
rt
learned counsel for the parties more than once and we are in complete
agreement with the ratio decidendi, that the period of continuousofficiation by a government servant, after his appointment by following
the rules applicable for substantive appointments, has to be taken into
account for determining his seniority; and seniority cannot be
determined on the sole test of confirmation, for, as was pointed out,confirmation is one of the inglorious uncer-tainties of government
service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the
availability of substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding interseniority has to conform to the principles of equality spelt out by articles
1 and 16. If an appointment is made by way of stop-gap arrangement,
without considering the claims of all the eligible available persons and
without following the rules of appointment, the experience on suchappointment cannot be equated with the experience of a regular
appoint- ee, because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To
equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would
violate the equality clause. But if the appointment is made after
considering the claims of all eligible candidates and the appointee
continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service
in accordance with the rules made for regular substantive appointments,
there is no reason to exclude the officiating service for purpose of
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made in accordance with the rules applicable to substantive
appointments as in the present case. To hold otherwise will be.
discriminatory and arbitrary. This principle has been followed in
innumerable cases and has been further elaborated by this Court in
several judgments including those in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P.and others, (1980) 4 SCC 226, and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage
Disposal Committee and others v. R.K. Kashyap, 1989 Supp. 1 SCC
194, with which we are in agreement. In Narender Chadha and others v.
of
Union of India (1986) 1 SCC 188, the officers were promoted although
without following the procedure prescribed under the rules, but they
continuously worked for long periods of nearly 15-20 years on the posts
without being reverted. The period of their continuous officiation was
rt
directed to be counted for seniority as it was held that any other view
would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. There isconsiderable force in this view also. We, there- fore, confirm the
principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous
officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rulesprescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service.”
94. Further reliance has been placed on para 22 of judgment of
the Apex Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others, AIR (5) 1963, Supreme Court, 1019, which reads as under:-
“22. Art. 13(2) on the other hand begins with an injunction to the State
not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
Part III. There is thus a constitutional prohibition to the State against
making laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights. The
legislative power of Parliament and the Legislatures of States under
Art. 245 is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and
therefore subject to Art. 13(2), which specifically prohibits the State from
making any law taking away or abridging the fundamental rights.
Therefore, it seems to us that the prohibition contained in Art. 13(2)
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abridging the fundamental rights as it would be where law is made
against the distribution of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to.
the Constitution between Parliament and the Legislature of a State.
Further Art. 13(2) provides that the law shall be void to the extent of the
contravention. Now contravention in the context takes place only oncewhen the law is made, for the contravention is of the prohibition to make
any law which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. There is
no question of the contravention of Art. 13(2) being a continuing matter.
of
Therefore, where there is a question of a post-Constitution law, there is
a prohibition against the State from taking away or abridging
fundamental rights and there is a further provision that if the prohibition
is contravened the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention.
rt
In view of this clear provision it must be held that unlike a law covered
by Art. 13(1) which was valid when made, the law made incontravention of the prohibition contained in Art. 13 (2) is a still,born law
either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention.
Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no question ofits revival under the doctrine of eclipse. A plain reading therefore of the
words in Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2) brings out a clear distinction between
the two. Art. 13(1) declares such pre-Constitution laws as areinconsistent with fundamental rights void. Art. 13 (2) consists of two
parts; the first part imposes an inhibition on the power of the State to
make a law contravening fundamental rights, and the second part,
which is merely a consequential one, mentions the effect of the breach.
Now what the doctrine of eclipse can revive is the operation of a law
which was operative until the Constitution came into force and had since
then become inoperative either wholly or partially; it cannot confer
power on the State to enact a law in breach of Art. 13(2) which would be
the effect of the application of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution
laws. Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which applies to existing law,
the doctrine of eclipse is applicable as laid down in Bhikuji Narain
Dhakras v. State of M.P. AIR 1955 SC 781; but in the case of a law
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and the effect of that is what we have already indicated and which was
indicated by this Court as far back as Saghir Ahmad v. Strate of U.P.,.
AIR 1954 SC 728).”
95. Reliance has also been placed on paras 43 and 46 of the
judgment of the Apex Court in K.K. Poonacha Vs. State of Karnataka
and others, (2010) 9 SCC 671, which read as under:-
of
“43. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini v.
State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1019 reviewed various precedents and
observed that the doctrine of eclipse will apply to pre-Constitution laws
rt
which are governed by Article 13(1) and would not apply to post-
Constitution laws which are governed by Article 13(2). The Court
rejected the argument that there should be no difference in the matter of
the application of doctrine of eclipse to both the clauses of Article 13
and observed: (AIR pp. 1029-30, para 22)”
“22. Art. 13(2) on the other hand begins with an injunction to the
State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by Part III. There is thus a constitutional prohibition to
the State against making laws taking away or abridgingfundamental rights. The legislative power of Parliament and the
Legislatures of States under Art. 245 is subject to the other
provisions of the Constitution and therefore subject to Art. 13(2),
which specifically prohibits the State from making any law takingaway or abridging the fundamental rights. Therefore, it seems to
us that the prohibition contained in Art. 13(2) makes the State as
much incompetent to make a law taking away or abridging the
fundamental rights as it would be where law is made against the
distribution of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution between Parliament and the Legislature of a State.
Further Art. 13(2) provides that the law shall be void to the extent
of the contravention. Now contravention in the context takes
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the prohibition to make any law which takes away or abridges the
fundamental rights. There is no question of the contravention of.
Art. 13(2) being a continuing matter. Therefore, where there is a
question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition against
the State from taking away or abridging fundamental rights andthere is a further provision that if the prohibition is contravened
the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. In view
of this clear provision it must be held that unlike a law covered byof
Art. 13(1) which was valid when made, the law made in
contravention of the prohibition contained in Art. 13 (2) is a
still,born law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent
of the contravention. Such a law is dead from the beginning and
rt
there can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of
eclipse. A plain reading therefore of the words in Art. 13(1) andArt. 13(2) brings out a clear distinction between the two. Art.
13(1) declares such pre-Constitution laws as are inconsistent
with fundamental rights void. Art. 13 (2) consists of two parts; the
first part imposes an inhibition on the power of the State to makea law contravening fundamental rights, and the second part,
which is merely a consequential one, mentions the effect of thebreach. Now what the doctrine of eclipse can revive is the
operation of a law which was operative until the Constitutioncame into force and had since then become inoperative either
wholly or partially; it cannot confer power on the State to enact a
law in breach of Art. 13(2) which would be the effect of theapplication of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws.
Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which would be the effect of
the application of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution
laws. Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which applies to
existing law, the doctrine of eclipse is applicable as laid down in
Bhikuji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P. AIR 1955 SC 781; but in
the case of a law made after the Constitution came into force, it
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already indicated and which was indicated by this Court as far
back as Saghir Ahmad v. Strate of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728).”
.
(emphasis supplied)
96. Further reliance has been placed on para 61 of the judgment
of Apex Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. R.K. Kishore,
(2023) 15 SCC 339, which reads as under:-
of
“61. Under Article 13(1) all existing laws prior to the
commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of Part-III, would be void to the
rt
extent of inconsistency. Further, according to Article 13(2), the
State is prohibited from making any law which takes away orabridges the rights conferred by Part-III and further that any law
made in contravention of this clause would be void to the extent
of contravention. Article 13(2) prohibits making of any law so it
would be relating to laws made post commencement of theConstitution, like the case at hand. In the present case, as it has
been held that Section 6A of DSPE Act is violative of Article 14 ofPartIII of the Constitution, as such, the same would be void. The
word “void” has been interpreted in a number of judgments ofthis Court beginning 1951 till recently and it has been given
different nomenclature such as “non est”, “void ab initio”
“stillborn” and “unenforceable”.”
97. Mr. Sharma, Senior Advocate has also referred para 45 of
Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi (3) and others,
(2006) 4 SCC 1, which has already been reproduced hereinbefore.
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98. It has been submitted by Mr. Adarsh Vashisht, Advocate on
.
behalf of petitioners that before regularisation, the contract appointee has
no right for counting service benefits for pensionary benefits, however
after regularisation the said right accrues.
99. It has been submitted by Mr. Adarsh Vashisht, Advocate that
of
in cases being represented by him, no benefit of seniority has been
extended to the contract appointees, who were appointed in consonance
rt
with policy framed by the State in the year 1996 and whose services were
regularized after considerable period of more than 8 years and, therefore,
plea of respondents-State that benefits, extended to these petitioners, are
going to unsettle the settled position on account of revision of seniority is
unfounded and baseless because no benefits of seniority have been
extended to the petitioners being represented by him. It has been further
submitted that claim of all these petitioners have attained finality after
dismissal of SLPs preferred by the State against these employees and,
therefore, verdict of the Court cannot be rendered useless by enacting
law.
100. It has also been submitted that State had appointed large
number of candidates as Para Teachers and after completion of requisite
period of service, their services were converted into contract employees
in the year 2015 and thereafter, giving benefit of regularisation of contract
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service policy, they were regularized in the year 2018. In all these cases,
.
State has accepted the claim of the employees for counting their service
for pensionary benefits and increments, and judgments in these cases
have been implemented by the State. Therefore, State is treating
similarly situated employees with different yardsticks.
of
101. To substantiate his plea, Mr. Adarsh Vashisht, Advocate has
placed reliance on para 47 of judgment of Apex Court in Direct Recruit
rt
Class II Engineering Officers’ Association Vs. State of Maharashtra
and others, (1990) 2 SCC 715, wherein it has been held as under:-
“47. To sum up, we hold that:
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his
seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not
according to the date of his confirmation.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedurelaid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post
uninterruptedly till the regularization of his service in accordance withthe rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.
(C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it ispermissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and
if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.
* * *”
102. Mr. Adarsh Vashisht, Advocate has further submitted that in
absence of provisions for contract appointment made by following the
prescribed procedure in terms of Recruitment and Promotion Rules, the
contract appointments has to be treated as regular from the first date of
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initial appointment and such employees are entitled for all service benefits
.
including seniority.
103. Mr.Abhimanyu Rathore, Advocate has submitted that
provisions of the Act are in conflict with object and aims of the Act. It has
been stated, in Object and Reasons of the Act for enactment of the Act,
of
that impugned Act is for harmonizing the interests of regular employees
and contract employees, whereas Section 6 of the Act states that service
rt
benefits shall be applicable only to the employees appointed on regular
basis. It has been further submitted that Section 8 removes the words
“on contract basis” through “by regularisation” and in such eventuality all
persons appointed on contract basis are to be treated to have been
appointed on regular basis because on removal of words of contract basis
with retrospective effect, large number of employees appointed on
contract basis shall not be considered in service, despite having been
appointed through following due process prescribed under Recruitment
and Promotion Rules, and further that word “by regularisation” itself
indicates that there shall be appointment before regularisation, but
except stating in Section 3 that recruitment to the public service in future
shall be in the manner as may be prescribed, nothing has been
prescribed till date after enactment of the Act and, therefore, there is
inherent defect in the Act, which mandates the appointment to the public
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service through backdoor entry, but not in consonance with the
.
Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed under Article 309 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, it has been submitted that the Act ousts
Public Service Commission from the recruitment process to the public
service, which is violative of Constitutional Scheme and mandate and
of
thus the Act is liable to be struck down. There is nothing in the Act that
how initial appointment is to be made. The entry in the public service by
rt
regularization can only be possible if prior to regularisation person has
been appointed.
104. It has been submitted by Mr. Rathore that Section 5 takes
away claim of contract service and Section 6 provides that regularisation
is to be related to initial appointment, but these provisions do not speak
about the mode and method of initial entry in the public service before
regularisation. The provisions for extending benefit only after
regularisation infringes right to claim benefit of past service, which is
exploitative in nature and change in nomenclature, by stating that entry in
public service shall be according to mode as prescribed, makes no
difference and change. The act of the State, making appointments
dehors the Rules through backdoor entry, that too on exploitative terms is
illegal because regularisation of appointment is only preceded by irregular
appointment and in case initial appointment is regular, i.e. in accordance
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with Recruitment and Promotion Rules, then it cannot be declared to be
.
irregular and in case the State intends to make irregular appointments,
then it is against the mandate of the Constitution. Further that Section 8
render the judgment, passed by the Court, as nullity. The Legislature has
a power to reverse the law, but not the judicial pronouncement which has
of
attained finality, at least between the parties. The State only can cure the
defect, but the judgment attained finality between the parties on the basis
rt
of peculiar facts and circumstances, cannot be superseded or overruled
or bypassed by the Legislature. Such an act is against the independence
of Judiciary and mandate of the Constitution and is also violative of basic
structure of the Constitution. The impugned Act is declaring the
appointment, made in consonance with Article 309 of the Constitution, as
not regular, whereas in present case and other similar cases,
appointments were made by following due process prescribed in
Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed in consonance with the
Constitution mandate and Scheme, and, therefore, impugned Act is liable
to be struck down.
105. Referring para 14 of the Apex Court judgment in Union of
India and others Vs. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty and others, (1994) 5
SCC 450, it has been submitted by Mr.Abhimanyu Rathore, Advocate that
respondents-State cannot use the power of Legislature to justify arbitrary,
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illegal and unconstitutional act of Executive, as in present case, by
.
enacting the impugned Act, intention of the respondents-State is to
deprive the contractual appointees of an accrued right vested in them.
Legislature cannot render the said right and relief obtained from the
Court, nugatory by enacting retrospective legislation.
of
106. With submission that there cannot be defiance to the
decision of the Judicial Authority, Mr.Abhimanyu Rathore, Advocate has
rt
referred following para 25 of the Apex Court judgment in Medical
Council of India vs. State of Kerala and others, (2019) 13 SCC 185:-
“25. In Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96
(2), a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed that it is open to
change the law in gerneral by changing the basis but it is not open toset aside an individual decision inter parties and thus affect their rights
and liabilities alone. Such an act on the part of the legislature amounts
to exercising the judicial power. This Court quashed the Ordinance andobserved that by issuing the Ordinance the State of Karnataka has
sought to take the law in its own hand and tried to be above the law.
Such an act is an open invitation to lawlessness and anarchy. There
cannot be defiance to the decision of the judicial authorities.”
107. To support the contention that State Legislature cannot
encroach upon judicial field and try to overrule the judicial decision
binding between the parties, paras 11 and 12 of judgment of the Apex
Court in S.R. Bhagwat and others Vs. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC
16, have been referred which are as under:-
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“11. Having given our anxious consideration to rival contentions we
have reached the conclusion that the impugned provision of the Act,.
namely, Section 11 Sub-section (2) is clearly ultra vires the powers of
the State Legislature as it encroaches upon the judicial field and tries to
over-rule the judicial decision binding between the parties andconsequently the relevant sub-sections of Section 4 which are also in
challenge will have to be read down as indicated hereinafter in this
judgment. Before we advert to the relevant provisions of the impugnedof
Karnataka Act it will be appropriate to keep in view the settled legal
position governing the present controversy.
12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a
rt
binding judicial pronouncement between the parties cannot be made
ineffective with the aid of any legislative power by enacting a provisionwhich in substance over-rules such judgment and is not in the realm of
a legislative enactment which displaces the basis or foundation of the
judgment and uniformly applies to a class of persons concerned with theentire subject sought to be covered by such an enactment having
retrospective effect. We may only refer to two of these judgments.”
Respondents-State’s submissions
108. Mr. Paramjit Singh Patwalia, Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of State defending the validity of impugned Act, has submitted that
there is always a presumption in favour of legality, constitutionality and
validity of a law enacted by the Legislature and an enactment can be
struck down only when Legislature has no competence to enact the
statute and/or it violates fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the
Constitution or any other Constitutional provisions. He has further
submitted that a statute enacted by exercising the power conferred upon
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the Legislature without violating any restriction on that power, has to be
.
upheld irrespective of any other opinion of the Court. It has been
contended that Legislature has power to nullify the effect of the judgment
of the Court by removing the base of the judgment even by enforcing
such enactment retrospectively, with further submission that unless there
of
is manifest arbitrariness apparent on the face of the enactment, the Court
should not strike down an enactment as Legislature represents the ‘Will’
rt
of the people of the State and the Court must make every effort to uphold
the constitutional validity of the statute even if it requires to give a strained
construction or narrowing down the scope. It has been further submitted
that in case some provisions warrant interference of the Court, in such
eventuality the Court should not strike down the entire statute, but should
make an effort to give harmonious consideration to the provisions of the
Act and if it is so inevitable, to render such defective provision
unconstitutional, but not the Act as a whole.
109. Mr. Patwalia has submitted that prior to 12.12.2003 there
was no provision in Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed for
recruitment of employees in different cadres in various Departments in
the Himachal Pradesh for making appointments on contract basis, and a
decision of the State was communicated vide communication No.
PER(AP)C-B (19) 2/98-Part-II dated 12th December, 2003 by Department
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of Personnel (AP-III), Government of Himachal Pradesh on behalf of
.
Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to all the
Secretaries to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, all Heads of
Department in Himachal Pradesh, all Divisional Commissioners in
Himachal Pradesh and all Deputy Commissioners in Himachal Pradesh,
of
conveying that it had been decided by the Government that the mode of
recruitment by way of “contract recruitment” may also be prescribed in
rt
addition to other mode of recruitment in all Recruitment and Promotion
Rules with request that all existing Recruitment and Promotion Rules
where the mode of direct recruitment of the post had been prescribed, the
same may be amended by amending the provision of Col. No. 10 of the
Recruitment and Promotion Rules by providing mode as “By direct
recruitment or on Contract basis.”
110. According to Mr.Patwalia there was financial constrain being
faced by the State and, therefore, Government had taken a decision to
make appointments on contract basis instead of direct recruitment at
initial stage with policy of regularisation after 6 years of contract and in
squeal to aforesaid communication Column No. 10 of Recruitment and
Promotion Rules was amended and Column No. 15 A was added with
method of recruitment on contract basis, terms and conditions of such
contract service and performa of the contract to be signed by the
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appointee at the time of his initial appointment, with the Government of
.
Himachal Pradesh through Head of Office/Head of Department.
111. In order to substantiate the aforesaid plea letters/
correspondence, communicating the decision of the Government in
regard to regularisation of contract appointees, bearing No. PER(AP)-C-B
of
(2)-1/99 dated 9th September, 2008 issued on behalf of Government of
Himachal Pradesh by Secretary Personnel to the Government of
rt
Himachal Pradesh and similar communications dated 29th August, 2009
and 7th May 2010 have been referred on behalf of State, which
communicated the decision of the Government to regularize service of all
contract appointees in all Departments, who had completed 8 years of
continuous service as on 1st March, 2009 and 31st March, 2010.
112. Communications dated 17th August, 2012, 31st August, 2012,
4th April, 2013 and 28th June, 2014 referred on behalf of respondents-
State, depict that period of contract to regularize the service of contract
appointees was decreased from 8 years to 6 years.
113. Vide communications dated 7th May, 2015 and 22nd April,
2016 period of contract service required for regularisation was reduced
from 6 years to 5 years contract service as on 31.3.2015.
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.
114. Vide communication dated 4th May, 2017 the requisite
service for regularisation of contract employee was reduced to 3 years
and the same period of 3 years was made compulsory vide
communications dated 11th May, 2018, 21st February, 2019 and 22nd April,
of
2019. The period for regularisation was reduced to 2 years was
communicated vide letters dated 8th March, 2022, 30th April, 2023, 2nd
December, 2023, 8th April, 2025 and 25th April, 2025.
115.
rt
Copy of Recruitment and Promotion Rules with amended
Column No. 10 and 15 A has also been produced by the State as sample,
wherein method of recruitment and terms and conditions of promotion has
been provided.
116. Referring various terms and conditions of the Policy
circulated by the State and proforma of the contract inserted in
Recruitment and Promotion Rules in provision of 15 A, Mr.Patwalia has
submitted that these terms and conditions of contract service make
contract service different and distinct appointment and employment other
than the persons appointed regularly on either post. Photocopy of
Himachal Pradesh, Department of Personnel, Clerk, Class-III (Non-
Gazetted), Ministerial Services, Common Recruitment and Promotion
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Rules, 2017, has been placed on record, which includes amended
.
Column 10 providing that 70% by direct recruitment on regular basis or by
recruitment on contract basis, as the case may be. These Rules also
contain newly added Rule 15-A alongwith terms and conditions of the
contract appointment which is similar to the Recruitment and Promotion
of
Rules of Assistant Professor referred supra.
117. Referring aforesaid documents, it has been advocated by
rt
Mr.Patwalia that contract service was outside and beyond the scope of
Service Rules. The terms and conditions for appointment on contract,
pay scale/pay pattern, entitlement for leave and in-applicability of medical
reimbursement, LTC, EPF, GPF Rules and other provisions applicable to
the regular appointees are different than regular appointees. It has been
contended that even maternity leave to contract appointee is also
available only for 12 weeks and contract service was liable to be
terminated at any point of time for unauthorized absence from the duty
without approval of Controlling Officer and contract services were
renewable from year to year basis and it was not a permanent contract.
118. To substantiate the aforesaid plea, copy of Notification dated
31st May, 2010 offering appointment as Lecturers in Commerce (College
Cadre) on contract basis, subject to terms and conditions indicated in the
Notification, has also been relied alongwith Recruitment and Promotion
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Rules with amended Rules 10 and 15-A as well as a copy of contract
.
signed between appointee and the State. By referring terms and
conditions of the Notification dated 31 st May, 2010, it has been stated that
contract appointees were not entitled to claim regularization as a matter
of right and it was understanding of Rules that service benefits will be
of
extendable to an employee only after date of regularisation, but not from
a date before that, and intention and understanding of the Government
rt
was and is very much clear from the provisions made for contract
appointment in the Recruitment and Promotion Rules by taking a policy
decision on account of financial constrain, but the Courts by passing
various judgments, especially judgment dated 3.8.2023 passed in CWP
No. 2004 of 2017, titled as Taj Mohammad and others Vs. State of H.P.
alongwith CWP No. 629 of 2018, titled as State of H.P. & Another Vs.
Lekh Ram and others, has extended all service benefits including
seniority, from the date of initial appointment on contract basis, to the
contract appointees alongwith their regular service and thereafter various
other judgments have been passed by the Court on the same line,
whereas State on account of aforesaid judgments is facing problem and
the base of the judgment is the provision made in the Recruitment and
Promotion Rules for contract appointment. It has been submitted by
Mr.Patwalia that the State despite sharing its problem with the Court, did
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not get any satisfactory solution and, therefore, to alter the base of the
.
judgment, State has enacted the impugned Act to resolve the problem by
removing the very basis of the judgment in Taj Mohammad‘s case.
119. It has been submitted that policy of regularisation, orders of
regularisation, appointment orders at the time of contract appointment as
of
well as regularisation, were very clear that no benefit of contract service
was available to the contract appointees on regularisation. But for
rt
extension of such benefits, including seniority, to candidates appointed on
contract basis, after regularisation of contract appointees, has
consequently impacted seniority of candidate appointed on regular basis
prior to regularisation of contract appointees. It has been submitted that
mandamus in Direct Recruit case has been wrongly applied in present
case and even if it is considered to have been applied rightly, the State
has right to remove such defect which is cause of troubling judgments.
120. It has been contended by Mr. Patwalia that in Taj
Mohammad‘s case provisions of Recruitment and Promotion Rules, terms
and conditions of contract, terms and conditions of appointment and
regularisation were never considered and the said judgment has resulted
in series of judgments in similar matters as well as Contempt Petitions
against the Officers of the State, who are unable to disturb the long
standing settled position since about more than 21 years.
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121. With aforesaid submissions, it has been contended by
.
Mr.Patwalia, Senior Advocate that State was facing mainly two problems
because of mandate of the Court. First it was causing large number of
serious seniority disputes amongst the employees and extending the
consequential benefits of contract service at par with regular service
of
including seniority shall be going to unsettle the settled position of several
years to say more then 21 years, leading multiplicity of litigation, and
rt
Second it was causing huge financial liability, which was never envisaged
by the State, rendering the State in serious trouble. It has been submitted
that in aforesaid background impugned Act has been enacted within the
limits of Legislature competence without infringing any constitutional right
of any body. It has been submitted that seniority, increments and other
service benefits are statutory rights, but not fundamental right and such
statutory right does not entitle the petitioners to assail the statute enacted
within the competence of the Legislature and as such Court has also no
right as well as occasion to interfere with the action of the State
Legislature in enactment of impugned Act.
122. It has been contended that appointment letters/orders,
regularisation orders and terms and conditions therein, have never been
assailed at any point of time, and despite clear intention of Government
and the State, by ignoring the provisions of contract appointment in the
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Recruitment and Promotion Rules,judgment in Taj Mohammad case have
.
been passed and the respondents have competence to change the Rules
on the basis of which judgments were suffered as these judgments are
beyond the scope of contract signed by the contract appointees with the
State which was also never assailed.
of
123. Referring preamble of the Act, it has been contended that on
account of inclusion of contract appointment in Recruitment and
rt
Promotion Rules, contract appointments are being termed as regular
appointments in consonance with R&P Rules despite the fact that service
conditions of contract appointees were regulated as per agreement
signed between the parties, and that various service Rules, applicable to
Government employees, were not applicable to contract appointees and
contract appointees were not part of public service and, therefore, to
restore the balance between the interest of regular appointees and
contract appointees and to secure the State Exchequer and harmonize
the interest of the persons, appointed on regular basis in the public
service and on contract basis, Act has been enacted. To substantiate the
aforesaid plea, Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the
impugned Statute, has been referred and it has been submitted that
because of provisions of Recruitment and Promotion Rules, the contract
employees were being treated as regular employees, and for revision of
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seniority list, large number of employees may have to be demoted to
.
adjust the contract appointees despite the fact that at the time of
engagement on contract basis, they were aware that they were not
entitled to seniority and other benefits of contract service period, and for
acceptance of terms and conditions and signing of contract to this effect,
of
the benefits extended to them were not available to them, whereas
regular employees were already in service and had sufficient experience
rt
about the working of the Department and thus were not liable to be
ignored and, therefore, to avoid huge burden on the State Exchequer and
not to unsettle the settled position and to achieve the objects sought in
the Statement of Objects and Reasons, impugned Act has been enacted,
which is within the scope of competence of the Legislature. It has been
submitted that to resolve the situation to overcome looming cloud of
finance, the cause of judgments in Recruitment and Promotion Rules, has
been removed.
124. It has been submitted by Mr. Patwalia that concept of
contract is not equivalent to regular appointment, but is less than regular
and the same had been clarified in initial appointment order as well as
regularisation order issued in consonance with the provisions of Column
No. 10 and 15-A of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, and benefit of
seniority and other consequential benefits for the period of contract
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service are not on account of substantive provision of Recruitment and
.
Promotion Rules and, therefore, Legislature was compelled to enact the
impugned statute. It has been submitted that probation period of an
employee starts from the date of regularisation when he becomes
member of service and seniority of an employee has to be counted from
of
the date from which he becomes member of service and as the contract
appointment is not a substantive appointment, such benefit has to flow
rt
only from the date of regularisation and thus impugned Act has been
rightly enacted. Further that the enactment is in consonance with principle
of jurisprudence of civil appointment as temporary service as a contract
employee does not confer any right or entitlement for regularisation as
before regularisation he is not entitled to receive any benefits other than
provided in the contract entered between the parties and, therefore, such
employee is also not entitled for such service benefits after regularisation
and contract appointments and regular appointments are qualitatively
differed from each other.
125. By referring provisions of Section 2 (d), providing definition of
Government employee, Section 3 Method of Recruitment to Public
Service by Regularisation of Service and Sections 5, 6 and 8 limiting the
entry to public service from the date of regularisation, it has been
submitted that the impugned Act is in consonance with the Constitutional
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Scheme with submission that in view of the provisions of Article 309 of
.
the Constitution, there is presumption that there shall be no more contract
appointments. It has been submitted that provisions of the Act deal with
the ground realities and provide a way to overcome the present situation
and burning problem caused on account of various judgments including
of
Taj Mohammad, and future appointments shall be as may be prescribed
by the Government and, therefore, by making the enactment grievance of
rt
large number of regular employees, likely to be suffered on account of
extension of benefit of contract period of service from the initial date, has
been address and redressed.
126. To substantiate the plea Mr.Patwalia has placed reliance on
following paras of the judgment of the Apex Court in B.K. Pavitra and
others Vs. Union of India and others, (2019) 16 SCC 129:-
“76. The decision in B K Pavitra Vs. Union of India, (2017) 4 SCC 620
did not restrain the State from carrying out the exercise of collecting
quantifiable data so as to fulfill the conditionalities for the exercise of theenabling power under Article 16 (4-A). The legislature has the plenary
power to enact a law. That power extends to enacting a legislation both
with prospective and retrospective effect. Where a law has been
invalidated by the decision of a constitutional court, the legislature can
amend the law retrospectively or enact a law which removes the cause
for invalidation. A legislature cannot overrule a decision of the court on
the ground that it is erroneous or is nullity. But, it is certainly open to the
legislature either to amend an existing law or to enact a law which
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exercise of judicial review. Curative legislation is constitutionally
permissible. It is not an encroachment on judicial power. In the present.
case, state legislature of Karnataka, by enacting the Reservation Act
2018, has not nullified the judicial decision in B K Pavitra Vs. Union of
India, (2017) 4 SCC 620, but taken care to remedy the underlying causewhich led to a declaration of invalidity in the first place. Such a law is
valid because it removes the basis of the decision.
77. These principles have consistently been reiterated in a line of
of
precedents emerging from this Court. In Utkal Contractors and Joinery
(P) Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, 1987 Supp 751, this Court held: (SCC p.
759, para 15)
“15….The legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary
rt
power conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution
render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law.
There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The
power of the legislature to pass a law postulates the power to
pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. That of course, is
subject to the legislative competence and subject to other
constitutional limitations. The rendering ineffective of judgments
or orders of competent courts by changing their basis by
legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating
acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes of
ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings cannot be
considered as encroachment on judicial power. The legislature,
however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly
overrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision.”
[See also in this context: Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India (1994)
6 SCC 77, Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala (1996) 7 SCC 637
(“Indian Aluminium Co.”), State of H.P. V. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC
165 and Cheviti Venkanna Yadav V. State of Telangana, (2017) 1 SCC
283.]
78. The legislature has the power to validate a law which is found to
be invalid by curing the infirmity. As an incident of the exercise of this
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power, the legislature may enact a validating law to make the provisions
of the earlier law effective from the date on which it was enacted (United
.
Provinces v. Atiqa Begum 1940 SCC OnLine FC 11 and Rai
Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar (1964) 1 SCR 897). These principles
were elucidated in the decision of this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills
Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283. The judgment
makes a distinction between a law which simply declares that a decision
of the court will not bind (which is impermissible for the legislature) and
of
a law which fundamentally alters the basis of an earlier legislation so
that the decision would not have been given in the altered
circumstances. This distinction is elaborated in the following extract:
(Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. case, SCC pp. 286-87, para 4)
rt
4. … Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to
declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind forthat is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial
power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A
court’s decision must always bind unless the conditions onwhich it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision
could not have been given in the altered circumstances.
Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because
the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are
invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a
tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of
illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in
fact removed and the tax thus made legal.”
79. In State of T.N. v Arooran Sugars Ltd. (1997) 1 SCC 326, a
Constitution Bench of this Court recognized the power of the legislature
to enact a law retrospectively to cure a defect found by the Court. It was
held that in doing so, the legislature did not nullify a writ or encroach
upon judicial power. The legislature in remedying a deficiency in the law
acted within the scope of its authority. This Court held: (SCC p. 341,
Para 16)
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“16…It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed
out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision.
of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be
said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature
over the power of the judiciary. A court’s directive must alwaysbind unless the conditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such
decisions could not have been given. This will include removal ofof
the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as
well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment
on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect.”
The same principle was formulated in the decision of this Court in
rt
Virender Singh Hooda v State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 588: (SCC p.
616, para 59)
“59. …vested rights can be taken away by retrospective
legislation by removing the basis of a judgment so long as the
amendment does not violate the fundamental rights. We are
unable to accept the broad proposition… that the effect of the
writs issued by the courts cannot be nullified by the legislature
by enacting a law with retrospective effect. The question, in fact,
is not of nullifying the effect of writs which may be issued by the
High Court or this Court. The question is of removing the basis
which resulted in issue of such a writ. If the basis is nullified by
enactment of a valid legislation which has the effect of depriving
a person of the benefit accrued under a writ, the denial of such
benefit is incidental to the power to enact a legislation with
retrospective effect. Such an exercise of power cannot be held
to be usurpation of judicial power.”
80. A declaration by a court that a law is constitutionally invalid does
not fetter the authority of the legislature to remedy the basis on which
the declaration was issued by curing the grounds for invalidity. While
curing the defect, it is essential to understand the reasons underlying
the declaration of invalidity. The reasons constitute the basis of the
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declaration. The legislature cannot simply override the declaration of
invalidity without remedying the basis on which the law was held to be
.
ultra vires. A law may have been held to be invalid on the ground that
the legislature which enacted the law had no legislative competence on
the subject matter of the legislation. Obviously, in such a case, a
legislature which has been held to lack legislative competence cannot
arrogate to itself competence over a subject-matter over which it has
been held to lack legislative competence. However, a legislature which
of
has the legislative competence to enact a law on the subject can
certainly step in and enact a legislation on a field over which it
possesses legislative competence. For instance, where a law has been
invalidated on the ground that the state legislature lacks legislative
rt
competence to enact a law on a particular subject – Parliament being
conferred with legislative competence over the same subject – it is open
for the Parliament, following a declaration of the invalidity of the state
law, to enact a new law and to regulate the area. As an incident of its
validating exercise, Parliament may validate the collection of a levy
under the earlier law. The collection of a levy under a law which has
been held to be invalid is validated by the enactment of legislation by a
legislative body-Parliament in the above example-which has
competence over the subject matter. Apart from legislative competence,
a law may have been declared invalid on the ground that there was a
breach of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution.
In that situation, if the legislature proceeds to enact a new law on the
subject, the issue in essence is whether the re-enacted law has taken
care to remove the infractions of the fundamental rights on the basis of
which the earlier law was held to be invalid. The true test therefore is
whether the legislature has acted within the bounds of its authority to
remedy the basis on which the earlier law was held to suffer from a
constitutional infirmity.
81. The petitioners have placed a considerable degree of reliance on
the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC
50, where a law -the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of
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Settlements) Act 1976 was enacted by Parliament to render ineffective
a settlement which was arrived at between LIC and its employees for
.
the payment of bonus. The law was challenged by the employees. In
that case, there was a judgment of the Calcutta High Court which had
given effect to the right of the employees to an annual cash bonus
under an industrial settlement, by the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
The mandamus bound the parties to the dispute. It was in this backdrop
that the Constitution Bench observed that the effect of the mandamus
of
issued by the High Court could not simply be nullified by enacting a law
overriding the industrial settlement. This Court held: (Madan Mohan
Pathak case, SCC p. 67, para 9)
“9. ….Here, the judgment All India Insurance Employees’ Assn.
rt
v. Union of India, 1976 SCC OnLine Cal 108 given by the
Calcutta High Court, which is relied upon by the petitioners, is
not a mere declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be
invalid, so that a validation statute can remove the defect pointed
out by the judgment amending the law with retrospective effect
and validate such impost or tax. But it is a judgment giving effect
to the right of the petitioners to annual cash bonus under the
Settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Life
Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. If by
reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation,
the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way
of appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot
be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life
Insurance Corporation. We are, therefore, of the view that, in any
event, irrespective of whether the impugned Act is
constitutionally valid or not, the Life Insurance Corporation is
bound to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High
Court and to pay annual cash bonus for the year 1-4-1975 to 31-
3-1976 to Class III and Class IV employees.’
82. The The decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India
(1978) 2 SCC 50 is hence distinguishable from the facts of the present
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case. The above observations recognized the constitutional position that
in the case of a declaratory judgment holding an action to be invalid, a
.
validating legislation to remove the defect is permissible. Applying this
principle, it is evident that the decision in B K Pavitra (I) declared the
Reservation Act 2002 to be invalid and consequent upon the declaration
of invalidity, certain directions were issued. If the basis on which
Reservation Act, 2002 was held to be invalid is cured by a validating
legislation, in this case the Reservation Act, 2018, this would constitute
of
a permissible legislative exercise. The grounds which weighed in Madan
Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50 would hence not be
available in the present case.
83. The decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2
rt
SCC 50 has been adverted to and clarified in several decisions of this
Court rendered subsequently. These include:
83.1 Sri Ranga Match Industries v. Union of India 1994 Supp (2) SCC
726, where it was held that: (SCC pp. 736-37, para 14)
“14. While appreciating the ratio of the said opinions, it isnecessary to bear in mind the basic fact that the settlement
between the Corporation and its employees was not based
upon any statute or statutory provision. Sub-sections (1) and (3)of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act provide merely the
binding nature of such settlements; they do not constitute the
basis of the settlements. The settlement between the parties
was directed to be implemented by the High Court. In otherwords, it was not a case where the High Court either struck
down a statutory provision nor was it a case where a statutory
provision was interpreted in a particular manner or directed to
be implemented. It was also not a case where the statutory
provision, on which the judgment was based, was amended or
altered to remove/rectify the defect.” (emphasis supplied)
83.2 Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637,
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“49. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50
…. From the observations made by Bhagwati, J. per majority, it.
is clear that this Court did not intend to lay down that Parliament,
under no circumstance, has power to amend the law removing
the vice pointed out by the court. Equally, the observation ofChief Justice Beg is to be understood in the context that as long
as the effect of mandamus issued by the court is not legally and
constitutionally made ineffective, the State is bound to obey theof
directions. Thus understood, it is unexceptionable. But it does
not mean that the learned Chief Justice intended to lay down the
law that mandamus issued by court cannot at all be made
ineffective by a valid law made by the legislature, removing the
rt
defect pointed out by the court.”
(emphasis supplied)
83.3 CIT v. Goodricke Group Ltd. (2015) 8 SCC 399, where it has was
held: (SCC p. 407, para 14)
“14. We are of the view that Madan Mohan Pathak case (1978)
2 SCC 50 would not apply to the facts in the present case for the
simple reason that what has been undone by Section 4-B and
Section 78-C is not a mandamus issued by a superior court.
What is undone is the very basis of the judgment in Buxa
Dooars Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1989) 3 SCC 211 by
retrospectively changing the levy of rural employment cess and
education cess.”
(emphasis supplied)
84. Madan Mohan Pathak (1978) 2 SCC 50 involved a situation
where a parliamentary law was enacted to override a mandamus which
was issued by the High Court for the payment of bonus under an
industrial settlement. The case did not involve a situation where a law
was held to be ultra vires and the basis of the declaration of invalidity of
the law was sought to be cured.
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85. Dr Dhavan adverted to the legal basis of B K Pavitra v. Union of
India, (2017) 4 SCC 620 as set out in the following extract from the
.
conclusion: (SCC p. 641, para 30)
“30. In view of the above, we allow these appeals, set aside the
impugned judgment M. Nagaraj v. Unionn of India, 2010 SCC
ONLine Kar 5407 and declare the provisions of the impugned Act
to the extent of doing away with the “catch-up” rule and providing
for consequential seniority under Sections 3 and 4 to persons
of
belonging to SCs and STs on promotion against roster points to
be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis
supplied)
rt
Dr. Dhavan is entirely correct, if we may say so with respect, in
submitting “that what has to be shown is whether the Reservation Act,
2018 is, in law Articles 14 and 16 compliant”. This necessities an
examination of the constitutionality of the Reservation Act, 2018. That
would require this Court to examine the challenge on the ground that
there has been a violation of the equality code contained in Articles 14
and 16.”
127. Further reliance has been placed on judgment of the Apex
Court in Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs. Union of India and others, (2023) 10 SCC
276, which read as under:-
“70. It could It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the
statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared
unconstitutional lightly. To do so, the Court must be able to hold beyond
any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was
so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. It
has been held that unless there is flagrant violation of the constitutional
provisions, on the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot
be declared bad.
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71. It has been the consistent view of this Court that legislative
enactment can be struck down only on two grounds. Firstly, that the.
appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law;
and secondly, that it takes away or abridges any of the fundamental
rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any otherconstitutional provisions. It has been held that no enactment can be
struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or
the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating anof
Act. It has been held that Parliament and the legislatures, composed as
they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and
be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them.
The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom.
72.
rt
It has been held by this Court that there is one and only one
ground for declaring an Act of the legislature or a provision in the Act tobe invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the
Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. It
has further been held that if two views are possible, one making thestatute constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former
view must always be preferred. It has been held that the Court must
make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even ifthat requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope.
73. It has consistently been held that there is always a presumption
in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared
unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. Ithas been held that if the law which is passed is within the scope of the
power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that
power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it.
74. It could thus be seen that the challenge to the legislative Act
would be sustainable only if it is established that the legislature
concerned had no legislative competence to enact on the subject it has
enacted. The other ground on which the validity can be challenged is
that such an enactment is in contravention of any of the fundamental
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the Constitution. Another ground as could be culled out from the recent
judgments of this Court is that the validity of the legislative act can be.
challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. However, while
doing so, it will have to be remembered that the presumption is in favour
of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
75. In the present case, it is nobody’s case that Parliament did not
have power to enact on the subject on which the aforesaid Amendments
have been enacted. As such, the said ground is not available to theof
petitioners.
* * *
114. It could, thus, clearly be seen that this Court has held that the
effect of the judgments of this court can be nullified by a legislative act
rt
removing the basis of the judgment. It has further been held that such
law can be retrospective. It has, however, been held that retrospectiveamendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be
violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It
has been held that the defect pointed out should have been cured suchthat the basis of the judgment pointing out the defect is removed. This
Court has, however, clearly held that nullification of mandamus by an
enactment would be impermissible legislative exercise. This Court hasfurther held that transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion
into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the principle of
separation of powers, the rule of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.”
128. Reliance has also been placed on judgment of the Apex
Court in NHPC Limited Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh Secretary and
others, (2023) 17 SCC 1, which read as under:-
“24. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on
perusal of the material on record, the following points would emerge for
our consideration:
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24.1(i) Whether, by enacting the Amendment and Validation Act of
1997, the Himachal Pradesh State Legislature had validly removed the.
basis of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 27
March, 1997, whereby the Act of 1955 had been held not to include
within its scope the activity of the appellants of providing gratis transport
facilities for their employees and their children?
* * *
33. Since these appeals concern, inter alia, the issue, as to, whether,
of
by enacting the Amendment and Validation Act, 1997, the Himachal
Pradesh State Legislature has validly removed the basis of the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 27-3-1997,
NHPC Vs. State of H.P., CWP No. 1733 of 1995, it would be useful to
rt
discuss the law on the adoption of the legislative device of abrogation,
to remove the basis of a judgment of a Court in a legislation.
34. In the following decisions, this Court has laid down the law with
regard to the permissible extent and manner of removing the material
basis of a judgment, by correcting the anomalies pointed out by a Court
in a legislation:
34.1 In Tirath Ram Rajendra Nath, v. State of U.P. (1973) 3 SCC 585,
this Court held that there is a distinction between encroachment on thejudicial power and nullification of the effect of a judicial decision by
changing the law retrospectively. The former is outside the competence
of the legislature but the latter is within its permissible limits. In that
case, the U.P. Sales Tax Act (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970was upheld by this Court.
34.2 In Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of Haryana,
(1985) 4 SCC 124, this Court held that it is permissible for a competent
legislature to overcome the effect of a decision of a court setting aside
the imposition of a tax by passing a suitable Legislation, by amending
the relevant provisions of the statute concerned with retrospective
effect, thus taking away the basis on which the decision of the court has
been rendered and by enacting an appropriate provision validating the
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rendered. In that decision, reliance was placed on Shri Prithvi Cotton
Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283, a
.
Constitution Bench decision of this Court, which has laid down the
requirements which a validating law should satisfy in order to validate
the levy and collection of a tax which has been declared earlier by a
court as illegal. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as
under:
“4…..When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a
of
court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid
law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed
before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most
important condition, of course, is that the Legislature must
rt possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action
must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislativecompetence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the
decision of the court shall not bind for that is tantamount to
reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which theLegislature does not possess or exercise. A court’s decision
must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are
so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have beengiven in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax
to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or
the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently
create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal maybe done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable
of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made
legal. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where
jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes
this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing
provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to
stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the Legislature gives
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binding upon courts. The Legislature may follow any one method
or all of them and while it does so it may neutralize the effect of.
the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after
the change of the law. Whichever method is adopted it must be
within the competence of the Legislature and legal and adequateto attain the object of validation. If the Legislature has the power
over the subject-matter and competence to make a valid law, it
can at any time make such a valid law and make itof
retrospectively so as to bind even past transactions. The validity
of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the
Legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the
subject-matter and whether in making the validation it removes
rtthe defect which the courts had found in the existing law and
makes adequate provisions in the validating law for a validimposition of the tax.”
34.3 In the case of Indian Aluminium Company Co. vs. State of
Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637, the principles regarding the abrogation of a
judgment of a court of law by a subsequent legislation were culled out in
the following words: (SCC pp. 662-63, para 56)
“56. From a resume of the above decisions the following salient
principles would emerge:
* * *
(6) The Court, therefore, need to carefully scan the law to find
out: (a) whether the vice pointed out by the Court and invalidity
suffered by previous law is cured complying with the legal and
constitutional requirements; (b) whether the Legislature has
competence to validate the law; (c) whether such validation is
consistent with the rights guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution.
* * *
34.7 In Madras Bar Assn vs. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455, L.
Nageswara Rao J. speaking for the majority (2:1) laid down the
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following principles, as regards the permissibility of abrogation, to
remove the basis of a judgment: (SCC p. 509, para 50)
.
“50 The permissibility of a legislative override in this country
should be in accordance with the principles laid down by this
Court in the aforementioned as well as other judgments, whichhave been culled out as under:
50.1 The effect of the judgments of the Court can be nullified by
a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment. Such lawof
can be retrospective. Retrospective amendment should be
reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. (Lohia
Machines Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (1985) 2 SCC
rt1987).
50.2 The test for determining the validity of a validating
legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect would not
have been passed, if the altered position as sought to be brought
in by the validating statute existed before the Court at the time ofrendering its judgment. In other words, the defect pointed out
should have been cured such that the basis of the judgment
pointing out the defect is removed.
50.3 Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise (See: S.R. Bhagwat v. State of
Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16). Even interim directions cannot be
reversed by a legislative veto (See: Cauvery Water DisputesTribunal, In re 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 and Medical Council of
India v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2019) 13 SCC 185).
50.4 Transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion into
the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the principle of
separation of powers, the Rule of law and of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.”
34.8 In a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Jaya Thakur
vs. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 276, this Court held that a writ of
mandamus could not be nullified by a subsequent legislation made by
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the legislator. That a binding judicial pronouncement between the
parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any legislative power
.
by enacting a provision which in substance simply overrules a judgment
unless the foundation of the judgment is removed. Referring to several
judgments of this court on the Doctrine of Abrogation, the following
principles as to the manner in which the device of abrogation could be
employed, were identified as under: (SCC p. 318, para 114)
“114. It could, thus, clearly be seen that this Court has held that
of
the effect of the judgments of this court can be nullified by a
legislative act removing the basis of the judgment. It has further
been held that such law can be retrospective. It has, however,
been held that retrospective amendment should be reasonable
rt
and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held that
the defect pointed out should have been cured such that the
basis of the judgment pointing out the defect is removed. This
Court has, however, clearly held that nullification of mandamus
by an enactment would be impermissible legislative exercise.
This Court has further held that transgression of constitutional
limitations and intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature
is violative of the principle of separation of powers, the rule of law
and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
35. What follows from the aforesaid judicial precedent is, a
legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision. However, when a
competent legislature retrospectively removes the substratum or
foundation of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the same is a
valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other
constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device which removes the
vice in the previous legislation which has been declared unconstitutional
is not considered to be an encroachment on judicial power but an
instance of abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India. The
decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is open to the
legislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is
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made in such a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court
to arrive at the same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the
.
earlier judgment should be removed, thereby resulting in a fundamental
change of the circumstances upon which it was founded.
36. The power of a legislature to legislate within its field, both
prospectively and to a permissible extent, retrospectively, cannot be
interfered with by Courts provided it is in accordance with the
Constitution. It would be permissible for the legislature to remove a
of
defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in
exercise of its powers by way of judicial review. This defect can be
removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process
and previous actions can also be validated. However, where a
rt
legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a
previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative
by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in
such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra vires.
Such instances would amount to an attempt to “legislatively overrule” a
Court’s judgment by a legislative fiat, and would therefore be illegal and
a colourable legislation.
37. At this juncture, we must highlight that separation of powers, as
crystalised under the Indian Constitution, is characterised by division of
power and functions between the legislature, executive and the
judiciary, which are the three co-equal organs of the State. The doctrine
also necessarily postulates that each institution has some power to
regulate the functions of the others; this is in the form of the ancillary
principle of “checks and balances.” The role of the judiciary in
galvanising our constitutional machinery characterised by institutional
checks and balances, lies in recognising that while due deference must
be shown to the powers and actions of the other two branches of the
government, the power of judicial review may be exercised to restrain
unconstitutional and arbitrary exercise of power by the legislature and
executive organs. The power of judicial review is a part of the basic
feature of our Constitution which is premised on the rule of law. Unless
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a judgment has been set aside by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding, finality and binding nature of a judgment are essential
.
facets of the rule of law informing the power of judicial review. In that
context, we observe that while it may be open to the legislature to alter
the law retrospectively, so as to remove the basis of a judgment
declaring such law to be invalid, it is essential that the alteration is made
only so as to bring the law in line with the decision of the Court. The
defects in the legislation, as it stood before the Amendment and
of
Validation Act of 1997 was enacted, must be cured by way of the
amendments introduced retrospectively. Simply setting at naught a
decision of a court without removing the defects pointed out in the said
decision, would sound the death knell for the rule of law. The rule of law
rt
would cease to have any meaning if the legislature is at liberty to defy a
judgment of a court by simply passing a validating legislation, without
removing the defects forming the substratum of the judgment by use of
a non-obstante clause as a technique to do so.
38. The legislative device of abrogation by enacting retrospective
amendments to a legislation, as a means to remove the basis of a
judgment and validate the legislation set aside or declared inoperative
by a Court, must be employed only with a view to bring the law in line
with the judicial pronouncement. Abrogation is not a device to
circumvent any and all unfavourable judicial decisions. If enacted solely
with the intention to defy judicial pronouncement, such an amendment
Act may be declared to be ultra vires and as a piece of “colourable
legislation.” The device of abrogation, by way of introducing
retrospective amendments to remove the basis of a judgment, may be
employed when a legislature is under the bonafide belief that a defect
that crept into the legislation as it initially stood, may be remedied by
abrogation. An act of abrogation is permissible only in the interests of
justice, effectiveness and good governance, and not to serve the
oblique agenda of defying a court’s order, or stripping it of its binding
nature.
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39. The Constitution of India precludes any interference by the
legislature with the administration of justice and judicial determination of
.
the validity of a legislation. The power of abrogation is to be exercised in
the light of the said Constitutional mandate. The legislative device of
abrogation must be in accordance with the following principles which
are not exhaustive:
39.1. There is no legal impediment to enacting a law to validate a
legislation which has been held by a court to be invalid, provided, suchof
a law removes the basis of the judgment of the court, by curing the
defects of the legislation as it stood before the amendment.
39.2. The validating legislation may be retrospective. It must have the
effect that the judgment pointing out the defect would not have been
rt
passed, if the altered position as sought to be brought in by the
validating statute existed before the court at the time of rendering itsjudgment.
39.3. Retrospective amendment should be reasonable and not
arbitrary and must not be violative of any Constitutional limitations.
39.4. Setting at naught a decision of a court without removing the
defect pointed out in the said decision is opposed to the rule of law and
the scheme of separation of powers under the Constitution of India.
39.5. Abrogation is not a device to circumvent an unfavourable judicial
decision. If enacted solely with the intention to defy a judicial
pronouncement, an Amendment and Validation Act of 1997 may be
declared as ultra vires.”
129. Competence of State for nullification of mandamus,
Mr.Patwalia has referred judgments of the Apex Court in S.R. Bhagwat
and others Vs. State of Mysore (1995) 6 SCC 16 and Cauvery Water
Disputes Tribunal, Special Reference No. 1 of 1991, reported in 1993
Supp (1) SCC 96(II).
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130. With submission that petitioners have no vested right to
.
claim service benefits for contract period of service, Mr.Patwalia has
referred pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Punjab State
Cooperative Agricultural Bank Limited Vs. Registrar Cooperative
Societies and others, 2022 (5) SCC 445; Chairman Railway Board
of
and others Vs. Crrangadhamaiah and others, 1997 (6) SCC 623; U.P.
Raghavendra Acharya and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others
rt
2006 (9) SCC 630; Bank of Baroda and Another Vs. G. Palani and
others 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3691; State of Gujarat & Another Vs.
Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & others, 1983 (2) SCC 33; Ex. Capt. K.C.
Arora & Another Vs. State of Haryana & others, 1984 (3) SCC 281;
T.R. Kapur & others Vs. State of Haryana & others, 1987 AIR 415;
P.D. Aggarwal & others Vs. State of U.P. & others, 1987 SCC (3) 622
and K.R. Narayanan & others Vs. State of Karnataka & others (1994)
Supp. 1 SCC 44.
131. For competence of Legislature for overruling of the judicial
mandate and to remove the defect in Rules, reliance has been placed by
Mr. Patwalia, Senior Advocate on the judgments of the Apex Court in
NHPC Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh Secretary and others, (2023) 17
SCC 1; Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerela and others,
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(2019) 13 185 and Janapada Sabha Chhindwara vs. The Central
.
Provinces Syndicate Ltd. And another reported in (1970) 1 SCC 509.
132. Apart from Mr. Patwalia, Senior Advocate, Learned Advocate
Geneal has also addressed arguments on behalf of the State.
133. For defending the enactment of the impugned Act by the
of
Legislature, learned Advocate General, repeating the argument(s) of Mr.
Patwalia, Senior Advocate, has referred the Statement of Object and
rt
Reasons with special reference that intention and purpose of engaging
the persons on contract basis has been ignored by the Courts especially
in Taj Mohammad‘s case and in case, contract appointee is treated as
equivalent to the regular employee, then it will not only put a huge burden
on the State Exchequer but also unsettle the settled position since 2003
and it will cause for revising of seniority list for the last more than 21 years
and many employees may have to be demoted to adjust the contract
employees, whereas persons engaged on contract basis were aware at
the time of their engagement that they were not entitled to seniority and
other service benefits for the period of contract service, and such persons
had accepted these terms and conditions and signed the contract to this
effect and further that most of regular employees were already in service
and had sufficient experience about working of the Department and the
said fact cannot be ignored, and to avoid huge burden on the State
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Exchequer and not to unsettle the settled position, impugned Act was
.
required to be enacted which was and is within the competence of the
State Legislature and, therefore, the impugned Act has been enacted to
remove the defect and the very basis of judgments of Court including Taj
Mohammad‘s case, which otherwise has been passed without taking into
of
consideration complete provisions of R&P Rules especially provision of
Column 15A of R&P Rules, which is exception to all Rules, but only
rt
Column 10 of R&P Rules has been considered.
134. It has been submitted by Learned Advocate General that
judgment in Taj Mohammad‘s case has been passed in ignorance of
Rules and therefore, the same is sub silentio and Per incuriam and
therefore the said judgment cannot be cited as a binding precedence or
conclusive and thus, Legislature was compelled to frame the impugned
Act.
135. To substantiate this plea, reliance has been placed on
Odisha State Financial Corporation vs Vigyan Chemical Industries
and others reported in 2025 INSC 928; (2025) 9 SCR 1 and 2025 Live
Law (SC) 772 by referring paras 12 and 13 thereof, which read as under:-
“12. Undoubtedly, Respondent No. 1 instituted a money suit for
recovery of dues from Respondent No. 2 on account of default in
payment for the supply of goods. Initially, the appellant was not a party
to the suit. Subsequently, Respondent No. 1 impleaded the appellant, a::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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State Financial Corporation, which took action under Section 29 of the
S.F.C Act, 1951 against Respondent No. 2. The suit was decreed on.
20.08.2001. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 filed an application under
Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 before the trial Court, pending
appeal. The trial Court allowed the application holding that the suitagainst the appellant was deemed to be initiated from the original date
of filing the suit. By a subsequent order, it was held by the trial Court
that the suit was not barred by limitation as against the appellant. Theof
finding of the appellate court and the High Court on limitation alone, was
upheld by this Court on 23.11.2017 in Civil Appeal No.2073/2010. It is
pertinent to mention here that this Court confined its decision only to the
issue of limitation and remained silent on all other material questions
rt
raised.
Doctrine of ‘Sub silentio’
13. It is a settled principle that a judgment is an authority only for what it
decides. When a judgment fails to address other issues raised, it is said
to be ‘sub silentio’, and cannot be held as a binding precedent on thoseundecided issues. From the records, it is very clear that in the earlier
judgment of this Court challenging the original decree, only the issue of
limitation was adjudicated. Critical issues such as (i) the jurisdiction ofthe trial Court to entertain the suit against the appellant in the absence
of a notice under Section 80 CPC, (ii) the maintainability of the suit, (iii)
the power of the Court to modify the decree by entertaining an
application under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and (iv) theapplicability of the Interest on Delayed payments to Small Scale and
Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 were not adjudicated. This
is where the concept of ‘sub silentio’ assumes significance. It refers to a
situation, where a rule or principle on a particular point of law is applied
or passed upon by a court silently, without any consideration of the
applicable law or without argument, and the judgment is rendered on
another question of law or fact. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary,
“the precedents that pass sub silentio are of little or no authority”.
Literally, it means ‘in silence’ and is used to refer to something that is
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not expressly stated. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the
judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No.2073/2010 is silent on the
.
issues now under consideration. When the judgment of a Court is silent
on questions of law either raised earlier but not decided, or raised in the
subsequent proceedings, it is settled law that constitutional courts are
empowered to decide such questions of law independently and the
earlier judgment cannot be cited as a binding precedent or conclusive. It
will be useful to refer to the following judgments of this Court on this
of
aspect.”
136. Learned Advocate General has submitted that base of Taj
Mohammad‘s case is incorporation of word “contract” in Column 10 of
rt
R&P Rules, and though Column 15A of R&P Rules was not considered in
the said judgment, even otherwise the State is competent to
remove/omit/replace the word “Contract” as has been done by enacting
the impugned Act by replacing the word “Contract” with “by
regularization”.
137. It has been submitted by Learned Advocate General that
Government Servant is governed by status and status is governed by
Rule and Rule can be changed at any time prospectively as well as
retrospectively. Whereas when employees engaged by entering into the
written agreement then their rights shall not be governed by R&P Rules
but by written contract between the parties i.e. contract between
employee and State. Whereas, this position has been ignored by Courts
in judgment passed in Taj Mohammad‘s case and therefore, there was
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cause, reason and compulsion for the State to enact the Statute which is
.
within the competence of Legislature under Constitutional provisions.
138. To substantiate the aforesaid plea, learned Advocate
General has referred judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Union
Public Service Commission vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and
of
others reported in (2006) 2 SCC 482.
139. By submitting that though status of Government Servant is
rt
an ordinary contract but his status is more than that, but the employees
appointed on simple contract is not enjoying such status being a person
on contractual employment, learned Advocate General has referred
judgment of Apex Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of
Assam and others reported in (1977)4 SCC 441 by citing following
paras:
“11. Mr. Niren De submits that Article 310(2) supports his submission
that the relationship between the Government servant and the
Government is contractual. Sub-article (2) of Article 310 thatnotwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a
State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case
may be, of the Governor of the State, any contract under which a
person, not being a member of defence service or of an all- India
service or of a. civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under
this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure
the services of a person having special qualifications, provide for the
payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected
with ,in.), misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post.” ‘The.
above is a special provision which deals with a special situation where I
con- tract is entered between the Government and a person appointed
under the Constitution to hold a civil post. But simply because there tie,in a given case, a contractual employment, as envisaged under Article
310(2) of the Constitution, the relationship of all other Government
servants, as a class, and the Government, cannot be said to beof
contractual. It is well-settled that except in the case of a person who has
been appointed under a written contract, employment under the
Government is a matter of status and not of contract even though it may
be said to have started. ‘initially, by a contract in the sense that the offer
rt
of appointment is accepted by the employee.
12. The rubric of rule 119 of DISI Rules is “essential services”. Indeed
this rule occupies a place in Part XII of the DISI Rules with the title
“Essential Supplies and Work”. Sub-rule (1) of rule 119 applies to three
broad categories of employment, namely, (1) employment under theCentral Government, (2) employment under the State Governments and
(3) employments declared by the Central and State Governments as
essential. The third category may include even private employmentswhich may be declared to be essential for the purpose of securing the
objects specified in sub-rule (1) of. rule 119. It may be sufficient, here, to
refer to the notification of the Control Government S.O. 206(E) dated
March 25, 1974 whereby “any employment under the HindustanConstruction Company Limited in the Haldia Dock Project” was declared
by the Central Government an essential employment for the purpose of
rule 119. It is because of the above mentioned third category of
employment that Explanation 2 was considered necessary so as to
extend the meaning of abandonment of employment by including the
persons who by the terms of their contract could terminate their
employment by notice. It goes without saying that in many
employments, whether of private limited companies or public
companies, contracts of employment are executed containing a terms or::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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termination of employment by notice. Such cases of contractual
employment are different from those of Government employees whose
.
employment is a matter of status and not of ordinary contract. The
conditions of service of a Government servant are regulated by statute
or statutory rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. This Court
observed in Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India as follows :
“It is true that the origin of Government service is Contractual.
There is an offer and acceptance in every case, But onceof
appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires
a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined
by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which
may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In
rt other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more
one of status than of contract. The hallmark of status is theattachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by
the public law and not by more agreement of the parties.
* * *
….it is obvious that the relationship between the Government
and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between
a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirelydifferent, something in the, nature of status. It is much more than
a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between
the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the
enforcement of these duties society has an interest”.
As Salmond and Williams put it
“In such contracts as those of service the tendency in modern
times is to withdraw the matter more and more from the domain of
contract into that of status”
140. Learned Advocate General has also referred following paras
of judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and others vs.
Charanjit Singh and others reported in (2006)9 SCC 321:
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“22. One other fact which must be noted is that Civil Appeals Nos. 6648
of 2002, 6647 of 2002, 6572 of 2002 and 6570 of 2002 do not deal with.
casual or daily rated workers. These are cases of persons employed on
contract. To such persons the principles of equal pay for equal work
has no application. The Full Bench Judgment dealt only with daily ratedand casual workers. Where a person is employed under a contract, it is
the contract which will govern the terms and conditions of service. In
the case of State of Haryana vs. Surinder Kumar and other, reported inof
(1997) 3 SCC 633, persons employed on contract basis claimed equal
pay as regular workers on the footing that their posts were
interchangeable. It was held that these persons had no right to the
regular posts until they are duly selected and appointed. It was held
rt
that they were not entitled to the same pay as regular employees by
claiming that they are discharging same duties. It was held that the veryobject of selection is to test eligibility and then to make appointment in
accordance with rules. It was held that the Respondents had not been
recruited in accordance with the rules prescribed for recruitment.
23. In the case of Union of India vs. K.V. Baby reported in (1998) 9
SCC 252, the question was whether Commission Bearers/Vendors are
entitled to the same salary as regular employees. It was held that theirappointment and mode of selection, their qualifications cannot be
compared with regular employees. It was held that by their very nature
of employment they cannot be equated with regular employees. It was
held that recruitment rules and service conditions do not apply to suchpersons. It was held that their responsibilities cannot be equated with
those of regular employees.
24. Thus it is clear that persons employed on contract cannot claim
equal pay on basis on equal pay for equal work. Faced with this
situation it was submitted that all these persons were in fact claiming
that their respective appointments were regular appointments by the
regular process of appointment but that instead of giving regular
appointments they were appointed on contract with the intention of not
paying them regular salary. It was admitted that the Petitions may be::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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badly drafted and such a contention not put forth specifically. The High
Court has disposed of these Petitions also on the footing that the
.
principle of equal pay for equal work applied. We therefore set aside
the impugned orders in these cases also and remit the matters back to
the High Court for disposal. The High Court shall permit these
Petitioners to amend their Petitions to make necessary averments and
will also permit the Respondents in these cases to file replies to the
amended Petitions.”
of
141. To substantiate that where status of employee is of
Government Servant, the R&P Rules will be applicable and where
rt
relationship is contractual the terms and conditions of the contract shall
be applicable and such employee shall not be governed by Service
Rules, para 16 of judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Public
Service Commission vs. Dr. Jamuna Kurup and others reported in
(2008)11 SCC 10 has also been relied upon by learned Advocate
General, which reads as under:-
“16. The learned counsel for appellant submitted that the advertisement
granted age relaxation to employees of MCD and employees of
government of India, and that the words ‘permanent’ or “regular” werenot used either with reference to “employees of government” or
“employees of MCD”. It is pointed out that in UPSC vs. Girish Jayanti
Lal Vaghel (2006)2 SCC 482, this Court while dealing with persons
employed in identical circumstances, that is “engaged for a period of six
months from the date of joining or till a candidate selected by UPSC
joined on regular basis”, held that the term ‘government servant’ did not
refer to or include persons employed on contract basis. It is argued that
on the same principle, the term “employees of MCD” cannot include a
contract employee of MCD. We cannot agree. Vaghela related to::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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contract employment by a government whereas in this case the
contract employment is by a Municipal Corporation. The reason that.
weighed with this Court in Vaghela to hold that a contract employee
was not a government servant, was in view of the special connotation
of the term ‘government servant’. This Court after referring to thedecision of the Constitution Bench in Roshan Lal Tandan vs. Union of
India 1968 (1) SCR 185, and the decision in Dinesh Chandra Sanpma
vs. State of Assam 1977 (4) SCC 441, held that employment under theof
government is a matter of status and not a contract even though
acquisition of such a status may be preceded by a contract; and that
contract employees of the government were governed by the terms of
contract and did not possess the status of government servants nor
rt
were governed by rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution,
nor enjoyed the protection under Article 311. But a MunicipalCorporation is not ‘government’, and municipal employees are not
government servants governed by Article 309 to 311. Though
permanent employees of municipal corporation or other statutorybodies may be governed by statutory rules, they do not enjoy the status
of government servants. Therefore, the decision in Vaghela, rendered
with reference to government servants may not be of any assistance ininterpreting the term “employees of MCD”. In fact, for that very reason,
these matters were de-linked from the hearing of Vaghela.”
142. Learned Advocate General submits that keeping in view the
financial constraints, Legislature of the State had and has competence to
enact the law to cope with situation and to avoid setting the clock 20
years ago, by adopting, formulating or framing the Policy. He has
submitted that this right has also been recognized by the Apex Court in
State of Himachal Pradesh and others vs. Rajesh Chander Sood and
others reported in (2016)10 SCC 77 wherein, according to him, it has
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been held that the State is entitled to make a law/Rule applicable
.
retrospectively in pursuant to subsequent administrative review based on
financial health of State with contention that in present case also, the
State has been compelled to enact the impugned statute to avoid the
huge burden on the State Exchequer.
of
143. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in Satish
Chander Sharma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others reported
rt
in AIR 2025 SC 2050 has also been referred with submission that in case
of financial viablity situation, the State has right to review the situation and
to take appropriate steps and such action of State cannot be described as
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and in such a
situation, the Court should not burden the State with financial liability
whereas in present case, Court has burdened the State with huge
financial liability despite the fact that contract employees were and are to
be governed by terms of contract but not by R&P Rules.
144. By referring paras 11 and 14 of the pronouncement of the
Apex Court passed in National Institute of Rural Development vs.
Shyam Sunder Prasad Sharma and others reported in (2023) 3 SCALE
397, it has been contended that contract employees were to be governed
as per contract Policy and terms and conditions of contract but not by
R&P Rules. Referred paras read as under:-
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“11. We may note here that the employment of respondent No. 1 was
regularised by the office order dated 4 th May 2012 which specifically.
records that the order will take effect from the date of issue of the order.
The said condition has not been challenged by respondent No.1.
Therefore, he cannot claim that his employment has been regularisedwith retrospective effect from the year 2002 when he was appointed on
a contract basis as an Associate Professor. The exception carved out
in Rule 6 provides that the main part of Rule 6 will not affect anof
employee initially appointed on a regular post who was presently
holding a high academic post on a contract basis and who was
subscribing to either CPF or GPF-cum-pension scheme of the appellant
from the date of his initial regular appointment. This exception is
rt
applicable to a member of the academic staff who was regularly
employed (not on a contract basis) earlier but was holding a highacademic post on a contract basis when the Regularisation Rules came
into force. The exception will not apply to an employee like respondent
no.1, whose first appointment was also on a contract basis and theappointment to a higher academic post was also on a contract basis.
Even assuming that the exception carved out is applicable to the case
of respondent no.1, the exception does not permit a change of optionfrom CPF to GPF-cum-Pension Scheme (old pension scheme). The
exception protects the option earlier exercised by the employee so that
the employee continues to be governed by the scheme for which he
has already opted. Respondent no.1 had admittedly exercised theoption of the CPF scheme.
…… …. ….
14. As noted earlier, Rule 6 clearly lays down that those who
are regularised under the said Rules will not be entitled to benefit of
any scheme other than the new pension scheme. Even when the
exception carved out to Rule 6 is applicable, it enables the regularised
employee to continue with either CPF or the old pension scheme as per
the option already exercised by him. The Regularisation Rules under
which the employment of respondent no.1 was regularised do not::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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permit the regularised employee to change his or her option from CPF
to the old pension scheme. Clause 52 of the Bye-laws cannot override.
subsequent statutory Rules in the form of the Recruitment Rules. The
Recruitment Rules are made for giving effect to the Resolution of the
General Executive Council made on 18th February 2009 for theregularisation of the academic staff appointed on a contract basis. After
having taken benefits of the Regularisation Rules, the entitlement of
respondent no.1 will be governed by Rule 6 and not by Clause (a) (4) ofof
Bye-law 52 of the Bye-laws.”
145. Learned Advocate General referring judgment of the Apex
Court in The Reserve Bank of India vs. M.T. Mani and another (2025
rt
INSC 769) reported in AIR 2025 SC 2885 has submitted that in view of
financial constraints, administrative exigency, economic condition and
other relevant circumstances, referred in Statement and Object published
at the time of enactment, the State is justified in enacting the impugned
Act. Followings paras have been referred in this regard:-
“20. The Respondent, having unconditionally accepted all terms of
these circulars and filled in the requisite forms etc. and fulfilled the
conditions as laid down therein, cannot now be permitted to challengeunfavourable conditions. The Scheme as a whole had to be given
effect to as a package deal.
21. An employer is entitled to consider several aspects while fixing a
particular date for implementation of a scheme such as financial
constraints, administrative exigencies, economic conditions, and other
relevant circumstances. With these aspects in mind, the employer is
fully justified in fixing some cut-off date, which cannot be said to be
arbitrary. The various decisions as conveyed by the Government of
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such a position with regard to the financial burden and liability which
the RBI and the Government would have to bear. The final proposal.
which had been finally accepted, and the financial liability as projected
therein, specifically took note of the fact that the arrears of pension
would not be paid to the optees as per the 2020 Circular. The nominalinterest of 3% charged on the refunded amount was merely for the
purposes of covering the administrative expenses, inflation etc.
22. In support of the aspect regarding the policy decision and fixation
of
of the cut-off date, dependent upon the financial liability apart from the
administrative exigencies, reference has been made to the judgments
of this Court in Mohammad Ali Imam and Others Vs. State of Bihar
and Others (2020)5 SCC 685, State of Tripura and Others Vs. Anjana
rt
Bhattacharjee and Others (2022)19 SCC 705, Hirandra Kumar Vs.
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Another (2020)17 SCC 401,State of Punjab and Others v. Amar Nath Goyal and Others (2005)6
SCC 754 and Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Another v.
Himachal Road Transport Corporation Retired Employees Union(2021)4 SCC 502.
….. ….. …
35. When this aspect is examined in the light of the law, as settled by
this Court in the case of Mohammad Ali Imam and Others (supra), in
Paragraph 11, this Court held thus:
“11. Apart from this, there may be other considerations in
the mind of the executive authority while fixing a particulardate i.e. economic conditions, financial constraints,
administrative and other circumstances, and if no reason is
forthcoming from the executive for fixation of a particular
date, it should not be interfered with by the Court unless the
cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous
result. In such cases, it has been opined that there must be
exercise of judicial restraint and such matters ought to be
left to the executive authorities, to fix the cut-off date, and
the Government thus, must be left with some leeway and::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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free play at the joints in this connection. Even if no particular
reasons are given for the cut-off date by the Government,.
the choice of cut-off date cannot be held to be arbitrary
(unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical) —
State of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu [State of A.P. v. N.Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S)
172].” In State of Punjab and Others (supra), in
paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 37, this Court held thus:-
of
32. The importance of considering financial implications,
while providing benefits for employees, has been noted
by this Court in numerous judgments including the
following two cases. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal
rtGandhi [(1997) 2 SCC 342 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 512 : AIR
1997 SC 782] this Court went so as far as to note that:
“Financial impact of making the Regulations
retrospective can be the sole consideration while
fixing a cut-off date. In our opinion, it cannot be saidthat this cut-off date was fixed arbitrarily or without
any reason. The High Court was clearly in error in
allowing the writ petitions In State of Tripura (supra)the Supreme Court, in reaffirming its earlier rulings
such as in Amar Nath Goyal (supra) and T.N
Electricity Board vs. R.VeerasamConstitution.
Accordingly, in the present case, the cutoff datefixed under the Pension Rules was constitutionally
valid, and the High Court’s judgment striking it down
was found to be erroneous. In Hirandra Kumar
(supra) the Court clarified that individual hardships
cannot justify altering a rule of general application
and underscored that the determination of cut-off
dates is a matter of policymaking. This function
squarely lies within the domain of the rule-making
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the role of framing or modifying policy decisions in
the guise of judicial review and Others6, held that
.
financial constraints can constitute a valid and non-
arbitrary basis for fixing a cut-off date for extending
pensionary benefits or pay revisions. It emphasized
that economic considerations are germane to
governmental policy decisions, and distinguishing
between retirees based on such a date does not
of
violate Article 14 of theand substituting the date of
1-1-1986 for 1-1-1990.” [Ibid., at AIR p. 784, para 17
: SCC p. 348, para 17
(emphasis supplied).]
rt
33. More recently, in Veerasamy [(1999) 3 SCC 414 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 717] this Court observed that, financial
constraints could be a valid ground for introducing a cut-
off date while implementing a pension scheme on a
revised basis [ Supra fn 2 SCC at p. 421 (para 15).] . Inthat case, the pension scheme applied differently to
persons who had retired from service before 1-7-1986,
and those who were in employment on the said date. Itwas held that they could not be treated alike as they did
not belong to one class and they formed separate
classes.
34. In State of Punjab v. Boota Singh [(2000) 3 SCC
733 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 435] (“Boota Singh”) after
considering several judgments of this Court in D.S.
Nakara [(1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] to
K.L. Rathee v. Union of India [(1997) 6 SCC 7 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 1253] it was held that D.S. Nakara [(1983) 1
SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] should not be
interpreted to mean that the emoluments of persons who
retired after a notified date holding the same status,
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must be treated to be the same [ Supra fn 13 SCC at p.
735 (para 8).].
.
…… …… ……
37. In the instant case before us, the cut-off date has
been fixed as 1-4-1995 on a very valid ground, namely,
that of financial constraints. Consequently, we reject the
contention that fixing of the cut-off date was arbitrary,
irrational or had no rational basis or that it offends Article
of
14.”
In State of Tripura (supra) the Supreme Court, in
reaffirming its earlier rulings such as in Amar Nath Goyal
(supra) and T.N Electricity Board vs. R. Veerasamy and
rt Others, (1999) 3 SCC 414, held that financial constraints
can constitute a valid and non-arbitrary basis for fixing a
cut-off date for extending pensionary benefits or pay
revisions. It emphasized that economic considerations
are germane to governmental policy decisions, and
distinguishing between retirees based on such a date
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
Accordingly, in the present case, the cutoff date fixed
under the Pension Rules was constitutionally valid, and
the High Court’s judgment striking it down was found to
be erroneous. In Hirandra Kumar (supra) the Court
clarified that individual hardships cannot justify altering a
rule of general application and underscored that the
determination of cut-off dates is a matter of
policymaking. This function squarely lies within the
domain of the rule-making authority, not the judiciary, as
courts cannot assume the role of framing or modifying
policy decisions in the guise of judicial review.”
146. Learned Advocate General has also submitted that issue
was raised in Taj Mohammad‘s case as evident from para 7 of judgment
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passed in CWP No. 2004 of 2017 that initial appointment of contract
.
employees was on contract basis and therefore, they were not entitled for
counting the said service for any purpose including the seniority and
regularization of those employees was with prospective effect which was
not challenged. According to learned Advocate General, this issue was
of
not decided by the Court and Supreme Court has also decided the lis
without touching the said issue and therefore, judgment is sub silentio to
rt
the Act. As the issue raised was not considered and decided, the State
was forced to enact the law to take away the basis of judgment which is
sub silentio for issuing direction to grant all service benefits including
seniority by ignoring the issue raised by State.
147. In response to plea, raised on behalf of petitioners, that in
view of Article 13 of the Constitution, the Act is dead Act and manifest
arbitrariness is apparent on the face of it, learned Advocate General has
submitted that Article 13 is crystal clear as it provides that law in violation
of fundamental rights of citizens shall be void whereas impugned Act has
been enacted by Legislature by exercising the power conferred under
Article 309 of Constitution to promulgate such Act. Further that service
benefits are not fundamental rights and therefore, Act is not violative of
Article 13 of Constitution and Act has been made under Article 309
providing that regularization is condition precedent for entering into the
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Government/public service which is within the scope of power conferred
.
upon the Legislature by Constitution and therefore, there is no manifest
arbitrariness in the impugned Act.
148. It has been submitted by learned Advocate General that
impugned Act is a good Act as it is harmonious to all and it establishes
of
Rule of law of the land.
149. It has been submitted by learned Advocate General that in
rt
pleadings of writ, plea, regarding manifest arbitrariness and judicial
decision cannot be over turned by the Legislature, has not been
demonstrated. However, Statement of Object and Reasons and
Circumstances published in Statement of Object and Reasons and
Circumstances, stated in preamble of enactment, are itself speaking that
there is no arbitrariness in provisions of the Act much less manifest
arbitrariness and in this regard, reliance has been placed on paras 60 and
62 of judgment of Apex Court in Khalsa University and another vs.
State of Punjab reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2697 which read as
under:-
“60. The next ground on which the Impugned Act is challenged is that
the Impugned Act suffers from manifest arbitrariness. Reliance in this
respect is placed on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
the case of Shayara Bano (supra). In the said case, R.F. Nariman, J.,
speaking for himself and Uday U. Lalit, J., after referring to various
earlier judgments, in para 70 onwards, observed thus:
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“95. On a reading of this judgment in Natural Resources
Allocation case [Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special.
Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1] , it is clear that this
Court did not read McDowell [State of A.P. v. McDowell and
Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709] as being an authority for the proposition
that legislation can never be struck down as being arbitrary.
Indeed the Court, after referring to all the earlier judgments,
and Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1
of
SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] in particular, which stated that
legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is “arbitrary”
under Article 14, went on to conclude that “arbitrariness” when
applied to legislation cannot be used loosely. Instead, it broad
rt
based the test, stating that if a constitutional infirmity is found,
Article 14 will interdict such infirmity. And a constitutional
infirmity is found in Article 14 itself whenever legislation is
“manifestly arbitrary” i.e. when it is not fair, not reasonable,
discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased, with
favouritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of
healthy competition and equitable treatment. Positively
speaking, it should conform to norms which are rational,
informed with reason and guided by public interest, etc.
96. Another Constitution Bench decision in Subramanian
Swamy v. CBI [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC
682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] dealt with
a challenge to Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946. This section was ultimately struck
down as being discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14.
A specific reference had been made to the Constitution Bench
by the reference order in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI
[Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2005) 2 SCC 317 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 241] and after referring to several judgments including
Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1
SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] , Mardia Chemicals [Mardia
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Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] , Malpe
Vishwanath Acharya [Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of
.
Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1] and McDowell [State of A.P. v.
McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709] , the reference, inter alia,
was as to whether arbitrariness and unreasonableness, being
facets of Article 14, are or are not available as grounds to
invalidate a legislation.
97. After referring to the submissions of the counsel, and
of
several judgments on the discrimination aspect of Article 14, this
Court held: (Subramanian Swamy case [Subramanian Swamy
v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3
SCC (L&S) 36] , SCC pp. 721-22, paras 48-49)
rt “48. In E.P. Royappa [E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974)
4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] , it has been held by this
Court that the basic principle which informs both Articles 14
and 16 are equality and inhibition against discrimination.
This Court observed in para 85 as under: (SCC p. 38)
”85. … From a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the
rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim
and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and
is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any
matter relating to public employment, it is also
violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at
arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and
equality of treatment.”
Court’s approach
49. Where there is challenge to the constitutional validity of
a law enacted by the legislature, the Court must keep in
view that there is always a presumption of constitutionality of
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an enactment, and a clear transgression of constitutional
principles must be shown. The fundamental nature and
.
importance of the legislative process needs to be
recognised by the Court and due regard and deference must
be accorded to the legislative process. Where the legislation
is sought to be challenged as being unconstitutional and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court must
remind itself to the principles relating to the applicability of
of
Article 14 in relation to invalidation of legislation. The two
dimensions of Article 14 in its application to legislation and
rendering legislation invalid are now well recognised and
these are: (i) discrimination, based on an impermissible or
rt
invalid classification, and (ii) excessive delegation of
powers; conferment of uncanalised and unguided powers on
the executive, whether in the form of delegated legislation or
by way of conferment of authority to pass administrative
orders–if such conferment is without any guidance, control
or checks, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The
Court also needs to be mindful that a legislation does not
become unconstitutional merely because there is another
view or because another method may be considered to be
as good or even more effective, like any issue of social, or
even economic policy. It is well settled that the courts do not
substitute their views on what the policy is.”
98. Since the Court ultimately struck down Section 6-A on
the ground that it was discriminatory, it became
unnecessary to pronounce on one of the questions referred
to it, namely, as to whether arbitrariness could be a ground
for invalidating legislation under Article 14. Indeed the Court
said as much in para 98 of the judgment as under:
(Subramanian Swamy case [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI,
(2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC
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“98. Having considered the impugned provision
contained in Section 6-A and for the reasons indicated.
above, we do not think that it is necessary to consider
the other objections challenging the impugned
provision in the context of Article 14.”
99. However, in State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. [State
of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453] , SCC at
para 22, in State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli [State of M.P. v.
of
Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 481] ,
SCC at paras 17 to 19, in Rajbala v. State of Haryana
[Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445] , SCC at
paras 53 to 65 and in Binoy Viswam v. Union of India [Binoy
rt
Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59] , SCC at paras
80 to 82, McDowell [State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co.,
(1996) 3 SCC 709] was read as being an absolute bar to the
use of “arbitrariness” as a tool to strike down legislation
under Article 14. As has been noted by us earlier in this
judgment, McDowell [State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co.,
(1996) 3 SCC 709] itself is per incuriam, not having noticed
several judgments of Benches of equal or higher strength,
its reasoning even otherwise being flawed. The judgments,
following McDowell [State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co.,
(1996) 3 SCC 709] are, therefore, no longer good law.
100. To complete the picture, it is important to note that
subordinate legislation can be struck down on the ground
that it is arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI
[Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC
703] , this Court referred to earlier precedents, and held:
(SCC pp. 736-37, paras 42-44)
“Violation of fundamental rights
42. We have already seen that one of the tests for
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legislation is that subordinate legislation should not be
manifestly arbitrary. Also, it is settled law that
.
subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of
the grounds available for challenge against plenary
legislation. [See Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express
Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,
(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] , SCC at p.
of
689, para 75.]
43. The test of “manifest arbitrariness” is well
explained in two judgments of this Court. In Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [Khoday
rt
Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 10 SCC
304] , this Court held: (SCC p. 314, para 13)
’13. It is next submitted before us that the
amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and
cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate
Article 14 of the Constitution. Although the
protection of Article 19(1)(g) may not be available
to the appellants, the Rules must, undoubtedly,
satisfy the test of Article 14, which is a guarantee
against arbitrary action. However, one must bear
in mind that what is being challenged here under
Article 14 is not executive action but delegated
legislation. The tests of arbitrary action which
apply to executive actions do not necessarily
apply to delegated legislation. In order that
delegated legislation can be struck down, such
legislation must be manifestly arbitrary; a law
which could not be reasonably expected to
emanate from an authority delegated with the law-
making power. In Indian Express Newspapers
(Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian
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Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union
of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax)
.
121], this Court said that a piece of subordinate
legislation does not carry the same degree of
immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by
a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation
may be questioned under Article 14 on the ground
that it is unreasonable; “unreasonable not in the
of
sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense
that it is manifestly arbitrary”. Drawing a
comparison between the law in England and in
India, the Court further observed that in England
rt the Judges would say, “Parliament never intended
the authority to make such rules; they are
unreasonable and ultra vires”. In India,
arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will
come within the embargo of Article 14 of the
Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be
so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in
conformity with the statute or that it offends Article
14 of the Constitution.’
44. Also, in Sharma Transport v. State of A.P. [Sharma
Transport v. State of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188] , this Court
held: (SCC pp. 203-04, para 25)
’25. … The tests of arbitrary action applicable to
executive action do not necessarily apply to
delegated legislation. In order to strike down a
delegated legislation as arbitrary it has to be
established that there is manifest arbitrariness. In
order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown
that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary.
The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an
unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously
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or at pleasure, without adequate determining
principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-
.
rational, not done or acting according to reason or
judgment, depending on the will alone.’ ”
(emphasis in original)
101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)of
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax)
121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate
legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds
available for challenge against plenary legislation. This
rt being the case, there is no rational distinction between the
two types of legislation when it comes to this ground ofchallenge under Article 14. The test of manifest
arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid
judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well assubordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest
arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the
legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or withoutadequate determining principle. Also, when something is
done which is excessive and disproportionate, such
legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are,
therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense ofmanifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would
apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”
(emphasis supplied)
…. …. ….
62. It can thus be seen that in the said case, it was held that the test of
manifest arbitrariness as laid down by this Court in various judgments
would also apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate
legislation under Article 14. It was held that manifest arbitrariness must
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be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or
without adequate determining principle. It further goes on to hold that
.
when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such
a legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. It, in unequivocal terms,
held that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness would
apply to negate legislation under Article 14 of the Constitution. In para
95, it was observed that the case of Natural Resources Allocation, In
re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 did not lay
of
down a proposition that legislation can never be struck down as being
arbitrary. This Court, after referring to all the earlier judgments including
Ajay Hasia and Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others,
(1981) 1 SCC 722, stated that legislation can be struck down on the
rt
ground that it is arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution. However,
arbitrariness when applied to legislation cannot be used loosely.”
150. It has been submitted by learned Advocate General that
final seniority in Taj Mohammad‘s case was published in 1997 and
thereafter, it was re-revised and is as such since 2008 onwards. The
contract employees were appointed in the year 2003 on contract basis
and their services were regularized in 2008, whereas other employees
had already been promoted, whereas there were no provisions of
appointment on contract in R&P Rules prior to 2003 and therefore, the
appointment of petitioners in Taj Mohammad‘s case was dehors Rules
and thus they are not entitled for seniority from initial date of appointment
and further that settled seniority cannot be unsettled after such long
period. It has been submitted that regularization of contract employees in
Taj Mohammad‘s case was prospectively which was accepted and was
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not challenged by them till date and filing the writ petition for seniority was
.
suffering from delay and laches and therefore, the said judgment led to
the initiation for enactment of impugned Act because it is established
principle of jurisprudence in the service law that settled position cannot be
unsettled after inordinate long period, and State can restrict the service
of
benefits on account of financial constraints. Further that for acceptance
of their regularization by contract employees without any protest at the
rt
relevant point of time, such employees were not entitled for benefit of
period of contract service and therefore, the cause of judgment in Taj
Mohammad was to be removed and thus, impugned Act has been rightly
enacted. Learned Advocate General has also stated that State does not
say that judgment is bad in law but implementation of this judgment is
going to unsettle the settled position and going to cause huge burden on
public expenditure and therefore, petitions are liable to be dismissed.
151. To substantiate such plea, learned Advocate General has
placed reliance on judgment dated 1.12.2002 passed by Division Bench
of this High Court in CWP No. 1218 of 2021 titled Suresh Kapoor and
others vs. State of HP.
152. It has been submitted that State has framed the Act to
mitigate the financial constraints and even otherwise the contract
employee were and are not entitled for seniority or other benefits for the
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period of service on contract basis. Learned Advocate General submitted
.
that Article 162 of the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to
make laws in all affairs on which State Legislature can make laws and in
present case, State has made law with respect to service conditions of
employees for which State has jurisdiction and competence to frame.
of
153. Learned Advocate General, referring pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Janapada Sabha Chhindwara vs. The Central
rt
Provinces Sydicate Ltd and another reported in (1970)1 SCC 509 has
submitted that in view of principle laid down in para 10 of this judgment,
State is competent to enact the impugned Act with retrospective effect.
(reproduced supra).
In rebuttal
154. In rebuttal, Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
confronts the State’s two principal contentions — first, that the judgments
in Taj Mohammad and related cases are per incuriam, and second, that
the impugned Act changes the legal basis of those judgments. The
petitioners’ response is that plea that judgment in Taj Mohammad‘s case
is per incuriam, is misplaced and in Taj Mohammad’s judgment the Court
has specifically referred to the relevant rules including Column 15 and the
contractual appointment provision, Column 15-A and has reached its
conclusion after dealing with the selection process; even if Rule 15-A is
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now considered, the result would remain the same. On the second point,
.
it is contended that the impugned legislation is not a merely validating
Statute designed to cure defects identified by the Courts and it does not
change the fundamental basis of the previous judgments interpreting the
Constitutional scheme.
of
155. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted
that the argument that the judgment in Taj Mohammed and other cases is
rt
per incuriam though is not relevant in this lis, however, this plea is not
correct. It has also been submitted that Court in paras 3, 11 to 16 of Taj
Mohammad‘s case has specifically referred to the Rules in question in
order to observe that the appointment was made on contract basis after
following the procedure meant for substantive appointments, against
available vacancies, and from open market. Selection process prescribed
for direct recruitment (Rule 15) and contractual appointment (Rule 15-A)
happens to be same and the perusal of judgment in Taj Mohammad
shows that the Court has made its observations after specifically referring
the Rules. Even otherwise, if presently, Rule 15-A is considered, it leads
to same conclusion. It has been submitted that the impugned legislation
is not a validating Act. The judgment had not pointed out any defects in
any Act but had simply interpreted the Constitutional Scheme after
taking into consideration the binding precedents of the
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Apex Court in Direct Recruits, Aghore Nath and Siraj Ahmed cases. The
.
impugned Act does not change the basis of any judgment. To
substantiate the plea reliance has been placed on paras 2, 147, 148, 165,
181.4 of judgment of the Apex Court in Bajaj Alliance General
Insurance Company Limited vs. Rambha Devi and others, reported in
of
(2025) 3 SCC 95 , which read as under:-
“2. Before we set out the relevant provisions, a brief overview of the
legal journey that has led us to the above quest would be appropriate.
rt
The vexed question was first noticed by a two-judge Bench of Justice
Kurian Joseph and Justice Arun Mishra, JJ. in Mukund Dewangan v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 SCC 298 [for short “Mukund
Dewangan (2016)”]. It took note of the conflicting views in 8 different
judgments of this Court and framed the following questions fordetermination by a three-Judge Bench: (SCC p. 341, para 59)
“59. …. 59.1. What is the meaning to be given to the definition of
“light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the MV Act?
Whether transport vehicles are excluded from it?
59.2. Whether “transport vehicle” and “omnibus” the “gross vehicle
weight” of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be a
“light motor vehicle” and also motor car or tractor or a roadroller,“unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder of
licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in Section
10(2)(d) would be competent to drive a transport vehicle or
omnibus, the “gross vehicle weight” of which does not exceed
7500 kg or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight”
of which does not exceed 7500 kg?
59.3. What is the effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act
54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 while substituting clauses (e) to (h)
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of Section 10(2) which contained “medium goods vehicle”,
“medium passenger motor vehicle”, “heavy goods vehicle” and
.
“heavy passenger motor vehicle” by “transport vehicle”? Whether
insertion of the expression “transport vehicle” under Section 10(2)
(e) is related to the said (2016) 4 SCC 298 substituted classes only
or it also excluded transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class
from the purview of Sections 10(2)(d) and 2(41) of of the Act?
59.4. What is the effect of amendment of Form 4 as to operation
of
of the provisions contained in Section 10 as amended in the year
1994 and whether procedure to obtain driving licence for transport
rtvehicle of class of “light motor vehicle” has been changed?”
….. ….. …….
147. Shifting gears, we may recall that the decision in Mukund
Dewangan(2017) Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
(2017) 14 SCC 663 was doubted for not noticing certain provisions of
the MV Act and MV Rules. These include, inter alia, Section 4(1), 7, 14,
the second proviso to Section 15 and Section 180 and 181 of the MV
Act. It was therefore argued before this Court that the said decision is
per incuriam. To begin with, it is useful to refer to some decisions that
have expounded on the principle of per incuriam.
148. The term per incuriam is a Latin term which means “by
inadvertence” or “lack of care”. English Courts have developed this
principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In Halsbury’s Laws of
England Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.). Vol. 26, the concept of
per incuriam was explained as under:
“A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in
ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of
coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which
case it must decide which case to follow; or when it has acted in
ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must
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the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. A decision
should not be treated as given per incuriam, however, simply.
because of a deficiency of parties, or because the court had not
the benefit of the best argument, and, as a general rule, the only
cases in which decisions should be held to be given per incuriamare those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statute or
binding authority. Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal has
misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, theof
Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the
House of Lords to rectify the mistake.”
rt (emphasis supplied)
...... ...... ......
165. It is true that Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company
Ltd. (2017) 14 SCC 663 did not analyse the provisions that distinguish
transport and non-transport vehicles, as noted in the reference orders.
The statutory scheme of MV is more nuanced than the simple weight-
based distinction made in the said judgment. Moreover, the Court failed
to notice Section 31(2) and 31(3) which specify “Transport” and “Non-
Transport” vehicles. However, the judgment gave due consideration tothe important statutory provisions. We have carefully looked at the
relevant and the wide ranging provisions in our analysis in this decision.
A harmonious interpretation, as we have explained earlier, would lead
us to the same conclusion but fortified with some additional reasoningbased on the consideration of all the relevant provisions. The
overlooked provisions would not, in our considered opinion, alter the
eventual pronouncement. Importantly, we do not notice any glaring
error or omission that would alter the outcome of the case. Therefore,
the ratio in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.
(2017) 14 SCC 663 should not be disturbed by applying the principles
of per incuriam.
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181.4. The decision in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd. (2017) 14 SCC 663 is upheld but for reasons as.
explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive
omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of
the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment“
156. Reliance has also been placed on the Apex Court judgment
in NHPC vs. State reported in (2023) 17 SCC 1 (quoted supra).
of
Analysis and Conclusion
157. The Apex Court in its pronouncement in Janapada Sabha
rt
Chhindwara Vs. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Another,1970 (1) SCC 509 has held that It is open to the Legislature within certain
limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and do declare
what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the
Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and
rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be
deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be
otherwise than as declared by the Court as it is not open to Legislature to
overrule or set aside the decision of the Supreme Court.
158. In State of Tamil Nadu and others Vs. M. Rayappa
Gounder and others, reported in 1971 (3) SCC 1, the Apex Court by
referring judgment in Janapada Sabha Chhindwara‘s case, has held as
under:-
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“6. In Mahal Chand Seihia Vs. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal
No. 75 of 1969, decided on September 10, 1969 (SC) Mitter, J.,.
speaking for the Court stated the legal position in these words :
“The argument of counsel for the appellant was that although it
was open to the State legislature by an Act and the Governor byan Ordinance to amend the West Bengal Criminal Law
Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, it was incompetent for
either of them to validate an order of transfer which had alreadyof
been quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari by the High
Court and the order of transfer being virtually dead, could not be
resuscitated by the Governor or the Legislature and the
validating measures could not touch any adjudication by the
rtCourt.
It appears to us that the High Court took the correct view
and the Fourth Special Court had clearly gone wrong in its
appreciation of the scope and effect of the Validating Act and
Ordinance. A legislature of a State is competent to pass anymeasure which is within the legislative competence under the
Constitution of India. Of course, this is subject to the provisions
of Part III of the Constitution. Laws can be enacted either by theOrdinance making power of a Governor or the Legislature of a
State in respect of the topics covered by the entries in the
appropriate List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Subject to the above limitations laws can be prospective as alsoretrospective in operation. A court of law can pronounce upon
the validity of any law and declare the same to be null and void if
it was beyond the legislative competence of the legislature or if it
infringed the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
Needless to add it can strike down or declare invalid any act or
direction of a State Government which is not authorised by law.
The position of a Legislature is however different. It cannot
declare any decision of a court of law to be void or of no effect.”
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159. In S.R. Bhagwat and others Vs. State of Mysore, (1995) 6
.
SCC 16, it has been held by the Apex Court as under:-
“15. We may note at the very outset that in the present case the High
Court had not struck down any legislation which was sought to be re-
enacted after removing any defect retrospectively by the impugned
provisions. This is a case where on interpretation of existing law, the
High Court had given certain benefits to the petitioners. That order ofof
mandamus was sought to be nullified by the enactment of the impugned
provisions in a new statute. This in our view would be clearly
impermissible legislative exercise.”
160.
rt
The Apex Court in S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala and
others, (2015) 4 SCC 400 has held as under:-
“13. It is settled law by a catena of decisions of this Court that the
legislature cannot directly annul a judgment of a court. The legislativefunction consists in “making” law (see Article 245 of the Constitution)
and not in “declaring” what the law shall be (see Article 141 of the
Constitution). If the legislature were at liberty to annul judgments ofcourts, the ghost of bills of attainder will revisit us to enable legislatures
to pass legislative judgments on matters which are inter- parties.
Interestingly, in England, the last such bill of attainder passing a
legislative judgment against a man called Fenwick was passed as farback as in 1696. A century later, the US Constitution expressly outlawed
bills of attainder (see Article 1 Section 9).
14. It is for this reason that our Constitution permits a legislature to
make laws retrospectively which may alter the law as it stood when a
decision was arrived at. It is in this limited circumstance that a legislature
may alter the very basis of a decision given by a court, and if an appeal
or other proceeding be pending, enable the Court to apply the law
retrospectively so made which would then change the very basis of the
earlier decision so that it would no longer hold good. However, if such is::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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not the case then legislation which trenches upon the judicial power
must necessarily be declared to be unconstitutional.”
.
161. In State of Karnataka and others Vs. Karnataka Pawn
Brokers Association and others (2018) 6 SCC 363, the Apex Court has
held as under:-
“24. On analysis of the aforesaid judgments it can be said that the
of
Legislature has the power to enact validating laws including the power to
amend laws with retrospective effect. However, this can be done to
remove causes of invalidity. When such a law is passed the Legislature
basically corrects the errors which have been pointed out in a judicial
rt
pronouncement. Resultantly, it amends the law, by removing the
mistakes committed in the earlier legislation, the effect of which is toremove the basis and foundation of the judgment. If this is done, the
same does not amount to statutory overruling.
25. However, the Legislature cannot set at naught the judgments
which have been pronounced by amending the law not for the purpose
of making corrections or removing anomalies but to bring in new
provisions which did not exist earlier. The Legislature may have thepower to remove the basis or foundation of the judicial pronouncement
but the Legislature cannot overturn or set aside the judgment, that tooretrospectively by introducing a new provision. The legislature is bound
by the mandamus issued by the Court. A judicial pronouncement isalways binding unless the very fundamentals on which it is based are
altered and the decision could not have been given in the altered
circumstances. The Legislature cannot, by way of introducing an
amendment, overturn a judicial pronouncement and declare it to be
wrong or a nullity. What the Legislature can do is to amend the
provisions of the statute to remove the basis of the judgment.”
26. ….. …… …..
27. Therefore, the State, in so far as it has made the amended
provisions retrospective, has attempted to nullify the writ of mandamus
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issued by the Court in favour of the respondents. This mandamus could
not have been set at naught by making the provisions retrospective. This
.
would be a direct breach of the doctrine of separation of powers as laid
down in State of T.N. Vs. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696. We are
clearly of the view that the State Legislature could not have nullified the
judgment passed in Manakchand Motilal Vs. State of Karnataka, 1991
SCC OnLine Kar 139, by retrospectively amending the Acts. Therefore,
the validating Acts in so far as they are retrospective, are held to be
of
illegal.”
162. In Medical Council of India Vs. State of Kerala and
others, reported in (2019) 13 SCC 185, the Apex Court has observed as
rt
under:-
“45. It is crystal clear in the instant case that the State Government
has exceeded its powers and has entrenched upon the field reserved for
the judiciary. It could not have nullified the judgment. The onlineprocedure was laid down by the judgment. The provision of any existing
law framed by legislation has not been changed by the State
Government by the impugned Ordinance but illegalities found in theadmissions were sought to be got rid of. What was laid down in the
judgment for ensuring the fair procedure which was required to be
followed was sought to be undone, it was nothing but the wholly
impermissible act of the State Government of sitting over the judgmentand it could not have promulgated the Ordinance setting at naught the
effect of the judgment.
46. It is also apparent that what the State Government has done by
way of the impugned Ordinance is not only impermissible and beyond
legislative competence it also has the effect of perpetuating illegality and
arbitrariness committed by the colleges in question by not following the
mandate of law laid down by the High Court as affirmed by this Court.
An effort has been made to cover up the arbitrariness and illegality in an
illegal and impermissible manner for which the State Government had::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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no competence. The provisions made in the Ordinance are otherwise
also quite illegal and arbitrary besides being in violation of the doctrine.
of separation of powers enshrined under Article 50 of the Constitution of
India.”
163. The Apex Court after taking into consideration numerous
judgment passed by the Apex Court earlier, in Dr. Jaya Thakur Vs.
Union of India and others, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 276 has
of
concluded in para 114 that though effect of the judgments of this court
can be nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment
rt
and such law can be retrospective, however retrospective amendment
should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held
that the defect pointed out should have been cured so that the basis of
the judgment pointing out the defect is removed, but nullification of
mandamus by an enactment would be impermissible legislative exercise.
It has been further held that transgression of constitutional limitations and
intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the
principle of separation of powers, the Rule of Law and of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
164. Statement of object and reasons, preamble and various
provisions of the impugned Act, especially Sections 3, 5 to 9, clearly
depict that this Act provides pre-service engagement as it excludes direct
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recruitment and introduces appointment by regularisation, meaning
.
thereby that pre-regularisation engagement shall be there against the
public post, but without conferring the status to the person so engaged as
a person in service of the State. He will be in service of the State after
regularisation. The Act is completely silent about the manner in which
of
pre-regularisation engagement shall be made. It confirms status of
public servant only on regularisation and confers service benefits only
rt
from the date of regularisation and service benefits already extended
contrary to this Act shall stand withdrawn and it replaces contractual
appointments with regularisation retrospectively notwithstanding anything
contained in judgment etc.
165. Not only above referred Sections of the impugned Act, but
the Statement of Object and Reasons as well as Preamble of the Act are
also either misconceived or mischievous.
166. In statement of object and reasons, though there is a
reference of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, providing for making
law for regulating the recruitment and condition of service of persons
appointed to public service and posts in connection with affairs of State,
but the Act provides contrary as it contemplates engagement of a person
performing the job of a Government employee against to the public
service and post in connection with affairs of the State, but without
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treating him as a person in public service, because status of such person
.
as a appointee to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of
the State shall be conferred on regularisation only, but not before that. It
contemplates some irregularity in itself in initial appointment which is to
be set right on regularisation. Therefore, on one hand statement of object
of
and reasons gives impression that Act is being made for regulating the
recruitment and condition of service of persons appointed to public
rt
service, but on the other hand it prohibits appointments of a person to
public service and posts from its initial date by providing entry in public
service on regularisation. The regularisation can be of a person who prior
to regularisation is in irregular service.
167. It has been further stated in the statement of object and
reasons that since the service condition of the person working on contract
basis are regulated as per the agreement signed between the parties,
various service Rules applicable to Government employees do not apply
to such persons and such contract appointees are not part of pubic
services, with further averment that on account of inclusion of contract
appointments in Recruitment and Promotion Rules, these appointments
were being treated as appointments to the public services wrongly, which
was against the intention and purpose of engaging the persons on
contract basis, and it created necessity to harmonize the interest of
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persons appointed on regular basis to the public services and contract
.
appointees. It has been further stated that treating the contract
appointees as equivalent to regular employees will not only put huge
burden on State exchequer, but also unsettle the settled position,
because the contract appointments have been made since 2003 and
of
treating them equivalent to regular employees will result to revising the
seniority list for last more than 21 years and many employees may have
rt
to be demoted to adjust the contract persons. Whereas persons engaged
on contract basis were aware at the time of their engagement and they
were not entitled to seniority and other service benefits for the period of
contract service. Therefore, to avoid huge burden on the State
exchequer and not to unsettle the settled position, the Act was purposed,
processed and enacted.
168. It is evident from various pronouncements of the Courts
including this High court which have been affirmed and upheld by the
Apex Court, that in none of the judgments it was ever directed by the
Courts to regularise the service of contract appointees or to treat the
contract appointees as regular appointees by extending service benefits
to them while they were and are serving on contract. From the very
beginning, in all its pronouncements, Courts have directed to extend
service benefits, to the incumbents, of the contract period of service only
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after their regularisation by the respondents-State/Department. It is
.
contrary to record to say that persons engaged on contract basis during
their contract engagement were directed to be treated at par with the
regular appointees. Therefore, the very object and reasons, for which the
impugned Act has been promulgated and enacted, are without foundation
of
and based on incorrect and misconceived notion and smacks malafide,
as a prudent man, after going through the pronouncements of the Courts
rt
and taking into consideration entire facts and circumstances, can easily
understand that in none of the judgments, the Courts had and have
directed to regularise the contract service of the appointees contrary to
terms of contract unless there is a policy of the State for such
regularisation, and the persons approaching the Courts were being
discriminated by refusing extension of benefits of Policy to such persons.
169. In the preamble of the Act there is repetition of statement of
object and reasons. It a hard fact that the Government, instead of making
the appointments according to Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed
under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, always intended and intends
to make appointments dehors Rules according to whims and fences of
the persons in power and also to avoid the payment of service benefits to
employees. The Government had been in practice of making
appointments on ad hoc or tenure basis at the first instance, but by giving
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artificial breaks after 89 days and thereafter re-engaging such persons.
.
When Courts interfered and directed the State to make appointments to
the public service and post by following the prescribed procedure as
envisaged under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State devised
various methods including framing numerous policies for appointment of
of
persons to the public service and post on temporarily basis by changing
its nomenclature as already referred supra.
170.
rt
From the submissions made by Mr. Patwalia, Senior
Advocate as well as learned Advocate General, it is more than apparent
that impugned Act has been enacted to supersede, overrule and
overreach the pronouncements of the Courts including the Apex Court,
wherein after adjudication by the competent Court, lis has been decided
and law has been declared by interpreting the provisions of law, and
contract appointees, after regularisation without any interruption in the
service, on the same post, have been held entitled for all service benefits
as available to regular employees in terms of CCS Rules, but after
regularisation only. The seniority etc has also been extended only after
regularisation, that too only in those cases wherein contract appointments
were made by following the prescribed procedure and in conformity with
minimum eligibility required for the said post by following the
Constitutional Scheme. It has been held by the Courts that when the
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contract appointee was appointed by undergoing the same rigour as were
.
applicable for regular appointment and had been serving on substantial
sanctioned post, on regularisation, he shall be entitled for all benefits like
regular candidate including the seniority because the only difference
between the regular appointee and the persons on contract service is that
of
one was appointed on regular basis and another on contract basis.
171. The Act envisages pre-regularisation engagement to the
rt
public service and post which is in conflict with and contrary to
Constitutional Scheme. In Uma Devi’s case, followed in Baldev Singh’s
case (supra) by this High Court, there are unambiguous directions to the
State to ensure appointments to the public services and post on regular
basis by following the prescribed procedure in terms of Recruitment and
Promotion Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, but
State of Himachal Pradesh, everytime, has devised a method to avoid
regular appointments and legislation has been enacted in order to nullify
mandamus issued by the Courts in favour of petitioners, despite the fact
that rights of the petitioners have been adjudicated and affirmed as well
as upheld by the Apex Court. It is a breach of the basic structure of the
Constitution and independence of Judiciary. Act and conduct of the
respondents is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, being ex-facie
arbitrary, capricious and colourable exercise of powers.
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Undoubtedly, the Act has been enacted to supersede, overrule, nullifying
.
the pronouncements of Courts including the mandamus of the Apex Court
which amounts to statutory overruling of judgment passed in accordance
with law by competent Court.
172. Section 3 of the Act provides method of recruitment providing
of
three modes of recruitment in the public service, i.e. (a) regularisation of
service (b) by promotion (c) in the manner as may be prescribed. From
rt
clauses (a) and (b), it is apparent that there shall not be direct recruitment
to the public services and post, but the direct recruitment shall only be
made on regularisation of service which per-supposes that before
regularisation no one will be in public service, but he shall be performing
the job of Government servant without entering in service. Provision for
recruitment as may be prescribed is vague, unbridled and arbitrary.
173. Section 5 of the Act provides regularisation of person
working of contract and Section 6 of the Act provides that service benefits
like seniority, increment, promotion etc. will only be admissible to the
employees appointed on regular basis, whether they had been appointed
prior to 12.12.2003 or after the said date. However, Section 6(2) provides
that such employee shall not be entitled for service benefits like seniority,
increment, promotion etc. This Section indicates that a person recruited
through H.P. Public Service Commission after fulfilling required eligibility
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criteria shall continue to serve the State in such temporary capacity for an
.
indefinite period and will not be called a public servant. Amendment in
Section 8 nullifies, overrule and supersede the mandate of the Court by
providing that the word on “contract basis” shall be replaced by words “by
regularisation”.
of
174. After considering the pronouncements of the Supreme Court
right from the Janapada Sabha Chhindwara till date, it is consistent view
rt
that Legislature is incompetent to enact the Act as, has been done by the
Legislature by enacting the impugned Act. It amounts to transgression of
power by one limb, i.e. Legislature by intrusion in the ambit, scope and
role of the Judiciary. The impugned legislative Act is not an Act removing
the basis of the judgment, but it amounts to superseding or overruling the
judgment, which is not permissible under the Constitution Scheme. It is
not a case where law has been modified from retrospective date, but it is
a case where mandate issued by the competent Courts and law declared
by the Court has been superseded and overruled, whereas nullification of
mandamus by an enactment is impermissible by Legislative exercise and
it amounts to transgression of Constitution limitations and intrusion into
the Judicial Power by the Legislature in violation of principle of separation
of power envisaged as a basic stricture of the Constitution, the Rule of
Law and of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such breach is
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impermissible under law and, therefore, enactment of the impugned Act is
.
beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The Act purports to
annul the final judgments referred supra and, therefore, this Act of
Legislature has to be declared unconstitutional, because annulment of
earlier judgments of the Court by subsequent Legislature is
of
impermissible.
175. It has been strongly contended on behalf of respondents-
rt
State that the judgments passed by the Courts including the Apex Court
were and are causing huge financial burden on the State and due to
financial constrain, it would not be possible to implement the judicial
verdict and, therefore, by exercising the power to legislate with respect to
service condition as provided under Article 309 of the Constitution of
India, the State is competent and justified in enacting the impugned Act.
176. Financial constrain or paucity of funds is no ground for the
State to shirk from performing its statutory duty. In this regard following
para of judgment of the Apex Court in All India Judges’ Association and
others Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 288, is
relevant to be referred:-
“16. The contention with regard to the financial burden likely to be
imposed by the directions in question, is equally misconceived. Firstly,
the courts do from time to time hand down decisions which have
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purse recurrently pursuant to such decisions. Secondly, when the duties
are obligatory, no grievance can be heard that they cast financial.
burden. Thirdly, compared to the other plan and non-plan expenditure,
we find that the financial burden caused on account of the said
directions is negligible. We should have thought that such plea was notraised to resist the discharge of the mandatory duties. The contention
that the resources of all the States are not uniform has also to be
rejected for the same reasons. The directions prescribe the minimumof
necessary service conditions and facilities for the proper administration
of justice. We believe that the quality of justice administered and the
calibre of the persons appointed to administer it are not of different
grades in different States, Such contentions are ill-suited to the issues
rt
involved in the present case.”
177. It would be apt to refer following paras of the judgment of the
Apex Court in Dharam Singh & others Vs. State of U.P. & Another,
2025 INSC 998:-
“1. When public institutions depend, day after day, on the same hands to
perform permanent tasks, equity demands that those tasks are placed
on sanctioned posts, and those workers are treated with fairness anddignity. The controversy before us is not about rewarding irregular
employment. It is about whether years of ad hoc engagement, defended
by shifting excuses and pleas of financial strain, can be used to deny therights of those who have kept public institutions running. We resolve it
by insisting that public employment should be organised with
fairness, reasoned decision making, and respect for the dignity of work.
…. …. ….
8. The State’s refusal of 11.11.1999 cites “financial constraints” and the
subsequent decision of 25.11.2003 (taken after the High Court’s
direction to reconsider) adverts to financial crisis and a ban on creation
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on record, namely, the Commission’s 1991 resolution and repeated
proposals, the acknowledged administrative exigencies of a recruiting.
body handling large cycles, the continuous deployment of these very
hands for years, and the existence of attendant work that is primarily
perennial rather than sporadic. While creation of posts is primarily anexecutive function, the refusal to sanction posts cannot be immune from
judicial scrutiny for arbitrariness. We believe that a non-speaking
rejection on a generic plea of “financial constraints”, ignoring functionalof
necessity and the employer’s own long- standing reliance on daily
wagers to discharge regular duties, does not meet the standard of
reasonableness expected of a model public institution.
..... ..... ....
17.
rt
Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State
(here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not amere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance
budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring
public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year,the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and
engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under
temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration andoffends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly
has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides
fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.”
178. In recent judgment in State of West Bengal & Another Vs.
Confederation of State Government Employees West Bengal and
others, Civil Appeal Nos. 792-794 of 2026 (2026 INSC 123), the Apex
Court has dealt with the issue that “whether does paucity of funds defeat
a legal right”, wherein findings of the Court are as under:-
“50. One of the implications of accepting the respondent’s contention
as submitted by the appellant – State is that it will lead to an incidence of::: Downloaded on – 02/05/2026 09:06:19 :::CIS
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thousands of crores on the State, thereby having a great negative
impact on the economy and financial security of the State. We find this.
position difficult to accept. This is so because once a legal right has
been established, as is the undoubted position in this case by virtue of
the ‘Judgment In Round One’, as also our discussion supra, irrespectiveof whether it pertains to salary, pension, gratuity or other statutory
benefits, it is not within the realm of permissible actions for the State to
refuse payment of the same on account of financial inability/paucity ofof
funds. The least that is expected of a State in a democracy is that it
honours its obligations and commitments, arising from a legislation or
judicial decisions, for such obligations are not discretionary in any way,
shape or form. This clear position protects such statutory obligations for,
rt
if such a ground of limited financial ability was readily available to the
State Government, which may undoubtedly in certain situations facetough times, it would render these obligations illusory. When it comes to
employees’ dues, this proposition would be extremely dangerous and
stifling since the amounts received thereby are not handouts or acts of
charity but are earned compensation / consideration for services given,and denial of such consideration would have a direct impact on the right
to life and livelihood enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. In Stateof H.P. v. H.P. State Recognised & Aided Schools (1995) 4 SCC 507,
it has been held by a bench of three judges that constitutional dutiescannot be evaded on the ground of paucity of funds. Granted, we have
not given any finding with respect to DA being a facet of Article 21 but at
the same time it has to be acknowledged that DA is an integral part ofsalary which is the means by which various other facets of right to life
under Article 21 can be seen to a logical and desirable end.
(a) In Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corpn. v.
G.S. Uppal, (2008) 7 SCC 375 , this Court observed as under:
“33. The plea of the appellants that the Corporation is
running under losses and it cannot meet the financial
burden on account of revision of scales of pay has been
rejected by the High Court and, in our view, rightly so.
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be no basis for the action of the appellants in denying the
claim of revision of pay scales to the respondents. If the.
Government feels that the Corporation is running into
losses, measures of economy, avoidance of frequent
writing off of dues, reduction of posts or repatriatingdeputationists may provide the possible solution to the
problem. Be that as it may, such a contention may not be
available to the appellants in the light of the principleof
enunciated by this Court in M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India
[1990 Supp SCC 191 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 632 : (1991) 16
ATC 541] and Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen
rt Workers’ Union [(2000) 4 SCC 245 : 2000 SCC (L&S)
471] . ..”
(Emphasis Supplied)
(b) In State of A.P. v. Dinavahi Lakshmi Kameswari, (2021)
11 SCC 543:
“13. The direction for the payment of the deferred
portions of the salaries and pensions is unexceptionable.
Salaries are due to the employees of the State for
services rendered. Salaries in other words constitute therightful entitlement of the employees and are payable in
accordance with law. Likewise, it is well settled that thepayment of pension is for years of past service rendered
by the pensioners to the State. Pensions are hence a
matter of a rightful entitlement recognised by theapplicable rules and regulations which govern the service
of the employees of the State. …”
(Emphasis Supplied)
(c) In Punjab State Coop. Agricultural Development Bank
Ltd. v. Coop. Societies, (2022) 4 SCC 363, this Court
observed:
“57. In our view, non-availability of financial resources
would not be a defence available to the appellant Bank in
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that too when it is for their socio-economic security. It is
an assurance that in their old age, their periodical.
payment towards pension shall remain assured. The
pension which is being paid to them is not a bounty and it
is for the appellant to divert the resources from where thefunds can be made available to fulfil the rights of the
employees in protecting the vested rights accrued in their
favour.”
of
51. It has often been recognised that the State must set an example for
other employers in the country by behaving as a ‘model employer’. Such
a position should not be difficult to attain given all the advantages that it
has. Its power lies in the volume of employment, its sovereign/
rt
constitutional authority to tax, ability to borrow and manage public
finances. In embodying the ‘model employer’ the State not only fulfils its
obligation but also instils and maintains public confidence in the rule of
law, governance and administration of justice. Leading by example,
fulfilling its financial duties in times of fiscal strain, gives it the moral
authority to wield the sword of law against private entities, should they
not do so. The position stated by us above has been recognised in a
number of judgments of this Court. In Bhupendra Nath Hazarika v.
State of Assam, (2013) 2 SCC 516, a coordinate Bench took note of
various past pronouncements as follows:
“61. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate
the oft stated principle that the State is a model employer and it
is required to act fairly giving due regard and respect to therules framed by it. But in the present case, the State has
atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for hammering the
concept.
62. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram Gupta v.
Union of India [1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126 :
(1987) 5 ATC 246] had observed thus: (SCC p. 236, para 13)
“13. … As a model employer the Government must
conduct itself with high probity and candour with its
employees.”
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In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh [(1992) 4 SCC 118 : 1992
SCC (L&S) 825 : (1992) 21 ATC 403] the Court had clearly
.
stated: (SCC p. 134, para 21)
“21. … The main concern of the court in such matters is
to ensure the rule of law and to see that the Executive
acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees
consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16.” …
... ...
of
65. We have stated the role of the State as a model employer
with the fond hope that in future a deliberate disregard is not
taken recourse to and deviancy of such magnitude is not
rt adopted to frustrate the claims of the employees. It should
always be borne in mind that legitimate aspirations of the
employees are not guillotined and a situation is not created
wher52. In that view of the matter, it is not open for the
appellantState to shirk away from its responsibility from paying
DA on
the count of financial difficulty that it may face in doing so. It is
an obligation arising out of the statute of its own creation and it
must be met.e hopes end in despair. Hope for everyone is
gloriously precious and a model employer should not convert it
to be deceitful and treacherous by playing a game of chess with
their seniority. A sense of calm sensibility and concerned
sincerity should be reflected in every step. An atmosphere of
trust has to prevail and when the employees are absolutely sure
that their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be treated
with dignified fairness then only the concept of good
governance can be concretised. We say no more.”
52. In that view of the matter, it is not open for the appellant-State to shirk
away from its responsibility from paying DA on the count of financial
difficulty that it may face in doing so. It is an obligation arising out of the
statute of its own creation and it must be met.”
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179. In present case, petitioners are agitating for their legal rights
.
which have been affirmed and approved by the Apex Court vide
judgments/verdict passed in their favour directing to grant them benefits
of service as per their entitlement and there is a vested and accrued legal
right in their favour in consonance with provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of
of
the Constitution of India, which are fundamental rights under Part-III of
the Constitution, therefore, denial of benefits based on such fundamental,
rt
legal and vested rights, by enacting a Statute, being arbitrary, is not
permissible, and the State cannot shirk away its duty and liability to
extend such benefits. Thus impugned Act is in conflict with and in violation
of Constitutional mandate.
180. Article 141 of the Constitution of India mandates that law
declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts.
181. Article 142 of the Constitution provides enforcement of the
decree and order of the Supreme Court as well as to pass any order as is
necessary for doing complete justice. In present case as referred supra,
the issues, on the basis of which judgment in Taj Mohammad case is
being criticized, have already been dealt with by the Apex Court in various
cases and verdict in those cases is binding on all including the State and
are to be enforced by the respondents for doing complete justice. As
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already stated supra, similarly situated contract employees have been
.
extended benefits which are being denied to the petitioners herein under
the garb of enactment of impugned Act.
182. Article 144 of the Constitution of India mandates that all
authorities Civil and Judicial in territory of India shall act in aid of the
of
Supreme Court. Therefore, any act, conduct, omission and commission
on the part of respondents which is contrary to verdict of the Apex Court,
rt
is in conflict with this provision of the Constitution. Therefore, enactment
of the impugned Act to supersede, overrule, bypass or render the
mandamus redundant, taking away the benefits extended, declared to be
available to the employees in terms of such mandamus, is an arbitrary act
and is liable to be interfered with.
183. Plea raised by learned Advocate General by stating that judgment
in Taj Mohammad case is sub silentio and per incuriam by advancing
arguments that the said judgment has been passed without taking into
consideration Column 15A of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, and that
contract service has to be governed on the basis of terms and conditions of the
contract agreed and signed between the appointees and the State, is also
misconceived, for the discussion hereinefore and after.
184. In present cases in none of the judgments passed by the
Courts, service benefits at par with the regular employees have ever been
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extended to the contract employees during their service period on
.
contract. It is only after regularisation, the employees who were
appointed initially on contract basis, the Courts have extended certain
benefits for the period of contract by applying and interpreting relevant
law applicable.
of
185. Depending upon nature and mode of initial contract
appointment, there are three types of verdict of the Courts.
186.
rt
In first category of the employees they had been appointed
without following the procedure prescribed in Recruitment and Promotion
Rules or any Policy formulated by the State with fair and transparent
procedure for appointment. In their cases Courts have categorically
declared that they are not entitled for any benefits of past contract
service, even after regularisation.
187. In second category, the employees were engaged on contract
basis in pursuance to the Policy of the State, duly notified, providing
method of appointment in fair and transparent manner, but without
following the procedure provided in Recruitment and Promotion Rules.
This category of employees, after regularisation, have been extended
certain service benefits like counting of contract period service for
pensionary benefits and grant of increments for that period on notional
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basis for calculating pension, but this set of employees have not been
.
granted any benefit of seniority.
188. Third category of employees is where employees, though
appointed on contract, but by following the procedure prescribed in
statutory Recruitment and Promotion Rules, after advertising the post and
of
undergoing the rigour of the said process by competing in open market in
the test/interview conducted by the prescribed agency, i.e. Public Service
rt
Commission. The process adopted for their appointment was identical to
the procedure prescribed and adopted for regular appointment and,
therefore, they were held entitled for all service benefits including
seniority like regular appointees, but after regularisation.
189. The Courts, after regularisation of the employees, but not
before the regularisation, being not only similarly situated, but identically
situated with respect to eligibility, process of recruitment through
prescribed agency and facing of rigour of overcompetetive exam
conducted by the Recruitment Agency prescribed in Recruitment and
Promotion Rules and nature of offer of appointment, had extended all
service benefits including seniority to such employees. It is apt to record
that this category of employees were selected and appointed after issuing
advertisement in consonance with Recruitment and Promotion Rules, but
one set of employees was offered regular appointment but other set of
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employees was offered appointment on contract basis in terms of Column
.
15-A of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. Not only in Taj
Mohammad‘s case, but in all other matters, every aspect has been taken
into consideration, including Column No. 15 A of Recruitment and
Promotion Rules, which contains the terms and condition of the contract
of
service.
190. In any case, plea of sub silentio and per incuriam does not
rt
justify the enactment of imugned Act. Merits of the judgments have
already been upheld by the Apex court. Further this issue is not relevant
to present lis, but competency of the respondents-State to enact a Statute
to overrule the judgments, is the subject matter of present lis, otherwise
also plea that judgment in Taj Mohammad‘s case is sub silentio and per
incuriam is also not sustainable, as the Courts have taken into
consideration entire Recruitment and Promotion Rules including Column
15-A thereof. The Courts have not interfered with the terms and
conditions of the contract service, but on regularisation of such service,
appointees have been held entitled for certain service benefits for their
past contract service followed by regular service without interruption.
During currency of contract service, none of the Courts had directed to
grant any service benefits to such employees over and above the terms
and conditions holding the Field in the in the subject matter.
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191. Legislature has been authorized by the Constitution to enact
.
any law with respect of service condition to public services and post as
provided under Article 309 of the Constitution. However, at the same time,
it is beyond the competence of the Legislature to frame and enact law in
conflict with mandate of the Constitution as well as essence of Article 309
of
of the Constitution. The Legislature has a right to enact a Statute in
consonance with the Constitutional mandate and provision, but not in
rt
conflict therewith, and being in conflict with the Constitutional mandate,
the impugned Act clearly depicts manifest arbitrariness on the part of
State in exercising the power to Legislate.
192. Though, time and again it has been stated that impugned Act
has been enacted to remove the defect and foundation of the verdict of
the Courts and it has not been enacted for superseding, overruling or
defying any orders/verdict of the Courts, however for arguments
addressed on behalf of respondents by Mr.Patwalia, learned Senior
Advocate and Mr. Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General, it is clear that
impugned Act has been enacted to render the judgment of the Courts
including the Apex Court ineffective by superseding and overruling the
same.
193. As discussed supra, the impugned Act has been enacted to
render the judgments of the properly constituted Courts, delivered by the
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such Courts in exercise of its power in a matter before the Courts,
.
ineffective and to give interpretation of law otherwise than as declared by
the Courts. Manifest arbitrariness is writ large at the face of it in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, Preamble and various Sections of the
impugned Act as discussed supra.
of
194. From the past history, it is apparent that Government,
irrespective of person in power, had been resorting to exploitative
rt
practices by restricting the service benefits to the persons appointed
against regular sanctioned functional post and also resorting to backdoor
entry to adjust their near, dears and supporters by engaging persons at
the whims and fences of the persons in power, and such practice has
been continued despite repeated mandamus issued by the Court
including by the Apex Court, whereby Government was repeatedly
directed to make appointments to the public services and post in
consonance with Constitutional Scheme.
195. The State was and is repeatedly making temporary
appointments deohrs of Recruitment and Promotion Rules and without
adhering to the prescribed procedure in terms of Constitutional mandate.
Being bound by verdict of the Courts including the Apex Court whereby
respondents were directed to make regular appointments in terms of
Recruitment and Promotion Rules, the State was incapacitated to make
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contract appointments without following the Recruitment and Promotion
.
Rules. Therefore, it is not a case where basis of the judgments is being
removed, but it is a case where respondents-State in order to resort again
for not only irregular, but illegal appointments in conflict with the mandate
of the Constitution, has enacted the impugned Act and, therefore, it is not
of
a case covered where judgments of the Court is being nullified by
legislative act, removing the basis of the judgment. In fact provisions of
rt
the impugned Act indicating intention of the State to appoint persons
before entry in the public service without following the Constitutional
Scheme, and its retrospective effect is not only arbitrary, but also violative
of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. It is a case where mandamus of the Courts in numerous
judgments is nullified by legislative exercise by an enactment by
undertaking impermissible legislative exercise. It is also breach of basic
feature of the Constitution, attacking on the independence of Judiciary by
transgression of Constitutional limits and intrusion into the judicial power
by the Legislature. The impugned Act is violative of ‘Principle of
Separation of powers’, ‘Rule of Law’ and Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
196. Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the State to
frame Act and Rules dealing with appointment to public service and post.
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But impugned Act provides that a person will be in public service only
.
after regularisation. Certainly, appointment of a person can be
regularised if he is already in service irregularly. Therefore, the impugned
Act not only impliedly, but explicitly provides that there shall be pre-
regularisation engagement dehors of Recruitment and Promotion Rules,
of
which shall be regularised and thereafter only persons engaged will be
the part of the public service. As Article 309 of the Constitution empowers
rt
the State for framing rules related to service condition of the appointees
to public service and the post, provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution
of India shall not be applicable to the persons, who are not in public
service, therefore, Act also ousts jurisdiction of Article 309 of the
Constitution with respect to pre-regularisation engagement. As already
discussed, there is nothing on record how and in what manner pre-
regularisation engagement shall be made, even if such appointments are
made through Service Commission, that will not cure the defect, because
it is mandate of the impugned Act that a persons shall be in public service
only after regularisation. On this count, State has created a mess and,
therefore, also being vague and arbitrary, the impugned Act deserves to
be quashed.
197. The impugned Act is also discriminatory in nature, as it takes
away benefits or nullify the judgments/orders passed by the Courts with
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respect to persons appointed on contract on or after 12.12.2003, whereas
.
contract appointments were being made by respondents since 1996. The
appointees on contract between 1996 and 12.12.2003 are also being
benefited by the judgments of the Courts by extending service benefits,
except seniority, to such contract employees and mandamus in their
of
favour is being complied with. Whereas with respect to employees
appointed after 12.12.2003, plea is taken that their contract service
rt
period shall be governed by the contract signed by them. The same plea
is not being raised with respect to contract appointees engaged before
12.12.2003. It is also apt to record that after 12.12.2003, maximum
contract appointees were selected through open competition after
advertisement of the post through prescribed agency as per Recruitment
and Promotion Rules, who were having full eligibility to be appointed as
regular incumbent, whereas before 12.12.2003 most of the contract
appointees were appointed on contract basis on the basis of Policy
decision, but not resorting to procedure prescribed in Recruitment and
Promotion Rules and some times eligibility condition was also
compromised. It appears that persons appointed on whims and fences
are being extended benefits, whereas persons appointed through
procedure prescribed under R&P Rules are being denied the same right.
State has extended benefits to thousands of its contract employees, who
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were appointed before 12.12.2003 dehors of Recruitment and Promotion
.
Rules, but on the basis of various Policies and examples in this regard
are cases of Om Prakash Vs. State of H.P. and others and connected
matters, CWP No. 7602 of 2010 and Yashwant Kumar Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh and others and connected matters, CWP No. 8148
of
of 2022, in which judgments of the Courts passed on similar lines, have
been implemented by the State. Therefore, provisions of impugned Act
rt
are manifestly arbitrary on this count also.
198. Respondents-State is bound to extend service benefits to its
employees by adhering to equality clause provided under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Judgments, rendered to be ineffective because of
the impugned Act, have been passed in consonance with the
Constitutional mandate and are binding on the respondents-State.
Therefore, impugned omission and commission of the respondents-State,
instead of implementing the judgments and verdict, are unconstitutional
being in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and thus the
impugned Act is liable to be quashed.
199. The provisions of Section 8 of the Act incorporating
amendment in Column-10 of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules is also
going to create mess as after replacing the words “on contact basis” by
“regularisation” with retrospective effect would mean that the previous
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appointments made on the basis of Recruitment and Promotion Rules on
.
contract basis would be rendered irregular, but at the same time there are
pronouncements of the Courts including the judgments referred supra
that in absence of any specific provision for contract appointments or
temporary appointments, the appointments made by following the
of
procedure prescribed in Recruitment and Promotion Rules have to be
considered appointments as provided under the Recruitment and
rt
Promotion Rules. In clause-10, apart from the words “on contract basis”
there is a provision of “direct recruitment” and for amendment made in
clause-10 the appointment shall be made on the basis of direct
recruitment or by regularisation and thus all earlier appointments made on
contract basis in terms of Recruitment and Promotion Rules, after
replacement of word on ‘contract basis’ by ‘regularisation’ shall be
deemed to have been made as direct recruitment, again entitling such
appointees for all benefits like regular appointees. However, Sections 3
and 6 read with Section 8 of the Act indicate that the pronouncements to
that effect have also been rendered ineffective by providing in Section 8
that persons shall be in public service by regularisation only and shall not
be entitled for any benefits extended by the judgments of the Courts prior
to that. For these reasons we are of the opinion that entire Act lacks
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competence of the State Legislature to enact the same and, therefore,
.
also, entire Act is liable to be quashed.
200. There is nothing in the Act, which can be saved, as
Constitutional, despite permissibility of validity and Constitutionality of the
Statute enacted by the Legislature. For discussion herein above, we are
of
of the considered opinion that the entire Act must go to maintain the Rule
of Law.
201.
rt
Normally Courts refrain from declaring an enactment
unconstitutional, however, it is also settled law that when an enactment is
in breach of Constitutional Scheme transgressing the powers by
interfering in the Judicial powers, the legislation must go. It is also true
that where it is possible, quashing of entire Act should be avoided by
declaring the offending provisions of the Statute unconstitutional, which
are in conflict with the Constitutional mandate. In present case Sections
3, 5 to 9 are in conflict with the Constitutional frame work and after
declaring these Sections only as unconstitutional, nothing substantial will
remain in the remaining provisions and, therefore, we are constrained to
declare that entire Legislation (impugned Act) deserves to be quashed
and set aside.
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202. Accordingly, in view of above discussion and considering
.
the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court, the impugned Act is
quashed and set aside.
203. In view of quashing of the impugned Act, all consequential
action, omission and commission of the respondents-State and its
of
functionaries, based on the impugned Act, are declared illegal,
unconstitutional and nullify, and resultantly orders/rejection/directions,
rt
withdrawal, denying benefits or proposing recovery of already granted
reliefs, based on the impugned Act, in conflict with the mandate of the
Court are also quashed and set aside and competent authority(ies) is
directed to ensure extension of benefits to the employees in terms of
judgments passed by the competent Courts, latest by three months from
today by issuing appropriate orders, if so required, in consonance with the
Constitutional mandate and verdict of the Court(s).
All petitions are disposed of in aforesaid terms alongwith
pending applications, if any.
(Vivek Singh Thakur),
Judge.
(Romesh Verma),
Judge.
25th April, 2026
(MS/Keshav/Pardeep/susheel)
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