Chattisgarh High Court
Devesh Patel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:27386-DB
NAFR
Digitally signed by
INDRAJEET INDRAJEET SAHU
SAHU Date: 2026.07.08
19:11:08 +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1634 of 2026
1 - Devesh Patel S/o Shridhar Patel Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Lendhra
Road Baramkela, District Sarngarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh
2 - Sanjay Singh Sidar S/o Late Lallan Singh Sidar Aged About 25 Years R/o
Village Sangitrai, P.S. Jutmil, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - Sidhdharth Chandra Anant S/o Late Sukhlal Anant Aged About 38 Years
Village Mithumuda, P.S. Jutmil, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
4 - Rajababu Maitri S/o Late Paleshwar Singh Maitri Aged About 35 Years R/o
Chantipali, Thana Baramkela, District Sarangarh Chhattisgarh
5 - Ritesh Bhoy S/o Late Bhogi Lal Bhoy Aged About 32 Years Village Rajiv
Nagar Sariya, District Sarangarh Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Baramkela, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
2 - Surendra Nayak S/o Lillambar Nayak Aged About 37 Years R/o Village
Jhabar, P.S. And Tahsil Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - Lillambar Nayak S/o Late Thakurram Nayak Aged About 64 Years R/o
Village Jhabar P.S. And Tahsil Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Shri CJK Rao, Advocate.
For State : Shri Sumeet Singh, Dy. Advocate General.
For Respondents 2&3 : Shri Atul Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
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Order on Board
03.07.2026
Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ.
1 The petitioner has filed this petitions seeking following reliefs:
“1. Allow the petition and set-aside the order dated 11.05.2026
(Annexure A/1) whereby the application under 320(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973/section 359(2) Bhartiya Nyay
Sanhita, 2023 has been rejected by Second Additional Judge of
Additional Session Judge, Sarangarh District Sarangarh-
Bilaigarh passed in Sessions Trial No. 37/2025 and further
consequent criminal proceedings in relating to Session Trial No.
37/2025 pending before Second Additional Judge of Additional
Session Judge, Sarangarh District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh.
2. and kindly be pleased to quash the FIR having Crime No.
397/2022 registered under section 452, 307/34, 201, 147 Indian
Penal Code at Police Station Baramkela, District Sarangarh-
Bilaigarh;
3. and quash the entire charge sheet bearing arising out of Crime
No. 397/2022, filed on 01.08.2025 before Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh for the
offence under section 452, 307/34, 201, 147 Indian Penal Code;
4. and further quash the impugned order of taking cognizance
dated 8.08.2025 passed in Criminal Case No. 2229/2025, arising
out of Crime No. 397/2022, registered at Police Station
Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) pending before
the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sarangarh, District
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) (Annexure A/2), in the interest of
justice.”
2 Brief facts of the case are that, on 15.12.2022 when the complainant-
Surendra Nayak was in his Computer Shop along with his father
Lilambar Nayak and two other workers, at about 1:00 PM, the
petitioners herein stated to have entered into his shop and the
petitioner Siddharth Anant assaulted his father with an iron rod and
caused serious injury. He immediately called Dial-112 and shifted his
injured father to Bilaigarh Hospital for treatment. Based on said
complaint, an FIR was registered on the same day i.e. 15.12.2022 for
the offence under Sections 452,307/34,201 and 147 IPC in Crime
No.397 of 2022.
3
3 Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the allegations
made by the complainant in the FIR is false and baseless. FIR was
lodged only to implicate them in a false case. As per MLC report, the
injuries received by the father of complainant was simple in nature.
Rather, the complainant, his injured father, Sevan Kumar and one
Khemsagar used filthy language against the brother of petitioner No.2
namely Ajambar Singh Sidar who is the complainant in another case
(CrMP No.3014 of 2025) for which written complaint was lodged by him
on 16.12.2022 and FIR was also registered on 14.06.2025 under
Sections 294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC in Crime No.69 of 2025 and
charge sheet has been filed on 09.08.2025 under Sections
294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(v)(a) and 3(1)(r)(s)
of The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1988.
4 The counsel for the petitioners have stated that they have settled their
dispute amicably. They would further submit that they have already
filed an application under Section 320(2) CrPC/359(2) of BNSS 2023
for compounding the offence on 11.05.2026 which was dismissed by
the trial court holding that the alleged offences are not compoundable
and therefore permission for compounding the offence cannot be
granted. The petitioners have referred the order sheet dated
11.05.2026 annexed at Page Nos.50&51 of petition. They also referred
page No.98 of the petition which is a joint application filed before the
trial court.
5 The submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners that parties
have entered into compromise and settled their dispute have not been
disputed by the counsel for the private respondents. They would also
4
submit that a deed of compromise have also been executed between
the parties on 28.04.2026 vide Annexure A/4.
6 In view of the categorical statement made by the complainant as well
as the accused/petitioners, this Court is of the opinion that once when
the complainant and the accused have settled their matter and buried
the dispute and differences, it would be an important consideration for
the High Court while exercising the powers under Section 528 of
BNSS, 2023 to compound the offence. The opinion of this Court stands
fortified from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab & Another [2012 (10) SCC 303] and also in
the case of Narinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Another
[2014 (6) SCC 466].
7 The Supreme Court in Gian Singh (Supra) has observed in para 49,
52, 53 and 57 as under:
“49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the
inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a
superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
It begins with the words, ‘nothing in this Code which means that the
provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of
doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the
inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in
Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated
that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely
safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court
necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure
the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be
resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very
sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of
law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High
Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a
straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.
53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a
5court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court
is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence
or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material
on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment.
57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i)
to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family
and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not
private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences
under special statutes like Prevention of corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such 5 like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases,
High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of
the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would
put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure
the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end
and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding”
8 Another aspect which has to be borne in mind is that the parties to the
dispute having entered into a settlement and compromised the matter,
6
there is a minimal chance of the complainant coming forward in support
of the prosecution case and the chances of conviction therefore appear
to be very remote and it would not be justified to drag these
proceedings unnecessarily knowing fully well the final outcome.
9 In view of the statement made by the complainant and the accused
persons; keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
the case of B. S. Joshi & others v. State of Haryana & Another
[2003 (4) SCC 675] and in the case of Gian Singh (supra) and
Narinder Singh (supra), this Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case
where the parties can be permitted to compound the offence.
10 Accordingly, the present petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is
allowed. The proceedings in Session Trial No.37/2025 pending before
Second Additional Judge of Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangarh
District Sarangarh, Bilaigarh, arising out of Crime No.397 of 2022
registered at Police Station Baramkela, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh,
stands quashed and the petitioners, who are accused persons in that
case, stand discharged from the offence punishable under Sections
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
inder
