Punjab-Haryana High Court
Davinder Pal vs State Of Punjab And Others on 22 July, 2026
CWP-12095-2019 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Sr.No.206
CWP-12095-2019
Decided on : 22.07.2026
Davinder Pal ...... Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ...... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
***
Present : Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner (through V.C.)
Mr. Karunesh Kaushal, AAG, Punjab.
***
NAMIT KUMAR J. (ORAL)
1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ in
the nature of Certiorari for quashing the order dated 21.09.2018 (Annexure
P-3), passed by the Commissioner of Police, Amritsar City, whereby the
petitioner was dismissed from service and the order dated 04.02.2019
(Annexure P-4), passed by respondent No.2, whereby the appeal preferred
by the petitioner was rejected.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner joined
the police department as a Constable on 09.12.1988. It is the case of the
petitioner that he remained under treatment for depression from 17.04.2017
to 16.08.2017. Upon reporting for duty on 16.08.2017, he was not allowed
to join his duty and was informed that he had already been placed under
suspension on 06.07.2017. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 08.12.2017
(Annexure P-1) was served upon him, wherein allegation of unauthorized
absence from duty from 17.04.2017 to 16.08.2017, i.e., 04 months and 03
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hours was made. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said charge-sheet
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on 01.02.2018 (Annexure P-2). The Inquiry Officer submitted his report
holding the charge of unauthorized absence from duty proved.
Consequently, petitioner was issued a show cause notice alongwith copy of
the inquiry report, to which he submitted his representation and he was
called for personal hearing. During the course of personal hearing, he
produced medical documents purportedly issued by Dr. Manjit Singh of
Neurology Department, Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar. The punishing
authority got the said medical documents verified from the concerned
hospital through Sh. Sukninder Singh, PPS, Station House Officer, Police
Station Mohkampura, Amritsar, who vide his letter dated 30.08.2018 had
sent the report that the medical documents are forged, as neither did the
concerned Neurology Department exist in the said hospital nor was there any
doctor by the name of Manjit Singh. Upon receipt of the said report, opinion
of the DA/Legal, Amritsar was obtained and on the basis of the said opinion,
FIR No.51, dated 22.09.2018, under Sections 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, 120-
B IPC, was registered against the petitioner at Police Station Majitha Road,
Amritsar. The criminal trial arising therefrom is stated to be pending against
him. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated
21.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), against which the petitioner preferred an appeal
before respondent No.2 which has been considered and rejected vide order
dated 04.02.2019 (Annexure P-4).
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the instant petition has been
preferred by the petitioner.
4. Reply by way of an affidavit of Sartaj Singh Chahal, IPS, Addl.
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquarters, Amritsar City has been filed
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1. That petitioner Ex. Constable Davinder Pal was
recruited as constable in district Tarn Taran and was allotted
regimental No. 3445/TT. During his entire service he remained
absent for approximately 2502 days on different occasions. He
absented himself from his duty on 17.04.2017 to 16.08.2017 i.e
121 days due to which he was placed under suspension vide this
office order No. 29309-11/A-1 dated 06.07.2017 (Annexure R-1)
for his wilful absence and due to his habitual and wilful
absence from his duty he was dismissed from service vide this
office order No. 2844-50/Supdt. dated 21.09.2018. (Annexed as
annexure R-2)
2. That the petitioner remained wilfully absent from his duty
time and again without any leave or permission from the
competent authority. Due to his habitual absence his 20 years
permanent service was forfeited with permanent effect out of his
total 30 year service.
3. That petitioner filed an appeal against his dismissal order
dated 21.09.2018 before the Director General of Police, Punjab
Chandigarh which was rejected by the appellant authority vide
their office order No. 4805-06/Law & order dated 04.02.2019.
(Annexed as annexure R-3).
4. That the petitioner was habitual absentee and his various
absence periods are mentioned in the following table:
Sr. Absent Absent to D.E Order No. Total Absent
No. from open/not
1. 25.02.1993 21.04.1993 Open 11884-83/B 55 days
dated
15.04.1993
2. 07.11.94 02.01.95 55 days
3. 22.07.1998 15.09.1998 After 51802-6/B 54 days
enquiry his dated
01 year 22.11.1998
service was
forfeited
4. 05.12.92 18.12.92 13 days
5. 12.06.1998 15.06.1998 3 days
6. 04.04.1998 17.04.1998 13 days
7. 12.01.1999 02.03.1999 After 14380-85/B 50 days
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CWP-12095-2019 401 year 20.04.1999
service was
forfeited
8. 04.06.1998 19.06.1998 14 days
9. 18.02.1998 28.02.1998 10 days
10. 05.12.1998 18.12.1998 12 days
11. 25.05.1998 02.06.1998 21 days
12. 07.08.1999 14.08.1999 07 days
13. 19.08.1999 20.08.1999 02 days
14. 12.01.1999 02.03.1999 50 days
15. 15.06.1999 10.07.1999 26 days
16. 07.09.1999 05.04.2000 211 days
17. 26.05.2000 23.09.2000 121 days
18. 03.10.2000 12.04.2001 192 days
19. 13.04.2001 19.04.2001 06 days
20. 09.03.2004 11.03.2004 02 days
21. 21.04.2004 29.04.2004 08 days
22. 25.05.2004 06.07.2004 After 41327-31/B 42 days
enquiry his dated
02 year 28.09.2004
service was
forfeited
23. 24.12.2004 18.03.2005 After 84 days 139
18.03.2005 04.08.2005 enquiry his days
07 year
service was
forfeited
24. 18.03.2005 04.08.2005 137 days
25. 18.11.2005 25.05.2008 After Order Approx. 919
enquiry his No.32576- days
05 year 80/B dated
service was 20.06.2008
forfeited
26. 17.11.2008 24.11.2008 7 days
27. 08.12.2008 11.12.2008 3 days
28. 30.07.2015 14.08.2015
29. 17.04.2017 16.08.2017 Suspended 29309- 125 days
and D.E 11/A-1
open dt.06.07.17
Total 2502
21.09.2018 Dismissed Dismissed due to the absence of 121
vide order days.
No.2844-
50/Supdt.
Dated
21.09.2018.
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5. That the petitioner is habitual absentee and his entire
absence period was treated as non-duty non-pay vide different
orders and dates. Before his dismissal his medical certificate
which was produced by him was verified from the concerned
authority i.e. Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar and after
verification said medical certificate was found fake. After
obtaining the legal opinion a case FIR No. 51 dated 22.09.2018
u/s 420,465,466,468,471, 120-B IPC, P.S Majitha Road,
Amritsar was registered against him.”
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
had rendered nearly 30 years of service, therefore, instead of imposing the
penalty of dismissal from service, the competent authority ought to have
compulsorily retired him from service. He further submits that the
punishment of dismissal awarded to him is harsh and disproportionate to the
allegations made in the charge-sheet.
6. Per contra, learned State counsel while referring to the
averments made in the written statement, submits that the petitioner is a
habitual absentee and remained absent from duty on 29 occasions for a
period of 2502 days. He further submits that even during the course of
disciplinary proceedings, he has produced forged and fabricated medical
certificates for which an FIR No.51, dated 22.09.2018, under Sections 420,
465, 466, 468, 471, 120-B IPC, has been registered against him, at Police
Station Majitha Road, Amritsar and the criminal trial is pending. He further
submits that, keeping in view the past service record of the petitioner and
the fact that petitioner being a member of the disciplined force, remained
absent from duty on 29 occasions, the punishment of dismissal from service
awarded to the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct committed by
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7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8. The petitioner was dismissed from service on charge of
unauthorized absence from duty after following the due procedure of law.
He was issued charge-sheet, to which he submitted his reply. A regular
departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with Punjab Police
Rules, wherein the charges levelled against petitioner have been proved.
Thereafter, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice alongwith the copy
of the inquiry report and during the course of personal hearing, the petitioner
produced certain medical certificates in support of his defence. Upon
verification, the medical certificates were found to be forged & fabricated, as
no doctor by the name of Manjit Singh was found to be associated with the
concerned hospital and even the said hospital was also found to be non-
existent, for which an FIR has been registered against the petitioner. The
scope of judicial review in matters arising out of departmental proceedings
has been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 AIR Supreme Court 1723,
wherein it has been held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which
examines the merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry and
the power of judicial review is confined to examining whether the inquiry
was conducted by a competent authority; according to the procedure
prescribed and whether rules of natural justice were duly complied with.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. P.
Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the scope of interference
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has held as under: –
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CWP-12095-2019 7“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing
to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority
in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the
evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I
was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also
endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act
as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of
its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to
the evidence and merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
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CWP-12095-2019 8
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh
and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court
1723, many of the above principles have been discussed and it
has been concluded thus :
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is
some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence
may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent pendent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
MAMTA MALHOTRA by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
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CWP-12095-2019 9the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds.
But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if
there be some legal evidence on which their findings can
be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is
not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under
Article 226 of the Constitution.”
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata
Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557, the principles have been further
discussed at paragraph paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows :
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.
Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao Rao. First, there is no warrant
for the view that in considering whether a public officer
is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If
that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry
the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The
High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court
is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by
MAMTA MALHOTRA an authority competent in that behalf and according to
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CWP-12095-2019 10the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where
there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The
High Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,
the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence
on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the
Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that
the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of
the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not
supported by any evidence or it can be said that no
reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In
Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court
MAMTA MALHOTRA exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the
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CWP-12095-2019 11disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent
was instrumental in compelling the shut- down of an air
compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This
Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that at the
evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group
of strikers and compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The
General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry
Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted
the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the
General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the
conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held
that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the High Court should not have
interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court
exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact
reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not
an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ
can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on
no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding
of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
MAMTA MALHOTRA adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate
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CWP-12095-2019 12to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High
Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect
that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on
the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate,
the evidence in the present case which was considered by
the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to
justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which
would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the
respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave
reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High
Court to say that no reasonable person could have
arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed
the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected
the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the
High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari should not do.”
These principles have been succinctly summed summed-up by
the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in
State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC
491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions:
“4. …. in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated
rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not
apply. All materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to
hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and
credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating
MAMTA MALHOTRA such material and should not glibly swallow what is
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CWP-12095-2019 13strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence
Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite
decisions nor text books, although we have been taken
through case case-law and other authorities by counsel
on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of natural justice.
Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or
arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held
good….”
10. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v. Abrar Ali,
2017(1) SCT 682, wherein it has been held as under: –
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High
Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and
was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any
reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit
had better medical facilities which could have been availed by
the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was
further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of
treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have
entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-
appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation
of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.)
28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
MAMTA MALHOTRA domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
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CWP-12095-2019 14another view is possible on the material on record. If the
inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings
are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no evidence or
where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out
perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably
could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record. The courts will however interfere
with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC
762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036 and High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.”
11. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said
judgment it has been held as under: –
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary
inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities
discharged by constitutional Courts under Article 226 or
Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is
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CWP-12095-2019 15procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of
principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of
the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been
earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government of
T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216 and
further examined by the three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others, 1995(6) SCC 749
wherein it has been held as under:-
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4
SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion,
upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent
error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this
Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited v.
Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently by the three
Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India
and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471.
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making
process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure
fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held
against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with
MAMTA MALHOTRA the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
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CWP-12095-2019 16
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be
extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of
a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged
misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine
and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the
competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are
complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are
based on some evidence and authority has power and
jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the
disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings
recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the
disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for
disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to
the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence
available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to
remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent
must be established by such evidence acting upon which a
reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may
arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against
the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or
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surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the
departmental enquiry proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of
judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the
Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact
arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a
case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence
to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man
acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at
that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support
the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the
same has to be sustained.”
12. To the similar effect are the judgments in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India and others : 1996(1) SCT 617 and Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora : (1997) 3 SCC 72.
13. A perusal of the record leaves no manner of doubt that the
disciplinary proceedings were conducted after following the prescribed
procedure in its entirety and in due compliance with the principles of natural
justice. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet, participated in the
enquiry proceedings, and submitted his defence, was afforded an opportunity
to make representation against the enquiry report, and was granted a
personal hearing before the disciplinary authority. In these circumstances, it
cannot be said that the petitioner was denied adequate or reasonable
opportunity, or that the proceedings stand vitiated on account of any
procedural infirmity.
14. The challenge raised in the present writ petition, in substance,
seeks re-appreciation of the factual findings returned in the departmental
proceedings and reassessment of the evidentiary material on record. Such an
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as an appellate forum over the findings recorded by the inquiry officer or the
disciplinary authority and it cannot go into the adequacy or inadequacy of
evidence, examine the reliability of evidence as if sitting in appeal, or
substitute its own view for the view taken by the competent authorities.
Unless the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence,
rendered in breach of the principles of natural justice, or unless the
punishment imposed is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the
Court, no interference is warranted. In the facts of the present case, none of
the aforesaid contingencies is made out.
15. Keeping in view the above, finding no merit in the present writ
petition, the same is hereby dismissed.
16. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
22.07.2026 JUDGE
mamta
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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