Crla / 144U / 1997Rajasthan Board … vs M/S J.V.Bleaching Works And Others … on 13 May, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Urn: Crla / 144U / 1997Rajasthan Board … vs M/S J.V.Bleaching Works And Others … on 13 May, 2026

[2026:RJ-JD:22905]

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
                     S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 29/1997

Rajasthan Board For Prevention And Control of Pollution, 4,
Industrial Area, Jhalana Dungri, Jaipur
                                                                      ----Appellant
                                       Versus
1. M/s J.V. Bleaching Works, Opp. Agarwal Bagichi, Pali
2. M/s G. M. Dyeing and Bleaching Works, Opp. Agarwal Bagichi,
Pali
3. Mafatlal s/o Achal Dasji Agarwal, r/o Pali
4. Jaikishan s/o Mafatlal r/o Pali
5. Ram Ratan s/o Mafatlal r/o Pali
6. Ram Niwas s/o Mafatlal r/o Pali
                                                                   ----Respondents


For Appellant(s)             :    Mr. Manish Sisodia, Sr. Advocate,
                                  assisted by Mr. Piyush Chauhan
For Respondent(s)            :    --



             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL

Judgment

13/05/2026

1. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 378

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC“),

against the judgment dated 22.08.1992, passed by learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Environment, Pali, Rajasthan,

in Criminal Original Case no. 6/1992, whereby the Respondent

accused were acquitted from offences under sections 24, 25 and

26 read with Sections 43 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and

Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter, “Act of 1974”).

2. Brief facts of the present case are that Respondent Nos. 1

and 2 are partnership firms and Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 are

alleged to be partners therein. The Respondent firms are engaged

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in the business of dyeing, printing, bleaching and processing of

clothes. On 17.08.1976, a letter for request of consent (Exh.P-2),

addressed to Member Secretary of the Appellant-Board, was sent

by Respondent No.1. On 01.09.1976, the Board directed the

Respondent no.1 to install treatment plant to process the effluent

before releasing it into the sewer. Subsequent thereto, on

13.11.1976, an intimation was sent under the letterhead of

Respondent No.1 (Exh. P-12) that the firm’s name had been

changed to ‘M/s G.M. Dyeing and Bleaching Works, Pali’. This letter

was sent by a partner, Mr. Jai Kishan Bansal.

2.1 Thereafter, on 20.12.1976, the consent for discharge of trade

effluents under section 25 and 26 of Act of 1974 was provisionally

granted to M/s G.M. Dyeing and Bleaching Works, subject to

certain conditions which are as follows:

“(i) The Consent is granted for a period upto JUNE, 1977.

(ii) Daily quantity of trade effluent shall be maintained
below 25,500 litres per day. Discharge must be regularly
measured by a flow measuring device.

(iii) The Industrial effluent shall be treated by suitable
method so as to conform to the tolerance limits as per I.S.
2490-Part-I, 1974 (as adopted by the Board).

The treatment method along with design should be
intimated to the Board with full details.”

2.2 On 13.05.1978, another letter was sent by Respondent No.2

that their dyeing unit was closed due to some ongoing repairing

work, and therefore, a 6-month time duration was sought to

install treatment plant.

2.3 On 17.01.1979, a notice for inspection (Exh.P-5) was issued

in the name of Respondent No. 2 under Rule 30(2), Water

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Rules, whereby Mr. D.C.

Sharma – Junior Chemist (PW-2) and Mr. C. M. Saini were

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appointed as the inspection officers. They were directed to

conduct inspection of the factory and disposal system of the firm.

Consequently, the inspection was carried out and a ‘notice of

intimation to have sample analysed’ (Exh.P-16) was served upon

the Respondent No.6, then and there, which mentions that sample

was collected from “final outlet” on 20.01.1979. The sample was

collected, sealed and marked in the presence of PW-2. The

signatures of Mr. Ram Niwas Bansal were also obtained on the said

notice.

2.4 Thereafter, an inspection report (Exh. P-6) was prepared by

Mr. D. C. Sharma (PW-2). It mentions that Ram Niwas

(Respondent No. 6) was a partner in the firm. Moreover, 27000

litres of trade effluent was being discharged by the firm per day.

The samples collected from the firm, were sent for analysis to the

State Board Analyst. On 12.02.1979, a report was issued by the

Board Analyst stating that the sample was received by him on

25.01.1979 and the condition of the seal, fastening and container

on receipt was “intact”.

2.5 According to testimony of PW-1, K.L. Goel (Member

Secretary), on 18.04.1979, the Board granted permission to

initiate prosecution against M/s G.M. Dyeing and Bleaching Works,

Pali. Thereafter, on 07.05.1979, a complaint was presented before

the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pali on the allegation that the

Respondent firms were discharging trade effluents in the sewers of

Municipal Corporation, without the consent of the Board, which, in

turn, was going into Bandi river. Respondent firms neither

obtained consent of the Board for discharging effluents in sewer

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nor did they install a treatment plant for processing the trade

effluent, thereby polluting the drains and the river. The complaint

was registered on 17.05.1979, and the Respondent accused were

charged under sections 24, 25 and 26 read with 43 and 44 of Act

of 1974.

2.6 The trial commenced and the Appellant-complainant

produced Mr. K.L. Goel, Member Secretary (PW-1) and Mr. D.C.

Sharma, Junior Chemist (PW-2) as witnesses and certain

documents in its support, most important witness being PW-2. The

Respondents did not produce any witnesses. The statements of

the Respondent-accused persons were recorded under Section

313, CrPC.

2.7 After examination of witnesses and evidences adduced by

the parties, the learned Trial Court, vide judgment dated

22.08.1992, acquitted the Respondents on benefit of doubt.

2.8 Hence, the present criminal appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the Appellant, while referring to the

reasoning of the learned Trial Court, submits that Mr. D.C.

Sharma, Junior Chemist (PW-2), was duly appointed by the Board

to conduct the inspection. It was also corroborated by the

testimony of Member Secretary (PW-1).

3.1 Learned counsel further submits that any objection with

regard to the authorization for conducting search and inspection

could have been raised at the time of inspection and sampling.

Therefore, in the light of the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 and

Exh. P-5, the learned Trial Court could not have doubted the

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validity of the authorization of Mr. D. C. Sharma to conduct the

inspection and collect sample from the Respondent firms.

3.2 Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that Section 21(3)

(a) of Act of 1974 states that notice is required to be served then

and there, on the person in-charge or the occupier of the

premises. The notice is required to be served only on the occupier

of the premises, not on all the accused persons. The notice was

duly served on Shri Ram Niwas Bansal – Respondent no. 6, who is

one of the partners in M/s G.M. Dyeing and Bleaching –

Respondent no.2. Therefore, service of notice on Respondent no. 6

was sufficient compliance of Section 21 of Act of 1974.

3.3 Learned counsel for the Appellant also submits that with

regard to division of samples obtained during inspection, Section

21(5) of Act of 1974 provides that the sample may be divided in

two parts at the request of the occupier. If, the occupier does not

make such request, the sample will be put in a sealed container,

which would be marked and signed by the inspecting authority

and the occupier. In the instant case, the sample was collected

from the final outlet. Since, Respondent no.6 did not ask for the

division of samples, therefore, Mr. D. C. Sharma, placed the

sample in container, sealed and marked it and also obtained the

signatures of Respondent no.6.

3.4 Learned counsel further submits that the involvement of the

Respondents no.3 to 6 as partners in the Respondent firms, was

duly established by the fact that Mr. Mafatlal – Respondent no.3,

had submitted the request for consent which contained his

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signatures. Respondent no.6 was involved in conducting day-to-

day business activities of the Respondent firms.

3.5 Learned counsel, while referring to the provisions of the Act

of 1974 submits that discharge of effluents without obtaining

permission of the Board is punishable under Section 44 of Act of

1974. In such a case, it is not required for the trade effluent to be

polluted. The Respondents have themselves admitted that trade

effluents were being discharged by the firms without consent of

the State Board.

3.6 Learned counsel for the Appellant, lastly, submits that the

learned Magistrate has gravely erred in holding that the

Respondent accused were prejudiced on account of not being

afforded an opportunity to further cross-examine PW-1 due to his

death during trial. According to the Appellant, the said finding is

wholly contrary to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,

which expressly renders previous testimony admissible where the

witness cannot be produced on account of death.

4. Heard learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the

material available on record.

5. The present case being an appeal against acquittal, this

Court is required to examine whether the findings recorded by the

learned Trial Court suffer from any error of fact or law, illegality,

infirmity or perversity. Upon consideration of the record, this Court

finds that there were several procedural lapses in the conduct of

inspection and collection of samples.

5.1 The notice for inspection (Exh. P-5), issued in the name of

Respondent No. 2, appears to bear the signatures of one “Shama

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Prasad” instead of the then Member Secretary, Mr. K.L. Goel.

Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly observed that the

appointment of the inspection officers was not duly authorised by

the Board. Since authorisation under the Act of 1974 is a statutory

requirement, non-compliance thereof raises doubt regarding the

authority of the inspection officers to conduct inspection and

collect samples.

5.2 Upon perusal of the inspection report (Exh. P-6), it is

observed that the same is a typed document and does not

mention the date on which it was prepared. PW-2, in his cross-

examination, stated that he had initially prepared inspection notes

on rough paper and subsequently prepared the typed report.

However, the rough notes were never produced before the learned

Trial Court. In the opinion of this Court, the inspection officer

ought to have prepared the inspection report at the site itself and

obtained the signatures of Respondent No. 6, thereon. This

circumstance further creates doubt regarding the authenticity and

reliability of the inspection report prepared by PW-2.

5.3 According to section 23(2), the entry and inspection must be

conducted in consonance with the provisions of CrPC for search,

inspection and seizure. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the

inspection officer to associate at least two independent witnesses

during the inspection proceedings.

5.4 The association of independent witnesses was necessary,

particularly because certain objections raised by the learned

counsel for the Respondent-accused during trial could not be

effectively rebutted by the Appellant-complainant. Firstly, the

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burden of proving that no request for division of sample was made

by Respondent No. 6, lay upon the Appellant. However, this fact

could not be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

5.5 The second objection pertains to the collection of the sample

from the final outlet. During trial, learned counsel for the

Respondent-accused contended that the sample had been

collected from the processing unit and not from the final outlet,

and that the signatures of Respondent No. 6 had been obtained

forcibly and without consent. Although Exh. P-16 was produced to

indicate that the sample had been collected from the final outlet

on 20.01.1979, no independent or corroborative evidence was

adduced to establish the said fact.

5.6 Exh. P-16 further records that the sample was sealed,

marked and signed in the presence of the inspection officer, D.C.

Sharma (PW-2), and bears the signatures of Respondent No. 6.

However, PW-2 admitted in his cross-examination that the sample

had been collected in only one container and sealed with the seal

prescribed by the State Board. Significantly, neither the specimen

impression of the seal was produced before the learned Trial Court

nor was the same brought on record before this Court.

5.7 The learned Trial Court further noted that although PW-1 was

cross-examined before framing of charge, after framing of charge

the Respondent-accused did not get an opportunity to further

cross-examine him due to his death. Consequently, the

Respondent-accused were deprived of the valuable right of further

cross-examination.

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5.8 In their statements under Section 313, CrPC, it was

submitted by the Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 that they were not

partners in the Respondent firms. It was also deposed by PW-2 in

his cross examination that at the time of inspection, Mr. Ram

Niwas mentioned that Respondent No.2 was a registered

partnership firm, however, no material was sought by PW-2 to

ensure as to who were the partners and whether it was a

registered partnership firm. PW-1, in his cross examination,

deposed that he was not aware as to who were the partners in the

Respondent firms. Thus, their vicarious liability was not

conclusively established.

5.9 It was further deposed that the meeting in which permission

for initiating prosecution was granted against the Respondent

firms, there were no documents of registration or partnership

deed available before the Board. The notice for inspection (Exh. P-

5) also does not mention the name of the partners in the firm.

Certain correspondences have been placed on record to show that

Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 were partners, however, the partnership

deed or document of registration of the firm were not produced as

evidence before the learned Trial Court nor was it brought on

record before this Court. Since, it is not fully established that

Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 were partners in the Respondent firms,

prosecution could not have been initiated against them.

5.10 Further, it was deposed by PW-1 that the permission to

initiate prosecution was granted only against M/s G.M. Dyeing and

Bleaching Works, Pali. Hence, it is observed that since the

permission to prosecute had not been granted against Respondent

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Nos. 3 to 6, there existed no sufficient basis to array them as

accused persons.

5.11 As far as Respondent No. 1 is concerned, PW-2 deposed that

the firm was closed at the time of inspection and therefore, the

sample was not obtained from that firm. Consequently,

prosecution against Respondent No. 1 also becomes

unsustainable.

5.12 Furthermore, the sample was received by the State Board

Analyst on 25.01.1979, i.e., five days after its collection. Although

PW-2 deposed that the sample had been collected in the presence

of the accused, sealed, marked and thereafter dispatched to the

Board Analyst, no independent evidence was adduced to establish

that the sample remained untampered during transit. Proper chain

of custody ought to have been affirmatively established till the

sample reached the Board Analyst.

5.13 PW-1 also deposed in the cross examination that he was not

aware about the fact as to whether the elements in the sample, as

mentioned in report of the Analyst, were in accordance with the

norms of I.S. 2490-Part-I, 1974 or not. The Appellant failed to

prove that the standards alleged to have been violated were

legally enforceable. Though reliance was placed on the said

norms, no notification or document was produced to show that

such standards had been formally adopted or notified under the

Act of 1974 at the relevant time. Penal liability cannot be imposed

without proving that the discharge contravened duly notified and

binding standards.

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5.14 Moreover, the prosecution did not establish that the alleged

effluent actually reached the Bandi river or any “stream” within

the meaning of the Act of 1974. No evidence, either through

inspection notes, maps, or witness testimony, was produced to

show that the discharge from the unit ultimately entered a natural

water body. This is an essential ingredient of the offences charged

and cannot be presumed.

5.15 Therefore, the lapses in ensuring the integrity of the sample,

bring the report of Board Analyst under the cloud of doubt as

there is no independent evidence to show that the sample was

received by the Board Analyst in original condition. This further

casts a shadow on the prosecution’s case.

5.16 The offence under section 24 read with section 43 of Act of

1974, is not made out as the entire prosecution case rests upon

the inspection and sampling procedure conducted by PW-2.

However, as discussed herein-above, serious doubts arise

regarding the legality and reliability of the inspection, collection of

samples, preservation of seal, chain of custody and analysis of the

sample.

5.17 As far as offence under section 25 of Act of 1974 is

concerned, the appellant has failed to produce cogent evidence

showing that, after expiry of the provisional consent, the

Respondents had established any new outlet or commenced any

new discharge. Therefore, offence under Section 25 r/w Section

44 was also not made out.

5.18 Another aspect that requires consideration was regarding the

consent for releasing the effluents in the drain, which was not

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obtained by the Respondent firms. Sections 25 and 26 of the Act

of 1974, make it mandatory for an any person discharging any

sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land,

immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1974, to

apply for consent of the Board. The punishment for contravention

thereof is provided under section 44 of Act of 1974.

5.19 The learned Trial Court observed that the complaint was

presented on 07.05.1979. However, even if it is assumed,

arguendo, that trade effluents were being discharged by the

Respondent-accused, the “Gazette Notification” published under

Section 26 of Act of 1974 by Rajasthan Government, namely,

Rajasthan Gazette Part 4(c) dated 08.09.1983 Page 89, (contained

in a book published by the Board titled “Compendium on

Environmental Protection Laws”, Page 175, First Edition, 1985),

granted liberty to industries to obtain consent till 01.10.1983.

Therefore, considering the complaint to be premature, offence

under Section 26 r/w Section 44 of Act of 1974, was not

established. This Court finds no infirmity in the aforesaid finding

recorded by the learned Trial Court and accordingly, upholds the

same.

6. At this juncture, it would appropriate to refer to the

landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, Mallappa and

Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka; (2024) 3 SCC 544, wherein it

was observed that:

“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values
of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while

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deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
comprehensive – inclusive of all evidence, oral or
documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground
of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds
that two views are possible, the one in favour of the
accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify
the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it
must specifically address all the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality,
perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the
Trial Court.”

7. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the

learned Trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence and legal

position and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not

proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds no

error of law or fact, illegality, or perversity in the impugned

judgment.

8. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment dated

22.08.1992, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Environment, Pali. in Criminal Original Case no.

6/1992 is affirmed.

9. All pending applications stand disposed of.

(SUNIL BENIWAL),J

20-skm/-

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