Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Urn: Cr / 215U / 2026Mukesh S/O Babu Lal vs Ghanshyam on 22 May, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:18037]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 119/2026
1. Mukesh S/o Babu Lal, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir,
District Bharatpur (Raj.).
2. Kamlesh D/o Babulal, W/o Vinod, R/o Mehmadpura, Tehsil
Rajakheda, District Dholpur.
3. Devesh D/o Babulal, W/o Ram, R/o Parwana Road,
Khureji Laxminagar, Delhi
4. Seema D/o Babulal, W/o Sunil, Resident Of Near
Parshuram Chatrawas, Vanki Road, Hindauncity, District
Karauli (Raj.).
5. Rudra Sharma S/o Mukesh Chand Sharma, Resident Of
Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.).
----Petitioners/Defendants Nos. 1,5,6,7,10
Versus
1. Ghanshyam Aged About 65 years S/o Shri Latoor, R/o
Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.)
2. Prem Chand, Aged About 60 Years S/o Shri Latoor,
Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.).
3. Horilal, Aged About 44 Years S/o Shri Latoor, Resident Of
Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.).
4. Kusma, Aged About 55 Years D/o Latoor, Wife Of
Shivdayal, Resident Of Village Jatmasi, Tehsil Roopwas,
District Bharatpur (Raj.).
5. Darupti Aged About 57 Years D/o Shri Latoor, W/o
Prabhudayal, Resident Of Village Jatmasi, Tehsil Roopwas,
District Bharatpur (Raj.).
6. Pooja Aged About 52 Years D/o Lathoor, W/o Ashok
Tiwari, Resident Of Mohammadi, Tehsil Tundla, District
Firozabad (U.p.).
----Respondents/Plaintiffs
7. Pammi Devi W/o Hemendra, S/o Babulal
8. Payal D/o Hemendra, S/o Babulal.
9. Kaushal Aged About 14 Years, S/o Hemendra S/o
Babulal,Minor Through Natural Guardian Mother Pammi
Devi. All Resident Of Morda Tehsil Weir, At Present
Resident Of Arjun Nagar Sonkh Road Behind Dainiki
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[2026:RJ-JP:18037] (2 of 11) [CR-119/2026]
Bhaskar Office, Bharatpur (Raj.).
10. Mithlesh D/o Babulal, W/o Mahendra, Resident Of C/o
Rajendra Prasad, Ram Nagar, Sitanagar, Rambagh, Agra,
District Agra (U.p.)
11. Krishankant Sharma S/o Mukesh Chand Sharma, Resident
Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.).
12. Sub-Divisional Officer, Weir, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur
(Raj.).
—-Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.K. Daga, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. J.P. Goyal, Sr. Adv. assisted by Ms.
Jyoti Swami, Adv.
Ms. Ronak Bansal, Adv.
Mr. Naman Sharma, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
Judgment
Date of Arguments Concluded : 15/04/2026
Date of Judgment Reserved : 15/04/2026
Full/Operative Part Uploaded : Full
Date of Judgment Pronounced : 22/05/2026
1. By way of filing this instant petition under Section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code (for short as ‘CPC‘), the petitioners have
assailed the order dated 25.02.2026 passed by the learned
Additional District Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur (hereinafter to
be referred as learned ‘trial Court’), in Civil Suit No. 1/2025 titled
as “Ghanshyam Vs. Mukesh and Ors.“, whereby the application
preferred by the present petitioners/defendant Nos.1,5,6,7 and 10
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC came to be rejected.
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2. Briefly stated, the respondents-plaintiffs instituted a civil suit
on 27.11.2024 seeking declaration and permanent injunction to
the effect that the compromise dated 17.07.1982 and the
judgment and decree dated 10.09.1982 passed by Additional
Collector, Bayana (hereinafter referred to as ‘Revenue Court’) in
Revenue Suit No. 95/1982, be declared null and void and further
declaration, that the gift deed dated 31.10.2022 be declared void.
3. The case set up in the plaint is that one Babulal had earlier
instituted a revenue suit for declaration of khatedari rights and
perpetual injunction against his brother Latoor (Father of the
plaintiff-respondent) before the competent Revenue Court, which
was decided on the basis of a compromise dated 17.07.1982,
culminating into a compromise decree dated 10.09.1982.
Consequently, mutation entries were effected in the revenue
records in terms of compromise decree. Later on, Babulal
executed a gift deed on 31.10.2022 in favour of Defendant Nos.9
and 10. It is an admitted position that during his lifetime, Latoor
never challenged the compromise or the compromise decree
passed by the learned Revenue Court. After a lapse of more than
four decades, the present suit has been instituted by his legal
representatives challenging the said compromise decree on the
ground that the compromise was obtained by playing fraud on
Latoor and necessary parties were not impleaded in the suit. The
present petitioners moved an application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC contending, inter alia, that the suit is barred by law
particularly, in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, and is also barred
by limitation. The respondents-plaintiffs opposed the said
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application, contending that the objections raised involve mixed
questions of fact and law, which require adjudication after
evidence. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 25.02.2026,
dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC holding
that the issues raised cannot be decided at the threshold and
require trial. Aggrieved thereby, the present civil revision petition
has been filed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error inasmuch as the
learned trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Learned counsel also submits that the
respondent-plaintiffs have challenged the compromise
decree/judgment dated 10.09.1982 by way of an independent civil
suit, which is expressly prohibited under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC.
It is further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to
appreciate that the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC is absolute
and operates at the threshold, and therefore, the plaint was liable
to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC without embarking
upon a trial.
5. Learned counsel for petitioners further contends that the
original decree having been passed in the year 1982, and the suit
having been instituted in the year 2024, the same is barred by
limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act. The plaint
does not disclose any cause of action as to how the suit is within
limitation, therefore, the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground
also.
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6. Learned counsel for petitioners further argues that the
predecessor of the plaintiffs/respondents, namely Latoor, never
challenged the compromise decree during his lifetime, and thus,
the legal representatives are bound by the said decree. The
plaintiffs, lack locus standi to challenge a decree which had
attained finality decades ago. Learned counsel further argues that
a decree passed by a competent court, particularly on the basis of
compromise, cannot be challenged by way of a separate suit, and
any such challenge must be raised before the same court which
passed the Judgment and compromise decree.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners prays that the order
passed by the learned trial Court be quashed and set aside, while
allowing the application filed by the petitioner for rejecting the
plaint.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on
the following judgments:-
• Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma reported
in 2024 SCC Online SC 3720
• Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh
Prasad and Ors. with Raja Pushpa Properties Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. N.Sailesh Prasad and Ors. reported in (2022) 5 SCC
736
• Shri Ram & Anr. v. 1st Addl. Distt. Judge & Ors.
reported in 2001 3 SCC 24
• Pushpa devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. reported
in (2006) 5 SCC 566
• T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. reported in
(1977) 4 SCC 467
• Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi & Anr. v. Gurusiddappa
Tirakappa Malagi (Dead Through LRs) reported in 2025
SCC online SC 835.
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• Jitendra Singh Deora v. Paras Kumar & Ors. reported in
2025 Supreme(Raj) 1881
• Anju (Smt.) & Ors. v. Vikram Kaur reported in 2013
Supreme (All) 1160
• Dunia Lal Dutta v. Nagendra Nath Datta & Anr. reported
in AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 163.
9. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, vehemently argued that a suit to examine the
validity and correctness of the compromise or the question
regarding legality of the same cannot be adjudicated by Revenue
Court, therefore, only a Civil Court would be able to adjudicate the
issue. Hence, the learned trial Court has rightly rejected the
application moved by the petitioners before it.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on
the following judgments:-
• Horil Vs. Keshav and Ors. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 525
• Sree Surya Developers (supra)
• S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. reported in 1994 1 SCC 1
• Jitendra Singh Deora (supra)
• Siri Bhagwan v. VBM Estates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported in
2015 Supreme(Del) 4151
• Harbir & Ors. v. Bhabhuti reported in 2012
Supreme(P&H) 1486.
11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record.
12. Before proceeding with the discussion, it is pertinent to first
examine Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the CPC. For ease of
reference, the provisions are reproduced herein below:
“ORDER XXIII
Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits
[1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of
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[2026:RJ-JP:18037] (7 of 11) [CR-119/2026]institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all
or any of the defendants abandon his suit or
abandon a part of his claim:
Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or
other person to whom the provisions contained in
rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the
suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned
without the leave of the Court.
(2) An application for leave under the proviso
to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an
affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or
such other person is represented by a pleader, by
a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the
abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the
benefit of the minor or such other person.
(3) Where the Court is satisfied,–
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some
formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for
allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit
for the subject matter of suit or part of a
claim,
It may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the
plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or
such part of the claim with liberty to institute a
fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such
suit or such part of the claim.
(4) Where the plaintiff–
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under
sub-rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim
without the permission referred to in sub-
rule (3),
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may
award and shall be precluded from instituting any
fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such
part of the claim.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to
authorise the Court to permit one of several
plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under
sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3),
any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of
the other plaintiff.]
[1A.When transposition of defendants as
plaintiffs may be permitted.–Where a suit is
withdrawn or abandoned by a plaintiff under rule
1, and a defendant applies to be transposed as a
plaintiff under rule 10 of Order I the Court shall, in
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considering such application, have due regard to
the question whether the applicant has a
substantial question to be decided as against any
of the other defendants.]
2. Limitation law not affected by first
suit.–In any fresh suit instituted on permission
granted under the last preceding rule, the plaintiff
shall be bound by the law of limitation in the same
manner as if the first suit had not been instituted.
3. Compromise of suit.-Where it is proved
to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been
adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement
or compromise [in writing and signed by the
parties]or where the defendant satisfied the
plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the
subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order
such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be
recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance
therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the
suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the
agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same
as the subject-matter of the suit:]
[Provided that where it is alleged by one party and
denied by the other that an adjustment or
satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall
decide the question; but not adjournment shall be
granted for the purpose of deciding the question,
unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded,
thinks fit to grant such adjournment.]
[Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which
is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act,
1872 (9 of 1872), shall not he deemed to be lawful
within the meaning of this rule.]”
[3A. Bar to suit.-No suit shall lie to set aside
a decree on the ground that the compromise on
which the decree is based was not lawful.
3B. No agreement or compromise to be
entered in a representative suit without leave
of Court.–(1) No agreement or compromise in a
representative suit shall be entered into without
the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the
proceedings; and any such agreement or
compromise entered into without the leave of the
Court as recorded shall be void.
(2) Below granting such leave, the Court shall
give notice in such manner as it may think fit to
such persons is as may appear to it to be
interested in the suit.
Explanation.–In this rule, “representative
suit” means,–
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(a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92,
(b) a suit under rule 8 of Order I,
(c) a suit in which the manager of an
undivided Hindu family sues or is sued as
representing the other members of the family,
(d) any other suit in which the decree passed
may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code or of
any other law for the time being in force, bind any
person who is not named as party to the suit.]
4. Proceedings in execution of decrees
not affected.–Nothing in this Order shall apply to
any proceedings in execution of a decree or order.”
13. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the
respondents upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Horil (supra),wherein the case of the appellant was
as hereinbelow –
“3. According to the appellant, the defendants had
instituted the suit before the Assistant Collector in
which his father, namely, Chunkai was made as
one of the opposite party. In that suit, a
compromise petition was filed on 7-10-1971 with
the fake signature of Chunkai and on that basis a
compromise decree finally came to be passed on
25-4-1979.
4. It is the case of the appellant that no notice of
the suit was ever served upon his father Chunkai.
He never appeared in the proceeding and was not
even aware of it. He did not sign any compromise
petition and his alleged signature on the
compromise petition dated 7-10-1971 was faked.
He had died much earlier and was not even alive in
1979 when the decree was passed. The appellant,
accordingly, sought a declaration that the decree
dated 25-4-1979 passed by the Assistant Collector,
Class I, Karwi, may be cancelled or it may be
declared as void ab initio, inoperative and not
binding upon him.”
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After analyzing the provision of Order XXIII of CPC, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Horil (supra), has held as
under:-
“15. We are of the view that the Revenue Courts
are neither equipped nor competent to effectively
adjudicate on allegations of fraud that have
overtones of criminality and the courts really
skilled and experienced to try such issues are the
courts constituted under the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
Hence, on the facts of the case, the Hon’ble Apex Court
came to the conclusion that the provisions of Order XXIII of CPC
shall not act as a bar against the suit filed by the appellant.
14. On the other hand, reliance has been placed by learned
counsel for petitioner on the settled proposition in the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sree Surya
Developers (supra) as well as the judgment passed by the
Coordinate bench of this Court at Principal seat at Jodhpur in case
of Jitendra Singh Deora (supra), has held that a separate suit
challenging a compromise decree is not maintainable and is barred
by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC particularly when read in conjunction
with the aforesaid explanation to Rule 3. It was also observed that
the Explanation underscores that the question of legality or
validity of a compromise must be examined by the very Court
before which such compromise is presented without a separate
suit; consequently, the only recourse available to an aggrieved
party is to invoke the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII CPC and
required to file an application seeking recall of the compromise
decree before the same Court which passed the compromise
decree, which alone is competent to examine the lawfulness of the
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compromise and adjudicate the issue upon consideration of the
material placed before it.
15. The facts of Horil‘s (supra) case are clearly distinguishable
with the facts of present case, because in Horil‘s (supra) case no
notice was ever served on appellant’s father and he had died
much earlier then the filing of the compromise on the basis of
which compromise decree was passed, whereas, in the present
matter, it is not the case of petitioner that alleged compromise
was not signed by father of the plaintiff-respondent. The objection
of the plaintiff-respondent with regard to not including the
necessary parties also can be looked into by the Revenue Court
which has passed the compromise decree/judgment on the basis
of compromise.
16. Hence, in light of decision in Sree Surya Developers
(supra), wherein it was held that the Court passing the
compromise decree retains the jurisdiction to scrutinise its
lawfulness upon challenge, the present revision petition is liable to
be allowed. Hence, the impugned order dated 25.02.2026 passed
by the learned Additional District Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur, in
Civil Suit No. 1/2025 is hereby quashed and set aside. The trial
Court is directed to decide the application under Order VII Rule 11
of CPC afresh in the light of the observations made in this order.
17. The revision petition is allowed accordingly and stay petition
as well as all pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
(ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J
AARZOO ARORA /–
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