Chattisgarh High Court
Coal India Ltd vs Shubhadra Kol on 27 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally signed by
V PADMAVATHI
Date: 2026.08.04
14:19:17 +0530
CGHC010227692026 2026:CGHC:31872-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 617 of 2026
1 - Coal India Ltd Through Its Chaiman Coal India Ltd., 10-Netaji Subhash Road
Calcutta (West Bengal)
2 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited Chaiman-Cum-Managing Director, South Eastern
Coalfields Limited, Seepat Road Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (C.G.)
3 - Area General Manager South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Kapildhara Ug Mine,
Kurja Sub Area Hasdev Area, Post Bijuri, District Anuppur (M.P.)
4 - Deputy General Manager Kapildhara Ug Mine, Kurja Sub Area Hasdev Area, Secl,
Post Bijuri District Anuppur (M.P.)
5 - Deputy Personnel Manager Kapildhara Ug Mine, Kurja Sub Area Hasdev Area,
Secl, Post Bijuri, District - Anuppur (M.P.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
Shubhadra Kol W/o Shri Babulal Kol Aged About 31 Years Father-In-Law Late Shri
Bhimsen Kol, R/o Kapildhara Colony Awas No. M/931, Post Bijuri, District Anuppur
(M.P.) 484440
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellant : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Sr Advocate with
Shri Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, Advocate
For Respondent : Shri Vijay K Deshmukh, Advocate
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Judgment on Board
Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
27.07.2026
Wa 617 of 2026
2
Heard Shri Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Vinod
Kumar Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Shri Vijay
K Deshmukh, learned counsel for the respondent.
1. The present writ appeal has been filed by the appellants/South Eastern
Coal Fields Limited against the order dated 01.09.2025 passed in Writ
Petition (S) No. 4879 of 2022 and order dated 27.02.2026 passed in Review
Petition No. 415 of 2025, by the learned Single Judge, whereby the order
dated 12.05.2022 passed by the SECL rejecting the claim of the writ
petitioner for compassionate appointment is quashed and SECL is directed
to reconsider the application of the writ petitioner.
2. Heard on I.A. No. 2 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of
delay of 58 days in filing the writ appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned single
judge has passed the order on 01.09.2025 and thereafter a Review Petition
no. 415 of 2025 was preferred, which has been decided on 27.02.2026, and
thereafter, the present writ appeal is filed, which is delayed by 58 days.
4. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the writ appellant
and for the reason mentioned in the application, the same is allowed and the
delay of 58 days in filing the writ appeal is condoned.
5. The present writ appeal arises out of a claim for compassionate
appointment made by the writ petitioner, Smt. Subhadra Kol, who is the
widow daughter-in-law of late Bhimsen Kol. The deceased employee
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Bhimsen Kol was working as a Driller in the South Eastern Coalfields
Limited (hereinafter called as “SECL”), Kapildhara Colliery, and died in
harness on 01.03.2015. After the death of Bhimsen Kol, the Manager,
Kapildhara Colliery, issued a communication dated 26.06.2015 to the widow
of the deceased, Smt. Soniya Bai, advising her to submit an application
either for compassionate appointment of an eligible dependent or for
monetary compensation in lieu of employment along with the requisite
documents in terms of the provisions contained in the National Coal Wage
Agreement-VI (hereinafter called as “NCWA”) dated 01.07.1996. Pursuant
thereto, Smt. Soniya Bai submitted an application on 27.08.2015 seeking
compassionate appointment for her son, Babulal, who was the son of the
deceased employee. The management considered the application however,
by communication dated 10.09.2015, the claim was rejected on the ground
that Babulal had crossed the prescribed upper age limit of 35 years and,
therefore, was not eligible for compassionate appointment. At the same
time, Smt. Soniya Bai was informed that she could avail monetary
compensation in lieu of employment. Despite such communication, she
neither opted for monetary compensation nor nominated any other
dependent for compassionate appointment.
6. Thereafter, no steps were taken by any member of the family for nearly
seven years. During this period, Babulal, the son of the deceased employee
and husband of the respondent/writ petitioner died on 27.02.2022.
Consequent upon his death, the respondent became the widow daughter-in-
law of the deceased employee. Thereafter, she submitted an application
Wa 617 of 2026
4
dated 02.04.2022 seeking compassionate appointment in place of her
deceased father-in-law. Subsequently, another application dated 21.04.2022
was also submitted in the name of Smt. Soniya Bai, wife of the deceased
employee, requesting that compassionate appointment be granted to the
respondent, widowed daughter-in-law. Besides this, Smt. Soniya Bai also
submitted further applications dated 22.05.2022, 03.06.2022 and
17.08.2022 requesting compassionate appointment for her daughter,
Pramila. The competent authority of the SECL considered the claim and, by
order dated 12.05.2022, rejected the same on the ground that the
respondent/writ petitioner, widowed daughter-in-law was not entitled to
compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA. It was held
that on the date of death of the employee on 01.03.2015, the respondent
was only a daughter-in-law because her husband was alive, and she did not
fall within the category of a “widowed daughter-in-law” as contemplated
under the NCWA. The authority further held that eligibility for compassionate
appointment is required to be determined on the basis of the policy
prevailing on the date of death of the employee and that there is no provision
under the NCWA for grant of compassionate appointment to a daughter-in-
law simpliciter. Accordingly, the writ petitioner’s claim was rejected.
7. Aggrieved by the rejection order dated 12.05.2022, the petitioner
preferred WPS No. 4879 of 2022 before this Court seeking quashment of
the said order and for a direction to the respondents to consider her case for
compassionate appointment. It was the writ petitioner’s case that after the
death of her husband she had become a widow daughter-in-law and was,
Wa 617 of 2026
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therefore, entitled to be considered under Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA. The
writ petitioner also relied upon the recommendation made by her mother-in-
law in support of her claim. However, the writ petitioner did not challenge the
validity of the provisions of the NCWA excluding a daughter-in-law from the
category of eligible dependents.
8. The respondents-SECL filed a detailed return opposing the writ
petition, filed by the writ petitioner contending that compassionate
appointment is governed entirely by the provisions of the NCWA and that the
policy applicable on the date of death of the employee alone would govern
the rights of the parties. It was specifically pleaded that the writ petitioner
was admittedly not a widowed daughter-in-law on the date of death of the
employee and, therefore, was not covered by the scheme. It was further
contended that the claim suffered from gross delay and laches, having been
made after more than seven years from the death of the employee, thereby
defeating the very object of compassionate appointment, which is intended
to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased
employee.
9. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 01.09.2025, allowed the writ
petition by relying upon the decision rendered in Smt. Asha Pandey v. CIL
& Others (WPS No. 4994 of 2015, decided on 15.03.2016), holding that the
reason assigned by the respondents for rejecting the petitioner’s claim was
contrary to the settled legal position.
Wa 617 of 2026
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10. Accordingly, the order dated 12.05.2022 was quashed, and the writ
petitioner was permitted to submit a fresh representation with a direction to
the competent authority to reconsider her claim strictly in accordance with
the applicable policy within a period of 120 days. The review petition
preferred by SECL, being Review Petition No. 415 of 2025, was also
dismissed on 27.02.2026, wherein the learned Single Judge observed that a
widow daughter-in-law would be entitled to claim compassionate
appointment under Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 01.09.2025 passed in WPS No.4879 of
2022 and the order dated 27.02.2026 passed in Review Petition No.415 of
2025 by this Court, the present writ appeal has been preferred by the SECL,
questioning the legality and correctness of the said orders.
12. The learned counsel appearing for the writ appellants/SECL would
submit that the impugned order dated 01.09.2025 passed by the learned
Single Judge, as affirmed by the order dated 27.02.2026 passed in Review
Petition No. 415 of 2025, are contrary to the provisions of the NCWA, as
well as the settled principles governing compassionate appointment. It is
argued that the learned Single Judge erroneously placed reliance upon the
decision rendered in Smt. Asha Pandey case (supra) by observing that this
Court had held that a daughter-in-law is entitled to compassionate
appointment. The issue involved in Smt. Asha Pandey (supra) was
altogether different, as the controversy therein related to the eligibility of a
married daughter for compassionate appointment, whereas the present case
concerns the eligibility of a daughter-in-law. The ratio laid down in Smt.
Wa 617 of 2026
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Asha Pandey (supra) has, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the
present case, and the learned Single Judge misdirected himself in treating
the two categories as interchangeable. It is further argued that the very
foundation of the impugned order is based on an erroneous understanding
of the earlier precedent and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. He would
further submit that the claim of the writ petitioner is squarely governed by
Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA, which exhaustively specifies the categories of
persons eligible for compassionate appointment. The said clause
recognizes the spouse, son, unmarried daughter and legally adopted son as
direct dependents and, only in the absence of such direct dependents,
permits consideration of certain indirect dependents, namely, brother,
widowed daughter, widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law, provided they
were residing with and almost wholly dependent upon the earnings of the
deceased employee. It is also submitted that the respondent admittedly was
not a widowed daughter-in-law on the date of death of late Bhimsen Kol, as
her husband, Babulal, was alive on 01.03.2015. She was merely a daughter-
in-law, a category consciously excluded from the definition of dependent
under the scheme. The subsequent death of her husband in the year 2022
cannot retrospectively confer upon her a status which she did not possess
on the date when the cause of action for compassionate appointment arose.
The eligibility of a claimant has to be determined with reference to the policy
and the factual position existing on the date of death of the employee and
not on the basis of subsequent events.
Wa 617 of 2026
8
13. It is further argued that the learned Single Judge also failed to consider
the objection regarding delay and laches. The deceased employee died on
01.03.2015, whereas the respondent submitted her application only on
02.04.2022, after more than seven years. The widow of the deceased had
earlier sought compassionate appointment for her son, Babulal, whose claim
was rejected on 10.09.2015 on the ground of overage, and the said order
was never challenged, thereby attaining finality. The family having survived
for several years after the death of the employee, the very object of
compassionate appointment, namely, to provide immediate financial
assistance to tide over the sudden financial crisis, stood exhausted.
14. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of
Maharashtra and another v. Madhuri Maruti Vidhate 1 (Since after
marriage Smt. Madhu Santosh Koli), learned senior counsel for the
appellants submits that compassionate appointment is not a vested right but
an exception to the general rule of public employment, and a belated claim
made after several years of the employee’s death is contrary to the object of
the scheme. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated
01.09.2025, as well as the order passed in review dated 27.02.2026, be set
aside and the order dated 12.05.2022 rejecting the respondent’s claim for
compassionate appointment be restored.
15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner
would support the impugned order and submit that the learned Single Judge
has rightly quashed the order dated 12.05.2022, as the competent authority
1
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1327
Wa 617 of 2026
9
rejected the petitioner’s claim solely on the ground that she was a daughter-
in-law of the deceased employee without examining her eligibility in the light
of Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA. It is argued that after death of respondent’s
husband-Babulal, the respondent became a widowed daughter-in-law of late
Bhimsen Kol and her mother-in-law, Smt. Soniya Bai, had also nominated
and recommended her case for compassionate appointment. The learned
Single Judge, therefore, rightly directed the competent authority to
reconsider the petitioner’s claim in accordance with the applicable policy
instead of granting compassionate appointment as a matter of right. It is
further submitted that the impugned order merely requires the authorities to
undertake a fresh consideration in accordance with the governing scheme.
16. He would further submit that compassionate appointment is a
beneficial social welfare measure intended to provide financial assistance to
the family of a deceased employee and, therefore, its provisions deserve to
be interpreted in a purposive and liberal manner. It is submitted that once
the writ petitioner acquired the status of a widowed daughter-in-law and was
recommended by the widow of the deceased employee, her claim could not
have been rejected at the threshold without examining whether she fulfilled
the conditions prescribed under Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA, including
dependency and other eligibility requirements. It is also argued that the
objections relating to delay and the writ petitioner’s status on the date of
death are matters to be considered by the competent authority while
deciding the claim on merits and do not justify outright rejection of the
application. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order does not suffer
Wa 617 of 2026
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from any jurisdictional or legal infirmity warranting interference in the present
writ appeal and deserves to be affirmed.
17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed with the writ petition as well as the writ appeal and
gone through their pleadings.
18. The short question which falls for consideration in the present writ
appeal is whether the respondent/writ petitioner, who admittedly was only a
daughter-in-law on the date of death of the deceased employee and became
a widowed daughter-in-law nearly seven years thereafter, could claim
consideration for compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.3 of the
NCWA, and whether the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside
the order rejecting her claim by placing reliance upon the decision rendered
in the matter of Smt. Asha Pandey (supra).
19. It is well settled that compassionate appointment is not a source of
recruitment, but an exception to the normal rule of public employment
envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The object of
such appointment is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family
of a deceased employee so as to enable it to tide over the sudden financial
crisis caused by the untimely death of the sole breadwinner. Being an
exception to the general rule, compassionate appointment is governed
entirely by the scheme or policy framed by the employer, and no
appointment can be directed dehors or contrary to the terms of such
scheme. In the present case, the claim of the respondent/writ petitioner is
Wa 617 of 2026
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governed by Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA, which specifically defines the
category of dependents eligible for compassionate appointment. The
provision recognizes the spouse, son, unmarried daughter and legally
adopted son as direct dependents and, in the absence of such direct
dependents, permits consideration of certain indirect dependents, namely,
brother, widowed daughter, widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing
with and almost wholly dependent upon the earnings of the deceased
employee.
20. A plain reading of the clause makes it evident that the scheme does not
recognize a “daughter-in-law” simpliciter as an eligible dependent. The
expression employed by the scheme is “widowed daughter-in-law”, which
cannot be ignored or substituted by judicial interpretation. It is necessary
here to notice the provisions of clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA, which is as
under:-
“9.3.3. the dependent for this purpose means the wife/husband as the
case may be unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no
such direct dependent is availabel for employement, brother, widowed
daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the
deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased
may be considered to be the earnings of the deceased may be
considered tobe the dependent of the deceased.”
21. Admittedly, when late Bhimsen Kol died on 01.03.2015, the
respondent’s husband, Babulal, was alive. Consequently, on the relevant
date, the respondent was only a ‘daughter-in-law’ and not a ‘widowed
Wa 617 of 2026
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daughter-in-law’. The subsequent death of her husband on 27.02.2022
cannot retrospectively alter her status or create a right which did not exist on
the date of death of the employee.
22. It is a settled principle that eligibility for compassionate appointment
has to be determined with reference to the policy and the factual
circumstances prevailing on the date of death of the employee and not on
the basis of subsequent events. Accepting the contrary interpretation would
amount to enlarging the scope of the scheme by judicial fiat, which is
impermissible.
23. This Court also finds substance in submission of the appellants/SECL
that the learned Single Judge misapplied the decision rendered in Smt.
Asha Pandey (supra). A perusal of the said decision would reveal that the
controversy therein related to the entitlement of a married daughter for
compassionate appointment, whereas the issue involved in the present case
concerns the eligibility of a daughter-in-law under Clause 9.3.3 of the
NCWA. The two categories stand on distinct footings under the scheme and,
therefore, the ratio of Smt. Asha Pandey (supra) could not have been
applied to hold that a daughter-in-law is entitled to compassionate
appointment. The very foundation on which the learned Single Judge
interfered with the order dated 12.05.2022 is, therefore, legally
unsustainable.
24. Another significant aspect, which has not received due consideration
by the learned Single Judge, is the unexplained delay in raising the claim.
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The deceased employee died on 01.03.2015. Immediately thereafter, the
widow of the deceased sought compassionate appointment in favour of her
son, Babulal, whose application came to be rejected on 10.09.2015 on the
ground that he had crossed the prescribed age limit. The said order was
never challenged and attained finality. Neither the widow of the deceased
nor any other dependent pursued any claim for compassionate appointment
for nearly seven years. The respondent (widowed daughter-in-law)
approached the authorities only after death of her husband in the year 2022.
By then, the family had admittedly survived the financial crisis arising from
the death of the employee. The very object of compassionate appointment,
namely, providing immediate succour to the bereaved family, therefore,
stood exhausted.
25. In this regard, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Madhuri Maruti Vidhate (supra) squarely applies, wherein it has been
considered that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed after a long
lapse of time as it would defeat the very purpose of the scheme and held
that:-
“11. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shashi Kumar reported in
(2019) 3 SCC 653, this Court had an occasion to consider the object and
purpose of appointment on compassionate ground and considered the
decision of this Court in the case of Govind Prakash Verma v. LIC, reported in
(2005) 10 SCC 289, in paras 21 and 26, it is observed and held as under: –
“21. The decision in Govind Prakash Verma [Govind Prakash Verma v.
LIC, (2005) 10 SCC 289], has been considered subsequently in several
Wa 617 of 202614
decisions. But, before we advert to those decisions, it is necessary to
note that the nature of compassionate appointment had been considered
by this Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana [Umesh
Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138]. The principles
which have been laid down in Umesh Kumar Nagpal [Umesh Kumar
Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138] have been subsequently
followed in a consistent line of precedents in this Court. These principles
are encapsulated in the following extract : (Umesh Kumar Nagpal case
[Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138], SCC pp.
139-40, para 2)
“2. … As a rule, appointments in the public services should be
made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and
merit. No other mode of appointment nor any other
consideration is permissible. Neither the Governments nor the
public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or
relax the qualifications laid down by the rules for the post.
However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in
every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the
interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such
exception is in favour of the dependants of an employee dying in
harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means
of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian
consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some
source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to
make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide
gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased
who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of
granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family
Wa 617 of 202615
to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member
of such family a post much less a post for post held by the
deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in
harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood.
The Government or the public authority concerned has to
examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased,
and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of
employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a
job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The
posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual
and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on
compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of
the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency.
The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an
exception to the rule is just and valid since it is not
discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such
dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a
rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved viz. relief
against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to
be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be
remembered in this connection that as against the destitute
family of the deceased there are millions of other families which
are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made
in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in
consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate
expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the
family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are
suddenly upturned.”
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26.The judgment of a Bench of two Judges in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v.
State of Maharashtra [(2008) 11 SCC 384] has adopted the principle
that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of
recruitment, but a means to enable the family of the deceased to get
over a sudden financial crisis. The financial position of the family would
need to be evaluated on the basis of the provisions contained in the
scheme. The decision in Govind Prakash Verma [Govind Prakash
Verma v. LIC, (2005) 10 SCC 289 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 590] has been duly
considered, but the Court observed that it did not appear that the earlier
binding precedents of this Court have been taken note of in that case.”
12. Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions,
compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of
appointment in the public services and is in favour of the dependents of a
deceased dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any
means of livelihood, and in such cases, out of pure humanitarian
consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of
livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet,
a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the
dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The
whole object of granting compassionate employment is, thus, to enable the
family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give such family a
post much less a post held by the deceased.
13. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the
facts of the case on hand, to appoint the respondent now on compassionate
ground shall be contrary to the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate ground. The respondent cannot be said to be dependent on
the deceased employee, i.e., her mother. Even otherwise, she shall not be
Wa 617 of 2026
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entitled to appointment on compassionate ground after a number of years
from the death of the deceased employee.”
26. Equally important is, the requirement of dependency contemplated
under Clause 9.3.3 of the NCWA. The scheme envisages dependency upon
the deceased employee and not merely upon another dependent family
member. Except for the bald assertion made by the respondent, there is no
material to demonstrate that she was residing with and was almost wholly
dependent upon the earnings of late Bhimsen Kol on the date of his death.
At best, she could have been dependent upon her husband, Babulal, but
such dependency cannot, in law, be equated with dependency upon the
deceased employee. In absence of fulfilment of this essential condition, the
competent authority rightly declined to entertain her claim.
27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of India v. P.
Venkatesh2 has held that:
“7. The primary difficulty in accepting the line of submissions, which weighed
with the High Court, and were reiterated on behalf of the respondent in
these proceedings, is simply this: compassionate appointment, it is well-
settled, is intended to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over
the crisis which is caused as a result of the death of an employee, while in
harness. The essence of the claim lies in the immediacy of the need. If the
facts of the present case are seen, it is evident that even the first recourse to
the Central Administrative Tribunal was in 2007, nearly eleven years after
the death of the employee. In the meantime, the first set of representations
had been rejected on 3-1-1997. The Tribunal, unfortunately, passed a
2
(2019) 15 SCC 613
Wa 617 of 202618
succession of orders calling upon the appellants to consider and then
reconsider the representations for compassionate appointment. After the
Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting rejected the representation
on 13-11-2007, it was only in 2010 that the Tribunal was moved again, with
the same result. These successive orders of the Tribunal for reconsideration
of the representation cannot obliterate the effect of the initial delay in moving
the Tribunal for compassionate appointment over a decade after the death
of the deceased employee.
xxxx
10. Bearing in mind the above principles, this Court held: (Umesh Kumar
case, SCC pp. 141-42, para 6)
“6. For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot
be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be
specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not
a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The
object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which
it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the
compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever
the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.”
28. Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of State of West Bengal Vs
Debabrata Tiwari 3 has held that:
“35.Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance,
regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be
considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case
where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in
3
(2025) 5 SCC 712
Wa 617 of 202619
claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such
claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial
circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the
better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such
circumstances, courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the
fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was
able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment
from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a
case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh4 would amount to treating a
claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of
inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the
Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the
same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the
dependants of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his
death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after
lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government
employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in
approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief
which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir
Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd 5
as under : (LR pp. 239-40)
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
4
Haryana SEB V Hakim Singh (1997) 8 SCC 85
5
(1874)LR 5 PC 221
Wa 617 of 202620
yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted,
in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But
in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting
to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
37.Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a
party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person
by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our
Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher6. In the said case, it was regarded
as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the
exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal7 this Court restated the principle
articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-
95, para 24)
24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.
If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this
6
(1967) SCC Online SC 117; AIR 1967 SC 1450
7
(1986) 4 SCC 566
Wa 617 of 2026
21
Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because
it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
39.While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided
for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ
petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana8; NDMC v. Pan Singh9.
40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ petitioners submitted their
applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said
that they diligently pursued the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this
regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari10, wherein the following
observations were made : (SCC p. 184, para 19)
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the
court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to
a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix.
Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent
authority does not arrest time.”(emphasis supplied)
8
(1997) 6 SCC 538; 1997 SCC (L&S)1550
9
(2007) 9 SCC 278; (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398
10
(2013) 12 SCC 179; (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 32
Wa 617 of 2026
22
41. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold that the
respondent-writ petitioners, upon submitting their applications in the year
2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e. for a
period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of
the appellant State in dealing with their applications, the respondent-writ
petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of
a mandamus against the authorities of the State. In fact, such a prolonged
delay in approaching the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a
remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the respondent-writ petitioners. Such
a delay would disentitle the respondent-writ petitioners to the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the High Court
dated 17-3-201511, whereby the writ petition filed by some of the respondents
herein was disposed of with a direction to the Director of Local Bodies,
Government of West Bengal to take a decision as to the appointment of the
respondent-writ petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of revival
of the cause of action.
42. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the following observations of
this Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa12, as to the manner in
which the authorities must consider and decide applications for appointment
on compassionate grounds : (SCC paras 14-16)
“14. Before parting with the present order, we are constrained to
observe that considering the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds i.e. a family of a deceased employee may be
placed in a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of
the employee while in service and the basis or policy is immediacy in
rendering of financial assistance to the family of the deceased
consequent upon his untimely death, the authorities must consider
11
Debabrata Tiwari Vs State of WB WPA No.3243 of 2015, order dated 17.03.2015 (Cal)
12
(2024)15 SCC 766
Wa 617 of 2026
23
and decide such applications for appointment on compassionate
grounds as per the policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not beyond a
period of six months from the date of submission of such completed
applications.
15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have found that in
several cases, applications for appointment on compassionate
grounds are not attended in time and are kept pending for years
together. As a result, the applicants in several cases have to
approach the High Courts concerned seeking a writ of mandamus for
the consideration of their applications. Even after such a direction is
issued, frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting the
applications. Once again, the applicants have to challenge the order
of rejection before the High Court which leads to pendency of
litigation and passage of time, leaving the family of the employee who
died in harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further, for
reasons best known to the authorities and on irrelevant
considerations, applications made for compassionate appointment
are rejected. After several years or are not considered at all as in the
instant case.
16. If the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate
grounds as envisaged under the relevant policies or the rules have to
be achieved then it is just and necessary that such applications are
considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We have come across
cases where for nearly two decades the controversy regarding the
application made for compassionate appointment is not resolved.
This consequently leads to the frustration of the very policy of
granting compassionate appointment on the death of the employee
while in service. We have, therefore, directed that such applications
Wa 617 of 2026
24
must be considered at an earliest point of time. The consideration
must be fair, reasonable and based on relevant consideration. The
application cannot be rejected on the basis of frivolous and for
reasons extraneous to the facts of the case. Then and then only the
object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds can
be achieved.” (emphasis supplied)
43. In Malaya Nanda Sethy case (supra), the claim of the appellant-applicant
therein for compassionate appointment was directed by this Court to be
considered by the competent authority. This Court noted that in the said case,
there was no lapse on the part of the appellant-applicant therein in diligently
pursuing the matter. The delay in considering the application of the appellant
therein was held to be solely attributable to the authorities of the State, and no
part of it was occasioned by the appellant-applicant. Further, in the said case,
the appellant-applicant was prejudiced not only because of the prolonged
delay in considering his application but also by the fact that in the interim, the
policy of the State governing compassionate appointment had changed to his
detriment. Therefore, the facts of the said case were distinct from the facts
involved herein. In the present case, the conduct of the respondent-writ
petitioners cannot be said to be blameless in that they did not pursue their
matter with sufficient diligence. However, the observations made in the said
case as to the manner in which applications for compassionate appointment
are to be considered and disposed of are relevant to the present case.
44.As noted in Malaya Nanda Sethy case (supra), the operation of a
policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded on considerations
of immediacy. A sense of immediacy is called for not only in the manner in
which the applications are processed by the authorities concerned but also in
the conduct of the applicant in pursuing his case, before the authorities and if
needed before the courts.
Wa 617 of 2026
25
45.In the present case, the applications for compassionate appointment were
made by the respondent-writ petitioners in the year 2005-2006. Admittedly,
the first concrete step taken by the Chairman of Burdwan Municipality was in
the year 2013, when the said authority forwarded a list of candidates to be
approved by the Director of Local Bodies, Burdwan Municipality. The
respondent-writ petitioners knocked on the doors of the High Court of Calcutta
only in the year 2015 i.e. after a lapse of nearly ten years from the date of
making the application for compassionate appointment. The respondent-writ
petitioners were not prudent enough to approach the courts sooner, claiming
that no concrete step had been taken by the appellant State in furtherance of
the application by seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus.
46.The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment has
been lost in the present case. This is attributable to the authorities of the
appellant State as well as the respondent-writ petitioners. Now, entertaining a
claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail,
because admittedly, the respondent-writ petitioners have been able to eke out
a living even though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of
the Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this are
therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the respondent-writ petitioners
for appointments on compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained.”
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the order dated 12.05.2022 rejecting the respondent’s claim was
in consonance with the provisions of the NCWA and the settled principles
governing compassionate appointment. The learned Single Judge, while
setting aside the said order, overlooked the scope of Clause 9.3.3,
misapplied the decision in Smt. Asha Pandey (supra), and did not consider
the effect of the respondent’s ineligibility on the date of death of the
Wa 617 of 2026
26
employee as well as the gross delay in preferring the claim. Consequently,
the impugned judgment dated 01.09.2025 and the order dated 27.02.2026
passed in Review Petition No. 415 of 2025 cannot be sustained and deserve
to be set aside.
30. Accordingly, the writ appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed.
31. The order dated 01.09.2025 passed in WPS No. 4879 of 2022 and the
order dated 27.02.2026 passed in Review Petition No. 415 of 2025 are set
aside; the Writ Petition (S) No. 4879 of 2022 is dismissed, and the order
dated 12.05.2022 passed by the competent authority of the SECL rejecting
the respondent’s claim for compassionate appointment is restored.
32. Before parting with the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to
observe that the dismissal of the writ petitioner’s claim for compassionate
appointment shall not preclude her from availing such other benefits as may
be otherwise permissible under the applicable provisions of the NCWA. If
the writ petitioner is otherwise eligible to seek monetary compensation in
lieu of compassionate appointment under the applicable policy, it shall be
open for her to submit an appropriate representation before the competent
authority. In the event such a representation is submitted, the competent
authority shall consider and decide the same strictly in accordance with law
and the applicable provisions of the NCWA, without being influenced by any
observation made in the present judgment, as expeditiously as possible.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
padma
Wa 617 of 2026
27
HEAD NOTE
Writ Appeal No.617 of 2026
The eligibility for compassionate appointment has to be determined
with reference to the policy and the factual circumstances prevailing on the
date of death of the employee and not on the basis of subsequent events.
