Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Chintapalli Satyavati vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh & 3 Others on 14 July, 2026
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
WRIT PETITIONER NO: 29553/2025
% 14.07.2026
# Chintapalli Satyavati
......petitioner
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh & 3 others
.... respondents
!Counsel for the petitioner : Sri M.R.K. Chakravarthy
^Counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 : Sri J. Krishna Praneeth
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2015) 16 SCC 253
2. H.C.P. No.2486 of 2022, decided on 05.06.2023
3. AIR 1990 SC 487
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITIONER NO: 29553/2025
Between:
Chintapalli Satyavati
..... PETITIONER
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh & 3 others
....RESPONDENTS
DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED :
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 14.07.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED : 23.07.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No
copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
_____________________________________
PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI,J
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
WRIT PETITION NO: 29553/2025
ORDER:
(per Ravi Nath Tilhari, J)
Heard Sri V. Chetan Susheel, learned counsel representing Sri
M.R.K. Chakravarthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.Krishna
Praneeth, learned Government Pleader attached to the office of the learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 4.
2. With respect to the detenue namely Chinthapalli Ramu, an order of
detention dated 19.09.2025 was passed by the Collector and District
Magistrate, East Godavari at Rajamahendravaram, under Sections 3(1) and
3(2) read with Section 2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No.1 of 1986). The detention
order was approved by the State Government vide G.O.Rt.No.1803, dated
01.10.2025, and was confirmed by G.O.Rt.No.2118, dated 12.11.2025, for a
period of twelve months from the date of detention, i.e., 22.09.2025.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while challenging the order of
detention, raised two grounds.
(i) Under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1986, the order of detention is to be
approved by the Government within twelve days. The order of detention
was passed on 19.09.2025 but was approved vide G.O. Rt. No.1803,
dated 01.10.2025. So, the order of approval was passed after the expiry
of 12 days. So, the detenue is entitled to be released. He submits that
the period of 12 days is to be counted by including the date of order of
detention. He placed reliance in Arun Prasanth v. State of Tamil
Nadu, H.C.P. No.2486 of 2022, decided on 05.06.2023.
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(ii) The detenue was in judicial custody in the criminal cases in Ground
Nos.4, 5, 6 and 7. He was granted bail in the criminal cases in Ground
Nos.1, 2 and 3. The Detaining Authority has taken note of the fact that
the detenue was in actual judicial custody but has not recorded any
satisfaction on the points that there is real possibility of the detenue
being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all
probability indulge in prejudicial activity. The order of detention is
therefore unsustainable. He has placed reliance upon Champion R.
Sangma v. State of Meghalaya, (2015) 16 SCC 253.
4. In reply, learned Government Pleader advanced the following
submissions:
i) That in counting the period of 12 days under Section 3(3) of the Act
1986, for approval to the order of detention, the date of the order of detention
is to be excluded and excluding that date, the order of approval was passed
within 12 days. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Administration and another 1. He
submits that though the said case arose under the National Security Act, 1980
(Act No.65 of 1980), and not under the Act, 1986 but Section 3(4) of the
National Security Act provides for the same requirement as in Section 3(3) of
the Act 1986. Consequently, the law laid down in Jitender Tyagi (supra) is
fully applicable to the present case.
ii) That the factum of the detenue being in judicial custody was taken
into consideration by the Detaining Authority. However, with respect to the
other two tests, he fairly submits that any consideration on those aspects is
not evident from a reading of the detention order.
5. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the
material on record.
1
AIR 1990 SC 487
5
6. In view of the submissions advanced, the points for consideration are as
follows:
(A) Whether the period of 12 days (twelve) under Section 3(3) of
Act 1986 for approval of the order of detention includes or excludes
the date of detention order ?
(B) Whether the order of detention satisfies the triple test to take
into account the criminal cases in which the detenue is in judicial
custody for passing an order of detention? and(C) In case of no satisfaction on the triple test in the order of
detention the effect on the order of detention?
Consideration on Point A:
7. It would be appropriate to refer Section 3 of the Act, 1986, which reads
as under:
“3. Power to make order detaining certain persons :- (1) The
Government may, if satisfied with respect to any boot-legger, dacoit,
drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to do, make an order
directing that such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to
prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District
Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied
that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that
during such period as may be specified in the order, such District
Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided
in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the
Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed
three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is
necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to
time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.
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(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer
mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the
Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made
and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the
matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve
days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been
approved by the Government.”
8. Section 3(3) of the Act 1986 thus provides that where an order of
detention is made under Section 3, the officer mentioned in Section 3(2), shall
forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which
the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a
bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than
twelve (12) days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been
approved by the Government. So an order of detention has to be approved by
the Government within 12 days. The point is from what date the period of
twelve (12) days starts.
9. The language of Section 3(3) is very clear. The order shall not remain in
force if it is not approved within the period of 12 days after the making of the
order of detention. The expression “after the making thereof”, indicates that
the period of 12 days is to be counted after the passing of the order of
detention. So, it is clear that the date of the order of detention is to be
excluded.
10. In Jitender Tyagi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considered
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980, and held that sub-section (4)
gave a clear indication as to the computation of the period of twelve days. The
period of twelve days had to be calculated “after” the making of the order of
detention. Paragraph Nos.4, 5, 7 and 8 in Jitender Tyagi (supra), are
reproduced hereunder:
“4. Under sub-section (4) of Section 3, “no such order shall remain in
force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the
7meantime, it has been approved by the State Government”. The
question that arises for our consideration relates to the computation of
the period of twelve days. To be more explicit, the question is whether
in computing the period of twelve days, the day on which the order of
detention is passed should be included or not. It is submitted on behalf
of the petitioner that the day on which the order of detention was passed
should be included and the order approving the detention having been
passed on 31-1-1989, that is, on the thirteenth day after the expiry of
twelve days, it had ceased to be in force.
5. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the
day on which the detention order was passed should be excluded and,
accordingly, the detention of the petitioner having been approved on 31-
1-1989, it was quite within the period of twelve days. Further, it is the
case of the respondents that the order of detention was, as a matter of
fact, approved on 26-1-1989 and by the order dated 31-1-1989, the order
of approval was communicated to the authorities concerned.
6. We may first consider the contention of the respondents that the order
of detention was duly approved on 26-1-1989. A statement in that regard
has been made in the counter-affidavit of the respondents. We are,
however, unable to accept the same. We have already extracted above
para 3 of the order of detention dated 31-1-1989 in which it has been
categorically stated “the Administrator hereby approves the order of the
Police Commissioner dated 19-1-1989 detaining Shri Jitender Tyagi…”.
After the said categorical statement in para 3, it is difficult to accept the
contention of the respondents that the said order dated 31-1-1989 was
made for the purpose of communicating the approval of the order of
detention. In our view, there can be no doubt, whatsoever, that the order
of detention was approved by the said order dated 31-1-1989.
7. Now, we may consider the question as to the computation of twelve
days as referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 3. Sub-section (4), inter
alia, provides that when an order is made by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (3), he shall forthwith report the facts to the State Government. It
is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under sub-section (4), the
8
officer has to act forthwith after the making of the order in reporting the
fact to the State Government and this is sufficient indication that the day
on which the order of detention is made should be included in computing
the period of twelve days.
8. In our opinion, sub-section (4) has given a clear indication as to the
computation of twelve days. The period of twelve days has to be
calculated “after” the making of the order of detention. Thus, it is
apparent that the period of twelve days comes after the making of the
order of detention. It is true that in sub-section (4), the officer making
the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State
Government, but the word “forthwith” will not be taken into
consideration for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days
inasmuch as there is a clear indication that the said period shall be
computed after the order is made. In other words, sub-section (4) itself
excludes the day on which the order is made. Computation of twelve
days including the day on which the detention order is made will be
ignoring the direction of the legislature, as given in sub-section (4) itself,
that the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the
detention order. It is, however, submitted that when two interpretations
are possible, that which ensures to the benefit of the detenu should be
accepted. In our opinion, sub-section (4) admits of only one
interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and,
accordingly, the question as to the adoption of the interpretation which
ensures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise.”
11. We find that Section 3(3) of the Act, 1986, also uses the expression
“after the making of the order” in the expression “no such order shall remain in
force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the
meantime, it has been approved by the State Government” as is used in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980. In view of the law laid down in
Jitender Tyagi (supra), we are of the view that under Section 3(3) of the Act,
1986, the same meaning is to be assigned to the expression “after the making
9
thereof”. In other words, the date of the order of detention shall be excluded
while computing period of twelve (12) days.
12. The case of Arun Prasanth (supra), upon which reliance has been
placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The High Court of Madras
drawing the inference from the case of Enforcement Directorate,
Government of India v. Kapil Wadhawan and another, vide order dated
27.03.2023 in Crl.A.Nos.701-702 of 2020, held that under Section 8(1) of Act
14 of 1982, i.e., the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug-Offenders, Forest-Offenders,
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand-Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and
Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act No.14 of 1982), the date of detention
should be included in computing the period of 5 days from the date of
detention under Section 8(1) of that Act.
13. In Kapil Wadhawan (supra), the question was as to whether the date of
remand was to be included or excluded for computing 60/90 days qua Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. default bail. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the date of
remand was to be included for computing 60/90 days. The Madras High Court,
in view thereof, held that the date of detention should be included in the period
of 5 days within which the grounds for detention were to be communicated.
14. The aforesaid judgment is on a different point. In Arun Prasanth
(supra), the Madras High Court was not considering Section 3(3) of the Act,
1986. Consequently, Arun Prasanth (supra) is on the different aspect and is
of no help to the petitioner.
15. In the present case, the order of detention was passed on 19.09.2025.
When counted from 20.09.2025, the order of approval is within the period of
12 days under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1986. The order of approval was
therefore passed within 12 days. The contention of the petitioner’s counsel
that the detenue is entitled to be released under Section 3(3) as the order of
approval was passed after 12 days cannot be accepted and is rejected.
10
Consideration on Points B & C:
16. The detenue was in judicial custody in criminal cases under ground
Nos.4, 5, 6 & 7. These cases could no doubt be taken into consideration for
passing detention order but subject to satisfying the triple tests as laid down in
Champion R. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya, in which the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under in Paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 11:
“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we
may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with
some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the
detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised
by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those
very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have
to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those
aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order.
10. There are three such factors which were restated
in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India,
(1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)
“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems
clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a
detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing
the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if
he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed
before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being
released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in
all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt
essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the
authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this
behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that
the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if
bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it
before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh
Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4
11
SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention
order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent
enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in
nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to
us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody,
if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can
be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite
clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to
refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was
drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it
difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the
petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for
passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus
were in custody.”
11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as well.
Some of which are as under:
(i) T.V. Sravanan v. State [T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC
664 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] ,
(ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N. [K.K. Saravana
Babu v. State of T.N., (2008) 9 SCC 89 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
679] ,
(iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [Huidrom
Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 956] .”
17. The law is thus well settled that in cases where the detenue is in judicial
custody, those cases can be taken into consideration for the purpose of
passing an order of detention, but the Detaining Authority has to record its
satisfaction on the triple test which is as follows:
(1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that the
detenue is actually in custody;
(2) If the detaining authority has reason to believe on the basis of
reliable material placed before him
12
(a) that there is a real possibility of the detenue being released
on bail, and
(b) that on being so released the detenue would in all
probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and(3) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing.
18. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction on the
aforesaid aspects, such an order cannot be struck down. On the ground that
the detaining authority took into consideration those criminal cases in which
the detenue was in judicial custody.
19. The first of the triple test i.e. “the authority being aware of the actual
custody of the dentenue” is satisfied. That satisfaction has been recorded.
However, nothing could be pointed out from the impugned detention order by
the learned Government Pleader to show that the satisfaction of the detaining
authority in the other two tests has also recorded. We are satisfied that the
triple test, as laid down in Champion R. Sangma (supra), is not satisfied in
the order of detention. The order of detention as confirmed therefore cannot
be sustained.
20. The writ petition is allowed. The order of detention dated 19.09.2025
and the order of confirmation dated 12.11.2025 are set aside. The detenue
shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in connection with any
other case. No order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
_____________________________________
PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI,J
Dated: 14.07.2026
Note: LR copy be marked
B/o. DSV
13
181
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
WRIT PETITION NO: 29553/2025
Dated: 14.07.2026
Note: LR copy be marked
B/o.
DSV
