Bombay High Court
Chaya Tulshiram Kharat And Others vs Honble Governor, State Of Maharashtra, … on 8 May, 2026
Author: Anil S. Kilor
Bench: Anil S. Kilor
2026:BHC-NAG:7324-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 2147 OF 2023
PETITIONERS : 1. Chaya Tulshiram Kharat, Age 54 Years,
Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o. C-38,
Akruti Nagar, Post: Gandhi Nagar,
Malkapur, Tq. & District. Akola.
2. Usha Prabhakar Mahale, Age 47 Years,
Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o.
Bhendimahala, Tq. Barshitakli, District
Akola.
3. Laxmi W/o. Shrirang Zate, Age 48
Years, Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o.
Chondhi, Tq. Patur, District Akola.
4. Smt. Savita Manoharrao Deshmukh,
Age 50 Years, Occu. Anganwadi Sevika,
R/o. Charangaon, Tq. Patur, District
Akola.
5. Nanda Vasantrao Chauvan, Age 54
Years, Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o.
Khadki, Tq. Barshitakli, Dist. Akola.
6. Anita Chandraprakash Bhagwat, Age 50
Years, Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, Aagar
No.1, Post Aagar, Tq. & District Akola.
7. Sharda Vinayak Wankhade, Age 50
Years, Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o.
Umri Aarab, Kinkheda, Tq. Murtizapur,
District Akola.
8. Surekha Motiram Lunge, Age 48 Years,
Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o. Kanheri
Saraf, Tq. Barshitakli, District Akola.
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9. Jyoti Onkar Sultane, Age 48 Years,
Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o. Ugwa,
Tq. & District Akola.
10. Sulbha Dattatray Tarale, Age 49 Years,
Occu. Anganwadi Sevika, R/o. Ugwa,
Tq. Barshitakli & Dist. Akola.
//VERSUS//
RESPONDENTS : 1. Hon'ble Governor, State of
Respondent No.1 is deleted as Maharashtra, Raj Bhavan, Malabar
per Hon'ble Court's Order dt:
03.04.2023
Hills, Mumbai 400035.
2. State of Maharashtra, through its
Principal Secretary, Women and Child
Development Department, Mantralaya,
Mumbai - 32.
3. The Commissioner, Integrated Child
Development Services Scheme
Commissionerate, State of Maharashtra,
Navi Mumbai.
4. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad,
Akola, Tq. & Dist. Akola.
__________________________________________________________
Mr. Ved. R. Deshpande, Advocate for the Petitioners.
Mr. A.V. Palshikar, AGP for the Respondents/State.
Ms. Deeplata C. Pandey, Advocate for Respondent No.4.
__________________________________________________________
CORAM : ANIL S. KILOR AND
RAJ D. WAKODE, JJ.
DATE : 8th MAY, 2026.
ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : RAJ D. WAKODE, J.)
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Heard Mr. Ved R. Deshpande, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Mr. A.V. Palshikar, learned AGP for the respondents/State,
and Ms. Deeplata Pandey, learned counsel for respondent No.4.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the
consent of the parties.
3. The petitioners have approached this Court seeking
challenge to the Rule 7(1)(c) of the Service Entry Rules, 2021
(hereinafter referred to as “the aforesaid Rules” for the sake of brevity),
formulated vide Government Resolution dated 04.06.2021 issued by
the Women and Child Development Department, State of Maharashtra
(respondent No. 2), and seek a declaration that the aforesaid Rule is
unconstitutional. The petitioners further seek challenge to the
consequential communication dated 22.09.2021 issued by respondent
No. 3 – Commissioner, as well as the impugned communication dated
19.12.2022 issued by respondent No. 4, directing appropriate action for
filling the posts of Supervisors in accordance with the aforesaid Rules, as
notified vide Government Notification dated 04.06.2021.
4. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present writ
petition are as follows:
4.1. The petitioners are appointed as Anganwadi Sevikas in
respective villages under Zilla Parishad, Akola, and have rendered more
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than 22 years of unblemished service on the said post. The petitioners
are graduates and possess rich experience in the work related to the
Integrated Child Development Services Scheme (ICDS). On
02.10.1975, the ICDS Scheme came to be formulated by the
Government of India with the aim of providing early childhood care
and development. The said scheme came to be adopted by the
respective States under the guidelines of the Government of India and
has been implemented for more than 30 years. The ICDS Scheme aims
to improve the nutritional and health status of children in the age group
of 0 to 6 years. ICDS services are provided through a vast network of
ICDS centres, better known as “Anganwadis”. The Anganwadi centre is
operated by an “Anganwadi Worker” assisted by an Anganwadi Helper
or Sahayika.
4.2. Across the State of Maharashtra, Anganwadi Centres have
been established under the ICDS Scheme. For the smooth functioning
of the ICDS Scheme at the grassroots level, Anganwadi Helpers,
Anganwadi Sevikas, Supervisors, and Child Development Project
Officers are appointed in each district. At each beat level, to ensure the
smooth functioning of all Anganwadi Centres, Supervisors are
appointed. One Supervisor manages and supervises the work of
approximately 25 Anganwadi Centres.
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4.3. The State of Maharashtra, vide various Government
Resolutions, has stipulated the conditions of service of the aforesaid
posts. In the aforesaid resolutions, it is stipulated that the age of
retirement of Anganwadi Sevikas shall be 65 years, whereas the age of
retirement of Supervisors is 58 years. The post of Supervisor is a
managerial post bestowed with the responsibility of coordinating the
implementation of the ICDS Scheme at the grassroots level by ensuring
proper functioning of Anganwadis in the concerned region.
4.4. The State of Maharashtra, vide Government Resolution
dated 17.11.2001, directed that 25% of the posts of Supervisors are to be
filled by way of promotion from candidates working as Anganwadi
Sevikas who possess a matriculation certificate and have completed 10
years of honorary service on the said post. It was directed that a
Selection Committee shall be established for effecting the aforesaid
appointments by way of promotion. It was further stipulated in the said
Resolution that candidates up to the age of 45 years shall be eligible for
appointment to the post of Supervisor by way of promotion.
4.5. The State of Maharashtra further issued a Corrigendum
dated 07.12.2001 to the aforesaid Resolution and thereby modified
paragraph 2(3)(b) of the said Resolution dated 17.11.2001. By way of
the said modification, it was directed that candidates up to the age of 55
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years shall be eligible for appointment to the post of Supervisor by way
of promotion.
4.6. Vide Government Notification dated 04.06.2021,
respondent No.1 formulated Service Entry Rules for Class III posts
under the ICDS Commissionerate. Rule 7(1)(c) thereof stipulates that
50% of the vacant posts of Supervisors shall be filled by way of
promotion from candidates working as Anganwadi Sevikas and Mini
Anganwadi Sevikas possessing a minimum of 10 years’ experience on
the said post. It is directed therein that 50% of the posts shall be filled
by way of promotion from candidates working as ‘Mini Anganwadi
Sevika’ and ‘Mansevi Anganwadi Sevika’. It is further directed therein
that the maximum age for a candidate to be eligible for appointment to
the post of Supervisor by way of promotion would be 45 years instead
of 55 years, as stipulated in the previous Government Resolution dated
07.12.2001.
4.7. It is in compliance of the said Government Notification
dated 04.06.2021 that the consequential impugned communication
dated 22.09.2021 was issued by respondent No.3, and the impugned
communication dated 19.12.2022 was issued by respondent No.4,
thereby seeking appropriate action for filling the posts of Anganwadi
Supervisors in accordance with law and the Service Entry Rules
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declared vide the impugned Government Notification dated
04.06.2021.
5. The petitioners, being aggrieved by the impugned Rule 7(1)
(c) of the aforesaid Rules, have approached this Court by way of the
present writ petition.
6. In response to the notice issued by this Court, respondent
No.2 – State of Maharashtra filed its reply, wherein, in paragraph 11, the
State Government has supported its decision for the reasons
enumerated below:
“11. Say that according to the Government decision dated
7/12/2001 (page 48) the age of selection can be up to 55 years
while selecting the post of Supervisor. But if appointed as
supervisor at the age of 55 years, retirement at the age of 58 years
gives only 3 years’ service. Thus, selection is done at the last stage
of age and it will be difficult to supervise the huge work of 25
Anganwadis in a Beat. Similarly, reporting of each Anganwadi to
the higher office is required. It is going to be very difficult to
complete the said work at this age even after taking training for it.
Therefore, in view of the above situation and for the reason
mentioned hereinabove the age limit is kept up to 45 years.”
7. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioners, has
vehemently argued that the impugned Government Notification dated
04.06.2021, and more particularly the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the
aforesaid Rules, is unconstitutional as it is in clear violation of Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the said Rule
is arbitrary and creates unreasonable discrimination between
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Anganwadi Sevikas possessing the same qualifications, and that such
Rule is in contravention of the basic principle of seniority.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further highlighted the
fact that the conduct of the respondents has not only violated the
doctrine of legitimate expectation but also the doctrine of rational nexus
with the object which the aforesaid Rules seek to achieve.
9. Per contra, Mr. Palshikar, learned AGP, relying upon the
reply submitted by respondent No.2 – State of Maharashtra, supported
the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules for the reasons stated
above.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that the Government of
Maharashtra, vide Corrigendum dated 07.12.2001, had modified
paragraph 2(3)(b) of the Government Resolution dated 17.11.2001 and
had directed that candidates up to the age of 55 years shall be eligible
for appointment to the post of Supervisor by way of promotion.
11. The aforesaid Corrigendum was issued on 07.12.2001. The
petitioners, in paragraph 7 of the present writ petition, have specifically
deposed on oath that even after issuance of such Corrigendum dated
07.12.2001, no appointment to the post of Supervisor was made for the
Anganwadis under Zilla Parishad, Akola. The posts were kept vacant
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even after issuance of such clear guidelines by the Government of
Maharashtra.
12. The petitioners have further stated that they became duly
qualified for the post of Supervisor during the years 2004 to 2008
respectively, in accordance with their dates of appointment. According
to the Government Resolution dated 17.11.2001, they had acquired ten
years of experience as Anganwadi Sevikas and also possessed the
requisite academic qualifications for the said post.
13. However, since no appointments were made in accordance
with the aforesaid Government Resolution, the respondents deprived
the present petitioners of their legitimate expectation of being promoted
in view of the right created by the Government Resolution dated
17.11.2001. Thus, the petitioners were deprived of their rightful
promotion to the post of Supervisor without there being any justifiable
reason for the same.
14. It is worth to mention here that respondent Nos.2, 3, and 4,
in their replies, have neither controverted nor denied the aforesaid
contention of the petitioners and have thus admitted the same. In our
considered opinion, such conduct on the part of the respondents is in
clear violation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
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15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of State of
West Bengal and another Vs. Confederation of State Government
Employees, West Bengal and others (Civil Appeal Nos.792-794 of
2026 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.22628-22630 of 2022 decided on
05.02.2026), has dealt with the aforesaid doctrine of legitimate
expectation in paragraph 40, which reads thus:
“40. Next, we now deal with the issue of legitimate expectation.
(a) The modern origins of this doctrine have authoritatively
been traced to a judgment of the House of Lords, penned by
Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home
Affairs60. The doctrine has, over time become well
recognised in India also. Sivanandan C T v. High Court of
Kerala61 in reference to Union of India v. Hindustan
Development Corporation62 culled out the following factors
to be considered for application of the doctrine:
“25….(i) legitimate expectation arises based on a
representation or past conduct of a public authority;
(ii) legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if
it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an
established procedure followed in regular or natural
sequence;
(iii) legitimate expectation provides locus standi to a
claimant for judicial review;
(iv) the doctrine is mostly confined to a right of a fair
hearing before a decision and does not give scope to
claim relief straightaway;
(v) the public authority should justify the denial of a
person’s legitimate expectation by resorting to
overriding public interest; and
(vi) the Courts cannot interfere with the decision of an
authority taken by way of policy or public interest
unless such decision amounts to an abuse of power.”
(b) In Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar63 the doctrine
was explained as under:
“15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is
not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief
or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or
established practice. The term “established practice”
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refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain
conduct, process or activity of the decision-making
authority.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
(c) In Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana64 this Court
observed:
“58. Application of doctrine of legitimate expectation
or promissory estoppel must also be considered from
the aforementioned viewpoint. A legitimate
expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It
is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is
based on a right. [See Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State
Rajasthan [(2003) 3 SCC 485: 2003 SCC (L&S) 322]
and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.
[(1993) 3 SCC 499] ] It is grounded in the rule of law
as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in
the Government’s dealings with the public. We have
no doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation
operates both in procedural and substantive matters.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
(d) In Punjab State Coop. Agricultural Development Bank
Ltd. v. Coop. Societies65, it was observed:
“46. This Court, after taking note of the earlier view on
the subject further held in Railway Board [Railway
Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1527] as under: (SCC pp. 637-38 &
640, paras 20, 24-25 & 33)
“20. It can, therefore, be said that a rule which
operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of
those already in service cannot be assailed on the
ground of retroactivity as being violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule
which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a
benefit which has been granted or availed of e.g.
promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
to the extent it operates retrospectively.
***
24. In many of these decisions [K.C. Arora v.
State of Haryana, (1984) 3 SCC 281: 1984 SCC
(L&S) 520] [P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P.,
(1987) 3 SCC 622: 1987 SCC (L&S) 310] [K.
Narayanan v. State Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1)
SCC 44: 1994 SCC (L&S) 392] [T.R. Kapur v.
State of Haryana, 1986 Supp SCC 584], [Union
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of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, (1994) 5
SCC 450: 1994 SCC (L&S) 1118], [Κ.
Ravindranath Pai v. State Karnataka, 1995 Supp
(2) SCC 246: 1995 SCC (L&S) 792] the
expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights”
have been used while striking down the
impugned provisions which had been given
retrospective operation so as to have an adverse
effect in the matter of promotion, seniority,
substantive appointment, etc. of the employees.
The said expressions have been used in the
context of a right flowing under the relevant rule
which was sought to be altered with effect from
an anterior date and thereby taking away the
benefits available under the rule in force at that
time. It has been held that such an amendment
having retrospective operation which has the
effect of taking away a benefit already available to
the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary.
discriminatory and violative of the rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. We are unable to hold that these
decisions are not in consonance with the
decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [Roshan Lal
Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185:
AIR 1967 SC 1889], B.S. Vadera [B.S. Vadera v.
Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 575: AIR 1969 SC
118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [State of
Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, (1983) 2
SCC 33: 1983 SCC (L&S) 231]”
We have also perused various other judgments
concerning the doctrine of legitimate expectation viz. State
of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics 66, Navjyoti Coop.
Group Housing Society v. Union of India,67; Food
Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries68.
Once it is the established that a right exists, the
following observation in G.C. Mandawar (supra) becomes
relevant:
“5….Under this provision, it is a matter of discretion
with the Local Government whether it will grant
dearness allowance and if so, how much. That being
so, the prayer for mandamus is clearly
misconceived, as that could be granted only when
there is in the applicant a right to compel the
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performance of some duty cast on the opponent.
Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules confers no right
on the government servants to the grant of dearness
allowance; it imposes no duty on the State to grant
it. It merely confers a power on the State to grant
compassionate allowance at its own discretion, and
no mandamus can issue to compel the exercise of
such a power. Nor, indeed, could any other writ or
direction be issued in respect of it, as there is no
right in the applicant which is capable of being
protected or enforced.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
(e) We are of the view that in light of the principles
referred to above, legitimate expectation on the part of the
respondents did arise in view of the change of law i.e.,
enactment of RoPA Rules and its recognition of AICPI as
the determinative factor for the computation of DA.”
16. In the present case also, a legitimate expectation on the part
of the petitioners to be promoted had arisen in view of the Government
Resolution dated 17.11.2001 and the Corrigendum dated 07.12.2001,
which was not fulfilled by the respondents for a period of almost twenty
years.
17. Not only that, respondent No.2, by issuing the Government
Notification dated 04.06.2021 and more specifically the impugned
Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules, has arbitrarily reduced the
maximum qualifying age to 45 years and has thereby deprived the
petitioners of their rightful promotion to the post of Supervisor. Thus,
in our considered opinion, the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid
Rules is in violation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
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18. Respondent No.2 – State of Maharashtra, in view of a
specific query raised by this Court vide order dated 16.10.2024, filed an
additional affidavit on 04.12.2024. In the said affidavit, respondent
No.2 has specifically stated that the reduction in age from 55 years to
45 years by virtue of the impugned Government Notification dated
04.06.2021 for Anganwadi Sevikas is applicable to all Anganwadi
Sevikas, including those who have already been recruited.
19. Thus, the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules has
been made applicable retrospectively even to those Anganwadi Sevikas
who were already appointed. The petitioners have already crossed the
age of 45 years and, therefore, the retrospective application of the
aforesaid impugned Rule has caused serious prejudice to the petitioners,
who were awaiting their promotion in view of the Corrigendum dated
07.12.2001 since 2004, when they became eligible for promotion in
view of the existing parameters prevailing at the relevant time.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has rightly argued that
the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules is also in breach of the
principle of seniority. If the aforesaid impugned Rule is sustained and
brought into effect, candidates up to the age of 45 years would be
eligible for appointment to the post of Anganwadi Supervisor, whereas
candidates like the present petitioners, who are beyond 45 years of age
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and possess greater experience, would remain stagnant at the
subordinate level. As a result, Anganwadi Sevikas junior to the
petitioners and similarly situated candidates, who are below 45 years of
age and possess lesser experience, would act as Supervisors despite being
less trained, less qualified, and less experienced as compared to the
senior Anganwadi Sevikas who are above 45 years of age. Such a Rule, if
permitted to operate, would result in an unreasonable alteration in the
conditions of service of candidates similarly placed as the petitioners,
and the action on the part of the respondents would be arbitrary, which
cannot be permitted.
21. We have already reproduced above the reasons given by the
Government of Maharashtra in support of the decision contemplated in
the impugned Government Notification dated 04.06.2021. The State
Government has justified its decision by stating that it would be
difficult for Anganwadi Sevikas aged about 55 years to perform the
duties attached to the post, as they would be required to supervise the
extensive work of 25 Anganwadi Centres in a beat. In our considered
opinion, such a reason given by the Government of Maharashtra bears
no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. As stated
above, as per the service conditions, the age of retirement of Anganwadi
Sevikas is 65 years, whereas the age of retirement of Anganwadi
Supervisors is 58 years. Thus, the petitioners are considered eligible to
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discharge duties as Anganwadi Sevikas till the age of 65 years; however,
the respondents have deprived them of an opportunity to serve as
Supervisors till the age of 58 years.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, we are at a loss to understand how
an Anganwadi Sevika, who is considered fit for rendering services till
the age of 65 years, is not considered fit for serving as an Anganwadi
Supervisor, whose age of retirement is 58 years. Thus, in our considered
opinion, such age restriction as imposed by the impugned Rule 7(1)(c)
of the aforesaid Rules has no logical justification and treats similarly
placed persons differently. The aforesaid Rule, in our considered
opinion, is arbitrary and creates unreasonable discrimination between
Anganwadi Sevikas possessing the same qualifications and therefore
deserves to be declared unconstitutional.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in a catena of
judgments, has held that the recruitment rules and conditions of service
framed by the State under Article 309 of the Constitution of India
should not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and
should not be arbitrary or discriminatory. Further, such Rules should
have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
formulating such Rules. In the present case, the petitioners, who are
more experienced and capable and possess the requisite eligibility
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criteria and qualifications for appointment to the post of Supervisors,
are being excluded from the selection process solely on the basis of age.
24. In our considered opinion, such classification creates an
unreasonable discrimination between Anganwadi Sevikas who are
otherwise similarly situated and has no rational nexus with the effective
discharge of duties attached to the supervisory post. The petitioners,
who are considered fit to discharge duties as Anganwadi Sevikas till the
age of 65 years, are being held unfit to serve as Supervisors till the age
of 58 years. Such discrimination by respondent No.2 – State of
Maharashtra while formulating the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the
aforesaid Rules is in clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of
Indravadan H. Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and another [1986 (Supp)
SCC 254], has held that imposing an age restriction for promotion to
the post of Assistant Judge was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected
the reasoning that candidates above a certain age lack physical or mental
capacity, observing that the experience gained with age enhances
suitability for higher responsibilities. It further noted that while an age
bar was imposed for promotion to the post of Assistant Judge, no such
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restriction existed for the higher post of District Judge, thereby
rendering the classification irrational and lacking any nexus with the
object sought to be achieved. Paragraphs 10 to 12 of the aforesaid
judgment are extracted below:
“10. The posts of Assistant Judge as well as of District Judge are
included in senior branch of Gujarat Judicial Service. It is
incomprehensible how those two cadres of Assistant Judges and
District Judges can be treated as two different classes altogether,
thereby justifying the introduction of age restriction in regard to
selection and appointment by promotion to the post of Assistant
Judge while doing away with any such sort of age limit or
restriction in respect of appointment to the post of a District
Judge by promotion from amongst the members of the junior
branch who have served as Assistant Judges. Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution ensure that there should not be any
discrimination in the matter of appointment in service, nor there
will be any arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the rules of
recruitment providing for appointment to the service either by
promotion or by direct recruitment. There is no nexus to the
object sought to be achieved by introducing the age restriction as
regards the promotion by appointment to the post of Assistant
Judge from amongst the members of the Gujarat Judicial Service
(Junior Branch), as provided in Rules 6(4)(i) and 6(4)(iii)(a) of
the said Rules. But in respect of appointment to the higher post
of a District Judge by promotion from amongst the members of
the junior branch who have served as Assistant Judges, no such
restriction of age has been provided in Rule 6(2)(i)(a) and (b) of
the said Rules. There is obviously no rationale, nor any
reasonableness for introduction of this age bar in regard to
appointment by promotion to the post of an Assistant Judge. The
rule, is, therefore, arbitrary and it violates the salutary principles
of equality and want of arbitrariness in the matter of public
employment as guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to the
observations of this Court in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of
T. N.1 which are in the following terms: [SCC p. 38, para 85,
SCC (L & S) p. 200, para 85]
Though enacted as a distinct and independent
fundamental right because of its great importance as a
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principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public
employment which is so vital to the building up of the new
classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution,
Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the
concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words,
Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species, Article
16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters
relating to public employment. The basic principle which,
therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and
inhibition against discrimination…. Equality is a dynamic
concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be
“cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and
doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality
is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of
law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of
an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit
in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and
constitutional law. . .
11. Similar observations have been made in the case of Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India2. It has been observed that : (SCC pp.
283-4, para 7)
Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and
ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of
reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an
essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades
Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence…
12. The reach and ambit of Article 14 has been very succinctly
reiterated again by this Court in the case of R. D. Shetty v.
International Airport Authority3 of India as follows: (SCC p. 511,
para 21)
It is now well settled… that Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not
be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and
relevant principle which is non-discriminatory: it must not
be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations,
because that would be denial of equality. The principle of
reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as
philosophically an essential element of equality or non-
arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must
characterise every State action whether it be under authority
of law or in exercise of executive power without making of
law.”
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26. Similar was the view endorsed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of D.S. Nakara and others Vs. Union of India
[(1983) 1 SCC 305]. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India emphasized that Article 14 is not confined merely to classification
but fundamentally strikes at arbitrariness in State action. Equality and
arbitrariness are opposites, and any arbitrary action is inherently
unequal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while the Constitution permits
reasonable classification, such classification must satisfy the twin tests as
mentioned therein and reproduced below:
“12. After an exhaustive review of almost all decisions bearing on
the question of Article 14, this Court speaking through
Chandrachud, C.J. in In re Special Courts Bill, 1978 3 restated the
settled propositions which emerged from the judgments of this
Court undoubtedly insofar as they were relevant to the decision
on the points arising for consideration in that matter. Four of
them are apt and relevant for the present purpose and may be
extracted. They are: (SCC pp. 424-25, para 72)
* * *
(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal
protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the
invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore,
classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific
exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts
should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire
tests for determining the validity of classification in any
given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably
arbitrary.
(4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is
not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all
persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies
should be made available to them irrespective of differences
of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges
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conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to
be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be
no discrimination between one person and another if as
regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is
substantially the same.
* * *
(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to
the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by
experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the
classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be
rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some
qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the
persons grouped together and not in others who are left out
but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable
relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the
test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes those that are grouped together from
others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
* * *
13. The other facet of Article 14 which must be remembered
is that it eschews arbitrariness in any form. Article 14 has,
therefore, not to be held identical with the doctrine of
classification. As was noticed in Maneka Gandhi case 1 in the
earliest stages of evolution of the constitutional law, Article 14
came to be identified with the doctrine of classification because
the view taken was that Article 14 forbids discrimination and
there will be no discrimination where the classification making
the differentia fulfils the aforementioned two conditions.
However, in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. 4, it was held that the
basic principle which informs both Article 14 and 16 is equality
and inhibition against discrimination. This Court further
observed as under : (SCC p. 38, para 85)
From a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness
are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a
republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in
it that it is unequal both according to political logic and
constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and
if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is
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also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at
arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality
of treatment.
14. Justice Iyer has in his inimitable style dissected Article 14 in
Maneka Gandhi case1 as under at SCR p. 728 (SCC p. 342, para
94)
That article has a pervasive processual potency and
versa- tile quality, egalitarian in its soul and allergic to
discriminatory diktats. Equality is the antithesis of
arbitrariness and ex cathedra ipse dixit is the ally of
demagogic authoritarianism. Only knight-errants of
‘executive excesses’ – if we may use current cliche – can fall in
love with the Dame of despotism, legislative or
administrative. If this Court gives in here it gives up the
ghost. And so it is that I insist on the dynamics of limitations
on fundamental freedoms as implying the rule of law: Be you
ever so high, the law is above you.1
Affirming and explaining this view, the Constitution Bench in
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi 5 held that it must, there-
fore, now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes
at is arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary must
necessarily involve negation of equality. The Court made it
explicit that where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is
unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law
and is, therefore, violative of Article 14. After a review of large
number of decisions bearing on the subject, in Air India v.
Nergesh Meerza6 the Court formulated propositions emerging
from an analysis and examination of earlier decisions. One such
proposition held well established is that Article 14 is certainly
attracted where equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis.
15. Thus the fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids
class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin
tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must
have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.
16. As a corollary to this well established proposition, the next
question is, on whom the burden lies to affirmatively establish
the rational principle on which the classification is founded
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correlated to the object sought to be achieved? The thrust of
Article 14 is that the citizen is entitled to equality before law and
equal protection of laws. In the very nature of things the society
being composed of unequals a welfare State will have to strive by
both executive and legislative action to help the less fortunate in
the society to ameliorate their condition so that the social and
economic inequality in the society may be bridged. This would
necessitate a legislation applicable to a group of citizens
otherwise unequal and amelioration of whose lot is the object of
State affirmative action. In the absence of doctrine of
classification such legislation is likely to flounder on the bed rock
of equality enshrined in Article 14. The Court realistically
appraising the social stratification and economic inequality and
keeping in view the guidelines on which the State action must
move as constitutionally laid down in Part IV of the
Constitution, evolved the doctrine of classification. The doctrine
was evolved to sustain a legislation or State action designed to
help weaker sections of the society or some such segments of the
society in need of succour. Legislative and executive action may
accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable
classification and the rational principle correlated to the object
sought to be achieved. The State, therefore, would have to
affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been
satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only
the rational principle on which classification is founded but
correlate it to the objects sought to be achieved. This approach is
noticed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India7 when at SCR page 1034 (SCC p. 506), the
Court observed that a discriminatory action of the Government
is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based
on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational,
unreasonable discriminatory.”
27. The above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India support our considered opinion in the present case that the
classification sought to be achieved by respondent No.2 through
impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules is arbitrary and creates
unjust discrimination amongst similarly situated persons, thereby
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violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The State
action must be fair, non-arbitrary, and based on a justifiable principle,
especially in matters affecting the rights and benefits of similarly
situated employees, which is utterly lacking in the present policy
adopted by respondent No.2 – State of Maharashtra while formulating
Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules.
28. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we are of the considered
opinion that the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules, as
formulated by respondent No.2 – State of Maharashtra vide
Government Notification dated 04.06.2021, is unconstitutional and
deserves to be set aside. Hence, we pass following order:
ORDER
(i) Writ petition is allowed.
(ii) We declare that the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid
Rules, as formulated by respondent No.2 – State of Maharashtra vide
Government Notification dated 04.06.2021, is unconstitutional and is
hereby set aside.
(iii) Needless to mention that the impugned communication
dated 22.09.2021 issued by respondent No.3 and the communication
dated 19.12.2022 issued by respondent No.4, being consequential to
the impugned Rule 7(1)(c) of the aforesaid Rules, are also unsustainable
in law and are hereby set aside.
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29. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.
(RAJ D. WAKODE, J.) (ANIL S. KILOR, J.)
Vijaykumar
Signed by: Mr. Vijay Kumar
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 17/05/2026 09:58:37
