Chattisgarh High Court
Charu Sharma vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally signed by
V PADMAVATHI
Date: 2026.07.03
17:36:46 +0530
2026:CGHC:27041-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPCR No. 353 of 2026
Charu Sharma S/o Gopal Sharma Aged About 30 Years R/o Fuljhariya, Sarangarh,
District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Ministry Of Home Department,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
2 - District Magistrate Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.)
3 - Superintendent Of Police Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.)
...Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner : Shri R Pradhan, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Shri SS Baghel, GA
———————————————————————————————————
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
02.07.2026
Heard R Pradhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri SS
Baghel, learned GA for the State.
1. Petitioner has filed this petition for the following reliefs:
“10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the
police authorities to quash/set-aside the impugned order dated
Wpcr 353 of 20262
23.12.2025 (Annexure P-1) and order dated 24.02.2026
(Annexure P2).
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any
other relief, as it may deems fit and appropriate.”
2. Present petition is filed challenging the order dated 23.12.2025
(Annexure P1) passed by the District Magistrate, Sarangarh, District-
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (CG)/respondent-2, as well as the order dated
22.04.2026 (Annexure P2) (wrongly mentioned in reliefs), whereby the
appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed on the ground of delay
in the arbitrary and illegal manner.
3. Brief facts of the case are that on 22.03.2025, a report was
submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Sarangarh, District-
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh against the petitioner for initiating proceeding under
the State Security Act, 1990 for externment of the petitioner. In the
report, the Superintendent of Police disclosed about the criminal
antecedents of the petitioner and his non-correctional behaviour. Show
Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner on 11.04.2025 (Annexure P3),
alleging petitioner’s involvement in Crime Nos.167/2014, 420/2015,
96/2021, 126/2022, 103/2025, 104/2025, Ishtagasa proceeding
No.109/2014, 59/2016, 13/2017 and 149/2024 for preventive action. The
petitioner filed his reply to the Show Cause Notice on 02.06.2025 and
thereafter, after hearing the parties, an externment order was passed on
23.12.2025 by the District Magistrate, Sarangarh, District-Sarangarh-
Bilaigarh, directing him to remain outside of the District-Sarangarh-
Wpcr 353 of 2026
3
Bilaigarh and adjoining districts for a period of one year. Petitioner
preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the State Security Act, 1990
before the State Government. The said appeal was dismissed on
22.04.2026 on the ground of appeal being barred by limitation. Hence,
this petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned
externment order dated 23.12.2025 does not satisfy the requirement for
externment of petitioner, as the offences which were registered against
the petitioner are quite old and there is no offence registered against the
petitioner in recent past. Challenging the impugned order, petitioner filed
an appeal before the State Government which has ben dismissed on the
ground of delay but the explanation for delay has not been considered by
the Appellate authority. He would further submit that the impugned order
was passed on 23.12.2025 by the District Magistrate and he applied for
certified copy of the said order and other document on 26.12.2025, and
the same was delivered to him on 05.01.2026. Thereafter, he filed the
appeal on 19.03.2026. He would further submit that the appellate
authority has erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay by
holding that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 applicable only to the
Court proceeding and it would not be applicable to quashing judicial
proceeding, or Tribunals and thereafter, by holding the appeal being
barred by limitation, dismissed the same. He would further submit that
when the statute provide the appeal before a competent authority, the
Limitation Act would be applicable to such proceeding also and therefore,
Wpcr 353 of 2026
4
the appellate authority, by condoning the delay, decide the appeal on
merits of the case. The externment order does affect the life and liberty
of the petitioner and the order itself is stigmatic. Therefore, the appeal of
the petitioner may be directed to decide on its own merits by setting aside
the impugned order dated 23.12.2025 (Annexure P-1), passed by
respondent-1.
5. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner
relied upon the judgment of Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh &
Others, 2026 INSC 657.
6. Per contra, learned State Counsel opposed the submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the
submissions advanced by the respective counsel.
8. The issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by a
recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jittu
Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2026 INSC 657 wherein the
Hon’ble Court held as under:-
“7. On hearing learned counsel for the respective parties, the
question of law that falls for our consideration is: whether Section
5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded either expressly or by
necessary implication from proceedings under Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam?
8. The Adhiniyam is an enactment to provide security of the
State, maintenance of public order and certain other matters
Wpcr 353 of 20265
connected therewith. Section 3 of the Adhiniyam enables a
District Magistrate to make a restriction order for the purpose of
maintenance of public order or to prevent a person from acting in
a prejudicial manner to the security of the State. Section 4 deals
with dispersal of anti-social elements and previous convicts.
Section 5 deals with removal of persons from committing the
offence, while Section 6 deals with removal of persons convicted
of certain offences. Any order made under Sections 4, 5 or 6
against a person restraining him to enter into a district or part
thereof or such area and any district or districts or any part
thereof, contiguous thereto, shall be for such period as may be
specified therein and shall in no case exceed a period of one
year from the date on which it was made. Section 8 mandates
hearing to be given before an order is made under Sections 3 to
6 of the Adhiniyam.
9. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, with which we are mainly
concerned, states that any person aggrieved by an order of the
District Magistrate or any other officer specially empowered
under the said Act may appeal to the State Government within
thirty days from the date of such order. Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam reads as under:
“9. Appeal- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order
under section 3, 4, 5 or 6 made by the District
Magistrate or any other officer specially empowered
under Section 13 may appeal to the State Government
within thirty days from the date of such order. Such
appeal shall be decided as far as possible within a
period of four months of the date of filing of the appeal.
(2) An appeal under this Section shall be preferred in
the form of a memorandum setting forth concisely the
grounds of objection to the order appealed against, and
shall be accompanied by a certified copy thereof.
(3) On receipt of such appeal, the State Government
may after giving a reasonable opportunity to the
appellant to be heard either personally or by a legal
practitioner and after such further inquiry, if any, as it
Wpcr 353 of 20266
may deem necessary, confirm, vary or rescind the order
appealed against:
Provided that the order appealed against shall
remain in operation pending the disposal of the appeal,
unless the State Government otherwise directs.
(4) In calculating the period of thirty days provided for
an appeal under this Section, the time taken for
granting a certified copy of the order appealed against
shall be excluded.”
10. It is a settled position of law that the right to file an appeal is
a statutory right or a creature of the statute and no other right to
file an appeal can be recognized de hors a statute. A right of
appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal can be filed unless
it is clearly expressed in terms of a statute. Further, the right of
appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of
procedure. It is a vested right which can be exercised when an
adverse judgment is pronounced. Though it exists from the date
the lis commences, such right is governed by the law prevailing
on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by
the law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of
the filing of the appeal, vide Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah
Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540.
11. In Anant Mills Company Limited vs. State of Gujarat,
(1975) 2 SCC 175, it has been held that though the right of
appeal is a creature of a statute, there is no reason why the
legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for
the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so
onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the
right almost illusory.
12. There is a fundamental distinction between a right to file a
suit and right to file an appeal which has been explained by Y.V.
Chandrachud J. (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Ganga
Bai vs. Vijay Kumar, (1974) 2 SCC 393 as under:
“There is a basic distinction between the right of suit
Wpcr 353 of 20267
and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in
every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless
the suit is barred by statute one may, at one’s peril,
bring a suit of one’s choice. It is no answer to a suit
howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no
such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires
no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars
the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite
the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and
therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the
clear authority of law.”
13. On the question of a party having a right to file an appeal,
one could usefully recall His Lordship Krishna lyer J’s
observation in Sita Ram vs. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 656,
wherein he has observed that “an appeal is the right of entering
a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress
the error of the court below”. “In an appeal, strictly the question is
whether the order of the court from which the appeal is brought
was right “A right of on the materials which that court had before
it” appeal, where it exists, is a matter of substance, and not of
procedure. Thus, the right of appeal is paramount, the procedure
for hearing canalises so that extravagant prolixity or abuse of
process can be avoided and a fair workability provided.
Amputation is not procedure while pruning may be. That an
appeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk
by procedural excess, the right becomes a casualty. That cannot
be.”
14. With regard to filing of a suit or an appeal within the
prescribed period of limitation, in N. Balakrishnan vs. M.
Krishnamurthy. (1998) 7 SCC 123. this Court has held as
under:
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to
repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The
Wpcr 353 of 20268
law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy
for the redress of the legal lead may never revisit.
During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for
each remedy. Unending period for launching the to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The
law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is
enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of
time.”
15. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7
SCC 372, on the question of a belated appeal being
unaccompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay
and the consequences of not filing the said application along with
the memorandum of appeal and the fact that the said defect is
curable, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“12. It is true that the pristine maxim vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt (law assists those who
are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights).
But even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes.
As the aphorism “to err is human” is more a practical
notion of human behaviour than an abstract philosophy,
the unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should
not normally cause the doors of the judicature
permanently closed before him. The effort of the Court
should not be one of finding means to pull down the
shutters of adjudicatory jurisdiction before a party who
seeks justice, on account of any mistake committed by
him, but to see whether it is possible to entertain his
grievance if it is genuine.”
Wpcr 353 of 2026
9
16. We may briefly explain the object and purpose of the
Limitation Act before answering whether Section 5 thereof will
come to the rescue of the appellant notwithstanding that the
period of limitation under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam is
specifically prescribed and the said provision is conspicuous by
an absence of a clause to condone the delay when a belated
appeal is filed; nor is there an express reference to read Section
5 of the Limitation Act into it.
17. The Limitation Act consolidates and amends the law of
limitation of suits, appeals and applications and for purposes
connected therewith. The law of limitation is an adjective law
containing procedural rules and does not create any right in
favour of any person, but simply prescribes that the remedy can
be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond. The
Limitation Act therefore does not confer any substantive right nor
define any right or cause of action. The law of limitation is based
on delay and laches. It is well known that the Limitation Act only
bars the remedy without extinguishing the rights. It is made to
ensure that a plaintiff does not resort to procrastination or dilatory
tactics, but seeks the remedy within a time fixed by the
legislature. But in certain special circumstances like Section 27
of the Limitation Act, once the remedy becomes barred by
limitation, the right itself gets extinguished, that is, when a suit for
possession of any property gets extinguished on the
determination of period of limitation. That unless there is a
complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot
be complete cause of action unless there is a person who can
sue and a person who can be sued. There is also an important
principle which has crystallized in the form of the maxim that
“when once the time has begun to run, nothing stops it”. The
public policy underlying the law of limitation is “interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium” meaning, that it is in the welfare of
the republic that there be an end to litigation. Thus, the object is
to put an end to the legal remedy and by so doing, have a fixed
period of life for litigation.
18. Section 5 of the Limitation Act states that an appeal or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions
Wpcr 353 of 2026
10
of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be
admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the
applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-
Any appeal or any application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted
after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the
applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause
for not preferring the appeal or making the application
within such period.
Explanation.- The fact that the appellant or the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment
of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the
prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the
meaning of this section.”
19. We now turn to address situations where a special or local
law, as in the present case, prescribes a different period of
limitation than under the Limitation Act. The answer to this
question is to be found in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. A
plain reading of the said Section reveals that where any special
or local law prescribes, inter alia, any appeal to be filed within a
period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the
schedule under the Limitation Act, Section 3 of the Limitation Act
shall apply and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24,
inclusive, shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Sections
3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act read as under:
“3. Bar of limitation.-(1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after
the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
Wpcr 353 of 2026
11
(2) For the purposes of this Act,-
(a) a suit is instituted, –
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to
the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for
leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is
being wound up by the court, when the claimant first
sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim,
shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed
to have been instituted-
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit
in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which
the counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is
made when the application is presented to the proper
officer of that court.”
XXX
29. Savings. (2) Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule
and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law, the provisions contained in
sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law.”
20. On a reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it
Wpcr 353 of 2026
12
becomes clear that where any special or local law prescribes,
inter alia, any appeal to be filed within a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the schedule under the
Act, Section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply and the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply
only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law.
21. What we have to ascertain in the present case is: whether
by virtue of Section 29(2) extracted above, there is an exclusion
of Sections 4 to 24, particularly of Section 5, either expressly or
by necessary implication, under the provisions of the Adhiniyam,
2019.
22. Some of the judicial dicta having a bearing on the question
under consideration may be adverted to this stage:
(i) The effect of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has
been summarised by this Court in Mukri Gopalan vs.
Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC
5, as follows:
“8. … A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows
for its applicability to the facts of a given case and
for importing the machinery of the provisions
containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the
following two requirements have to be satisfied by
the authority invoking the said provision:
(i) There must be a provision for period of
limitation under any special or local law in
connection with any suit, appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation
under such special or local law should be different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the
Limitation Act. 9. If the aforesaid two requirements
are satisfied the consequences contemplated by
Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These
consequences are as under:
Wpcr 353 of 2026
13
(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation
Act would apply as if the period prescribed by
the special or local law was the period
prescribed by the Schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation
prescribed by such special or local law for a
suit, appeal or application all the provisions
containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would
apply insofar as and to the extent to which
they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law.”
There is no difficulty insofar as the applicability of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to the present case is
concerned. The Adhiniyam, being a special law,
prescribes in Section 9 a period of limitation for appeals
against the order of the District Magistrate, i.e. 30 days.
What remains to be seen is, whether, Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam excludes the operation of Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) and in particular Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.
(ii) In Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain
Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, this Court interpreted
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act against the argument
that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not
applicable to the proceedings under the Representation
of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the words
“expressly excluded” appearing in Section 29(2) would
mean that there must be an express reference made in
the special or local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded.
Rejecting the argument, the three-Judge Bench of this
Court held:
“17. what we have to see is whether the scheme of
the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the
nature of the remedy provided therein are such that
the legislature intended it to be a complete code by
Wpcr 353 of 202614
itself which alone should govern the several matters
provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant
provisions it is clear that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view,
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether
and to what extent the nature of those provisions or
the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the
special law exclude their operation.”
(iii) In Union of India vs. Popular Construction
Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 (“Popular Construction
Company”), this Court considered whether the delay in
filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an arbitral
award could be condoned by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Section 34(3) prescribes a limitation
period of three months, with a further grace period of
thirty days if sufficient cause is shown, is accompanied
by the phrase “but not thereafter.” This Court interpreted
that phrase as a clear legislative mandate excluding any
extension beyond the additional thirty days. It held that
the expression constituted an express exclusion within
the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
thereby rendering Section 5 of the said act inapplicable.
Upon further examining the scheme and object of the
Arbitration Act, this Court concluded that the limitation
period prescribed under Section 34(3) was absolute
beyond the specified extended period and incapable of
further enlargement.
(iv) In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise
vs. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791
(“Hongo India”), this Court examined whether delay in
filing a reference application before the High Court
Wpcr 353 of 2026
15
under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944
could be condoned by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The provision required such reference to
be made within 180 days from the date of service of the
Tribunal’s order. Since the application in that case was
filed beyond the prescribed period, the issue was,
whether the High Court possessed the authority to
extend the limitation period. Upon analysing the
framework of the Central Excise Act and the nature of
the statutory remedy, this Court held that the said Act
constituted a self-contained code governing limitation for
proceedings under it. This Court also observed that even
where a special statute does not expressly exclude
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, exclusion may still
arise by “necessary implication” from the scheme,
object, and structure of the special law. The
determination as to whether Section 5 applies, therefore,
depends not merely upon the language of the Limitation
Act, but upon whether the special enactment manifests
an intention to exclude such applicability expressly or
even by necessary implication. It was noted as under:
“35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must be
an express reference made in the special or local
law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of
which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard,
we have to see the scheme of the special law which
here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The
nature of the remedy provided therein is such that
the legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several matters
provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant
provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
considered view, that even in a case where the
Wpcr 353 of 202616
special law does not exclude the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express
reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court
to examine whether and to what extent, the nature
of those provisions or the nature of the subject-
matter and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but
by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating
to filing of reference application to the High Court.”
Applying this principle to facts of that case, the Court
concluded that the limitation period prescribed under
Section 35-H(1) was intended to be rigid and incapable
of extension. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation
Act was held inapplicable, and the delay was not
condoned in the said case.
(v) In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5
SCC 23 (“Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board”), this
Court considered whether delay in filing an appeal under
Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 could be
condoned beyond the maximum period prescribed
therein by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Briefly put, Section 125 of the aforesaid Act provided
that an appeal against a decision of the Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity was required to be filed within
sixty days from the date of communication of the order,
with the proviso empowering the Supreme Court to
permit filing within a further period not exceeding sixty
days upon sufficient cause being shown. After examining
the scheme and object of the Electricity Act, this Court
held that the enactment was a complete and self-
contained code establishing a specialised adjudicatory
framework for resolution of disputes under the Act. The
limitation provision itself prescribed both the original
period and the maximum extent to which delay could be
Wpcr 353 of 2026
17
condoned. The Court inferred from this scheme that the
Parliament intended to place an absolute outer limit on
the power to condone delay. Accordingly, it was held that
once the aggregate period of 120 days had expired,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked to
enlarge the limitation further, and any appeal filed
beyond that period was not maintainable as being
barred.
(vi) In Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association us.
Kalyan Chowdhury, (2018) 3 SCC 41 (“Bengal
Chemists”), the question was, whether, under Sections
421(3) and 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, an appeal
from the orders of the Tribunal could be preferred after
the limitation period of forty-five (45) days prescribed in
Section 421(3) plus additional forty-five (45) days in its
proviso had lapsed. This Court observed that Section
421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not merely
contain the initial period of 45 days for filing an appeal,
but also grants a further period of 45 days, being the
grace period. This grace period of 45 days was held to
be a special in-built variant of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, which the Parliament had expressly incorporated in
the special law. Accordingly, the application of Section 5
of the Limitation Act was denied by this Court. What is
important, for our purpose, is that emphasis was laid by
this Court on the expression “not exceeding 45 days” in
the proviso to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act,
2013, to state that it would have the same effect as the
expression “but not thereafter”, as occurring in the
proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
23. Thus, what emerges from the above discussion is that
whenever there is a special enactment prescribing a limitation
period distinct from the Limitation Act, it falls for the courts to
determine whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. In
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the expression that occurs is
“expressly excluded by special or local law”. But, with the
passage of time, the expression “expressly excluded” has been
Wpcr 353 of 2026
18
interpreted to also include “exclusion by necessary implication”,
having regard to the scope, object and scheme of the special
law.
Therefore, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
must be decided from the language, object, and scheme of the
special or local enactment in question. While a special statute
may prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself will not
automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act. Under Section 29(2), those provisions continue to
apply unless their applicability is expressly or by necessary
implication excluded having regard to the scheme of the special
or local enactment.
24. The aforesaid decisions of this Court, which we have
referred to and where Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been
held inapplicable, demonstrate that exclusion of Section 5 is not
inferred merely because a special statute prescribes a distinct
period of limitation. Rather, exclusion is to be founded on clear
statutory language or a legislative scheme indicating that the
prescribed limitation is absolute and incapable of enlargement.
Thus, in Popular Construction Company, the Court treated
the expression “but not thereafter” in Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act as an express exclusion of
Section 5. Similarly, in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board,
the Electricity Act itself prescribed both the original limitation
period and the maximum extent to which delay could be
condoned, leading the Court to conclude that Parliament
intended to impose an absolute outer limit beyond which no
extension was permissible. So also in Bengal Chemists, the
expression “not exceeding 45 days” in the proviso to Section
421(3) of the Companies Act was held to have the same
restrictive effect as the phrase “but not thereafter,” thereby
excluding recourse to Section 5 beyond the prescribed grace
period.
24.1 Even in cases where the statute did not expressly
exclude Section 5, the Court examined whether
exclusion arose by necessary implication from the
Wpcr 353 of 2026
19
scheme and structure of the enactment. Thus, in Hongo
India, the Central Excise Act was treated as a self-
contained code and the limitation prescribed therein was
held to be rigid and unextendable.
24.2 However, when we revert to the present case, the
statute in question stands on an entirely different footing.
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely prescribes that an
appeal may be filed within thirty days and does not
contain any expression akin to “but not thereafter,” “not
exceeding,” or any other restrictive expression indicating
that delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be
condoned. Nor does the Adhiniyam prescribe any
maximum outer limit in terms of period of time for
condonation from which, legislative intent to exclude
Section 5 may be inferred. Unlike the enactments
considered in the above decisions, the Adhiniyam does
not create a self-contained code of limitation. It also
does not disclose a scheme suggesting that the
appellate authority becomes functus officio upon expiry
of thirty days. It only prescribes a limitation period but
does not provide a specific and limited grace period for
condonation beyond the above limitation period, or use
restrictive expressions such as “but not thereafter” or
“not exceeding”, etc. If hypothetically it did, the
legislative intent could have been understood to mean
that beyond the prescribed outer limit, the authority
ceases to possess jurisdiction to entertain the matter or
becomes functus officio after expiry of that maximum
period. But, Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely provides
that an appeal may be filed within thirty days from the
date of the order. The provision neither states that the
appellate authority shall have no power to condone the
delay, nor employs prohibitive language indicating
finality after expiry of the prescribed period of thirty days
being the limitation period. The absence of words such
as “but not thereafter,” or any equivalent restrictive
formulation, is significant because where the legislature
Wpcr 353 of 2026
20
intends to make limitation absolute and unextendable, it
ordinarily does so in clear terms.
24.3 Further, Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not reveal
a self-contained or exhaustive limitation mechanism to
the exclusion of the general law of limitation. For
instance, Section 9(4) which expressly incorporates a
recognised principle of the general law of limitation by
directing exclusion of the time taken for obtaining a
certified copy of the impugned order for the purpose of
calculating limitation. This indicates that the legislature
did not contemplate total insulation from the general law
of limitation.
24.4 The nature of the remedy provided is also relevant.
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam confers a right of appeal
against orders of externment which have civil and
criminal consequences affecting the liberty, movement,
livelihood, and reputation of the aggrieved person. The
appellate remedy, therefore, constitutes an important
procedural safeguard against possible arbitrary or
erroneous exercise of power under the Adhiniyam. In
such a context, the right of appeal itself is to be treated
as an integral component of fair procedure. Such a right
should not ordinarily be defeated on technical grounds
unless, of course, the statute clearly mandates strict
exclusion which, as we have already stated, it does not.
Hence, a purposive interpretation ought to be made of
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam having regard to Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act.
24.5 The law of limitation is intended to regulate the
exercise of remedies and ensure diligence, but it is not
meant to extinguish rights, particularly civil rights, in the
absence of express legislative command. Consequently,
where the statute is silent on the exclusion of
condonation powers, as in the present case, the
interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and
advances substantial justice ought to be preferred over
Wpcr 353 of 2026
21
one that defeats the remedy on that technicality alone.
As noted, this principle will acquire greater significance
where the consequences are grave. Denial of appellate
scrutiny solely on account of delay, despite sufficient
cause being shown, may result in irreversible prejudice,
in fact, loss of an appellate remedy itself if the appeal is
to be filed even on the thirty first day as the limitation
period is only thirty days. Therefore, unless the statute
expressly or by necessary implication excludes the
operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellate
authority should retain the discretion to condone delay in
appropriate cases. Hence, an interpretation that would
lean in favour of an appellant who seeks access to an
appellate remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam must
be made.
25. In our view, both from the text of Section 9 and from the
overall statutory scheme of the Adhiniyam, there is no indication
that the legislature intended to exclude the operation of Section
5 of the Limitation Act. There is no contra provision in the
Adhiniyam expressly for not condoning the delay if an
application is filed beyond thirty days under sub-section (1) of
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. In the absence of such exclusion,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act operates, and delay in filing the
appeal can be condoned upon sufficient cause being shown in
accordance with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
26. In the result, we conclude as follows:
a. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not bar the
application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
b. No application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
seeking condonation of delay being before the State
Government, the application for directions filed by the
appellant being Crl. M.P. No.150947 of 2026 before this
Court is taken on record and is allowed. The delay in
filing the appeal is condoned.
c. Accordingly, the appeal before the State Government
Wpcr 353 of 202622
under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam stands restored and
shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance
with law as expeditiously as possible and at any rate on
or before 15.06.2026. The appellant shall appear before
the State Government on 01.06.2026.
d. Resultantly, the Impugned Judgment dated
16.10.2025 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at
Bilaspur in WPCR No. 548 of 2025 is set aside.
27. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.”
9. From perusal of the documents and the impugned order, it appears
that the approach adopted by the Respondent/State in dismissing the
petitioner’s appeal solely on the ground of limitation cannot be sustained.
The issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the recent
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jittu Yadav (supra), wherein
the Supreme Court emphasized that, particularly in matters relating to
externment orders which directly impinge upon the fundamental rights of
a citizen, the appellate authority is required to adopt a pragmatic and
justice-oriented approach while considering an application for
condonation of delay and should ordinarily decide the appeal on merits
rather than rejecting it on technical grounds, unless the delay is
inordinate and unexplained.
10. In the present case, the petitioner has explained that the delay of 62
days in preferring the appeal was occasioned due to his poor financial
condition. The explanation furnished cannot be said to be mala fide or
lacking in bona fides. Considering the nature of the proceedings, the
serious civil consequences flowing from an order of externment, and the
Wpcr 353 of 2026
23
settled principle that substantial justice should prevail over technical
considerations, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been
shown for condoning the delay. Consequently, the application filed by the
petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act deserves to be allowed.
11. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed
in part. The impugned order dated 22.04.2026 (Annexure P2), passed
by the respondent-1/Home Department, is hereby set aside. The
application for condonation of delay stands allowed, and the delay of 62
days in filing the appeal is condoned.
12. The Respondent/State is directed to restore the petitioner’s appeal
to its original file and decide the same on merits, in accordance with law,
after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties and
keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jittu
Yadav (supra), as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of
four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The
petitioner shall appear before respondent No.1/State Government on
17.07.2026.
13. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the externment order dated 23.12.2025 (Annexure P1), and
all contentions of the parties are left open to be considered by the
appellate authority in accordance with law.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
padma
